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Abstract 
Since the crisis-engrossed 1970s, and especially the 1990s, ‘governance’ has become a dominant 
concern and concept; notably, within particularly political science, a certain diagnosis explicitly or 
implicitly focused on a shift ‘from government to governance’ has become increasingly popular. This 
study examines the governance phenomenon of the post-1970/1990s period from a state-situated and 
historically informed perspective. Specifically, taking initial analytical departure in an approach of the 
early 1970s associated with James O’Connor, Jürgen Habermas and Claus Offe focused on the state-
situated tension-filled functional relationship between legitimation and accumulation, the study both 
historically and theoretically reworks this approach and reapplies it for the post-1970s/1990s 
governance period. It asks whether and to what extent governance has served as a distinctive post-
1970s/1990s state-facilitated way of bridging/altering the tension-filled relationship between 
legitimation and fiscal accumulation in Western European liberal-capitalist democratic polities.  
This agenda is activated through an overall ‘retroductive’ examination, which places governance 
in a wide historical, analytical and philosophical/epistemological landscape and investigates its 
particularly legitimatory conditions of possibility. Besides aligning the study with a critical realist and 
emergentist orientation, and providing a social-theoretical defense of corporate functionalism, the study 
is organized through an overall historical-theoretical approach. Specifically, a distinctive ECR model is 
launched/developed, which both ideal-typically covers (1) an emergence period (late 19th century-
1945), (2) a consolidation period (1945-1970s) and (3) a reconfiguration period (1970s-2008) and 
associates each of these historical-theoretical periodizations with a certain tension-status and logic of 
tension-management. The study’s Part I focuses on the emergence of modern statehood and develops a 
framework centered on legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting; Part II focuses on the postwar 
consolidation of legitimation and fiscal accumulation; Part III examines the reconfiguration of 
legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting in the governance period. Lastly, Part IV rolls out the macro-
governance analysis through a historical case study examination of the emergence, consolidation and 
reconfiguration of the automobile industry in the UK and Sweden.   
The study makes two overall arguments: (1) governance is deeply, historically, continually and 
increasingly state-facilitated and should be construed in the context of the historically changing tension-
filled dynamics of legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting; (2) governance presuppose, and was allowed 
for by, (a) a micro-situated possibly irreversibly heightened popular socio-psychological expectation of 
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ever-widening economic growth and consumption prospects and (b) a macro-situated reconfiguration of 
state legitimation, involving a relative historical shift towards a more self-legitimating mode of fiscal 
accumulation. 
Above all, the study provides a critical interdisciplinary examination of the historical conditions 
of possibility for the governance phenomenon. In particular, it sheds light on the status of state 
legitimation in the governance period. Also, it provides a substantial historical and theoretical 
reworking of the 1970s legitimation and accumulation functions approach. More generally, the study 
stresses the importance of corporate functionalism, the direct/indirect effects of state-crafting strategies 
and the historical variability of political legitimation. Finally, rather than necessarily focusing on 
capitalism/markets/finance, it productively highlights the importance of state-situated tension-filled 
functional dynamics for understanding the post-1970s political-economic development and some of the 
contemporary symptoms of Western democratic ‘fatigue’.   
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Resumé 
Siden de kriseramte 1970’ere, og især 1990’erne, er ’governance’ blevet et dominerende anliggende og 
koncept; især inden for statskundskab er en bestemt diagnose som er eksplicit eller implicit fokuseret på 
et skift fra ’government’ til ’governance’ i stigende grad blevet populær. Denne ph.d.-afhandling 
undersøger ’governance’ fænomenet fra post-1970’er/1990’er perioden fra et stats-situeret og historisk 
informeret perspektiv. Mere specifikt: med indledende analytisk udgangspunkt i en tilgang fra de 
tidligere 1970’ere associeret med James O’Connor, Jürgen Habermas og Claus Offe, som er fokuseret 
på det stats-situerede spændingsfyldte funktionelle forhold imellem legitimation og akkumulation, 
omarbejder afhandlingen både historisk og teoretisk denne tilgang og genanvender det på post-
1970’er/1990’er governance perioden. Den spørger hvorvidt og i hvilket omfang governance har 
fungeret som en markant post-1970’er/1990’er stats-faciliteret måde at udjævne/forandre det 
spændingsfyldte forhold imellem legitimation og fiskal akkumulation i vestlige europæiske liberal-
kapitalistiske demokratiske stater.         
Denne agenda er aktiveret gennem en overordnet ’retroduktions’-orienteret undersøgelse som 
placerer governance i et bredt historisk, analytisk og filosofisk/epistemologisk landskab og udforsker 
særligt dets legitimatoriske mulighedsbetingelser. Udover at knytte studiet til en kritisk realistisk og 
emergentistisk orientering, og at leverer et social-teoretisk forsvar for korporations-orienteret 
funktionalisme, er studiet organiseret gennem en overordnet historisk-teoretisk tilgang. Mere specifikt 
bliver der i denne afhandling lanceret/udviklet en særlig FKR model, som både ideal-typisk dækker (1) 
en fremkomstperiode (det sene 19. århundrede-1945), (2) en konsolideringsperiode (1945-1970’erne) 
og (3) en rekonfigurationsperiode (1970’erne-2008) og associere hver af disse historiske-teoretiske 
periodiseringer med en bestemt spændings status og spændings-styrings logik. Studiets Del I fokusere 
på fremkomsten af moderne statslighed og udvikler en analyseramme fokuseret på legitimatorisk og 
fiskal statsdannelse; Del II fokuserer på efterkrigs-konsolideringen af legitimation og fiskal 
akkumulation; Del III undersøger rekonfigurationen af legitimatorisk og fiskal statsdannelse i 
governance perioden. Afslutningsvist ruller Del IV makro-governance analysen ud gennem en historisk 
case studie undersøgelse af fremkomsten, konsolideringen og rekonfigurationen af bilindustrien i 
England og Sverige.        
Studiet fremfører to overordnede argumenter: (1) governance er gennemgående, historisk, 
kontinuerligt og i stigende grad stats-faciliteret og bør forstås i konteksten af den historisk foranderlige 
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spændingsfyldte dynamik forbundet med legitimatorisk og fiskal statsdannelse; (2) governance 
forudsætter, og var muliggjort af, (a) en mikro-situeret (muligvist uigenkaldeligt) forøget populær 
socio-psykologisk forventning om evigt udvidende økonomisk vækst og forbrugsudsigter og (b) en 
makro-situeret rekonfiguration af statslegitimation, som involverer et relativt historisk skift henimod en 
mere selv-legitimerende form for fiskal akkumulation.   
Frem for alt tilvejebringer afhandlingen en kritisk interdisciplinær undersøgelse af de historiske 
mulighedsbetingelser for governance fænomenet. Den kaster i særdeleshed lys over statussen af 
statslegitimation i governance perioden. Desuden leverer den en væsentlig historisk og teoretisk 
omarbejdning af 1970’er legitimations og akkumulations funktions tilgangen. Mere generelt 
understreger studiet vigtigheden af korporations-orienteret funktionalisme, de direkte/indirekte effekter 
af statsdannelses strategier og den historiske variabilitet i politisk legitimation. Endeligt, i stedet for 
nødvendigvis at fokusere på kapitalisme/markeder/finansverdenen fremhæver afhandlingen på en 
produktiv måde vigtigheden af stats-situerede spændingsfyldte funktionelle dynamikker for at forstå 
den politisk-økonomiske udvikling i post-1970’erne og nogle af de nuværende symptomer på vestlig 
demokratisk ’udmattelse’.   
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
This study examines the so-called shift ‘from government to governance’ of the post-1970/1990s period 
from a state-situated and broadly speaking historically informed perspective. Specifically, taking initial 
analytical departure in an approach of the early 1970s focused on the state-situated tension-filled 
functional relationship between legitimation and accumulation, the study both historically and 
theoretically reworks this approach and reapplies it for the governance-situated post-1970s/1990s 
period. In short, it investigates the main historical, state-situated and particularly legitimatory 
conditions of possibility for the governance phenomenon.     
In recent decades, against the backdrop of the generalized crisis of the 1970s which shockingly 
shattered the conditions for the relative historical tranquility of the transitory so-called ‘Golden Age’ 
post-WW2 period and momentarily shook controlling elites, a series of more of less interrelated both 
popular and academic narratives concerning the importance, quality and proper role of post-1970s 
Western liberal-capitalist democratic statehood and government have proliferated and gradually 
become commonsensical premises: ‘Advanced’ Western states and governments, with their 
traditionally top-down inclinations and mannerisms, have generally become fatigued, defensive and 
overall too clumsy for a class-unspecific, complex, turbulent and borderless world, in which nationally 
uncommitted financial markets, global profit-focused corporations, and international organizations 
mostly set the both foreign and domestic tone; a world in which national public authorities and 
bureaucracies are typically systematically one step behind, and sometimes outright at odds with, the 
inherently more spontaneous dynamism of market-situated processes and entrepreneurship, the 
sprightliness of the less synthetic civil society and the volatility of the contemporary digitalized and 
cognitive/knowledge-heavy capitalist conditions of work and organizational structures (associated with 
flexible routines, network patterns and hybrid setups, etc.).  
Academically speaking, whether optimistically or pessimistically, or construed from within the 
fields of political science, sociology, economics, etc., (and their respective sub-fields), the post-1970s, 
and particularly post-1990s, period is in this overall vein typically characterized as an era of both: (1) a 
relatively downgraded state/governmental authority and control mechanism; (2) a relatively upgraded 
dynamism and causal saliency of markets, profit-maximizing corporate entities, and civil society actors 
14 
 
more broadly. Since particularly the 1990s, primarily within political science, this multi-levelled overall 
diagnosis has found particular popular academic expression in analyses that address and/or are 
implicitly underpinned by the so-called ‘turn to governance’ or shift ‘from government to governance’ 
(notably Rhodes 1994, 1996; more generally, see Kjær 2004).1 According to Rhodes’ (1996: 657, 1994: 
149) influential (neo-)pluralist analysis – which operated with an understanding of a ‘polycentric state 
characterized by multiple centres’ – ‘current trends erode the centre’s capacity to steer the system’. In 
Rhodes’ (1996, 1994) well-known terms, the state/government was gradually becoming ‘hollowed out’ 
and what appeared was gradually a form of ‘governing without Government’.   
Although its more precise attributes shall be clarified later, the governance perspective not only 
centers on the relative downgrading of state/governmental authority and control mechanisms but also 
the shift towards new and alternative steering-based structures and processes and measures (e.g., 
networks, public-private partnerships, civil society dynamics, co-productive arrangements) that are less 
top-down, formal and bureaucratic. As Rhodes (1996: 664) puts it, ‘[e]ffective governance requires a 
re-examination of the government’s tool kit’. In other words, what is being described through the 
governance perspective is a shift towards a governance-setting in which policy-relevant 
experimentations, structures and measures for managing dilemmas and reenergizing steering or 
governing – or, in short, governability – has appeared under new more fragmented conditions. In 
Rhodes’ (1994: 151) words, the governance turn ‘is about redesigning governments to cope with 
scarcity and devising complex solutions to problems which defeat the simpleminded nostrums of both 
free markets and national plans’. In this sense, governance more or less explicitly appeared as an 
answer to the so-called ‘ungovernability’ crisis or intellectual worry of the 1970s (on this, see also 
Goetz 2008: 260-2).2 
                                                          
1 ‘Google Books Ngram Viewer’ gives a helpful anecdotal and descriptive indication of the historically intensified 
use of the term ‘governance’ (in the English corpus) since the 1970s. 
2 Interestingly, Google Books Ngram Viewer provides an anecdotal descriptive indication of this relative 
historical shift from a preoccupation with ungovernability to governance: as the popularity of ‘ungovernability’ 
(within the English corpus) peaks and stagnates around the mid-1990s, ‘governance’ takes off from the 1970s and 
explodes from the 1990s.  
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Importantly, as governance not only historically coincides with but arguably directly causally ties 
into the crisis context of the 1970s, it makes sense to place the phenomenon in the particular theoretical 
context of the crisis interpretations prevailing at the time. Specifically, in the overall international 
political economic context of the so-called ’stagflation’ crisis of the 1970s, thinkers and scholars 
presented more or less pessimistic distinct diagnoses of the times: Whereas liberal, neo-conservative or 
right-leaning interventions stressed the democratically- and complexity-induced ‘excessive 
expectations’, ‘disintegration’ and ‘overload’ of advanced liberal democracies (see notably Brittan 
1975; King 1975; Crozier et al. 1975), critical, neo-Marxist or left-leaning interventions put emphasis 
on the negative social externality-producing capitalist conditions for, especially, a ‘legitimation’ and/or 
‘fiscal’ crisis (see notably O’Connor 1973; Habermas 1973; Offe 1984).3 In particular, the latter 
approach taken by James O’Connor, Claus Offe and Jürgen Habermas in the early 1970s sought to 
critically theorize, in slightly different ways, the state-situated tension-filled functional relationship 
between legitimation and accumulation. Here, Western democratic capitalist states were not only 
generally strained from having to both systematically serve a legitimation and accumulation function, 
the tension-filled dynamics associated with the very simultaneity of the state’s twin function-fulfillment 
was also thought to critically underlie and condition the potential activation of institutionalized crisis 
events. Arguably, although this particular crisis-directed approach of the 1970s – what chapter 2 shall 
more formally label the legitimation and accumulation functions (LAF) approach – was to some extent 
sought empirically disconfirmed, strategically incorporated or forgotten by mainstream neo-positivist 
political science scholarship in the subsequent decades (and more or less in that order), its overall 
shared theoretical orientation and basic conceptual repertoire nevertheless remains highly analytically 
productive for grasping key politico-economic and political sociological developments of the post-
1970s period.  
The relevant and salient question to ask in this relation then becomes: Can a direct analytical and 
causal-functional connection between the state-situated tension-filled functional relationship between 
legitimation and accumulation – as analyzed in the early 1970s – and the governance phenomenon be 
established? Or, more specifically, should governance be considered a way of tackling the steering 
                                                          
3 See Offe (1984: especially chapter 2, 164-70) for a largely temporally parallel yet partly meta-theoretic overview 
and discussion. See also the brief overviews in, for example, Weil (1989: 682-3), Held (1996: 191-6) and Goetz 
(2008: 258-9).  
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problems and the potential fiscal and/or legitimatory crises of the 1970s associated with the tension-
filled relationship between legitimation and accumulation? Although without making this functional 
connection explicit, or actively analytically and historically examining it through the above perspective, 
other scholars have in their own ways insinuated or suggested this relationship: Offe (2009: 555, 
emphasis removed) has for example more recently proposed that governance, amongst other things, 
may be understood as a ‘state-organized unburdening of the state’; Jessop (1998: 36) has perceived 
governance as a situation in which ‘the state gives up part of its capacity for top-down authoritative 
decision-making in exchange for influence over economic agents and more effective overall economic 
performance’; Goetz (2008) initially frames his discussion of governance by placing it in the general 
context of the ‘ungovernability’ crisis of the 1970s (and the corresponding conservative and leftist 
debates).    
Energized by the above general intuition, this study intends to directly and extensively historically 
explore the functional connection between governance and the tension-filled relationship between 
legitimation and accumulation – to actively and at monograph-length historically examine the 
governance turn from the explicit analytical perspective of the state-situated tension-filled LAF 
approach of the early 1970s. In this light, and in order to pursue this agenda, the study asks the 
following main research question:  
 
 To what extent has governance served as a distinctive post-1970s/1990s state-facilitated way of 
bridging or altering the tension-filled relationship between legitimation and accumulation in 
Western European liberal-capitalist democratic polities? 
 
To be clear, asking ‘to what extent’ in the above manner also automatically implies asking both (1) 
whether this process has taken place in the first place and (2) through what overall mechanisms it might 
have occurred. Moreover, although this shall become clearer later, particularly in chapter 6, in this 
study legitimation refers specifically to state-situated political legitimation and accumulation refers 
specifically to fiscal accumulation. As a natural sub-question to be discussed, placed at a more generic 
theoretical level and directly linked to the core arguments of the LAF approach of the early 1970s, the 
study also asks: 
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 To what extent has the tension-filled relationship between legitimation and accumulation been 
either (1) temporarily bridged or (2) altered – that is, (a) reconfigured (displaced, fragmented, 
privatized, etc.) or alternatively (b) outright overcome – through the governance turn?   
 
The analytical details of this sub-question – for example, the status and relationship between the 
different scenarios – in relation to the state-situated literature of the 1970s that this study initially takes 
departure in, will become clearer as the study’s analysis proceeds and especially in chapter 11 and 12, 
which more explicitly discusses this question.4    
In order to answer the above main research question, the study engages in an overall critical 
realist-based so-called ‘retroduction’-like examination and questioning (on this, see Danermark et al. 
2002), which seeks to not only place governance in a wider than usual historical, analytical and 
philosophical/epistemological landscape but also investigate its socio-historical conditions of 
possibility. As shall be explained in greater details later, a research design organized around a 
retroductive logic or ‘mode of inference’ aims ‘to identify foundational conditions behind concrete 
historical events’ and thus concerns the search for ‘the basic conditions for the phenomena under study’ 
(Ibid.: 96, 100, 99). A retroductive analysis/argumentation/inference implies asking: ‘How is X 
possible?’, ‘What causal mechanisms are related to X?’ or ‘What qualities must exist for something to 
be possible?’, etc. (Ibid.: 110, 80). Adapting these generic retroductive questions to the specific 
governance agenda of this study implies asking the following three operational questions:  
 
 How is governance historically possible? 
 What state-situated macro-causal mechanisms are related to governance? 
 What legitimatory qualities must exist for governance to be possible?  
 
                                                          
4 Although his wider analysis shall not be explored in this study, and although this study launches the question at a 
critically different level of analysis (having all sorts of alternative implications), this sub-question may be loosely 
referred to as a generic Marcusean question. In his book One-Dimensional Man Herbert Marcuse (1964: 24) asks 
himself the generally salient question: ‘Is this stabilization ‘temporary’ in the sense that it does not affect the roots 
of the conflicts which Marx found in the capitalist mode of production (…) or is it a transformation of the 
antagonistic structure itself, which resolves the contradictions by making them tolerable?’.     
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As shall be argued and become clearer throughout the study, in order to provide a meaningful and 
productive answer to the main research question it is necessary to both ask and examine the above three 
operational retroductive questions; answering the main question requires a particular interdisciplinary 
and broadly speaking historically informed type of examination (more on this later) that not only looks 
into the governance period and its suggested tension-bridging/reconfiguring/overcoming qualities but 
examines the wider historical emergence and consolidation of the tension-filled relationship between 
legitimation and fiscal accumulation. Thus, while these operational retroductive questions are not actual 
research questions themselves, they are necessary ways of getting at the main research question; they 
allow it to be answered.   
More specifically, this study’s state-situated and historically informed analysis of governance is 
particularly focused on examining and shedding light on the conditions and status of post-1970s state 
legitimation in the governance period – that is, the legitimatory underpinnings of governance and the 
question of how it has affected, and what it entails and presupposes in terms of, political legitimation. 
As shall be argued, scholarship concerning itself with the shift ‘from government to governance’ can 
not only generally benefit from both a clearer analytical unpacking of government, party politics and 
statehood and a historical examination of the preceding shift from state to (democratic party) 
government; reaching a genuine understanding of the governance phenomenon requires a wider 
historical, analytical and philosophical/epistemological perspective than is usually taken. In this 
relation, rather than focusing on the post-1970s/1990s governance period itself, it should be made clear 
to the reader up front that the bulk of this study’s analysis concerns the wider historical, state-situated 
and (particularly) legitimatory conditions of possibility for the governance phenomenon. But while the 
study finds it necessary to zoom in on and explore these conditions at great length, the objective is 
nevertheless to in this way ultimately provide a more meaningful and productive take on the 
governance dynamics of recent decades (on such historical exercises, see also more generally Kumar 
2015).  
Underpinning and naturally encoded into the above three retroductive questions is of course the 
even more foundational informal meta-retroductive issue of locating the philosophical/epistemological 
conditions and considerations that are necessary for productively understanding and studying 
governance. Because this meta-issue is something that this study takes seriously, the extended 
philosophical/epistemological maneuvers that the study engages in cannot simply be sidestepped (as 
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they sometimes are): they are arguably necessary for not only understanding and defending the types of 
arguments being made but also for ideally circumventing some of the less productive 
philosophical/epistemological premises underpinning the governance perspective.   
As shall be made clearer in chapter 3 and 4, this research agenda is partly motivated by an 
observed need to in all modesty reach back to and actively engage with both the style of analysis and 
the ambition of the pre-1980s period: a genuine desire to focus on, in the spirit and words of Mills 
(1959: 128, 11), ‘substantive problems’ and ‘the major issues for publics and the key troubles of private 
individuals in our time’. The study is motivated by a desire, and felt analytical need, to engage with the 
post-1970s period from an explicit and defensible long-term macro-situated functionalist perspective, 
which tries to not simply focus on either very narrow or descriptive or symptomatic aspects – or simply 
make very brief theoretical remarks pointing in the right direction – but more systematically (albeit 
always tentatively) probes some of the overall driving forces and mechanisms. Of course, the 2008 
crisis also plays a motivating role: Writing from a contemporary crisis-situated vantage point – with the 
governance turn rolled out after the crisis of the 1970s – it in all modesty tries to establish some kind of 
imaginary shared or general crisis link between this study’s analysis and the crisis-situated approach of 
the early 1970s, which this study takes analytical departure in.   
 
 
1.1 Research strategy 
Although the particular research strategy that shall be utilized to pursue this agenda shall be elaborated 
upon in much greater detail in chapter 3 and 4, it makes sense to briefly flag some of its main aspects.  
Firstly, as mentioned, the study frames the overall agenda through a critical realist-based 
retroductive setup, directing the study towards examining the main historical, state-situated and 
particularly legitimatory conditions of possibility for governance.  
Secondly, with some qualifications this overall retroductive examination can partly be 
complimentarily construed as following the logic of what Beach & Pedersen (2013: see especially 18-
21) has described as ‘explaining-outcome process-tracing’. In this type of analysis, the scholar ‘explain 
particular historical outcomes’ that are ‘particularly interesting (…) both because of their substantive 
and theoretical importance’ via ‘the pragmatic use of mechanismic explanations’ (Ibid.: 63, 61, 11). 
Importantly, in contrast to other types of process-tracing studies, it relies on two key elements, namely 
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‘eclectic theorization and the inclusion of non-systematic mechanisms’ (Ibid.: 66). In this manner, 
governance can be perceived as the historical phenomenon to be examined and explained through a 
‘complex conglomerate of systematic and case-specific causal mechanisms’ (Ibid.: 169). 
Thirdly, besides situating the study within the philosophy of social science (and broadly aligning 
it with the critical realist orientation) and providing a social-theoretical defense of both the existence of 
and active scholarly search for relevant macro-mechanisms and a particular ‘corporate’ type of 
functionalist analysis, the study pledges allegiance to and develops, through a critical discussion and 
selective synthesis of relevant extant literature, what can overall be described as a historical-theoretical 
approach (HTA) organizing the study. Underpinned by a rejection of the dominant but problematic neo-
positivist distinction between ‘discovery’ and ‘justification’ (on this ‘DJ distinction’, see Schickore & 
Steinle 2006), the utilization of this HTA for the analysis of governance and its conditions of possibility 
notably imply that the study:  
 Explicitly strives to be systematically historically informed.  
 Seeks to productively roll out and reinvigorate a flexible but primarily macro-level 
historical-theoretical analysis.  
 Against the so-called ‘varieties’ literature of the 1990s/2000s (notably Esping-Andersen 
1990; Hall & Soskice 2001), and partly in line with both the spirit of the LAF approach 
of the early 1970s and more recent work on the cross-cutting trends associated with 
capitalism/neoliberalism (notably Streeck 2012b, 2014; see also Baccaro & Howell 
2011), seeks to zoom in on the essential dimensions of certain entities and deliberately 
focuses on dominant long-term tendencies, dispositions, trends and ‘conjunctures’ 
cutting across different types of variations. 
 Seeks to productively transcend stifling disciplinary borders and synthesize insights 
from different thematic specializations. 
 Seeks to explicitly accept and take seriously certain inherent trade-offs with regards to 
research choices. 
 
At its core, the HTA utilizes ‘ideal-typification’ (Weber 1949: 91; e.g., Jackson 2011: 142-155) as 
its main analytical procedure – a procedure that, as shall be argued, not only meaningfully breaks with 
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the unhelpful distinction between ‘discovery’ and ‘justification’ but also per definition productively 
involves a pragmatically selective ‘accentuation’ of an entity’s ‘essential tendencies’.  
Fourthly, and more concretely, the HTA utilized for analyzing the conditions of governance is 
executed through a particular organizing historical-theoretical model, termed the ECR model (named 
after the three below periodizations), which is simultaneously used to historically-theoretically (1) 
inductively summarize the core analysis and (2) deductively guide this examination. As shall be seen, 
the ECR model covers three distinctive and successive ideal-typical periodizations: (1) an emergence 
period stretching roughly from the late 19th century until 1945; (2) a consolidation period stretching 
roughly from 1945 until the 1970s; (3) a reconfiguration period covering the post-1970s governance 
period. Importantly, each of these three historical-theoretical periodizations is analytically associated 
with a distinctive status of the legitimatory and fiscal tension as well as the correlative dominant logic 
of tension-management. While concrete country experiences are variously highlighted, the primary 
focus, with regards to this ECR model, is on Western Europe more generally – and in particular the 
broader and shared developments pertaining to the tension-filled relationship between legitimation and 
accumulation observed across Western European liberal-capitalist democratic polities. As shall be 
discussed, although the analysis is based on so-called qualitative examination and theorization, the 
HTA underpinning the constitution of the ECR model, relies on a ‘pluralist’ approach to 
methodology/methods (see Danermark et al. 2002: e.g., 152) and a continuous engagement with a broad 
heterogeneous repertoire of empirical sources, historical accounts, perspectives and analytical tools and 
procedures. 
Fifthly, the above historically informed governance-directed ECR model shall be put to work 
through an empirics-intensive historical case study analysis of the emergence, consolidation and 
reconfiguration of the automobile industry in Britain and Sweden – a sector often considered reflective 
of the ‘turn to governance’. By juxtaposing the analytical approach and the launched/developed ECR 
model with the concrete automobile experiences of these two (in many ways) maximally varying 
countries, the study seeks to both highlight and qualify some of the claims and contextual premises 
associated with the governance phenomenon. Selectively drawing on the vocabulary of Thomas & 
Myers’ (2015: 53-55) case study typology, the analysis can be described as a key diachronic single case 
study, chosen for instrumental and explorative reasons and operating with semi-parallel and semi-
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comparative nested elements, which uses a primarily illustrative but also partly theory-building/testing 
approach and a varied or eclectic repertoire of methods and empirical sources. 
Most obviously, the study’s overall analytically exploratory research strategy – which to some 
extent naturally follows from the overall agenda and the operational retroductive questions to be 
explored – does not allow for any kind of exhaustive treatment of either governance, the functional 
relationship between legitimation and accumulation or modern statehood, or for that matter the 
interconnection between these entities/dynamics. As shall be argued, pragmatic academic trade-offs 
should be taken into account and the decision to focus on broader forces and mechanisms in a less rigid 
manner to some non-trivial extent closes off the chance, at least in this specific study, of pursuing 
detailed examinations of every aspect or argument launched/developed. In that sense, although pitched 
at a relatively broad level, this study’s analysis merely constitutes a selective exercise, a zooming in on 
particular aspects pertaining to governance – foremost, as mentioned, some of its main historical, state-
situated and legitimatory conditions of possibility. Thus, many aspects and questions will be left open 
and relatively analytically and empirically unexplored. Hopefully, though, some of the non-exhaustive 
elements and tentative considerations, which of course always already require further empirical and 
analytical specifications, may potentially be taken up later, for example as part of an imaginable future 
either more specific or larger research agenda.   
 
 
1.2 Arguments, implications and contributions  
Some of the key arguments of the study may be flagged. Put simply – that is, sidestepping a range of 
analytical intricacies, sub-issues, considerations and not the least the question of how these points 
should be interpreted, their implications and dynamics, etc. – the study makes two overall arguments: 
(1) Governance should not only be understood as a historically specific modality or institutional-
organizational mode of modern ‘state-crafting’ (more on this term later) – it concerns a process which 
is both deeply, historically, continually and increasingly state-facilitated – but should more specifically 
be analytically construed in the context of the historically changing tension-filled dynamics of (what 
shall be described as) legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting; (2) Governance presuppose, and were 
allowed for by, two types of heavily interrelated socio-ontological conditions of possibility: (a) a micro-
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situated possibly irreversibly heightened popular socio-psychological expectation of ever-widening 
economic growth and consumption prospects and (b) a macro-situated reconfiguration of state 
legitimation, involving a relative historical shift towards a more self-legitimating mode of fiscal 
accumulation.  
Although the implications of the study’s analysis, and specifically the two overall arguments 
above, will be addressed in particularly the conclusion, some of the main ones can be flagged here. 
Through its governance-focused examination, the study directly or indirectly: 
 Promotes an analytical perspective that systematically integrates (what shall be described as) 
state-situated corporate functionalism – including state dynamics, activities, interests, 
functional considerations, etc. – into the study of post-1970s social affairs, not simply 
governance.  
 Suggests the general productiveness of tweaking macro-social analyses in the direction of the 
historically changing state-situated tension-filled functional relationship between legitimation 
and accumulation. In relation to the post-1970s period more generally (including the 2008 
crisis and ‘neoliberalism’), this would ideally imply a relative change of analytical focus – 
from a to some extent natural preoccupation with (and well-meaning critique of) capitalism, 
markets and financial actors/institutions to the importance of this state-situated tension-filled 
functional dynamic. Obviously, this focus on specifically legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting 
should not replace but ideally compliment the ongoing extensive study of capitalist dynamics.     
 Stresses the dynamics and significance of state-crafting strategies. In particular, the study 
highlights the importance of not conflating these strategies with the possible downgrading of 
state/governmental authority. Moreover, it puts attention on both the direct and long-term 
indirect effects (e.g., on the gradual production of values) of state-crafting practices. 
 Emphasizes the causal saliency, and productiveness of studying, the historically evolving 
emergent relationship between both the exogenously- and endogenously-driven and top-down- 
and bottom-up driven dynamics of state-functional reproduction.    
 Puts focus on the historical variability of political legitimation, and by extension democracy as 
one historically contingent articulation of this. Moreover, by emphasizing the constantly 
evolving state-facilitated production of the variable quality and substantive content of 
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democratic dynamics, the study indirectly warns against fetishizing (contemporary party-
political) democracy.  
 Provides an indirect comment on and implicitly and tentatively proposes some of the main 
macro-mechanisms possibly driving the contemporary generally accepted symptoms of 
Western democratic ‘fatigue’.  
 
The exercise of examining the governance phenomenon from a state-situated and historically 
informed perspective – taking initial departure in the LAF approach but both historically resituating and 
analytically reworking it in important ways – most importantly amounts to a direct and simultaneous 
two-fold contribution. Firstly, the adoption-cum-reworking of the LAF approach – and, more generally, 
the strategy of placing the shift from government to governance in a wider than usual historical, 
analytical and philosophical/epistemological landscape (and thus juxtaposing the governance 
perspective with a range of alternative insight and concepts) – allows the study to productively critically 
examine, qualify, discuss and historicize the governance phenomenon and its historical conditions of 
possibility. In particular, and most importantly, the study’s analysis aims to contribute to the 
governance perspective by shedding more light on the status of post-1970s state legitimation and the 
legitimatory order underlying the governance phenomenon. Secondly, the study seeks to both 
contribute directly to the LAF approach and more generally provide a better understanding of many of 
the important themes, concepts and issues that were raised by these scholars. This is done through the 
study’s three-fold reworking of the approach, in which it is both: (1) historically reapplied for the 
governance-situated post-1970/1990s period, (2) theoretically and conceptually revised and (3) 
historically contextualized through notably the launching/development of the historical-theoretical ECR 
model.  
Moreover, the study arguably indirectly engages itself in – or, more precisely, potentially 
implicitly makes a particular monograph-length loose contribution to – two types of more recent 
debates, namely: (1) a more governance-skeptic literature that analytically or empirically critically 
questions some of the premises associated with governance (e.g., Goetz 2008; Offe 2009; du Gay & 
Scott 2010); (2) a primarily post-2008 crisis literature on neoliberalism that critically questions some of 
the mainstream interpretations of this phenomenon and generally reinterprets it in a more ‘strong state’ 
manner (e.g., Wacquant 2012; Bonefeld 2013; Bruff 2014).  
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1.3 Structure of the study 
Besides chapter 2, which places the analysis in a scholarly context, and chapter 3 and 4, which provides 
an extensive account and discussion of the philosophical/epistemological conditions necessary for 
understanding and studying governance, the study consists of four overall parts. As mentioned, both 
chapter 3 and 4 and the four parts are concerned with productively placing governance in a wider 
historical, analytical and philosophical/epistemological landscape and examining its particularly 
legitimatory conditions of possibility. Thus, importantly, these ‘conditions of possibility’ maneuvers are 
not simply introductory (i.e., a prelude of some sorts); they are the main constitutive elements of the 
analysis. 
Chapter 2 provides a more detailed outline and discussion of both the LAF approach and the 
governance perspective that are being selectively and critically utilized, examined and brought together 
in this study. Chapter 3 and 4 engage in an in-depth formalization and discussion of both, respectively, 
the study’s (1) philosophical and social-theoretical considerations – focusing on defending a critical 
realist-underpinned study of macro-mechanisms and a particular type of state-situated corporate 
functionalism – and (2) epistemological and methodological considerations – focusing on rejecting the 
mainstream neo-positivist distinction between ‘discovery’ and ‘justification’, launching the main tenets 
of the HTA of the study and presenting and detailing the logic of the research design (including the case 
study analysis). While extensive and perhaps requiring a bit of patience on the part of the reader, this 
broadened formalization, explanation and defense of the different philosophical/social-theoretical and 
epistemological/methodological maneuvers is ultimately necessary for understanding the governance 
phenomenon.   
Part I, which includes chapter 5 and 6, focuses broadly on the emergence of modern statehood 
and legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting. While chapter 5 theorizes and discusses the both analytical 
and historical conditions of modern functionalist state-crafting and provides a defense of a perspective 
that takes these conditions and dimensions seriously, chapter 6 not only critically develops and launches 
a historically informed framework centered on legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting but also presents 
the core tenets of the organizing ECR model.  
Part II, which includes chapter 7, focuses on the consolidation period, and thus provides the 
important postwar background for analyzing the later governance turn. Chapter 7 seeks to provide the 
necessary empirical context for understanding the postwar period, explain its particular party political 
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articulation and analyze the mechanisms underpinning and the implications of the post-WW2 
production of popular expectations and frustration-escalating effects.  
Part III, which includes chapter 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12, focuses on the reconfiguration period – that 
is, the state-facilitated governance turn. Chapter 8 can be perceived as a brief prelude to the analysis of 
the post-1990s dynamics: it provides an analytically selective characterization of the general policy-
related tentativeness and bewilderments of the crisis-situated 1970s and 1980s. Chapter 9 engages in a 
more extensive multi-domain examination of the shift towards the more co-productive hybrid tension-
displacing order of the post-1990s and its connection to the reconfigured dynamics of the tension-filled 
functional relationship between legitimation and fiscal accumulation. Chapter 10 – a kind of mini-
chapter – zooms in on the dynamics of co-produced legitimation in the 2000s by engaging in a brief 
empirically-founded analytical examination of the case of the pre-2008 crisis expansion of growth-
spurring household debt-taking. As a way of theoretically discussing the overall analytical agenda and 
the research questions posed, chapter 11 both formalizes the arguments made concerning the 
reconfigured status of the tension between legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting in the post-1970s 
period, juxtaposes these with the key points and prophesies of the LAF approach of the 1970s and 
discusses the study’s argument concerning a relative shift towards self-legitimating fiscal accumulation 
in relation to two other more recent works. Hoping to make the governance-situated reconfiguration 
more social-theoretically credible and meaningful at a lower level of analysis, chapter 12 engages in a 
theoretical discussion of some of the main micro-situated dynamics and mechanisms underpinning state 
legitimation and functional reproduction.   
Part IV, which includes chapter 13, rolls out and develops the ECR model through a case study 
analysis focusing on the historical dynamics of automobile production in a state-crafting context. 
Specifically, chapter 13 examines the emergence, consolidation and reconfiguration of the automobile 
industry in the UK and Sweden. 
Lastly, the conclusion both summarizes and discusses the analysis and its implications and 
reflects on the limitations of the study and the potentials for future research.  
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Chapter 2. Presenting and Discussing the Literature: LAF and 
Governance  
 
In this chapter I shall provide a more detailed outline and discussion of the two types of scholarly 
approaches/perspectives that is being selectively and critically utilized, examined and brought together 
in this study, namely the LAF approach and the governance perspective. Rather than attempting to 
provide an exhaustive account, the focus is on identifying some of their core analytical properties as 
they relate to the overall agenda of this study. In this way I hope to theoretically contextualize not only 
the main literature that informs this study but also the analytical logic underpinning the main research 
question posed in the introduction. The chapter is split into three sections: firstly, it discusses the LAF 
approach; secondly, it discusses the governance perspective; thirdly, and lastly, against the background 
of this theoretical and conceptual contextualization, it very briefly summarizes the overall agenda of 
this study.   
 
 
2.1 Bringing back the 1970s: The legitimation and accumulation functions 
approach 
As pointed out in the introduction, while it shall be both historically resituated and critically 
analytically reworked, the examination of the governance phenomenon takes initial overall theoretical 
departure in what in this study is described as the state-situated tension-filled legitimation and 
accumulation functions (LAF) approach of the early 1970s.5 For this reason, this section intends to both 
contextualize this approach and selectively outline key parts of its analytical toolbox.  
                                                          
5 Arguably, for reasons that shall be (at least indirectly) further addressed throughout this section, the designation 
legitimation and accumulation functions approach, or LAF approach, seems to be the most adequate one. For 
example, while Streeck (2014: 14) speaks loosely of the ‘Frankfurt crisis theories of the 1970s’ (although without 
explicitly/directly taking on board their perspectives/insights), presumably referring to Habermas, Offe and 
O’Connor, this description both (1) tells us less about the actual core analytical content of the overall perspective 
and (2) arguably under-assesses the distinctively US-based fiscal-budgetary components of O’Connor’s 
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As mentioned, the LAF approach appeared in the context of the overall crisis-engulfed context of 
the early 1970s, representing one notable critical/neo-Marxist/left-leaning case of a greater population 
of pessimistic diagnoses of the times. Here, the state-situated tension-focused LAF approach, as it is 
construed in this study, made its mark through the three critical analyses presented in James 
O’Connor’s Fiscal Crisis of the State (FCS) (1973), Jürgen Habermas’ Legitimation Crisis (LC) (1973) 
and Claus Offe’s Contradictions of the Welfare State (CWS) (1984).6 Partly heuristically sidestepping a 
range of theoretical intricacies pertaining to these works, it is arguably possible to ideal-typically 
outline three main productive shared properties of this approach:  
 
(1) A focus on two perennially important, strong and productively generic overall organizing concepts, 
namely ‘legitimation’ and ‘accumulation’, which, contrary to many recent alternative and popular 
categories, in principle can also be meaningfully applied to both (a) contemporary ‘authoritarian’ non-
liberal contexts and (b) early modern or pre-democratic and pre-capitalist contexts. Moreover, these two 
dimensions not only underlie a vast range of important contemporary dynamics, conflicts and trends but 
also intrinsically allow for the selective and productive integration of two distinctive interdisciplinary 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
(otherwise Frankfurt-like) contribution. While Paterson’s (2010) article on climate politics otherwise helpfully 
speaks of an ‘accumulation/legitimation tension’, or a ‘legitimation-accumulation tension’ he both makes 
reference to a slightly different/broader group of scholars and engages with the theme more loosely and 
generically. In this study, it is explicitly and strictly the specifically state-situated functional works of O’Connor 
(1973), Habermas (1973) and Claus Offe (1984) that is considered. Moreover, by the designation legitimation and 
accumulation functions approach, emphasis is put on the central importance of the shared functional logic of 
legitimation and accumulation – the basically state-situated functional outlook, the function requirement of having 
to ensure both legitimation and accumulation – rather than necessarily stressing the tension between the two, 
which, although important, should be considered a sub-component of this larger dynamic. Other analyses of the 
1970s such as that of Wolfe (1977), focusing on the contradictions of ‘liberal democracy’, or Bell (1976), 
operating with an eclectic non-state-situated framework focusing on, for example, ‘realms’ are not considered part 
of the LAF approach.   
6 Offe’s 1984 book is a selected collection of translated essays written throughout the 1970s.  
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sub-fields or types of literature, namely political economy (‘accumulation’) and political sociology 
(‘legitimation’).7 
 
(2) A preoccupation with the specifically tension-filled character of state-functional reproduction.8 As 
O’Connor (1973: 6) characteristically bluntly puts it: ‘the capitalist state must try to fulfill two basic 
and often mutually contradictory functions – accumulation and legitimization’. Specifically, the 
capitalist state is problematically simultaneously obliged to both (1) ‘maintain or create the conditions 
in which profitable capital accumulation is possible’ and (2) ‘maintain or create the conditions for 
social harmony’ (Ibid.). Importantly here: while both of the functions require fulfilment – the 
systematic non-fulfillment of one of the functions may potentially be crisis-triggering – the servicing of 
either one of the functions (say, the ‘fiscal function’) complicates the smooth servicing of the other 
function (say, ‘the legitimation function’). Offe (1984: 49) also provides a salient interpretation of this 
tension-filled relationship: ‘the capitalist state has the responsibility of compensating for the processes 
of socialization triggered by capital in such a way that neither a self-obstruction of market-regulated 
accumulation nor an abolition of the relationships of private appropriation of socialized production 
results’.    
                                                          
7 Describing his own theory, O’Connor (1973: xix) points out that it ‘depends on two kinds of observations, the 
first political-economic, the second political-sociological’.   
8 While Offe (1984: 130-4) provides an otherwise productive (although ambiguous) understanding of a 
contradiction, the term tension is preferred over that of this former generally more demanding and 
deterministically-sounding notion (which is arguably more often used in the LAF approach). This study shall 
operate with a minimal and pragmatic understanding of a tension: Against Offe (1984: 131), who would largely 
describe these features as merely ‘dilemmas’, a tension simply reflects any type of setup having structurally built 
into its operating logic a systematic set of ‘opposing demands’ and ‘conflicting pressures’. Generally, as should 
also indirectly follow from the overall philosophical and epistemological orientation of this study (see chapter 3 
and 4), in this understanding of the term tension: (1) no necessary logical/ontological incongruity exists between 
the constitutive elements of the tension, (2) the activation of a crisis scenario is not necessarily inevitable, even in 
the long-term (cf. Offe 1984: 133), (3) tension-filled dynamics are in no way exclusively a feature of the 
‘capitalist mode of production’. In this relation, a crisis simply refers to a historically contingent situation in 
which an either rapid or prolonged spraining of the ‘opposing demands’ and ‘conflicting pressures’ results in a 
functionally relevant disruption, which manifests itself in some non-trivial empirically observable form.  
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Thus, in particular, the tension-filled dynamics associated with the very simultaneity of the state’s 
twin function-fulfillment was thought to critically underlie and condition the potential activation of 
institutionalized crisis events. Internal differences aside, it is possible to extract the following shared 
crisis-inducing causal scenario: Private-property arrangements not only require continuing 
regulative/fiscal support (in O’Connor’s budgetary terminology: ‘social capital expenditures’), the 
(ultimately Marxist) antagonism between the ‘socialization of costs and the private appropriation of 
profits’ (O’Connor 1973: 9; see also Offe 1984: 49; Habermas 1973: 20-24) produces negative social 
externalities, which become transferred to the increasingly ‘politicized’ democratic capitalist states, 
destabilizing and straining them via rising popular compensatory claims and demands (in O’Connor’s 
budgetary terminology: ‘social expenses’), and tendentially culminates in regular fiscal and/or 
legitimation crises. Through this process, in the context of a ‘repoliticized’ postwar form of ‘organized 
capitalism’, market-based tensions and dynamics become ‘displaced’, or ‘pass over’, into the 
bureaucratic-political sphere (Habermas 1973: e.g., 37, 47, 52, passim). 
 
(3) A strong preoccupation with the organized, bureaucratic, administrative, managed, etc. – in short, 
state-situated – character of advanced liberal-capitalist democratic society. Although Habermas and 
Offe originally, at least partly, placed their largely comparable analyses within a nominally systems-
oriented framework (whether that of Parsons or Luhmann), both the actual content/substance of their 
examinations and their continually changing terminology reveals that capitalist statehood, construed in 
an institutional inside-out manner, and the tension-filled conditions for its functional reproduction 
assumes absolute primacy.9 Arguably, this generally state-situated outlook sprung from three 
                                                          
9 In the first chapters of their books, Offe (1984: 52) and Habermas (1973: 5) present a largely similar initial 
nominal systems-oriented legitimation and accumulation functions framework. More specifically, Habermas 
(1973: 5) adopts his initial model for LC ‘from a working paper’ written by Offe, which is an early version of the 
paper presenting Offe’s scheme which would amongst other things be included in CWS. In this scheme, to take 
Habermas (1973: 5) as an example, there are three systems, namely a ‘Socio-Cultural System’, an ‘Economic 
System’ and a ‘Political-Administrative System’, which each provides outputs to the other and correspondingly 
receives inputs. Importantly, the ‘Political-Administrative System’ should be construed as the ‘control center’, it 
‘assumes a superordinate position’ in relation to the other two systems (Ibid.); in Offe’s (1984: 52) terms, it is 
placed at the ‘organizational disjunction’ between the two. Effectively, in terminology and throughout the 
chapters, both LC and (particularly) CWS de facto operate with a state-situated perspective. Moreover, as John 
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interrelated factors. Firstly, the LAF approach took a historically specific form of statehood, 
intrinsically associated with the interventionist so-called ‘Golden Age’ postwar period, as their 
organizing category and baseline from which crises tendencies could be analyzed. As opposed to 19th 
century ‘laisse-faire’ or ‘competitive’ or ‘liberal’ capitalism (which, as this study generally argues, was 
always highly state-facilitated), the ‘advanced capitalism’ of the postwar period was for the LAF 
scholars best characterized as a form of ‘organized or state-regulated capitalism’ (Habermas 1973: 33). 
This postwar form of capitalist statehood had to systematically engage in all kinds of fiscal 
expenditures (O’Connor 1973) and ‘crisis management’ (Offe 1984) procedures.10 Secondly, the state-
situated outlook also arguably sprung from the indirect/implicit and undertheorized influence of an 
underlying Weberian Marxist orientation (on ‘Weberian Marxism’ more generally, see, e.g., Löwy 
1996; Dahms 1997).11 Thirdly, and relatedly, it sprung from the equally indirect/implicit influence of 
the diagnosis of ‘state capitalism’ classically advanced by Friedrich Pollock (e.g., Habermas 1973: 33-
41; cf. ten Brink 2015: 336).12 
Importantly, this largely implicit or taken-for-granted broadly speaking Weberian input to the 
LAF approach, productively allows for, at least in principle, perceiving the governance phenomenon as 
an in many ways state-facilitated historically reconfigured continuation of organized state capitalism; 
contrary to much mainstream scholarship associating the post-1970s development with increased 
privatization, de-regulation, a debilitated form of government, etc., the legitimation and accumulation 
functions approach – with, for example, its commonsensical/casual stress on inter alia ‘social capital 
expenditures’ (O’Connor 1973) or ‘administrative recommodification’ (Offe 1984), etc. – allows one to 
analytically unproblematically construe it as being both deeply, historically, continually and 
increasingly state-facilitated.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
Keane correctly notes in the 1982 interview with Claus Offe that concludes CWS, Offe’s ‘more recent writings on 
the welfare state do not use the conceptual language of systems theory’ (Offe 1984: 256).   
10 Offe (1984) also spoke of, for example, the ‘Keynesian welfare state’.  
11 It makes sense to simply define Weberian Marxists as ‘the Western-Marxist thinkers who systematically used 
certain key ideas of Max Weber’ or define Weberian Marxism as simply entailing ‘the use, for the benefit of an 
approach basically inspired by Marx, of certain themes and categories from Weber’ (Löwy 1996: 431, 432). 
12 For an analysis of the connection between Friedrich Pollock’s notion of ‘state capitalism’ and the theories of 
particularly Horkheimer and Adorno, see notably Dahms (2010: 332-347) and ten Brink (2015). 
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Relative to Habermas’ LC and Offe’s CWS, O’Connor’s FCS stands out for its more fiscal 
sociological or fiscal-budgetary approach. Importantly, O’Connor’s (1973: 6) critical fiscal-budgetary 
framework for analyzing the capitalist state – whose categories ‘are drawn from Marxist economics and 
adapted to the problem of budgetary analysis’ – productively construe ‘[s]tate expenditures’ as having 
‘a two-fold character corresponding to the capitalist state’s two basic functions: social capital and social 
expenses’. Whereas ‘social capital expenditures’ – which is split into two sub-dimensions, namely 
‘social investment’ and ‘social consumption’ – could roughly be construed as ‘expenditures required for 
profitable private accumulation’ (that is, they were mainly associated with the ‘accumulation’ function), 
‘social expenses’ could roughly be understood as various kinds of welfare-oriented ‘projects and 
services which are required to maintain social harmony’ (that is, mainly associated with the 
‘legitimation’ function) (Ibid.).13 Although generally providing a state-functional outlook, O’Connor’s 
(1973: 10) partly class-situated budgetary framework also productively emphasizes ‘struggles around 
the control of the budget’. For O’Connor (1973: 7), because the ‘national income accounts lump the 
various categories of state spending together’ – since ‘[t]he state does not analyze its budget in class 
terms’ – a critical scholarly exercise thus consists in trying to ‘determine the political-economic forces 
served by any budgetary decision, and thus the main purpose (or purposes) of each budgetary item’.14 
In sum, the LAF approach focuses on the governability-related consequences associated with 
increased legitimatory and fiscal politicization and displacement and, more generally, the tension-filled 
state-situated functional reproduction of legitimation and accumulation. Arguably, as shall be seen, this 
approach provides a productive initial conceptual repertoire and analytical orientation for examining the 
post-1970s governance phenomenon from a state-oriented and broadly speaking historically informed 
perspective.  
As mentioned, while this study intends to start off relatively analytically deductively from the 
vantage point of the LAF approach – selectively adopting and utilizing its state-situated analytical 
                                                          
13 Obviously, to provide a full appreciation of O’Connor’s distinctive but also complex and idiosyncratic 
contribution to the LAF approach, one would need to place the analysis in his more elaborate empirical 
application of it, his particular Marxist understanding of the ‘competitive’ and ‘monopoly’ sector and his at least 
partly class-situated conception of US capitalism – tasks which are outside the scope of this study.  
14 Of course, O’Connor (1973: 7) acknowledges that ‘nearly every state expenditure’ at the same time serves both 
the legitimation and accumulation function, ‘so that few state outlays can be classified unambiguously’. 
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toolbox – it shall also not only reapply the approach (focusing on the post-1970s governance-situated 
period) but also analytically and historically rework it by tweaking and expanding some of its 
categories, historically informing it and pragmatically complimenting it with other relevant perspectives 
and insights. Although this reworking is done continuously throughout the study, chapter 6 in particular 
seeks to more formally develop and launch the main analytical perspective of this study centered on 
legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting. The motivation for the study’s ongoing gradual reworking partly 
stems from an acknowledgement of some of the more or less natural limitations or blind spots of the 
LAF approach, which requires supporting historical-theoretical procedures and additional analytical 
maneuvers. 
To take a notable example: while, as argued above, the LAF approach can be said to be 
underpinned by the implicit/indirect influence of an overall both Weberian Marxist orientation and 
‘state capitalism’-like diagnosis, this broadly speaking Weberian input remains not only undertheorized 
but also critically under-activated. For example, weighing contemporary Marxist considerations more 
heavily and commonsensically operating with a Golden Age-like baseline from which to understand 
changes, the approach fails to provide us with much insight into the historical context and foundations 
of modern statehood or the genesis of its two functions. But, as shall be argued continuously in this 
study, in order to understand the governance phenomenon, it is necessary to understand the historically 
situated dynamics of state-crafting. Also, more generally, the LAF approach relies on a number of 
undertheorized premises concerning the status of statehood: its ability to act, the dynamics of its 
functional setup, the theoretical status of legitimation and accumulation, etc.  
Thus, this study seeks to think more deeply about the conditions of modern statehood and the 
category of the liberal-capitalist democratic state, provide a defense of some of the implicit premises of 
the approach and, importantly, in a historically informed manner examine the emergence, consolidation 
and reconfiguration of legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting. While these non-trivial supporting 
historical-theoretical procedures and additional analytical maneuvers – which of course always remain 
incomplete and somewhat tentative  – sometimes entail unearthing and accentuating the implicit 
Weberian component of the approach, they also to a great extent consist in reaching firmly outside the 
LAF frame.  
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2.2 The fragmented post-1990s: The governance perspective 
As argued earlier, across the academic social science disciplines (and sub-fields), whether perceived 
optimistically or pessimistically, the post-1970s/1990s period is typically characterized as an era of 
both (1) a relatively downgraded state/governmental authority and control mechanism (2) a relatively 
upgraded dynamism and causal saliency of markets, profit-maximizing corporate entities, and civil 
society actors more broadly. In recent decades, especially within political science, this multi-levelled 
overall diagnosis has found particular academic expression in analyses that address and/or are implicitly 
underpinned by the so-called ‘turn to governance’ or shift ‘from government to governance’.  
Notably, as mentioned, R. A. W. Rhodes’ (1994: 151, 1996: 667) influential analysis of ‘the new 
governance’ spoke of the ‘hollowing out of the state’ and ‘governing without Government’ – a process 
introducing, notably, increased ’fragmentation’, an ’erosion of central capability’ and the proliferation 
of ‘self-organizing interorganizational networks’ that generally ‘resist central guidance’. The post-
1990s governance perspective straddles many thematic areas and issues within the overall political 
science discipline (on this, see also Kjær 2004), with some scholarly works focused more on national 
public policy and comparative politics, such as Rhodes, or global governance (e.g., Rosenau 1995) or, 
for example, ‘New Public Governance’ (e.g., Osborne 2006) or ‘collaborative’ governance (e.g., Ansell 
& Gash 2008). The governance perspective has been applied to, or implicitly informs analyses directed 
at, a vast amount of empirical cases or issue areas, from ’climate change’ (Betsill & Bulkeley 2006) to 
’security’ (Krahmann 2003) to ‘tourism’ (Dredge 2006), and so on.   
The term governance goes back more than two centuries – at first being more or less identical to 
the notions of government, governing or steering (Kaufmann & Kraay 2008: 3; Kjær 2004: 3). Later, in 
recent decades, it has partly taken on a new meaning, separating it itself from, and defining itself 
negatively in terms of, the notion of government (Kjær 2004: 3). In this relation, Offe (2009: 551) 
provides a helpful distinction between two possible understandings of governance (the second of which 
this study shall primarily examine): (1) as a ‘generic category’, i.e. entailing something broader than 
government or (2) as ‘a counter-concept to government’, i.e. ‘a novel form of coordination among 
actors’. In the former case, governance seems to be used almost as another way of saying steering, 
governing, etc. – a usage in line with the generic definition provided in the Oxford English Dictionary, 
which refers to governance as simply the ‘office, function, or power of governing’ or the ‘action or fact 
of governing a nation, a person, an activity, one’s desires’ (‘Governance’ n.d.). Also the definition 
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provided by one 2007 World Bank report, which refer to governance as ‘the manner in which public 
officials and institutions acquire and exercise the authority to shape public policy and provide public 
goods and services’ (as cited in Kaufmann & Kraay 2008: 4), arguably belongs in this category.  
In the latter case, governance refers to a shift, a transformation, a turn; in Rhodes’ (1996: 652-3, 
emphasis in original) terms it ‘signifies a change in the meaning of government, referring to a new 
process of governing; or a changed condition of ordered rule; or the new method by which society is 
governed’. Clearly, this study is primarily interested in examining this latter understanding – although, 
of course, the two conceptions to some extent presuppose each other, co-exist and are sometimes 
applied simultaneously within one study. Arguably, both conceptions, although they include many 
different types of analyses, minimally operate with an understanding in which, to use Stoker’s (1998: 
17) formulation, the ‘essence of governance is its focus on governing mechanisms which do not rest on 
recourse to the authority and sanctions of government’. Moreover, since the increased institutional and 
academic preoccupation with governance (in whatever sense of the term) in itself illustrates a shift, an 
increasing focus on steering, governing, etc., the former usage of the term in any case becomes integral 
to the latter understanding.    
Informally and ideal-typically extracting insights from the vast governance-related literature for 
the purposes of this study, it is arguably possible to describe the governance phenomenon of the post-
1970s/1990s period, or perhaps more precisely the post-1990s governance perspective, via the 
following four necessary (but not necessarily sufficient or sufficiently specified) overall attributes:15  
 
(1) A weakening, fragmentation, pluralization, decentralization, privatization or evaporation of 
statehood/sovereignty and nation-state-based democratic (party political) government. 
 
(2) A government/sovereignty-decreasing expansion of multi-level organizational (or intra-
organizational) or steering-oriented relationships (involving, e.g., network patterns, hybrid setups, 
localization, regionalization, internationalization, Europeanization, globalization). 
 
                                                          
15 For other descriptions of basic governance dimensions, see, for example, Rhodes (1996), Kjær (2004), Goetz 
(2008) or Ruhanen et al. (2010).  
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(3) The proliferation of democratically-framed ‘co-production’ arrangements (e.g., participatory, self-
steering/self-organizing or privatized activities). 
 
(4) A heightened intensity and societal diffusion of steering, management, organization, etc. (i.e., what 
from a critical perspective can be understood as a governing fetishism). 
 
Obviously, not all aspects of these four attributes shall be treated, or treated equally, in this study. 
The focus is on the overarching claim of the governance perspective, namely the first attribute above, 
which, in the context of the governance perspective, at varying degrees already implies and includes the 
other three. While it may take a more direct/explicit form, this overall attribute – concerning broadly 
speaking a ‘hollowing out’ of state/government – in many instances appears as an implicit premise: 
whether using a governance-specific vocabulary or not, a vast political science literature exists that has 
taken on board this main premise of the governance perspective, presupposing a shift ‘from government 
to governance’. In this light, the study is relatively less interested in specific governance takes than in 
examining the quality of the overall shared premises of the governance perspective in light of the 
overall analytical research agenda (which, as mentioned, is operationalized through an investigation of 
the main historical, state-situated and particularly legitimatory conditions of possibility for the 
governance phenomenon).  
As indicated above, even the broader and more implicit governance perspective can be considered 
a significant political science-focused case of a larger population of social science perspectives directly 
arguing for or simply implicitly presupposing a relatively downgraded state/governmental authority and 
control mechanism in the post-1970s period. Although less (neo-)pluralist and generally more 
critical/power-focused, notable other cases would for example be the neo-Foucauldian ‘governmentality 
perspective’ (e.g., Miller & Rose 1990; Rose & Miller 1992) or neo-Marxist/neo-Keynesian 
interventions (e.g., Duménil & Lévy 2015; Streeck 2011, 2014) focusing on the state-
weakening/retreating aspects of neoliberalism. In this sense, an examination of the (so to speak) 
‘governance case’ arguably provides an alternative way of addressing the premises of this larger 
state/governmental downgrading literature. But relative to alternative cases, the governance perspective 
helpfully more explicitly focuses on governmental and governing issues (how states/governments 
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function, how certain processes are governed, governability and steering problems, etc.) – aspects that 
directly connect to the questions addressed by the LAF approach of the early 1970s.   
Although this will become clearer throughout, it may be productive to flag, early on, this study’s 
general implicit two-fold understanding and treatment of the governance phenomenon. Firstly, it should 
be considered both (1) a partly actualized phenomenon (but, importantly, one which should be critically 
analytically reinterpreted) and (2) a partly overstated and ideological-strategic phenomenon. Regarding 
the first understanding: on the one hand, it should be considered a partially empirically actualized 
phenomenon; certain aspects, trends, processes, etc., linked to the shift from government to governance 
are accepted. On the other hand, these partially actualized features should be construed, as shall be 
argued, in the context of the historically changing dynamics of legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting. 
Regarding the second understanding: many of the proposed aspects, trends, processes, etc., linked to the 
governance phenomenon have not actually taken place (or taken place to the degree suggested) and the 
governance perspective may to some extent be considered to be (1) partly overstating the case (on this, 
see also Goetz 2008), (2) unintentionally relying on an ideologically enmeshed framework and/or (3) 
part of a more strategic-performative institutional and discursive agenda focused on intensifying the 
empirical actualization of the governance phenomenon (on this, see also Stoker 1998: 18).  
Against this backdrop, as argued earlier, this study intends to explicitly, actively and causal-
functionally tie the LAF approach of the early 1970s to the post-1970/1990s governance phenomenon, 
while continuously critically considering the above mentioned partly overstated and/or 
ideological/strategic-performative aspects of the governance perspective. To repeat: this agenda of 
directly tying the state-situated tension-filled LAF approach to the governance phenomenon implies 
examining whether and to what extent the latter can be perceived as a distinctive post-1970s/1990s 
state-facilitated way of bridging or altering (reconfiguring or overcoming) the tension-filled relationship 
between state legitimation and fiscal accumulation in Western European liberal-capitalist democratic 
polities.  
Having presented and discussed some of the key properties of the two main types of literature 
directly engaged with in this study – and explicated the relevance of these for the overall agenda – the 
next two chapters (3 and 4) shall engage in a necessary extended formalization, explanation and defense 
of the central, respectively, (1) philosophical and social-theoretical and (2) epistemological and 
methodological considerations critically informing the study.     
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Chapter 3. Philosophical and Social-Theoretical Considerations: From 
Critical Realist Emergentism to Corporate Functionalism 
 
In this chapter and the next one, I shall engage in an important introspective discussion and presentation 
of the key broadly speaking philosophical/social-theoretical and epistemological/methodological 
dimensions of the study. In this capacity, these two chapters thus represent an all-too-rare chance to 
reflect on both the basic premises and conditions of possibility of social science research, more 
generally, and the many implicit/explicit considerations that have gone into developing and designing 
this study, more specifically.16 Basically, chapter 3 and 4 seek to serve two main purposes. Firstly, to 
ideally provide some reasonable degree of general justification of the basic research practices, 
procedures and style of the study. Secondly, and relatedly, to relatively pedagogically explicate and 
outline how the study is set up and methodologically organized in a way that hopefully improves the 
reader’s capacity to follow the different arguments and overall structure of the study. Importantly, the 
nature of the study requires an extended formalization and discussion of the key philosophical/social-
theoretical and epistemological/methodological considerations; as argued, and as shall be seen, these 
perhaps lengthier than usual meta-retroductive maneuvers are highly integral to the analysis of the 
conditions of possibility for (studying) governance.  
This study is informed by a deep-seated intellectual belief in the intrinsic value and 
productiveness of a ‘pluralist’ approach to methodology and an inclusive understanding of ‘science’ 
(Jackson 2011: chapter 1, chapter 7, passim; see also Danermark et al. 2002: chapter 6, passim). In 
particular, the study opposes the increasingly ‘disciplining function’ of the term ‘science’; the way in 
which it is more and more used in a ‘tactical’ manner as a ‘rhetorical trump-card’ by usually neo-
positivist ‘self-identified ‘scientists’’ and erroneously ‘[w]ielded as though it represented a single, 
unitary mode of knowledge-production’ (Jackson 2011: 9, emphasis removed, 17, 19, 7, 189). Against 
this, a broad Weberian-like understanding of science – broad enough to unproblematically encompass 
all of the major social science paradigms/schools/positions or philosophy of science perspectives – is 
                                                          
16 Ideally speaking, this exercise/endeavor is broadly in line with Bourdieu’s (1988: 784) more general 
programmatic advocacy of a critically informed ‘genuinely reflexive social science’.  
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implicitly preferred, one that simply defines it as more or less ‘systematic inquiry designed to produce 
(…) knowledge’ (Ibid.: 2011: 24).17   
I have structured the relationship between chapter 3 and 4 in what is arguably the most logically 
meaningful manner, namely one that first presents the philosophical and social-theoretical 
considerations (this chapter) and then proceeds to engage with the relevant epistemological and more 
concrete methodological/methods-specific aspects (chapter 4).18 Specifically, while this chapter is 
separated into two sections, dealing with (1) philosophy of social science and (2) functionalism, the 
next chapter, as things gradually become increasingly tangible, is split into three sections, focusing on 
(1) the logic/dynamics of ‘discovery’ and ‘justification’, (2) historical-theoretical research and (3) 
methods.  
 
 
3.1 Philosophy of social science: Critical realism and emergentism  
As a way of anchoring the next chapter’s more concrete epistemological and methodological 
considerations, it makes sense to first explicate the basic ontological premises and philosophy of social 
science background of this study. Such an ontological/philosophical basis is ‘foundational to particular 
modes of knowledge-production’ (Jackson 2011: 196); philosophical world-views ‘animate (…) 
technical procedures’ and ‘set the stage for the kinds of empirical and theoretical puzzles and 
challenges that a scholar takes to be meaningful and important’ (Ibid.: 34).19 In the following sub-
section, I shall briefly outline the basic philosophical orientation of this study, and indicate two crucial 
implications of this, taking departure in a critical realist philosophy of social science focused on the key 
writings of Roy Bhaskar (1975, 1979) as well as later notable elaborations of this overall approach 
(e.g., Archer et al. 1998; Sayer 2000; Danermark et al. 2002; Kurki 2007; Elder-Vass 2007a; Jackson 
                                                          
17 Although very few scholars would deny that their work bears any relationship to some ‘worldly’ 
aspects/dimensions (cf. Jackson 2011: 24), notice that this slightly tweaks Jackson’s (Ibid.: 24, emphasis added) 
definition which arguably too restrictively technically speaking refers to (some kind of) ‘factual knowledge’.  
18 See Jackson (2011: 26, 26-32) for an alternative view of this standard ’sequence’.  
19 I shall here sidestep or collapse the distinction Jackson (2011: passim, especially 28) takes onboard and 
positively applies in his own way between ‘scientific ontology’ and ‘philosophical ontology’.  
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2011: 72-111).20 Afterwards, in the next sub-section, I shall discuss how the study is critically informed 
by a so-called emergentist perspective.  
 
 
3.1.1 Critical realism and its two implications 
How should critical realism be positioned within the general terrain of philosophy of social science? It 
seems reasonable to argue that critical realism seeks to collapse, or place itself somewhere in between, 
Martin Hollis’ (1994: 1-21) well-known distinction between ‘explanation’ and ‘understanding’.21 On 
this level, critical realism wants to distance itself from two dominant alternative positions, namely 
positivism and ontological or radical epistemological constructivism. On the one hand, if positivism is 
ideal-typically defined as minimally a form of empirical realism – that is, as necessarily and sufficiently 
adhering to the two principles of realism and empiricism – and neo-positivism22 as a more specific 
Popperian or ‘falsificatory’ (that is, post-Vienna Circle) version of this (which I shall primarily be 
referring to), critical realism seeks to simultaneously defend realism and reject empiricism. Thus, 
together with (neo-)positivism, critical realism accepts a possible distinction between the mind, 
consciousness, language, concepts, etc., and the world, causal powers, objects, etc. – what (Jackson 
2011: 35, 37, 74-111) labels a form of ‘mind–world dualism’23 – but against (neo-)positivism it rejects 
its fixation on (immediate) observability and ‘data’ and the necessity of systematic empirical testing.  
                                                          
20 A few elements of the below sub-section on critical realism have been broadly conceived/thought out in the 
context of previous unpublished work done together with Raphaël Wolff and Annette Freyberg on the possibility 
of a genuine critical realist process-tracing method.  
21 Although this arguably requires a more specific comparison (which have not been worked out here), it is 
reasonable to assume an overall similarity between critical realism’s rejection of both positivism/explanation and 
constructivism/understanding and Pierre Bourdieu’s (e.g., 1988) rejection of an objectivism/subjectivism 
opposition (see also, more generally, Wight 2013: 329, fn. 19).      
22 For a sophisticated treatment of the term ‘neopositivism’, as well as a more substantial critique of this position, 
see Jackson (2011: 41-71). For a note on Jackson’s usage of the term, see Neumann (2011: xiii-xiv).  
23 That said, Jackson (2011: 156-187) arguably tends to overstate the ‘duality’ aspect with regards to critical 
realism (see also Wight 2013: 329).  
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On the other hand, critical realism seeks to reject a non-realist or radical epistemological 
constructivist, hermeneutic, interpretivist, discourse-theoretic, etc., view that either outright rejects the 
existence of a ‘real’ material or causal world (the bold ontological claim) or, more typically found, 
argues, in a radical Kantian fashion, that while material objects and (also sometimes) social events, 
structures, processes, etc., may exist an sich, (1) the only way to gauge such entities is through their für 
uns quality and (2) the determining properties of an entity reside principally in this für uns dimension 
(the radical epistemological claim). In short, critical realism would, for example, reject – regarding the 
latter radical epistemological claim – Laclau & Mouffe’ (1985: 108) a priori, non-tendential and 
ahistorical indeterminacy/openness with regards to the question of whether the (actual) falling of a 
brick (which they use as an example) is interpreted as either ‘expressions of the wrath of God’ or part of 
a ‘natural phenomena’. Arguably, critical realism is critical in at least two ways (the former of which I 
shall not explore here) (cf. Sayer 2000: 18-19): (1) in a substantive manner (informed by Marxist and 
Frankfurt School questions of alienation and emancipation) and (2) in a philosophical manner (aimed at 
transcending the choice between empirical realism and ontological or radical epistemological 
constructivism).24   
Critical realism operates with a ‘stratified’, rather than a ‘flat’ (Sayer 2000: 12), ontological 
understanding of the world. In this stratified conception one finds ‘three overlapping domains of reality’ 
– namely the ‘real’, the ‘actual’ and the ‘empirical’ – each of which is constituted by, respectively, 
‘[m]echanisms, events and experiences’ (Bhaskar 1975: 46). Bhaskar (1975) deconstructs the 
logic/conditions of scientific experimentation as a way of grounding and presenting this three-layered 
‘stratified ontology’.25 First, empiricists favor the ‘closed system’ of the experimental lab because it 
may synthetically close, and control for counter-acting factors pertaining to, the normally complex and 
contingent ‘open system’ of the world. Second, and most importantly, as Bhaskar (Ibid.: 4, 2) argues, 
the ‘artificially generated exception’ of the ‘experimentally closed conditions’, set up to grasp the 
                                                          
24 As Sayer (2000: 8, fn. 2) argues, ‘although there are many affinities between critical realism and Marxism, the 
former does not entail the latter’. Of course, the philosophical dimension of critical realism’s criticalness also 
relies on a reflection on Karl Marx’s (at least implicit) philosophical grounding and methodological procedures. 
For an interesting discussion/debate on this (particularly) philosophical relationship, see Bhaskar & Callinicos 
(2003: especially 90-1, 100-2, 106, 108).   
25 See also the description in, for example, Sayer (2000: 12-17) and Danermark et al. (2002: 67-69).  
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character of specific causal mechanisms, demonstrates the non-identity of our ordinary experience of 
the world and the dynamics of its real structures and mechanisms, and thus the saliency of a stratified 
view. Following this logic implies that ‘real structures exist independently of and are often out of phase 
with the actual pattern of events’ and that ‘events occur independently of experiences’ (Ibid.: 2). 
Importantly, critical realism would argue, empirical realism – and arguably other versions of 
‘phenomenalism’ that limit ‘knowledge to those aspects of the world that can be empirically grasped 
and directly experienced’ (Jackson 2011: 42) – is caught up in a form of ‘epistemic fallacy’ which 
reduces ontology to epistemology or ‘statements about our knowledge of being’ because in this view 
the ‘three domains of reality are collapsed into one’ (Bhaskar 1975: 5, 46). 
We can point to two key implications for this study of the stratified view. Firstly, mechanisms,26 
and causal structures/powers/entities/forces more generally, are unobservable – that is, as Jackson 
(2011: passim, 38, 96, 114, 88, emphasis added) argues, ‘in-principle unobservable’, i.e. reflecting not 
so much ‘unobservable-but-detectable things’ as unobservable ‘real-but-undetectable causal powers’, 
the latter ‘defined (…) as entities and properties that cannot, even in principle, be observed or detected 
either with unaided or with augmented senses’ (cf. Wight 2013: 341-2). Importantly, for critical realists 
the unobservablity of the ‘open system’ of the social world should necessarily point the scholar in the 
direction of what Jackson (2011: 36-7) in a critical realist vein calls ‘transfactualism’ – that is, the 
attempt to ‘[go] beyond the facts to grasp the deeper processes and factors that generate those facts’ – a 
procedure which inherently puts a relatively higher premium on theoretical contemplation, ‘thought 
experiments’ and ‘thought operations’, etc. (on these procedures, see Danermark et al. 2002: 73-114). 
The condition of unobservability also ‘makes reliance on strict observational knowledge problematic 
and entails some indeterminacy in explanation’ (Kurki 2007: 371). More generally, when setting 
up/applying standards for assessing an explanation one should ‘take into account the ontological nature 
of the objects studied’ (Ibid.), implying, to take a notable example pertaining to this study, that studying 
inherently abstract objects like ‘states’, over longer periods of time and at the macro-level, should grant 
the researcher relatively more methodological leniency and flexibility.27  
                                                          
26 For a productive and sophisticated philosophy of science understanding of mechanisms, see notably Machamer 
et al. (2000) and Machamer (2004).  
27 More generally, as Rosenberg (2008: 145) points out, ’statements that transcend observation are to be judged on 
their explanatory power, not their testability’.  
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Secondly, because ‘objects have powers whether exercised or not, mechanisms exist whether 
triggered or not and the effects of the mechanisms are contingent’ (Danermark et al. 2002: 56), it 
follows that ‘causal laws must be analysed as their tendencies’ (Bhaskar 1975: 3) in ‘open systems’. 
And, in this view, tendencies should thus both be considered ‘potentialities which may be exercised 
(…) without being realized or manifest in any particular outcome’ and powers which may be ‘fulfilled 
or actualized unperceived by men [sic]’ (Ibid.: 40, emphasis added). This particular critical realist 
displacement from ‘statements of laws’ to ‘tendency statements’ (Ibid.: 7) not only naturally implies an 
increasing focus on the less strict notions of, for example, macro-level ‘tendentiality’ (as in Marx’s 
work) and more mundane sociological ‘dispositions’ (as in Bourdieu’s work) but also, with regards to 
mechanisms and social structures, a redirected emphasis on theoretical considerations and (if 
ontologically meaningful and pragmatically feasible) the discovery of theoretically framed symptomatic 
indirect/derivative empirical indicators/approximations (cf. Beach & Pedersen 2013).  
 
 
3.1.2 Emergentist statehood and macro-mechanisms 
A constitutive element of critical realism’s stratified ontological conception of reality is the notion of 
emergence (and emergentism), which in more than one way deeply informs this study. In specific 
relation to critical realism, emergentism not only provides a complimentary argument against collapsing 
the three domains into one empirical realm but also conditions and supports critical realism’s particular 
take on the perennial ‘structure-agency debate’ or, in Hollis’ (1994) terms, the distinction between 
‘holism’ and ‘individualism’. Before treating the relationship between each of these two elements and 
emergence, it makes sense to provide a brief account of the latter notion itself, as it is applied in this 
study.    
Put briefly, a (critical realist informed) emergentist social ontology (see notably Bhaskar 1975, 
1979; Archer 1998; Elder-Vass 2007a, 2010) implies ‘that a whole can have properties (…) that would 
not be possessed by its parts if they were not organised as a group into the form of this particular kind 
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of whole’ (Elder-Vass 2007a: 28).28 Arguably, there is both a ‘diachronic’ and a ‘synchronic’ 
dimension to emergence (Elder-Vass 2007a: passim, 37, 2010: 16). Firstly, Archer’s (1998: 375, 
emphasis added) so-called ‘morphogenetic’ approach argues for an analytically posited temporal 
separability of structure and agency; in this view ‘structure necessarily pre-dates the action(s) which 
transform it’ and ‘structural elaboration necessarily post-dates those actions which transformed it’. 
Importantly here, emergence or extra-individuality, in Archer’s (1998: 376, emphasis added, 375, 377) 
approach, stems in particular from the existence of ‘pre-existing structures’ operating over and above 
individuals – that is, the analytically necessary temporal or ‘diachronic’ (Elder-Vass 2007a: 34) 
distinction between a prior ‘structural conditioning’ and a later agentic 
interaction/elaboration/reproduction.29 Secondly, in Elder-Vass’s (2007a, 2010: 23) so-called 
‘relational’ or ‘synchronic’ account of emergence, it is construed as ‘a synchronic relation amongst the 
parts of an entity that gives the entity as a whole the ability to have a particular (diachronic) causal 
impact’. In this synchronic view the origin of the irreducible sui generis quality of ‘social wholes’ lies 
particularly in ‘the organisation of the parts: the maintenance of a stable set of substantial relations 
between the parts that constitute them into a particular kind of whole’ (Elder-Vass 2010: 20, emphasis 
added). In other words, it is ‘because a higher-level entity is composed of a particular stable 
organisation or configuration of lower-level entities that it may be able to exert causal influence in its 
own right’ (Ibid.: 23, emphasis in original).  
Now, brought together, this dual understanding of emergence provides the study with an initial 
firm philosophy of social science basis for accepting the existence of, and practically operating with, 
complex collective ‘social entities’, such as notably organizations and institutions, having ‘causal 
powers in their own right’ (Elder-Vass 2010: 26) – a coherent social-theoretical justification which 
many scholars who commonsensically treat collective/corporate actors often fail to provide. 
                                                          
28 For a discussion of the similarity and, especially, ontological incommensurability between (particularly critical 
realist) emergentism and Luhmann’s type of autopoietic (and partly emergentist) functionalism, see Elder-Vass 
(2007b).  
29 On the (perhaps seemingly) subtle yet crucial divergences between Anthony Giddens’ well-known 
‘structuration’ theory and Roy Bhaskar’s so-called Transformational Model of Social Action (TMSA) and 
Archer’s Morphogenetic approach – the former of which informed the latter – see notably Porpora (1998), Archer 
(1998) and Buch-Hansen (2005: 62-3).     
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Importantly, this study’s particular treatment of statehood shall construe the state as an irreducible 
higher-level entity with extra-individual ‘emergent powers’ (notably, as shall be seen, in the form of 
‘state-crafting’ and its related properties and strategies). In this study, the emergent connection between 
the lower- and higher-level properties of statehood is stressed in particularly two overlapping ways. 
Firstly, the study puts emphasis on the dynamics and tensions associated with the state’s 
relational/synchronic organization of (what shall later be described as) both its four organizational 
monopolies and its four institutional/structural functions. Secondly, the study emphasizes the emergent 
simultaneity of the state’s (a) complex lower-level constitution – implying a necessary dependence on 
the dynamics of elites, classes, bureaucratic personnel, voters, consumers, etc., and (b) peculiar 
irreducible extra-individual emergent causal powers.  
As shall be argued in chapter 5, both the Skinnerian-Hobbesian conception and the Staatslehre 
tradition’s understanding of modern statehood is commensurate with, compliments and implicitly 
operates with, such emergentist account of the state. The productiveness of an emergentist conception 
of entities like states can be understood in light of the way in which organizations and institutions more 
generally appear as particular paradigmatic forms of emergent collective/social action and social 
structure (see Elder-Vass 2007a: 31-34; Elder-Vass 2010: 115-168; Kaidesoja 2013: 312-19). Although 
both are ultimately merely different modalities of ‘social structure’ (Elder-Vass 2010: 167-8), 
institutions and organizations may be defined slightly differently: While the former refers to relatively 
continuing causally emergent rules, orders and structures that normatively pattern behavior and 
expectations, the latter denotes a more or less persisting, regularized, formalized, authority-constitutive, 
interest-driven and purposeful form of emergent collective/social/group interaction or association (cf. 
Elder-Vass 2007a: 31-34, 2010: 115-168; Kaidesoja 2013: 312-19; Hall & Soskice 2001: 9; Streeck & 
Thelen 2005: 9).  
Importantly, it is critical to take into account both of these two dimensions when treating modern 
statehood – that is, both the more concrete, visible organizational apparatuses of the state and its more 
transfactual and functional institutionalized existence. Arguably, as this study shall continuously 
maintain, a productive way of grasping the state’s simultaneous organizational and institutional 
presence – is to conceive it as a ‘corporate actor’ (on this term, see notably Coleman 1974, 1982). 
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Unlike ‘natural persons’ (Coleman 1982: 19), and some but not all organizations,30 corporate actors 
have a transcendental legal status and codification; as juridical/legal persons, corporate actors inter alia 
operate with a heightened degree of: (1) ‘replacability’ of natural persons (Coleman 1974: 35-38, 1982: 
26-7) – i.e. put in the presented emergentist vocabulary, the corporate actor, having emergent higher-
level properties, structurally lowers the importance of the specific quality of the lower-level entities (see 
also Elder-Vass 2007a: 31-34); (2) actorness/agency/personhood – i.e. capacity for ‘unitary action’ or 
‘coherent, goal-directed action’ (Coleman 1982: 33); (3) abstractness, providing them with an unusual 
transfactual and transcendental quality.  
Importantly, the emergent ‘corporate’ character of the state critically complicates a purely 
empiricist conception of statehood – in other words, it provides an independent basis for rejecting ‘flat’ 
or non-stratified ontological perspectives. As shall be elaborated upon later, this implies a rejection of 
the largely ‘phenomenalist’ so-called neo-Weberian state perspective (e.g., Evans et al. 1985a), which 
tends to (over)stress Max Weber’s definitional/nominal account of the state and his programmatic 
emphasis on its organizational ‘means’.31 Specifically, both the relational organization of the state’s 
lower-level properties and the temporal separability of prior ‘structural conditioning’ and later agentic 
dynamics critically complicate the establishment of a 1:1 relationship between the state’s individually 
non-exhaustive components, their synthetic organization and the final contingent empirical 
manifestation of this in the form of an institutional-organizational whole. The transcendental and 
transfactual character of the state renders it not only much more than an identifiable organizational 
apparatus (as in the neo-Weberian view) but, more importantly here, makes it necessarily different from 
merely government (or occasionally party politics), as sometimes commonsensically proposed in the 
governance perspective. As shall be argued repeatedly, this empiricist tendency of failing to take into 
account the emergent corporate quality of modern statehood generally inhibits scholars’ ability to 
productively construe governance as an alternative historically specific modality of state-crafting.    
                                                          
30 One can perhaps say that while all corporate actors are also necessarily organizations, the reverse is not 
necessarily true (cf. Coleman 1982: 33).    
31 Although he occasionally falls prey to the above mentioned epistemic fallacy, a proper reconstruction of 
Weber’s broader substantial historically informed work, as also undertaken in, for example, Dusza (1989) and 
Anter (2014), shows him implicitly operating with a social-theoretically appropriate emergentist understanding of 
modern statehood.  
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As already hinted at earlier, the critical realist understanding of emergence also has implications 
for another perennially important and perhaps ultimately unsolvable question in social theory, namely 
how to treat the relationship between structure and agency. Importantly, the particular ways in which 
emergentism and the structure-agency question deeply intertwine in the critical realist perspective 
implies that both so-called ‘individualism’ and ‘holism’ should be rejected. Firstly, as mentioned, both 
Elder-Vass’ synchronic form of relational emergentism and Archer’s (1998: 376-7) morphogenetic 
approach implies the necessary operation of irreducible extra-individual higher-level causal properties. 
Secondly, it also follows from the presented form of emergentism that macro-causal arguments – 
pertaining to ‘social facts’, systems, structures, societies, fields, functions, networks, organizations, etc. 
– cannot meaningfully refuse to make, as Porpora (1998: 348) puts it, ‘reference to individual 
behavior’. Just as it is the case that ‘any entity’s emergent properties depend upon its being composed 
of a collection of lower-level entities that are its necessary parts and on the properties of those parts’ 
(Elder-Vass 2010: 19, emphases added), one can say that, as Bhaskar (1998: 216, emphasis added, 214) 
points out, ‘[s]ociety does not exist independently of human activity’ and ‘that such activity would not 
occur unless the agents engaging in it had a conception of what they were doing’.32  
Let me – by way of also going beyond critical realist reflections – specify this initial position. On 
the one hand, the acceptance of sui generis emergentist powers means that one can defensibly operate 
with authentic ‘macro-mechanisms’ (Kaidesoja 2013: 310-13) or processes of an ‘institutional’ or 
‘social-organizational’ kind causally working ‘above the individual or elementary social level’ 
(Jepperson & Meyer 2011: 62). Clearly, if ‘individual-level microfoundationalism’ minimally implies 
‘that all causal powers ascribed to social groups are ontologically reducible to the aggregates of casual 
powers of their individual members’ (Kaidesoja 2013: 308, emphasis removed), and if methodological 
individualism entails that ‘facts about societies, and social phenomena generally, are to be explained 
solely in terms of facts about individuals’ (Bhaskar 1998: 208) – or, as Elster (1982: 454, emphasis 
removed) seems to advocate, the necessary search for a ‘purposive actor’ – the above emergentist view 
rules out all (meaningful) versions of either perspectives.  
On the other hand, as mentioned, the existence of some kind of agentic activity is necessary: there 
should always be ‘micro-instantiations’, micro-level events/objects/forces that are ‘present and 
                                                          
32 One can perhaps add to Bhaskar’s last point concerning agents having a ‘conception of what they were doing’ 
that this conception obviously need not be an accurate or normatively desirable one.  
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operative’ and processes ‘working through individual actors’ (Jepperson & Meyer 2011: 66, 67). But, 
as pointed out, even though society – or any other form of ‘social fact’ – ‘exists only in virtue of 
[individuals’] activity’ it is nevertheless ‘irreducible to people’ (Bhaskar 1998: 214, 206). Moreover, as 
Jepperson & Meyer (2011: 67) argue, ‘microfoundations must be distinguished from explanation’ – that 
is, it is important not to confound two overlapping yet critically separate issues, namely (1) the selected 
level/unit of analysis and (2) questions of causation and explanation.33 Although perhaps correlated in 
some way, these two dimensions are not identical: providing ‘micro-instantiations’ of a certain process 
– i.e. placing one’s explanation, at least momentarily, at a relatively lower level of analysis (focusing, 
e.g., on detailed micro action) – is not the same as providing ‘causal arguments at the level of 
individuals conceived as actors’ (Ibid.: 67, emphasis removed). In other words, the existence of micro-
level activity does not necessarily imply that it has ‘explanatory centrality’ (Ibid.).  
Of course, while there is not necessarily a relevant micro-causal mechanism being activated 
higher-level emergent explanations are arguably all else equal relatively more convincing if they are 
supplemented with some kind of micro-level ‘instantiations’ of the proposed relevant process (cf. 
Jepperson & Meyer 2011: 66; Kaidesoja 2013: 315). Importantly, though, this study does not 
necessarily agree with Jepperson & Meyer’s (2011: 66; although cf. 68) claim that while explanation 
and microfoundationalism should be disentangled, it is nevertheless a ‘(legitimate) requirement’ to be 
‘able to illustrate micro-instantiations of any process’. This seems to be too strong an obligation; as 
Kaidesoja (2013: 316) for example argues: ‘[I]n many explanatory studies on large-scale macro-
phenomena, it is sufficient that we have a general understanding [of] how the collective agents of this 
kind function (…) and empirically grounded reasons to believe that the macro-phenomenon of interest 
was causally generated by the interactions of this kind of collective agents with emergent powers’. The 
decision of what unit of analysis to focus on – or, relatedly, how abstract the study should be – cannot 
be decided a priori but is contingent on a number of factors, such as: (1) pragmatic considerations (time, 
space, skills, data, style, etc.);34 (2) analytical considerations (the specific questions being 
                                                          
33 It is arguably uncertain whether, for example, Rose & Miller (1992), as dominant exponents of the neo-
Foucauldian literature (with its advocacy of the search for more micro-level ‘mobile’ and ‘diverse’ practices of 
government), are able to appropriately distinguish between these two dimensions.    
34 As Kaidesoja (2013: 316) for example argues, micro-level corroboration ‘requires the uses of different methods 
and data from the explanatory studies on large-scale macro-phenomena’.   
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asked/studied);35 (3) causal/ontological considerations (whether one thinks that the chosen unit of 
analysis is where, as Jepperson & Meyer’s (2011: 68) would formulate it, the relevant ‘causality lies’).  
It makes sense to now return to another issue which likewise obviously cannot be treated entirely 
abstractly (for early arguments in this vein, see Mills 1959: especially chapter 2), namely the earlier 
overall question of the relative weighing between structure and agency. As shall be seen throughout the 
study, this question critically hinges on at least the following four aspects. Firstly, the structure-agency 
issue obviously depends on the specific question(s) being asked. Secondly, and equally obviously, the 
relative strength of either structure or agency critically depends on the specific sphere, location, point in 
time, constellation, actor, etc., one is focused on studying (see also Berger & Offe 1982: 524). A movie 
director all else equal has more causal leverage (i.e., ‘agency’) than an ordinary citizen trying to alter 
global CO2 emissions through her/his individual consumption behavior. Thirdly, and relatedly, it is 
productive to make a simple analytical distinction – which many scholars involved in the structure-
agency debate, surprisingly, fail to properly consider – between what might be described as local 
agency and global agency. Whereas local agency refers to a persons’ capacity for positively affecting 
and cognitively supervising certain highly geographically and causally circumscribed parochial events 
or processes, global agency denotes a person’s capacity to positively and genuinely affect, change, 
control or help restructure the key dynamics of certain geographically and causally encompassing and 
comprehensive large-scale social structures (i.e., systems, organizations, institutions, networks, etc.). 
Importantly, as shall be pointed out later, the two types of agency do not necessarily move in tandem.    
Fourthly, implicitly in line with much historically inclined literature it makes sense to speak of a 
Weberian-like historical-temporal evolutionary logic of ‘path dependency’ connected to causally 
emergent social structures (more generally) and concrete institutional-organizational constellations 
(more specifically), which, at least within their circumscribed extra-individual domains, over time tends 
to lessen the general causal significance of individual actors and spontaneous human interaction.36 In 
other words, the type of higher-level sui generis emergent powers that have been treated above is not 
only simply temporally situated; tendentially speaking, emergentist powers become increasingly 
                                                          
35 As Jepperson & Meyer (2011: 68, emphasis in original) at one point argue – although this conflicts with their 
earlier point about this being a requirement – ‘one may go on to seek micro-foundations if it is analytically useful 
to do so’.  
36 For a particular and formalized conceptualization of ‘path dependency’, see Mahoney (2000: 510-11).  
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accumulated and concentrated over time within a specific social structure/constellation. Specifically, 
organizations may be singled out as extreme examples of this temporal concentration process; as argued 
earlier, organizations/collective agents can be taken as ‘plausible candidates’ for higher-level emergent 
mechanisms (Kaidesoja 2013: 312, 313-16). Organizations not only ‘have real emergent causal powers 
that materially affect social events’ (Elder-Vass 2010: 168, 2007a: 32) but also, more specifically, 
coordinate relationships between humans through the explicit/implicit codification of ‘roles’. In other 
words, organizations (and, in particular, mature and formalized corporate actors) and their proliferation 
– or what can be described, following Coleman’s (1974, 1982) overall analysis, as a both quantitatively 
and qualitatively heightened societal corporatization – all else equal tend to reduce the importance of 
the distinct attributes of individual actors. As shall be seen in the next section discussing state 
functionalism, this generally inverse relationship between emergent corporatization and agency – the 
implications of which I shall return to many times – provides an independent justification for a state 
functionalist perspective.        
 
 
3.2 Functionalism  
This section shall not only shed light on how the above philosophy of social science considerations 
inform the applied type of functionalist perspective but also, more generally, spell out what kind of 
functionalism is being offered in this study. This is important because (1) functionalism is so often 
(unwarrantedly, as shall be argued) outright rejected or even ridiculed and, more importantly, (2) this 
study intends to analyze governance from a state-situated functionalist perspective. The section’s 
explication entails both a discussion and rejection of some of the often made criticisms of functionalist 
social science and an advocacy and positive outline of not only an arguably more ‘open’ functionalist 
take (on this, see Becker 1988) but a form of (what shall be described as) corporate functionalism. 
 
 
3.2.1 Renovating the functionalist fortress 
Partly following Uwe Becker’s (1988: 865-6) cue, I shall initiate the discussion/rejection of some of the 
standard claims against functionalism by making a helpful distinction between what may be called (1) 
51 
 
substantive/sociological functionalism and (2) methodological/causal functionalism. Whereas the 
former, whether in its traditional form or for example in the more recent ‘reconstructive’ guise of 
‘neofunctionalism’ (Alexander & Colomy 1990), is firmly linked to Talcott Parson’s work and his 
substantive concepts and considerations, the latter – a perhaps more Anglo-American understanding 
linked to Robert Merton’s (1968: chapter 3) methodological discussion of functionalism – refers, less 
restrictively, to all types of social scientific work (implicitly or explicitly) addressing causal or quasi-
causal logics or explanations (partly or solely) appealing to functions/functional dynamics. Importantly, 
when this study speaks of functionalism it (unless otherwise specified) refers to this latter 
methodological/causal version, and thus many of the intricate substantive criticisms and 
reconfigurations of, and questions ultimately linked to, Parsonian functionalism may be legitimately 
pushed to the side (see Becker 1988: 866, 880, fn. 6). With that crucial qualification in mind, I shall 
proceed to critically examine the merits of some of the key charges against (orthodox) functionalism. 
 To start out, as Merton’s (1968: chapter 3) classical discussion and codification of functional 
analysis makes clear, one can fairly unproblematically dispense with three key postulates of 
functional analysis – or, more correctly (i.e., going beyond Merton in this regard), postulates that 
critics of functionalism unwarrantedly sometimes (still) claim are constitutive of this position.  
o The ‘unqualified postulate of functional unity’, that is, the claim that one should observe a 
full integration or ‘unity of the total society’, is unproductive since, inter alia, different 
actions/initiatives ‘may be functional for some groups and dysfunctional for others in the 
same society’ (Merton 1968: 84, 81).  
o The exaggerated ‘postulate of universal functionalism’ claiming that ‘all persisting forms of 
culture’ – and ‘social structure’ – ‘are inevitably functional’ and ‘fulfill vital functions’ 
simply cannot be sustained (Merton 1968: 90, emphasis removed, 85, 86, emphasis added).    
o The ‘postulate of indispensability’ claiming both the ‘indispensability of certain functions’ 
and the ‘indispensability of existing social institutions, culture forms, or the like’ overlooks 
that ‘just as the same item may have multiple functions, so may the same function be 
diversely fulfilled by alternative items’ – the latter element involving what is referred to as 
‘functional equivalents’ (Merton 1968: 90, emphasis removed, 87-8, emphasis removed).  
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 Technically speaking, Elster (1982: 462) is correct when arguing, in his critique of functionalist 
analysis, that a ‘need does not create its own fulfillment’. But while it seems obviously true that, for 
a number of different reasons, any functionally ‘necessary collective actions may fail to materialize’ 
(Ibid.: 462), very few functionalists would actually conceive of functional strains in such a 
deterministic way, as implying automatic and ‘necessary’ action, as Elster suggests (see also Berger 
& Offe 1982: 521). In this sense, although Becker (1988: cf. 875) has a more specific agenda, any 
non-deterministic understanding of functionalism can be said to imply an ‘open functional logic’. 
 
 Relatedly, functionalists are often criticized for relying on a flawed and temporally problematic 
mode of causal explanation ‘in which an event (…) is explained in terms of its effect’ (Cohen 1982: 
485). But, as Cohen (Ibid.: 486, emphasis in original) points out, functionalists typically merely rely 
on so-called ‘consequence laws’ of the following form: ‘e [a cause] occurred because it would cause 
f [its effect]’. In this way, extending/complementing Cohen’s argument (and not necessarily 
following his terminology of ‘laws’), one can sensibly make the claim that a specific lower-level 
activity exists or is set up because it either tendentially has or is expected to have certain higher-
level effects, consequences or properties.  
 
 The above point immediately raises the question of both actors’ recognition of, and the 
intentionality behind, the functional logic of certain activities. In Merton’s (1968: chapter 3, passim, 
114, emphasis removed) well-known codification, a helpful distinction is made between ‘manifest’ 
and ‘latent’ functions: whereas the former refers to the more subjective, apparent, avowed, nominal, 
designed, anticipated, purposive, recognized, intended, naïve and ‘conscious motivations for social 
behavior’, which contribute functionally to the maintenance of the relevant social unit, the latter 
notion refers to the opposite qualities of functionally relevant social activities. For Becker (1988: 
867, 875) – and many other scholars addressing this – it is only really relevant to look at ‘latent 
functions’ when discussing functional analysis. For him, ‘intended functions’ – like, for example, 
ships, which are obviously ‘built to cross the sea’ – ‘do not produce theoretical problems’ (Ibid.). 
But while it may be true that intended manifest functional activity is not what functionalists 
typically are interested in, it is a grave mistake to disregard or at least underestimate the importance 
of designed activity, as it is arguably deeply constitutive of modern social organization. The 
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question of whether the proper object of study for functional analysis should be manifest or latent 
functions critically hinges on which actors (or group of actors), activities, organizations, etc., or 
what units of analysis, one chooses to examine. Of course depending on what type of ‘organism’ 
whose functional reproduction one is studying, organizational elites – for example, state actors or 
CEOs – usually further systemic maintenance through both recognized and purposeful (i.e., 
organized) action, whereas the relative manifest-latent mix tends to vary much more amongst non-
elites (depending, naturally, on various kinds of historically specific geographic, demographic and 
class-based, etc., factors).  
Moreover, it is not only important to not reduce functional analysis to the study of latent 
functions but also to appreciate the crucial dialectical connections between the subjective and 
objective levels of functional reproduction. Firstly, Paul Helm (1971), in his (sometimes a bit 
unwarranted) criticism of Merton’s manifest-latent functions scheme, helpfully points out that 
Merton unproductively lumps together two separate dimensions, namely recognition and 
intentionality. Indeed, while Merton construes latent functions as being both unrecognized and 
unintended, it is correct, as Helm (Ibid.: 52, 57) argues, that recognizing some action/activity is not 
the same as intending it. Secondly, the challenge, as shall be discussed later, for organizational 
elites is to find intentional ways of conjoining micro-specific manifest functions (meaning, in this 
case, that which is both intentional and recognized) with macro-relevant latent functions (i.e., that 
which is at least unintentional and perhaps also unrecognized). One short example might be 
helpful. In consumer-oriented liberal-capitalist democratic polities, the maintenance of a certain 
non-trivial level of aggregate consumption is almost by definition functionally (that is, fiscally and 
economically) pivotal. Now, from the perspective of the non-elite individual, consumption 
arguably has to do mainly with organic subjective (or inter-subjective) manifest questions of 
needs/desires, identity, status, etc., (cf. the discussion in Helm 1971: 54-6). But from the macro-
level perspective of, for example, state elites and CEOs, non-elite consumption is mainly relevant 
in terms of its latent objective consequences for fiscal maintenance and profit-making dynamics. In 
the absence of ideal cases where the manifest functions has become identical to the latent functions 
(say, a situation in which individuals consume with the intention of reproducing economic growth), 
the exercise from the organizational elite perspective thus consists in intentionally (that is, 
manifestly) findings ways of designing frameworks that establish a productive relationship 
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between the micro-level subjective manifest functions of consumption and its macro-level latent 
objective fiscal/economic consequences.37  
 
 It is sometimes argued – although this is probably one of the least convincing or relevant charges – 
that functionalist analysis is politically biased; that it, for example, a priori implicitly supports 
explanations and analyses normatively favoring anti-radicalism and the reproduction of the macro-
social status quo. This is obviously incorrect. Firstly, this claim typically lumps together the above 
distinction between substantive/sociological and methodological/causal functionalism and, in doing 
this, reduces functionalism to especially Parsonian functionalism, which is sometimes (not 
necessarily justifiably) considered politically conservative. Secondly, and more importantly, as 
Merton (1968: 93, emphasis in original) succinctly argues, the fact that functionalism ‘can be seen 
by some as inherently conservative and by others as inherently radical suggests that it may be 
inherently neither one nor the other’.38       
 
 Functionalist frameworks, it is said, cannot explain everything. This is true. But what single 
perspective or logic of explanation can ever really do this? Critics of functionalism like Jon Elster 
(1982: 454, 456, emphasis added) characteristically exaggerate the purported claims of 
functionalists along the following lines: ‘an institution or behavior explain the presence of that 
institution or behavior’ or ‘[a]ll activities benefit the capitalist class, and these benefits explain their 
presence’. This strawman-like way of presenting functional analysis – in which everything is 
explained functionally, where an entity is exhaustively accounted for, or fully ‘explained’, by 
functionalist logic – makes it easy for Elster to refute the perspective. While functional analysis 
may arguably be necessary in social science research (Davis 1959; Berger & Offe 1982: 523), it is 
of course by itself insufficient. Importantly, there is no reason why one should not consider 
functionalism and other perspectives ‘complimentary’ (Berger & Offe 1982: 523). The relevant 
                                                          
37 For an implicitly slightly overlapping consideration, not directly couched in the Mertonian vocabulary, see Offe 
(1984: 83).  
38 As Davis (1959: 766) argues ‘the view of functionalism as disguised ideology is most often advanced by those 
who are themselves ideologically charged’.  
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question must be whether a functionalist type of analysis has (so to speak) explanatory horsepower 
and equips the researcher with salient analytical tools with regards to a specific issue, theme, 
question, case, etc. The unnecessary reductionism of Elster also finds (a bit more sophisticated) 
representation in Giddens’ (1984: 293-297, 294) explicit critique of functionalism, which tries to 
simply substitute a purely functional model for another (allegedly) exhaustive interpretation that 
instead ‘involves an attribution of rationality and of motivation to the agents concerned’. Again, 
why set the debate up, as Giddens seems to do, as a question of either/or? It makes little sense to 
apply a model that a priori solely includes reflexive, intentional and ‘purposeful action’ (Ibid.).    
 
 It is argued, not entirely unjustifiably, that functionalist analyses in social science unwarrantedly 
take on board logics of explanation and terminology that only make sense in biology/the natural 
world. It is of course always dangerous to simply unreflectively transfer logics from the natural to 
the social domain (or vice versa). But two things may be said here. Firstly, it may (in specific 
instances) make purely heuristic sense to draw analogies to functional dynamics found in biology – 
that is, to use biological-functional terminology and make methodological reference to modes of 
explanation found in biology without genuinely taking on board any of the actual deterministic-
biological content possibly implied by this (see also Merton 1968: 102; Rosenberg 2008: 168, cf. 
165-8).  
Secondly, while ontologically speaking non-human animals/mammals and plants are very 
different from the relatively self-reflexive and abstractly thinking contemporary Homo sapiens – in 
this sense there are surely, to put it in Merton’s (1968: 103) words, ‘differences in the character of 
the data examined by the physiologist and the sociologist’ – there are arguably a range of instances 
of social life substantively resembling biological-functional patterns.39 Notably, organizationally- 
and institutionally-emergent corporate entities like modern states or private profit-oriented firms are 
organized internally through hyper-professionalized logics, and are placed in external causal 
contexts, centered on strategy, self-interestedness, self-preservation, competition, adaptive 
behavior, needs, maintenance, etc. In such instances, one may perhaps speak of ‘quasi-biologicality’ 
                                                          
39 Few social science scholars discussing functionalism doubt that functional patterns exist/persist in biology (on 
this point, see also Berger & Offe 1982: 523; Rosenberg 2008: 151, cf. 167; for examples of this, see Elster 1982; 
Becker 1988: 867-8). 
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(Berger & Offe 1982: 523).40 The functional difference between social and biological domains is 
arguably a ‘matter of degree’ (Van Parijs 1982: 502). Ultimately, the functional potential of a social 
entity – and thus, perhaps, the potential for making more substantive reference to biological-
functional explanations – depends on the ontological characteristics of the specific social sphere or 
object being examined.      
 
 Functionalists are – due to an a priori focus on systemic reproduction and maintenance – classically 
charged with being incapable of explaining or accounting for change. Importantly, though, 
functionalist modes of explanation are, as established, non-exhaustive and thus other factors 
obviously also play a role and these may help change/alter the social or organizational order in 
question. As shall be specified in chapter 5, functional reproduction is always at varying historical 
degrees problematized or made difficult; if functions could always be fulfilled smoothly without 
any type of difficulties, if there were no counter-acting forces to consider, social science research 
would be both sociologically unrealistic and analytically meaningless (or at the very least highly 
uninteresting). Since it is not a question of simply either/or, it is meaningful to set up a basically 
functionalist framework that includes and incorporates class-factors, conflict or ‘societal trial and 
error’ (on this term, see Becker 1988: 974-5, 879-80), both ‘critical junctures’ and ‘incremental 
changes’ (e.g., Streeck & Thelen 2005), micro-level normative changes, etc.  
Moreover, even if one only made use of functional analysis, change would not necessarily 
be excluded. Firstly, the notion of ‘functional equivalence’ implies that alternative tools or efforts 
may be used to satisfy similar functions and this modality-specific choice or ‘opportunity structure’ 
may introduce contingency and steer action/activity in different directions. Secondly, and relatedly, 
static reproduction – that is, basically non-change – may in itself paradoxically introduce changes. 
Doing the same things over and over may over time alter the quality and composition of factors – a 
logic that, as shall be seen later, not only applies at both the micro and macro level but also works 
                                                          
40 Whether this view is correct or not, even Jon Elster (1982: 455), who is otherwise critical of extending 
functional logics to the social sphere, nonetheless admits – as both Berger & Offe (1982: 523) and Van Parijs 
(1982: 498) notice – that ‘market behavior’ may be explained functionally ‘through a natural-selection model of 
competition between firms’.   
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to emergently chain the two levels to each other. Thirdly, as shall be argued, it is productive take 
state-facilitated functional mechanisms of change into consideration – notably, how state functional 
reproduction indirectly sets processes, mechanisms, organizations and actors (that all have their 
own dynamics and rationality) in motion.  
 
 
3.2.2 The productiveness of corporate functionalism 
It is not only possible and quite justifiable to apply functional analysis – as the above discussion have 
tried to make clear – sophisticated functionalist frameworks can also be very productive. According to 
Kingsley Davis’ (1959) classical statement there is simply no way social science research41 can 
dispense with functional questions, logics and answers. While Davis arguably overstates his case when 
claiming that ‘if there is functional method, it is simply the method of sociological analysis’, and 
because of this arguing that one might as well dispense with the functionalist brand and vocabulary, he 
is quite correct in (at least indirectly) suggesting that whether a scholar intentionally uses an explicit 
functionalist vocabulary or not, functional logics are almost always embedded in her/his modes of 
explanation. Extending, or perhaps inverting, the logic of Davis’ wish to oust the functionalist label 
(since it is for him in practice identical to sociology), one can perhaps say that precisely because most 
social science scholarship to some degree is (knowingly or not) functionalist it makes sense to retain, 
for the sake of clarity, logical sharpness, convenience, etc., the functionalist brand and vocabulary. 
As is partly evident from the above, a positive case for functional analysis that is grounded in 
analytical factors can be made; or, put differently, functionalism also appears beneficial as ’an 
analytical strategy’ (Rosenberg 2008: 158, see generally 158-62). As Rosenberg (Ibid.: 159) explains: 
‘appeals to functions (…) are used for ‘individuating’ and classifying things, for identifying units or 
wholes, for tying together disparate and apparently unconnected things into a larger category’. In this 
view, to ‘[individuate] social institutions by functions’ implies ‘discovering the common function that 
many disparate things serve’ – something that also enables us to ‘begin to frame interesting 
generalizations about them’ (Ibid.: 161, 159). Rosenberg (Ibid.: 159) gives the example of a ‘clock’, 
asking us to ‘consider the incredibly diverse set of physical objects that have this function’ (i.e., not 
                                                          
41 His view focused specifically on sociology and anthropology.     
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only the endless different types of clocks but ‘the many different kind of watch mechanisms’). As he 
points out: ‘what enables us to identify them all as clocks is their function’ (Ibid.). Moreover, in this 
way, ‘knowing functions enables us to identify wholes made up of components and to tell which 
components go with which wholes’ (Ibid.). Categorization/classification is thus essential: although it 
may seem counterintuitive, in functional analysis certain (at least superficially different) institutions 
‘will be classified together with other social institutions having the same role’ (Ibid.: 160). Importantly, 
this maneuver may ‘enable us to recognize the artificiality of distinctions between social institutions’ 
(Ibid.: 161). This study’s state-situated functionalist examination of governance seeks to productively 
utilize these analytical attributes of functional analysis. 
More generally, although a sophisticated form of functional analysis can neither provide 
exhaustive explanations nor guarantee the actual fulfillment of a function, it can point us in the right 
analytical directions and force us to ask productive questions, such as: what are the functional needs or 
requirements of this entity? Or: what function(s) does this piece of legislation seem to serve? To be a 
sophisticated functionalist simply implies assuming (1) that there is a systemic functional ‘pressure’ 
towards something (the precise logic of which depends on the ontological character of the object(s) 
being studied) and (2) that this pressure is relatively strong (unless historical and empirical 
contextualization suggests something contrary).42 In this view, recalling the above Bhaskarian 
understanding of mechanism-oriented causation, to speak of functional necessities or the functional 
fulfillment of needs is to speak of ‘tendency statements’; it suggests not necessity or determinism but 
strong structural tendentiality or disposition. Such form of functionalism may perhaps best be described 
as, to borrow terms used in a slightly different context, a functional ‘orientation’ or ‘outlook’ (Merton 
1968: 100, 85, 86), which, imbued with core ’provisional assumption[s]’, provides a strong ‘directive 
for research’.  
Two additional aspects may be added to this productive characterization of functional analysis. 
Firstly, as Becker (1988: 874, 875) convincingly points out, although there may be no such thing as a 
genuine ‘transhistorical human need’, one may nevertheless reasonably speak of ‘general existential 
                                                          
42 Pressure is here meant in an analytical sense and not in the more specific and substantive way in which Becker 
(1988) seems to refer to it.  
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necessities of social life’.43 It is, for example, arguably possible to locate (through empirically informed 
theorization) ‘the general conditions of life in a capitalist society’ – a ‘central condition of existential 
reproduction’ inter alia being ‘a certain level of profitability’ (Ibid.: 876). In this way, by pointing to 
structural necessities and ‘comprehensive existential condition[s]’ of certain systems/structures/entities, 
it is possible to justifiably tendentially speak of functional needs or requirements (Ibid.: 876). Secondly, 
partly following Van Parijs’ (1982: 504, 510, fn. 14; see also Becker 1988: 873) considerations, it often 
makes more sense to speak of the existence of entities, institutions, items, etc., in terms of defensive 
categories such ‘minimization’ or ‘satisficing’ rather than more optimistic and expansive ones such as 
‘optimality’, ‘maximization’ or ‘optimization’. As Van Parijs (1982: 504, emphasis in original) puts it 
(although the meaning of evolutionary should be left open here): ‘the metaphor of evolutionary 
attraction towards a locally stable optimal position should be replaced by the metaphor of evolutionary 
repulsion away from grossly suboptimal (and therefore unstable) positions’. In this sense, ‘pressure for 
functionality’ should typically ‘be interpreted as pressure toward non-dysfunctionality’ (Becker 1988: 
873).44  
As shall become clear throughout the chapters, this study crucially indirectly departs from much 
substantive/sociological functionalism – notably of the Durkheimian or Parsonian kind – in perceiving 
the modern state, and not the ‘social system’ or ‘society’ as such, as the master unit (i.e., the organism) 
of the functional analysis. While this identification of functional analysis with a more substantive 
account of the functional reproduction of a broader social system is predominant, it is, as the above 
appeal to methodological rather than sociological functionalism also implicitly suggests, not necessary. 
While Merton (1968: 79, emphasis removed, 98, 93, cf. 106) sometimes slips between in principle 
speaking of any type of ‘organism’ or ‘social structure’ and launching his codification of functional 
analysis in relation to works addressing the ‘total social system’45 or ‘society as a whole’, it seems (at 
least indirectly) clear that (1) he accepts the existence of other arguably smaller units such as ‘the 
                                                          
43 It should be stressed that contrary to Becker (1988: 878), and in line with the above reasoning, these ‘general 
existential necessities’ need not only imply objective (and thus for Becker unintentional) necessity.      
44 It should be stressed that while this study shares Van Parijs’ and (partly) Becker’s emphasis on ‘minimization’ 
over ‘maximization’, it rejects their explicit suggestions that only the former can or should be taken into account 
or that the two types of functional dynamics are mutually exclusive.  
45 This is Radcliffe-Brown’s formulation (as cited in Merton).  
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patriarchal family system’46 and (2) the methodologically-oriented functionalist terminology which he 
applies perfectly allows for conceiving functional reproduction and maintenance from within a specific 
organization or corporation (and specifically the modern state). Partly reconstructing and partly going 
beyond Merton’s (1968: chapter 3) terminology, I shall  propose a descending three-level conceptual 
hierarchy suitable for this study consisting of (1) an organism (whatever chosen emergent 
system/society/social structure, etc.), (2) its functions (its analytically identified structurally constitutive 
component parts) and (3) specific items (Ibid.: 81-2), or clusters of items (that is, analytically identified 
functionally relevant concrete practices and actions, policies/regulations, beliefs, etc.).47   
This conscious switch from what may be called total societal functionalism to corporate 
functionalism, not only implies that this study has little explicit or direct to say about the maintenance 
of society as such or the ‘total social system’ – in this type of state functionalism, in which the state is 
the master unit of analysis, focus is rather on total state reproduction – but arguably also that the applied 
functional framework is in fact provided with a more social-theoretically convincing basis.48 On the one 
hand, the shift from society to the state merely implies a shift from one type of large-scale social 
structure (or social system) to another. On the other hand, as discussed, corporate entities, such as 
notably modern states, are different from other types of social structure; they are transcendental and 
administratively formalized organizationally- and institutionally-emergent juridical actors with a high 
degree of agency and a strong historically concentrated self-interested orientation.49 Because corporate 
actors, modern states being powerful large-scale extreme examples of these (see also Coleman 1974: 
29, 1982: 50, 35), are extraordinary in their emergentist powers, i.e. in the independent extra-individual 
causality that is organizationally- and institutionally concentrated and possessed, they are also the most 
functionally believable social entities. Self-interested corporate personhood is highly correlated with a 
hyper-strategic functional (i.e., maintenance/maximization-oriented) sense of direction, and thus makes 
                                                          
46 This is a Richard LaPiere’s formulation (as cited in Merton).  
47 In this view, using the (inappropriate or not) metaphor of the human organism, the state is the organism, the 
(state’s) functions are its vital organs and the specific (regulatory, fiscal, cultural, etc.) items are the body’s 
individual cells. 
48 As argued earlier, although this move technically speaking breaks with the terminology of Habermas’ and 
Offe’s early nominal sub-systemic LAF setup, it is nonetheless in line with the spirit and implicit logic of their 
analyses.   
49 The notion of self-interest with regards to corporate actors/states shall be addressed in more details in chapter 5.  
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corporate actors especially prone to functional analysis. Arguably, a basic social-theoretical condition 
of possibility for, for example, commonsensically addressing the corporate activities of Coca Cola or 
making foreign policy comments in the form of the French or Chinese state ‘saying’, ‘signing’ or 
‘doing’ something, is that one unproblematically accepts the existence of, and can at least implicitly 
identify, a causally emergent and functionally constituted form of personhood. In this sense, 
emergentism allows for, or conditions, the higher than usual functional logic and outlook of 
corporations.50  
Corporations are functionally hardwired in a much more convincing way than any overarching 
‘society’ or ‘social system’; as proactive institutional-organizational actors, they are reasonably and 
commonsensically understood to be routinely and strategically (that is, with a high degree of both 
intentionality and recognition) seeking ways/patterns of maintaining/maximizing certain structurally 
constituted needs and requirements. This commonsensical intentionality implied by corporate 
personhood has an important overlooked implication for understanding the distinction between 
subjective (or manifest) and objective (or latent) functions. Recalling Becker’s (1988: 867, 875) point – 
arguably shared by many – that functional analysis should refer to latent (unintended and/or 
unrecognized) functions rather than unproblematic regular ‘intended functions’, one can say that 
corporate actors, like modern states or multinational profit-making companies, dissolve or at least 
problematize any sharp distinction between the manifest and the latent. To some non-trivial extent, 
emergent corporate personhood renders a marketing campaign or a particular piece of fiscal regulation, 
intentionally and explicitly designed to enhance, respectively, profitability or (for example) economic 
growth, identical to the equally goal-specific practical activity of drinking water because one is thirsty 
(i.e., to fulfill a ‘thirst function’). Importantly, because (1) strategic and self-interested functional 
activity is deeply constitutive of corporate actors and (2) as mentioned (and as shall be discussed later), 
a heightened societal corporatization has taken place, it is clear that (3) every functionalist is obliged to 
also accept as functional most types of intentional and conscious fulfillments of functions and take 
these into account when diagnosing societal patterns.      
It is important to stress two things regarding the proposed maneuver of conceiving the modern 
state as an alternative type of functionally constituted social structure than the ‘total social system’. 
                                                          
50 Compare this argument with Rosenberg’s (2008: 143, 158, 160, 162) generic claim about a natural connection 
between methodological holism (or social facts) and functionalism.  
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Firstly, this maneuver in no way implies that the state is identical to or exhausts society. Arguably, 
something which may be labelled ‘society’ exists, and is typically more encompassing than the state.51 
Just as the employees of The Coca Cola Company are also simultaneously its (potential) costumers, one 
can say that citizens, as lower-level entities, are simultaneously (1) part of the state’s specific internal 
corporate structure and (2) part of society and the larger social system. Thus, in this view, although the 
state is not identical to this, it is part of society or arguably a larger entity called, for example, the ‘total 
social system’. In other words, while society’s existence (and extra-statist societal dynamics) is 
accepted, this study is focused on the institutionally-organizationally speaking internal dynamics of the 
functional reproduction of modern statehood52  – a perspective that conceives the modern state as a 
distinctive emergent social system in its own right. Importantly, though, accepting the existence of 
society does not necessarily imply that the researcher must be able to provide a fully-fledged theory of 
society – as shall also be discussed more generally in the next chapter, whether and to what extent such 
a task is necessary critically depends on many factors, substantive as well as pragmatic ones.  
Secondly, and relatedly, to view something from within the corporate social system of the modern 
state in the above way does not presuppose a commitment to the type of effective ontological or radical 
constructivism that for example arguably informs Luhmann’s (e.g., 1986; see also examples in Elder-
Vass 2007b: 416-20) system/environment conception. Rather, what is being proposed here, with 
regards to the question of the status of the inside/internal vs. outside/external distinction in the case of 
the corporate entity of the state, is a form of (critical) realist founded epistemological constructivism.  
On the one hand, there is, as mentioned, a real ‘outside’ which is at varying degrees causally 
impinging on the state entity. On the other hand, as shall be discussed, the emergent historical logic of 
modern corporate statehood also points towards the constitution of a form of ‘organizational 
solipsism’53 (Marchese 2012), in which states comes to perceive and factor in social reality from their 
own interest-driven functional perspectives, or, as Scott (1998) might put it, their simplifying and 
categorizing ‘lenses’. Thus, this (what might be called) ‘lens effect’ ensures, in a Luhmannian fashion 
(albeit here a muffled and non-radical one), that a productive mediation between the inside and the 
outside takes place inside the corporation. As Offe (1975: 135) argues, albeit a bit cryptically and 
                                                          
51 Of course, ‘societies’ may principally exist at whatever level (local, national, regional, global, etc.).  
52 The specific type/model of statehood to be studied shall be specified later.  
53 Marchese (2012) uses the term in relation to leadership roles and management practices.     
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perhaps ultimately too boldly: ‘[e]very time a state deals with a problem in its environment, it deals 
with a problem of itself, that is, its internal mode of operation’. Importantly, again, the relatively 
solipsistic functional ‘lens’ of the corporate person does not imply that the outside/external reality of 
the corporation is non-existent but rather that this lens fosters an intensified search for dimensions and 
properties of this larger social reality that may further the maintenance/maximization of this entity. 
Here, in an analogous way, one can say that the patterns, opinions, whims, etc., of the costumers and 
the rest of society (of which there might also be potential costumers) figure into The Coca Cola 
Company’s calculations, rationale and systemic/functional practices to historically varying degrees, 
depending on the specific organizationally-institutionally specified functional relevance of these 
‘outside’ dimensions.    
Although this issue shall be addressed more carefully in chapter 5, it is possible to flag some basic 
analytical considerations regarding the inside/internal vs. outside/external distinction and the problem 
of ensuring smooth functional reproduction. Firstly, it seems evident that Luhmannian a priori posited 
notions such as systemic autopoiesis – or what should actually more realistically be considered ‘quasi-
autopoietic’ dynamics – ‘must always be supported by an explanation of why lower-level mechanisms 
and external causal factors can be neglected in a particular range of cases’ (Elder-Vass 2007b: 421, 
emphasis removed), or, less strictly put, should preferably be historically and empirically situated. 
Secondly, and more generally, one can say that while the extent to which the outside/external impinges 
on the inside/internal is ultimately historically/empirically contingent it nevertheless systematically 
depends on the relatively causal saliency of the outside/external forces – that is, more specifically, (1) 
the specific ontological character of the objects being studied (the causal forces associated with the 
relevant entities), (2) the socio-historical ‘opportunity structures’ connected to these objects/entities and 
obviously (3) chance and the specific dynamics of micro-situated interaction. Specifying this a bit 
further, the degree to which outside factors – which, as mentioned, have an independent reality – 
impinge on and figure into a corporation’s considerations depends on the degree to which, firstly, one 
or all of the above three factors kick in and, secondly, these outside factors are considered to be 
potentially affecting it (which of course is related to the former).  
While this issue shall be explored in more details later (especially in chapter 5), one can say that 
this perspective, first of all, tries to overcome two ideal-typical traps: frameworks that abstractly or a 
priori focus exclusively (or one-sidedly) on either the internal/endogenous or the external/exogenous 
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constitution and functional reproduction of a social structure. Second, and importantly, this perspective 
argues that while the importance of the outside/external dimension for functional reproduction varies 
empirically, this variation is not free-floating but structurally and historically situated in relatively 
systematic or patterned ways that can be, as I shall variously attempt to do throughout the study, further 
detailed, sketched, outlined and surveyed (cf. Alexander & Colomy 1990: 48).   
 
In this chapter I have explained and discussed how key ontological/social-theoretical 
considerations concerning notably emergentist statehood and corporate functionalism critically inform 
and constitute the study. Importantly, as part of doing this aspects integral to the governance 
phenomenon, and in particular the basic scientific conditions for studying it, has been addressed and 
sought tackled. In the next chapter, the study’s key epistemological/methodological considerations and 
maneuvers, relevant and necessary for examining governance, shall be presented and discussed.   
65 
 
Chapter 4. Epistemological and Methodological Considerations: The 
Discovery-Justification Nexus, the Historical-Theoretical Approach 
and the Methodological Strategy  
 
Against the background of the previous chapter’s constitutive philosophical/social-theoretical 
considerations, this chapter shall focus on key (still very much related) epistemological-cum-
methodological questions. More than anything, as shall become clear, this study’s advocacy (and 
particular account) of historical-theoretical research, is deeply informed by a general intellectual desire, 
obviously shared by eminent scholars such as C. Wright Mills (1959) and Pierre Bourdieu (for a 
programmatic statement, see 1988), to in all modesty try to break with many of the arguably 
unproductive epistemological/methodological dichotomies, dualities, etc., still prevailing in social 
science. In this general dichotomy-breaking spirit, the chapter shall engage in three overall tasks. The 
first section centers on the problematic aspects of the dominant neo-positivist distinction between 
‘discovery’ and ‘justification’. This epistemological undertaking is necessary since it serves to defend 
and set up the subsequent methodological maneuvers. Through a critical discussion and selective 
synthesis of some of the relevant extant literature, the second section presents and discusses the main 
properties of the historical-theoretical approach (HTA) organizing the study’s analysis of governance 
and its conditions of possibility. The third and last section, informed by the two previous ones, proceeds 
to explain the more detailed methodological procedures of the study. As this chapter, like the preceding 
one, more generally constitutes a reflection on the important scientific conditions of studying 
governance, and thus should not be considered merely introductory, extra energy is spent on these 
epistemological/methodological issues.     
 
 
4.1 The discovery-justification nexus  
As mentioned, this study’s analysis of governance is informed by and organized through a specific type 
of HTA, which shall be explained in section two. But before, and partially as part of, unpacking the 
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main characteristics of this ideally dichotomy-breaking approach it is necessary to prepare the ground 
by discussing and transcending a few of the dominant pitfalls organically informing mainstream neo-
positivist thinking, as well as asses the methodological merits and philosophical compatibility of some 
of the important well-known social science tools. The section shall both question the social-scientific 
dominance of the distinction between ‘discovery’ and ‘justification’ and critically discuss the merits, 
implications and analytical usability of certain prevailing methodological procedures in terms of this 
distinction. As a useful way of framing/organizing this task, I shall first briefly introduce two important 
pairs of conceptual distinctions/relations (that is, four concepts in total).  
Firstly, although this theme is rarely explicitly referred to in social science research (for an 
exception, see Swedberg 2014), philosophers of science have, ever since the logical positivist/empiricist 
Hans Reichenbach introduced it in 1938 in his work Experience and Prediction, discussed the relevance 
of a distinction between a ’context of discovery’ and a ’context of justification’ – what Hoyningen-
Huene (2006) labels ‘the DJ distinction’. Arguably, proponents of this DJ distinction generally refer to 
it as a separation between (1) a (typically temporal, empirical, factual or historical) process related to 
the more private generation or formation (i.e., ‘discovery’) of ideas/theories/hypotheses/arguments ,etc., 
and (2) a process, method or logic related to the more public testing and validation (i.e., ‘justification’) 
of these (cf. Richardson 2006: 42; Hoyningen-Huene 2006: 120; Arabatzis 2006: 215; Steinle 2006: 
183, 188).          
Secondly, and relatedly, Marx (1990: 101-2) – in his all-too-rare meta-commentary, presented in 
the postface to the second edition of the first volume of The Capital– sets up a helpful distinction 
between his ‘method of enquiry’ and his ‘method of presentation’. In the spirit of the above DJ 
distinction, this conceptual pair may be referred to as Marx’s EP distinction. Sidestepping otherwise 
interesting discussions concerning the detailed contextual and analytical properties of Marx’s dialectical 
method (e.g., Paolucci 2000), the following commonsensical characterization of the distinction can be 
fleshed out: while the ‘method of enquiry’ refers to the specific intellectual procedure or logic through 
which certain ideas/theories/hypotheses/arguments, etc., have actually been generated, the ‘method of 
presentation’ refers to the specific form (or the intellectual procedure or logic underlying this) in which 
these are being presented. In sum, the chapter now has at its disposal two distinctions – both the DJ and 
the EP distinction – and four concepts, namely the ’context of discovery’ and the ’context of 
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justification’, on the DJ side, and the ‘method of enquiry’ and the ‘method of presentation’, on the EP 
side.  
 
 
4.1.1 Problematizing the distinction 
I shall now problematize the DJ distinction. As the important book on the DJ distinction entitled 
Revisiting Discovery and Justification: Historical and Philosophical Perspectives on the Context 
Distinction (Schickore & Steinle 2006b), an edited collection of chapters written by established 
philosophy/history of science scholars, clearly demonstrates, the distinction is extremely precarious and 
contested. As Schickore & Steinle (2006a: vii) point out, the status of the DJ distinction within 
philosophy of science gradually weakened already from the 1960s, with two ‘related lines of critique’ 
being brought forward – one focused on ‘the exclusion of discovery from the domain of philosophy of 
science’ and another focused on ‘the exclusion of history and sociology’ (Ibid.: vii). This chapter/study 
is mostly interested in the implications of the latter type of critique, initiated with Kuhn’s pioneering 
work (Ibid.: ix), which focuses on questioning the merits of the separation itself. Drawing on the 
sophisticated discussion in Schickore & Steinle (2006b), I shall try to recap and synthesize some of the 
most important arguments against maintaining the distinction (or at least a strict separation):  
 As Hoyningen-Huene (2006: 120) points out regarding the assumption of a temporal distinction 
between a discovery phase and a justificatory phase, ‘[i]t is doubtful that it is really possible to 
identify discovery and justification processes in the history of an item that is an unquestionable 
candidate for having been discovered and having been justified’.  
 
 As Steinle (2006: 190) points out, ‘justification is always relative to a specific conceptual 
framework and this relativity transfers to the validity of the results that have been justified’. 
Moreover, ‘not only have concepts been formed and stabilized in historical processes, but they 
continue to bear traces of these processes as well; their historicity is irreducible’ (Ibid.).  
o In this way, as ‘justification turns out to be more genuinely bound to history than is usually 
assumed’, it becomes possible to establish a strong correlation between ‘the historicity of 
concepts’ and a kind of ‘historicity of justification’ (Ibid.: 183, 192) – and perhaps even to 
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speak of regular historical regimes of ‘justificatory procedures’ (cf. Schickore & Steinle 
2006a: xiv).54   
 
 Concepts are typically ‘formed and corroborated at the same time’ (Steine 2006: 187). As Arabatzis 
(2006: 216) points out in a more general manner, ‘hypothesis generation and theory construction are 
extended problem-solving processes with many stages, each of which involves (partial) 
justification’. In a somewhat similar vein, as shall be discussed below concerning the ‘ideal-type’, 
rather than reflecting any kind of neat temporal separation, one can say that social science 
conception-formation processes most often actually involves a swaying series of sub-level or 
smaller heterogeneous packages of discoveries and justifications or hypotheses and tests.55  
 
 In the spirit of Kuhn’s claim that ‘scientists who share the concerns and sensibilities of the 
individual who discovers a new theory are ipso facto likely to appear disproportionality frequently 
among that theory’s first supporters’ (as cited in Arabatzis 2006: 216), it can more neutrally be 
argued that the validity of a theory/argument is either bolstered or weakened as the knowledge of or 
intimacy with its actual historical formation increases. Also in this specific sense is it true that, as 
Steinle (2006) points out continuously, genesis and validity is highly correlated.     
 
 Arabatzis (2006: 271) gives the example of ‘the discovery of unobservable entities’. In this relation, 
although I shall not take on board Arabatzis’ (Ibid.) entire argument on this matter, it is minimally 
obvious that ‘[t]he context of discovery is ‘laden’ with the context of justification because 
‘discovery’ is a term which refers to an epistemic achievement; if one succeeds in discovering 
something then, no doubt, this something exists’.  
 
                                                          
54 Relatedly, in a Kuhnian sense, one may speak of historically changing ‘communal cognitive values’ 
(Hoyningen-Huene 2006: 127).  
55 More generally, on the multifarious structure/logic of ‘complex’ explanatory schemes such as the one utilized in 
Weber’s The Protestant Ethic, see also the argument in Hernes (1989: 157-9), which provides a formalized 
reconstruction of Weber’s thesis. See also, again more generally, Beach & Pedersen (2013: especially 64-67, 34-
36) on the ‘eclectic’ setting up of ‘non-systematic mechanisms’ (more on this later).  
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 As Nickles’ (2006: 159) forcefully argues, although this is often overlooked, the ‘context of 
justification’ not only involves what he calls ‘epistemic appraisal (EP)’ but also to a very large 
extent ‘heuristic appraisal (HA)’.56 Whereas the former ‘attends to truth-conducive features of 
justification and decision-making’, the latter ‘attends to a variety of heuristic and pragmatic 
considerations relating to economy of research’ (Ibid.). As a necessary and ‘distinct form of 
evaluation’, heuristic appraisal ‘evaluates the promise, the future potential (including what is at 
stake), the problem-solving capacity, or what we might call the ‘opportunity profile’ of a claim, 
technique, proposal etc.’ (Ibid.: 161). Clearly, one cannot ‘[treat] justification as a purely epistemic 
affair’ (Ibid.: 163).    
o Arguably, understanding HA generically, as ‘a loose, catch-all category that includes a great 
diversity of things, including pragmatic as well as strictly heuristic ones’ (Ibid.: 164), it also 
involves standard but actually non-trivial necessary pragmatic 
decisions/considerations/declarations by the scholar regarding for example the time spent on 
researching an issue, what to include, the level of specification of an argument, etc.57 As 
Nickles (Ibid.: 162-3, 169, passim) stresses, EAs and HAs, epistemic and 
heuristic/pragmatic considerations, do not have to be correlated. Theories, hypotheses, 
findings, etc., cannot purely depend on ‘internal factors’ – and, as a matter of historical fact, 
they are never actually solely epistemically assessed in terms of their truth-value (Ibid.: 169, 
164, 168, passim). Typically, ‘[s]cientists are not so much interested in final justification of 
truth claims as in getting results reliable enough to continue on to the next stage of 
investigation’ (Ibid.: 175).  
o Of course, the salient question – which Nickles naturally cannot answer (and is not really 
interested in) – remains what factors regulate the relative primacy of EA and HA regarding 
both the formation and later assessment of a certain scientific item? Even though it may be 
argued – in a Popperian spirit – that while HA may be factually, historically, descriptively, 
causally, etc., important, justification must/should in any case exclusively remain an ex-post 
logical or normative assessment (e.g., Hoyningen-Huene 2006: 122), one is still left with the 
                                                          
56 As Nickles (2006: 159) points out, heuristic appraisal is connected to both types of contexts.   
57 Although there is nothing in Nickles’ definition of HA that would exclude such usage, it is unclear to what 
extent his understanding in the first instance concerns these more mundane pragmatic considerations.   
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fact that, as established, the ‘two contexts are inextricably linked’ (Arabatzis 2006: 217) and 
the unanswered question of both (1) ‘how (…) one attain[s] the norms for proper 
justification and testing’ (Hoyningen-Huene 2006: 122) and, related to the above, (2) by 
which standards one may determine whether EA or HA should be most important in a given 
case.     
 
In sum, although one may arguably retain a certain ‘lean’ version of the DJ distinction that simply 
differentiates between two possible ‘perspectives’ or ‘attitudes’ on scholarly work (one being 
factual/descriptive, the other being normative/evaluative) (Hoyningen-Huene 2006: 128-30; see also 
Schickore & Steinle 2006a: xiii), the above (highly non-exhaustive) series of arguments against 
maintaining a distinction between the two contexts either ‘sets definite limits to the separability of 
genesis and validity’ or entail that the separation ‘is useless and may even hinder an appropriate 
understanding‘ (Steine 2006: 191, 187).  
 
 
4.1.2 The unproductive vitality of the distinction 
Importantly, though, despite this questionable philosophical status of the DJ distinction, one may 
nevertheless speak of the ‘persistent if unstated force of the distinction’, which is for example notably 
visible ‘[i]n methodological introductions of science textbooks’ where ‘it shapes the regulations for 
scientific research’ (Schickore & Steinle 2006a: x, ix). In these textbooks/handbooks it is typically 
unrealistically and simplistically claimed that ‘the (unsystematic) process of discovery is completed 
before the (regulated) process of justification and testing can begin’ (Ibid.: ix). Of course, as ‘scientists 
and science educators’ also argue, this supposed ‘two-step scheme is frequently violated in practice’ 
(Ibid.). Arguably, ‘[t]extbook accounts (…) contrast most sharply to the actual research process in the 
laboratory, in the field or at the desk’ (Steinle 2006: 189) – in this sense, they are extremely 
‘dehistoricized and decontextualized’.  
There is every indication that the DJ distinction also (explicitly or implicitly) informs mainstream 
(most often neo-positivist) social science guidelines on methods, research design, case study analysis, 
etc., in a similar unproductive way. Importantly, to the extent that this is the case, it follows that such 
work and its methodological procedures naturally lose its convincingness and saliency.    
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As a first observation it is symptomatic that so many of the leading social science methodologists 
prefer not to mention the DJ distinction or engage with philosophy of science issues more generally. As 
for example the highly influential social science methods book, Designing Social Inquiry (King et al. 
1994: 6), widely known as simply KKV, makes it clear in its opening pages: ‘[o]ur focus here on 
empirical research means that we sidestep many issues in the philosophy of social science’.58 Also 
Gerring (2001, 2007), a more contemporary dominant scholar of ‘social science methodology’ does not 
discuss the philosophical critique of the DJ distinction or the many philosophy of social science 
problems associated with the arguably empirical realist perspective that implicitly informs his 
methodological guidelines. 
Importantly, although King et al. (1994: e.g., 13) and particularly Gerring (2001: 22-3, 230-40, 
2007: 39-43) seem to implicitly accept that in actual research practice the DJ distinction is (especially 
temporally) fuzzy, they nonetheless – along with more sophisticated and KKV-skeptical social science 
methodologists (e.g., George & Bennett 2005: 111-123; Beach & Pedersen 2013) – effectively maintain 
a (both temporal and logical) separation between the two contexts when discussing the choice between 
either deduction or induction or the generation/building/development/conjecturing/exploration of a 
theory/hypothesis/case, on the one hand, and the testing/confirmation/refutation of these, on the other.59 
Importantly, while the above scholars seem to factually accept that some social science work straddle 
the deduction-induction divide, in the end they (1) tend to think of such ‘iterative’ activity as ‘forming 
the background for further searches’ (Beach & Pedersen 2013: 18, see also 64) and/or (2) think that 
legitimate tests or revisions of a theory requires ‘new facts or new evidence within the same case’ 
(George & Bennett 2005: 219, emphasis in original, see also 111-12).  
Interestingly, also otherwise sophisticated recent works like Swedberg’s (2014) The Art of Social 
Theory unfortunately fails to problematize the DJ distinction that effectively informs and thus weakens 
                                                          
58 On the general tendency of neo-positivists, like, for example, King et al. (1994), to ‘unreflectively’ or implicitly 
conflate all philosophy of science/methodology/methods with specifically neo-positivist philosophy of 
science/methodology/methods, see Jackson (2011: 222, fn. 29, 67-88). See also more generally Mills (1959: 57).  
59 While, to be sure, Beach & Pedersen’s (2013: 18-21, 19, 169, 63-64) more refined setup introduces the more 
‘iterative’ and messy ‘explaining-outcome process-tracing’ (to be briefly engaged with later) as an alternative to 
the two more traditional ‘theory-testing’ and ‘theory-building’ variants, this former process-tracing strategy is 
arguably still constituted by ‘deductive and inductive paths’ – these are ‘two alternative paths’ – and in their 
description of it they still speak of, for example, different ‘stages’.  
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the book. Swedberg (2014: 26) attempts to theorize and provide practical ‘tips’ for dealing with what he 
calls the ‘prestudy’ (effectively the context of discovery), while leaving open the details and core tenets 
of what he calls the ‘main study’ (effectively the context of justification). Importantly, though, while 
Swedberg (2014: 26, 211, 219, 220-22, 247) a few times seems to briefly acknowledge the dialectical 
connection between the pre- and main study, the book’s entire structure and argumentation is hampered 
by a bold prestudy/main study separation (Ibid.: 26, 98, 8), and thus a firm maintenance of the DJ 
distinction, which is accompanied by statements for example promising/requiring that the prestudy 
should later be ‘properly tested against facts’.  
Moreover, while Swedberg (2014: 209, cf. 207-8, 218-19) for example mentions that final 
presentations should preferably be ‘logical, clear and analytical’, the book overall leaves open the 
question of how to justify the method of enquiry applied in the context of discovery/prestudy phase. For 
example, how to reconstruct or present the logic that made something make sense?  
That the writing process itself is deeply connected to thinking and the method of enquiry/context 
of discovery is something that the ‘classic social analysts’60 were greatly aware of. For example, in the 
preface to his A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx (1904: 9) writes: 
 
The entire material lies before me in the form of monographs, written at long intervals not for publication, but for the 
purpose of clearing up those questions to myself, and their systematic elaboration on the plan outlined above will depend 
upon circumstances 
 
We see here that writing, for Marx, is a way of ‘clearing up those questions to [himself]’; the 
thinking process is directly constituted by the writing/drafting. The next question naturally becomes: 
how to present this necessary draft – that is, necessary in terms of ‘discovering’ your 
ideas/theories/arguments – in a way that is helpful, productive or convincing? Or asked differently: 
what kind of considerations goes into the method of presentation? Clearly, these questions depend on 
many factors: the perennial time issue (which implies that all presentations are always in the midst of 
the context of discovery), pragmatic considerations (e.g., practical possibilities for rewriting), the 
maturity/level of understanding of one’s own arguments, what counts as convincing in a given situation 
                                                          
60 Mills (1959: 6, 21) speaks fondly of the ‘classic social analyst’ or ‘classic social analysis’ (such as Marx, 
Durkheim, Weber, Mannheim, Veblen).   
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or context, and so on – which all necessarily help decide how much the method of presentation reflects 
the method of enquiry.  
Interestingly, many works are convincing exactly because they to some non-trivial extent take 
you through their method of enquiry, because they present, and keep somewhat intact, their context of 
discovery. Arguably, many of the superior now classic texts – such as notably Marx’s Primitive 
Accumulation section (1867: part eight), Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism 
(1930), Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation (1944) and Foucault’s Discipline and Punish (1975) 
– achieve their intellectually productiveness (which is easily evidenced by the endless academic and 
popular references made to these texts (see also Mills 1959: 125)) precisely because they, in a (for 
them) organic and natural manner, (1) collapse the DJ distinction and (2) manage to somewhat match 
the method of presentation with the method of enquiry; they reveal how presentation is productively 
linked to justification: showing the context of discovery/method of enquiry can help justify it.  
Mainstream textbooks and much neo-positivist social science work firmly upholding the DJ 
distinction are of course representative of the complete opposite maneuver: the ‘clean’ results are 
usually neatly presented in the final reconstructed ‘decontextualized’ (Steinle 2006: 188-9) version. As 
Blachowicz’s (2009: 331, 330) systematic philosophy of science examination of textbooks 
symptomatically show, although some of them do acknowledge for example ‘feedback loops’, ‘none of 
the examined texts scrutinizes revision/correction very closely at all’. Although it of course makes 
sense to engage in an ex-post synthetic ‘reconstruction process’ (Nickles 2006: 176; see also Arabatzis 
2006: 218), as any work (including this study) necessarily must do, it is not unproblematic. Firstly, it 
may not only give an imprecise depiction of scholarly work (thus failing to properly guide others) but 
also serve to make the final product more neutral and ‘scientific’ in the specific neo-positivist sense.61 
Moreover, in the case of an extremely synthetic ‘reconstruction process’, the above argued pedagogical 
and justificatory productiveness of taking the reader through the method of enquiry is lost.     
Secondly, by sterilely cleaning up the final product (or advising scholars to do this), social 
science scholars and textbook authors in this way sidestep the fact that, as mentioned, presented 
concepts and arguments most often represent, embody, constitute and involve a whole range of 
underlying or embedded swaying packages of discoveries and justifications or hypotheses and tests. 
                                                          
61 For a more (condoning) description of this ’reconstruction process’, see Nickles (2006: 176). Interestingly, even 
King et al. (1994: 13) at some level seem to accept this process as lying behind synthetic revisions of texts.  
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Interestingly, the earlier mentioned neo-positivist maxim that qualitative scholars must not ‘[use] the 
same data to generate and test a theory’ (King et al. 1994: 23) is of course not even uphold by (self-
described Popperian) regression-based scholars (for a similar observation, see Rueschemeyer & 
Stephens as cited in Gerring 2001: 237, fn. 6).  
 
 
4.1.3 Three attempts at overcoming the distinction 
Some qualitative scholars implicitly try to sidestep/tackle the annoyance of the dominant neo-positivist 
separation between deduction and induction – which in some ways is a specific variant of the more 
general problem of the DJ distinction – by making reference to Charles S. Peirce’s increasingly popular 
notion of ‘abduction’. Although very productive, rather than necessarily helping to dissolve the DJ 
distinction or transcend its embedded deduction-induction separation, it in some ways also serves to 
entrench and codify these demarcations. This is especially evident from Swedberg’s (2014, 230-48, 
passim) helpful appendix reconstructing the notion of abduction and Peirce’s work more generally. 
Here, one learns that abduction, which means ‘[coming] up with a new idea’ – and which thus at first 
glance correctly seems to resemble a call for collapsing the DJ distinction – ‘must be followed by 
deduction and induction to be complete and for a scientific enquiry to be possible’ (Ibid.: 236, 240, 
more generally 235-40). In this sense, Peirce have through the notion of abduction to a large extent 
simply theorized/highlighted another, third, mode of thinking/investigation of the scientific repertoire, 
and placed it in a temporal chain which, because ‘abduction can never represent the end of the enquiry’ 
(Ibid.: 240), necessarily requires subsequent steps/stages of deductive and inductive maneuvers. In this 
way, while it surely represents a step in the right direction, abduction remains a limited tool; it arguably 
keeps the DJ distinction intact.  
Another complimentary potential way of getting around the DJ distinction and the related 
deduction-induction division is through what critical realists refer to as ‘retroduction’ (see notably 
Danermark et al. 2002: especially 96-106), as also discussed earlier.62 As ‘a mode of inference’ or ‘a 
thought operation’, operating more or less alongside/together with induction, deduction and abduction, 
                                                          
62 A discussion of the relationship between the two notions of retroduction and abduction can be found in, for 
example, Danermark et al. (2002: 80-1, 88-100).     
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retroduction aims ‘to identify foundational conditions behind concrete historical events’ (Ibid.: 96, 99). 
It is sometimes considered ‘the vital contribution of critical realism to social scientific methodology’ 
(Ibid.: 11). Through retroduction, which can operate ‘both as analyses at a very high level of abstraction 
and as analyses of more specific conditions for social processes’, the scholar seeks to ‘[provide]  
knowledge of transfactual conditions, structures and mechanisms’ (Ibid.: 98, 80).  
Clearly, as addressed in the introduction and as shall be discussed further below, this study is both 
sympathetic to the retroductive agenda and explicitly set up in a way that directly relies on overall 
retroductive inferences and questioning. Importantly, because retroduction, relying on the researcher’s 
‘[a]bility to abstract’ (Danermark et al. 2002: 81),63 naturally straddles the three (critical realist) 
domains in its quest to explain the social conditions of possibility for certain entities, it organically 
collapses the DJ distinction. That said, although retroductive scholars like Danermark et al. (Ibid.: e.g., 
108-12) to some extent (at least indirectly) acknowledges many of the problems associated with the DJ 
distinction, it is unclear whether, to what extent and how retroductive analysis should be both later 
scrutinized and finally presented, and retroduction sometimes simply becomes yet another 
‘complimentary’ (Ibid.: e.g., 75, 79, 87, 109, 113) tool, alongside deduction, induction and (now) 
abduction, which at other stages of the research is accompanied by more specific tests, scrutiny, 
theoretical clarification, etc. Thus, while genuinely taking us one non-trivial step in the right direction, 
retroduction neither exhausts the criticism of the DJ distinction nor necessarily constitute the most 
important basis for promoting a historical-theoretical approach that tries to overcome the unproductive 
deduction-induction division.  
While abduction and retroduction can only take us so far, ‘ideal-types’ (Weber 1949) constitute a 
more genuine break with the unproductive dichotomous logic of the DJ distinction and the related 
deduction-induction division; interpreted in the right way, ideal-types, or ‘ideal-typification’ (e.g., 
Jackson 2011: 114), arguably best embody the spirit and proposed productiveness of (this study’s 
understanding of) a HTA. Ideal-types, as Weber’s (1949: 90, emphasis in original) well-known 
definition puts it, are:  
 
                                                          
63 I do not have space here to elaborate on the importance of the notion of abstraction, whether in critical realist 
thinking or as part of Marx’s (implicit or explicit) methodology.   
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(…) formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, 
discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to 
those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct  
 
Both interpreting this definition and attempting to integrate and slightly weigh some of the useful 
meta-writings on Weber’s ideal type, the following defining elements shall be non-exhaustively 
mentioned and discussed: 
 The ideal-type is an active and ‘deliberate construction’ (Ringer 1997: 112, 114, 116, 120; 
Jackson 2011: 145, 152; Drysdale 1996: 80-1). 
 The process underlying the selective accentuation and synthesis of factors constituting an ideal-
type is intrinsically and necessarily connected to both the contextual ‘sphere of values’ 
surrounding the researcher and her/his specific ‘stand-taking’ and ‘value commitment(s)’ 
(Jackson 2011: 144-5).  
 This always already necessary interpretive or subjective dimension notwithstanding, as 
Drysdale (1996: 82, 83, 82, fn. 23) stresses, the ‘traits/elements accentuated’ are not simply 
arbitrarily free-floating, but needs to somehow be in ‘conformity to the object’; the selected 
elements ‘are ‘found’ in reality’ – or, minimally, represent an ‘objective possibility’ – and ‘are 
understood as ‘characteristic’ of the phenomenon in its distinctiveness’ (cf. Ringer 1997: 110-
121; cf. Jackson 2011: 142-155).     
 However, despite this correlation (or non-arbitrary limiting relationship) between the ideal type 
and the ontological nature (and empirical observability) of the relevant underlying entity, ideal 
types remain synthetic creatures that must ultimately primarily be assessed according to a 
pragmatic (or perhaps heuristic) theory of truth (Jackson 2011: 146, 142); what matters is 
simply whether the ideal-type is ‘useful’ – that is, ‘an appropriate means to the analytical end 
that animates the scholar’s scientific activity’ – and for that reason ideal-types are ‘not available 
for any kind of direct empirical verification or falsification’ (Ibid.).  
 
Importantly, an overlooked aspect of ideal-types is that as natural bearers of both deductive and 
inductive elements (and abductive and retroductive for that matter) they fruitfully implicitly collapse 
the DJ distinction. Implicitly against this, it is typically argued – usually based on textual evidence 
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(Weber 1949: e.g., 92) – that ideal-type concepts are merely ‘means in the service of the end of 
hypothesis construction’ or ‘elements out of which judgements, in the form of hypothetical 
constructions, are formed’ (Drysdale 1996: 79, emphasis in original). Or as Swedberg (2014: 63, 60-4, 
77, 188) describes it, the ideal-type primarily serves a ‘heuristic’ function, which ‘makes it particularly 
well suited for theorizing during the stage of the prestudy’; it should be ‘discarded’ once it ‘has fulfilled 
its function’. Clearly, this mainstream view indirectly reproduces a sharp (both temporal and logical) 
distinction between discovery and justification. But, besides the obvious problems connected to the DJ 
distinction, what is important here is that Weber many times actually presented these ideal-types in his 
final substantive work; his ideal-types were not always subsequently tested by himself, but often 
effectively operated as valuable end products within one of his specific substantive works/publications, 
as de facto results which was then later either (1) directly taken on board or (2) tested, evaluated or 
reconfigured by other scholars as part of their own work.64 Thus, otherwise helpful interpretations of 
Weber’s ideal-type, such as that of Swedberg (2014: 62-4) or Drysdale (1996: 79-81, 81, fn. 22), oddly 
overlook the fact that Weber actually proudly presented his ideal-types to the reader; Weber’s ‘ideal-
typification’ process were not simply part of his own initial private method of enquiry. Interestingly, 
Weber (1949: e.g., 90, 94, 97) also speaks of ideal-types in terms of not only (1) their ‘heuristic’ 
employment and usefulness in ‘research’ but also (2) their ‘expository’ function.    
Moreover, the ideal-type should be understood within a ‘broader strategy of causal analysis’ 
(Ringer 1996: 119, more generally 113-16); more specifically, it ‘permits Weber to join interpretation 
to explanation’ (Mommsen as paraphrased in Ringer 1996: 118; see also Rosenberg 2016: 85-6, 89, 91-
3, 96-8). Interestingly, final manuscripts usually erroneously give the reader the impression that the 
presented ideal-type is either (1) an inductive product of an empirical investigation (which ideally is 
further scrutinized by the same scholar using fresh data or exported to others for their own unique 
assessment/testing) or (2) an imported deductive product which is then neutrally tested or empirically 
assessed on new data. But a presented ideal-type, whether a concept, category, model, typology, 
periodization etc., is always already simultaneously constituted through both a deductive and inductive 
logic; it usually both: (1) served as a guiding analytical lens/filter/framework through which certain 
                                                          
64 Compare this argument with Burger’s view as cited in Drysdale (1996: 81, fn. 22) or Rosenberg’s (2016: 99) 
point that Weber’s ideal-types, otherwise regarded as initial products or means, ironically ‘have become so much 
a part of the cultural literacy of contemporary society’.  
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empirically observable events and entities have been selected/accentuated/evaluated/synthesized (the 
deductive logic) and (2) operates as the (so far) final summarizing product of the empirically informed 
investigation, an analytical output that has been selectively extracted from the available data and 
observable events as a way of explaining/organizing/making sense of these. Thus, the ideal-type usually 
simultaneously serve a both guiding and summarizing function. Of course, the relative dominance of 
either deductive or inductive logic or content varies across different texts (and within the same text), 
and depends to a large extent on the chosen method of presentation, to what extent the ideal-type is 
lifted from another study and applied to the new one (a maneuver which, in a sense reifies or 
decontextualizes the history of the concept), etc. In this sense, an ideal-type implicitly contain, at 
varying degrees, both a discovery and a justification within itself. 
These dichotomy-breaking ideal-types are used heavily throughout this study; they are at varying 
levels of precision, depth and contextualization, brought forward and utilized, serving as both initial and 
final products, means and ends, or guiding and synthesizing tools. The way in which this study tries to 
put ideal-type categories to productive use is perhaps best exemplified by the study’s understanding of 
modern statehood, which, in chapter 5, on the basis of both deductive maneuvers and inductive 
historically informed contextualization shall be described as being emergently and institutionally-
organizationally constituted by four monopolies and four roughly corresponding functions – as well as 
the historically varying, dialectical and tension-filled dynamics between these dimensions.  
Importantly, ideal-typification refers to the search for the ‘essential’ aspect(s) of a certain 
phenomenon (Weber 1949: e.g., 93, 97). Weber (Ibid.: 91, 90, 94, emphasis removed) speaks of the 
‘accentuation’ of an ideal-type’s ‘essential tendencies’, of being able to ‘delineate’ the ‘utopia’ or 
‘governing principle’ of a concept, of synthesizing phenomena that are ‘more or less present’, of 
concepts that do not ‘appear in full conceptual integrity’, etc. Clearly, there is a connection between 
Weber’s ideal-type and the so-called ‘family resemblance’ (Collier & Mahon 1993) perspective on 
social science concepts/categories.65 In this latter perspective, ‘the category’, which may not fit every 
case perfectly, ‘captures a set of commonalities considered by the researcher to be analytically 
important’ (Ibid.: 847). The analytical construct is ‘expected to be only a partial approximation’ – and 
there is no ‘expectation that the full set of attributes would be found in every instance’ (Ibid.). 
Importantly, in this approach, ‘family resemblance can (…) be assessed by identifying attributes that 
                                                          
65 Collier & Mahon (1993: 847, 853, fn. 8) also briefly explicitly recognize this connection.  
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are present to varying degrees in particular cases, rather than being simply present or absent’ (Ibid.: 
848, emphasis added). It thus implies degreeism – a full obtainment is not necessary. From such an 
ideal-typical or family resemblance conceptual perspective, it is much less of a problem that, for 
example, (1) one of the (whatever) identified attributes of the modern state is not found in a particular 
case or (2) the intensity or quality of this attribute does not live up to the ‘utopian’ ideal-typical 
standard.   
 
 
4.2 A historical-theoretical approach 
Having discussed the main epistemological considerations informing the historical-theoretical approach 
(HTA) organizing this study – which, as seen, concerned both the collapse of the DJ distinction and the 
deduction-induction division and a reassessment of some distinctive social-scientific tools – this section 
shall proceed to outline some of the main features of this HTA. To be sure, this outline of the HTA 
should not be thought of as exhaustive (also, it has to be considered in relation to the preceding 
premises). Moreover, the HTA is not necessarily supposed to be novel – it is to a large extent a 
selective synthesis of existing productive insights and particularly implicit practices, not the least 
among the ‘classic social analysts’. I am mostly trying to briefly map and discuss some of the main 
aspects, as these pertain and are relevant to the study, of an approach that can broadly be considered 
historical-theoretical.66 The argument is of course not that this is the only way of approaching social 
                                                          
66 Since many scholars of course explicitly/implicitly combine theory and history in various ways (and have done 
so in the past) – whether it be the ‘classic social analysts’, social historians, historical sociologists (including 
comparative sociologists), critical theorists, etc. – it makes most sense to speak of a HTA, or a specific type of 
HTA, rather than the HTA. While a label like ‘historical sociology’ might have been used, the more generic title 
of HTA seems more suitable since: (1) there is arguably no real agreement on what ‘historical sociology’ actually 
covers and which ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions that informs it (see also, e.g., 
Kumar 2015: 267); (2) the suggested HTA is underpinned by both a clear philosophy of social science position 
and an above elaborated critical perspective on the DJ distinction, the deduction-induction split, ideal-types, etc.; 
(3) the domain or discipline of ‘sociology’ does obviously not exhaust theory; (4) although compatibilities may 
exist between this study’s HTA and some forms of historical sociology (of particularly the more rare non-
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scientific work, but rather, and merely, that the suggested features of the HTA should be considered 
both completely justifiable and productive. In the HTA informing/organizing this study, the following 
five procedural elements apply and are celebrated (at varying degrees).       
 
 
1. The study’s theoretical analysis is historically informed  
This foundational element of a HTA implies at least the following two things. Firstly, and most 
obviously, it implies both (1) a productive attention to time, development, temporal patterns and context 
and (2) that relevant historical literature is allowed to play an integrative role in the analysis. In this 
way, following Streeck’s (2012b: 23, 21, 3) general advocacy, a higher premium is naturally put on a 
‘longitudinal’ perspective that looks at major objects of study, such as, for example, capitalism, ‘over 
time’, as opposed to a more ‘static’ view that tends to construe these entities as practically ‘timeless’. 
Thus, although there is obviously nothing intrinsically wrong with, for example, more narrow 
regression-based scholarship – it may (if relevant, possible, etc.) very well be productively utilized in a 
selective manner to, for example, corroborate a certain argument – such typically diachronic 
statistical/variables-based/correlation-oriented procedures are naturally less suitable for retroductively 
theorizing events and constellations through the historically informed examination of macro-causal 
mechanisms and processes operating over long time spans.67 
Secondly, the historical dimension of a HTA does not mean it is historical in any formal or 
technical sense, but, much more loosely, merely implies that the work represents a historically 
contextualized form of theorization. Arguably, this more loose or restrictive understanding also finds 
representation in C. Wright Mills’ (1959) advocacy, outlined in his book The Sociological Imagination, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
empiricist implicit kinds), the former represents a specific version of historical-theoretical analysis that has been 
molded in relation to the purposes of this study.   
67 See Danermark et al. (2002: passim, 154, 161-5) for a more general discussion of the congruity between critical 
realism and ‘quantitative’ or statistical work and the difference between, and complimentary of, so-called 
‘extensive’ and ‘intensive’ designs/strategies.    
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of a sociology68 that is, as Kumar (2015: 268) labels it, ‘historicized’. In this study, this rather soft 
characterization of the historical leg of the HTA, as work that is merely ‘historicized’ or (as this study 
prefers to describe it) historically informed, implies three things.  
 Firstly, although at times being too polemical, Mills (1959: 50, 20, 34, 74, 71) correctly 
criticized and rejected the two rival positions of ‘Grand Theory’ and ‘Abstracted Empiricism’ 
for being, respectively, either (1) marked by the ‘fetishism of the Concept’, ‘addicts of the high 
formalism of ‘theory’’ and for operating at ‘high levels of abstraction’ or reversely (2) marked 
by a specialized and narrowly oriented ‘methodological inhibition’ and a ‘usual thinness of 
result’, which is ‘stuck (…) in what are essentially epistemological problems of method’.69 
Clearly, a proper HTA, or at least the version found useful for this study, should place itself 
somewhere in between these two extremes (see also Mills 1959: 124): more 
historically/empirically informed and circumscribed than Grand Theory, but much less narrow, 
fetishized with data/methods and skeptical of social theory than Abstracted Empiricism. More 
specifically, one can for example say that while the LAF approach perhaps leans slightly too 
heavily towards Grand Theory – although still very far from Mills’ ideal-type category – more 
recent approaches like Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) or the well-known welfare state analysis 
of Esping-Andersen (1990), for all their worth, leans too heavily towards Abstracted 
Empiricism.   
 Secondly, as non-specialists in history, macro-oriented social scientists ‘cannot generally 
undertake (…) primary research in the archives’ (Kumar 2015: 271). For this reason, social 
scientists are forced to draw on either ‘what are taken to be the best or most scholarly 
publications by historians’ (Ibid.: 271, although cf. 274) or the work of other historically-
inclined social science scholars providing a productive historical context (who are themselves 
either interpreting insights/findings from historians or drawing on other historically informed 
social science work).  
                                                          
68 To be sure, although Mills (1959: 18-9, fn. 2) for specific historical and disciplinary reasons focused on 
‘sociology’, it is both implicitly and explicitly clear that his argument pertained to ‘the social studies’ more 
generally.  
69 Bourdieu (1988: 775) arguably launches a similar type of critique when rejecting (also implicitly through his 
actual work) both ‘theoreticist theory and empiricist methodology’.  
82 
 
 Thirdly, and relatedly, this condition is natural and relatively unproblematic given that the aim 
is not ‘to outdo the historians at their own game’ or to examine history ‘for its own sake’, but to 
deal with the past in order to ‘understand our own world, in its own time’ (Ibid.: 277): in this 
sense, as opposed to the formal objective of historical work and the practice of some scholars 
within historical sociology, ‘the past is mainly important (…) for the light it sheds on the 
present’ (Ibid.: 277, 276).  
 
 
2. The study seeks to productively roll out and reinvigorate a flexible but primarily macro-level 
historical-theoretical analysis   
This element, which is intrinsically connected to the historical leg of the proposed HTA, in the first 
instance implies a research agenda that focuses on long-term structures, mechanisms, processes, 
tendencies, patterns, developments, configurations, etc., that operates and are deliberately studied at a 
relatively abstract macro-level. Obviously, this intentional focus on emergent macro-level entities and 
processes taking place over long time-spans necessarily or logically entails a trade-off in the form of a 
loss of detail, depth, intensity or, as qualitative scholars sometimes puts it, ‘thickness’ (on the natural 
trade-off between breadth and depth, see Gerring 2001: 24-25, 2007: 48-50);70 reversely, focusing on 
the micro-level (whether through, e.g., a narrow case study, field work or running regressions), which is 
also simply another legitimate choice, entails a weakened scope and breadth and that less attention is 
put on context, broader structures, the so-called ‘longue durée’, etc.71 Importantly, focusing on either 
the micro or the macro-level (or, of course, something in between) is simply a question of research 
strategy – the two strategies serve different purposes, have different qualities and are in principal 
equally valid – and, as argued, it is both meaningful, justifiable and productive to operate with macro-
causal mechanisms.   
                                                          
70 For a particular, and slightly problematic, take on the more general question of trade-offs in social science, see 
Gerring (2001: 23-29). 
71 For a discussion of the distinction between ‘extensive’ and ‘intensive’ procedures, see Danermark et al. (2002: 
161-5).   
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That said, productive historical-theoretical approaches operating at the macro-level preferably do 
this in a flexible manner. Flexibility in this sense implies that the macro-situated analysis either (1) as 
Mills (1959: 34) prefers, is able to at varying degrees ‘shuttle between levels of abstraction’ throughout 
the study or (2) shows awareness of the possible implications of shifting between units of analysis or 
somehow provides some initial indications of the structure/direction of relevant formally unstudied 
micro-mechanisms (which may be studied in a later separate study). By scrutinizing the relevant 
historical development in more details through a case study looking at the two specific countries of the 
UK and Sweden and, at one point, trying to theorize the micro-dynamics of state legitimation (or at the 
very least preparing the ground for doing this more extensively in a possible later work), this study 
lands somewhere in between the above two scenarios of a flexible macro-model. 
Although everyone would obviously ideally like to engage in a careful ‘continual shuttle’ 
between the macro- and micro-level (Mills 1959: 126), this is rarely possible and not even 
automatically productive to do in all studies; ultimately, the choice of level of analysis depends to a 
very large extent on questions of skills, scholarly habits, time, word count, practicalities or more 
generally ‘heuristic appraisals’, or importantly, as discussed above, the specific ontological 
characteristics of the objects being studied (and their conditions of empirical possibility). Specifically, 
besides the above factors, this study’s choice of focusing on the macro-level depends very much on 
timing; given the particular diagnosis of this study, a higher relative premium should be put on 
inclusive long-term macro-situated functionalist work that in all modesty seeks to genuinely and 
legitimately focus on ‘substantive problems’, that is, ‘the major issues for publics and the key troubles 
of private individuals in our time’ (Mills 1959: 21), such as was arguably much more frequent in the 
mainstream academic world before the 1980s.   
 
 
3. The study seeks to zoom in on the essential dimensions of certain entities and deliberately focuses on 
dominant long-term tendencies, dispositions, trends and ‘conjunctures’ cutting across different types of 
variations  
Put simply, following Streeck (2012b: 23, 22), this study finds it most productive to examine 
‘longitudinal commonalities’ – that is, search for and scrutinize a relevant ‘inherent generic dynamism’ 
and focus on how ‘common dynamics’ in various ways are causally connected to ‘parallel trajectories’. 
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Obviously, this deliberate attention to ‘commonalities’ implies a simultaneous de-emphasis on ‘cross-
sectional variations’, such as those notably found in the VoC literature (Ibid.: 21, 22). This strategy of 
course recognizes all kinds of variations (e.g., organizational, institutional, geographical, national, 
regime-based differences). But this study’s substantive analysis, its overall research agenda, the critical 
realist stratified ontology and mechanism-based focus on tendentiality and disposition, and the logic 
and expected productiveness of the applied Weberian ideal-typification procedure and partly ‘family 
resemblance’ (Collier & Mahon 1993) perspective – which, respectively, among other things 
deliberately zooms in on the ‘utopia’ or ‘governing principle’ of a category (Weber 1949: 91) and 
accepts (and actually expects) that not all of the relevant dimensions are necessarily empirically 
activated or fully operative in many specific cases/instances due to ‘countervailing’ factors – clearly 
predispose it to favor the examination of shared cross-cutting macro-mechanisms.    
Although the study is overall structured through a descending level of abstraction72 (see below), 
which means that the analysis generally becomes increasingly empirically/historically detailed, 
contextualized and concrete as it proceeds – culminating in a case study that zooms in on two particular 
countries showing maximum variation across the relevant macro-mechanisms and processes – it is 
undoubtedly generally more interested in examining temporally preceding, structural/contextual 
‘remote’ factors than more immediate, variable/changeable, agency-specific ‘proximate’ ones (on this 
remote/proximate distinction, see Schneider & Wagemann 2006: 759; Young 2012: 669).73 This study, 
in line with the largely implicit productive practice of the LAF approach, focuses on a specific 
emergent configuration, namely modern liberal-capitalist democratic statehood. And as part of this, the 
study concerns itself with a specific cluster of countries, namely modern Western European liberal-
capitalist democratic polities; countries which despite many ‘proximate’ differences share a similar set 
of ‘remote’ conditions and many times display corresponding general tendencies and dispositions. In 
this study, as shall be seen/argued, the overall ‘remote’ macro-level dynamic shared across Western 
European liberal-capitalist democratic polities – within which more ‘proximate’ historically contingent 
variations (e.g., welfarist, party-specific or agentic) are analytically embedded74 – is connected to the 
tension-filled functional relationship between legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting.  
                                                          
72 Compare this to Giovanni Sartori’s ’ladder of abstraction’ (see discussion in Collier & Mahon 1993: 846).   
73 Natural scientists generally refer to a distinction between ‘distal’ and ‘proximal’ factors or causes.  
74 See also more generally Kaspersen (2008: 30-39).  
85 
 
Additionally, on the analytical organization of this study: variously, certain concepts, categories, 
models, typologies, periodizations, etc., shall be rolled out or developed in an ideal-typical manner, 
selectively focusing (in the Weberian sense) on what is ‘essential’ about a certain phenomenon. For 
example, when variously discussing and mapping the development of party politics – or more precisely, 
the historically varying relationship between statehood and party politics – the study is, despite 
recognized variation, primarily interested in the ‘essential tendencies’ (Weber 1949: 91) of a party 
system or a party-type and the overall development and pattern cutting across the different nationally 
specific party systems.    
 
 
4. The study seeks to productively transcend stifling disciplinary borders and synthesize insights from 
different thematic specializations  
The HTA of this study is underpinned by a deep-seated preference for a genuinely ‘unified social 
science’ (Mills 1959: 138). As Mills (Ibid.: 142) succinctly points out: ‘[t]o state and to solve any one 
of the significant problems of our period requires a selection of materials, conceptions, and methods 
from more than any one of [the] several disciplines’. However this is realized it should ideally imply 
that the unhelpful ‘departmentalization of social science’, the ‘lazy safety of specialization’ or ‘the idea 
of distinct ‘fields’’, etc., to some non-trivial extent is buried or transcended (Ibid.: 140, 21, 141). 
Moreover, in contrast to Mills’ (Ibid.: 139-42) seemingly optimistic diagnosis of his times of a slow but 
gradual overcoming of specialization and departmentalization, a concentration of academic 
specialization and proliferation of disciplines and fields (and sub-version within these) over the last 30-
40 years has arguably taken place. For this reason, there is an even greater need for transcending 
disciplinary boundaries than before. 
Of course, although they are intellectually unsustainable, the ‘oppositions between disciplines’ 
should nevertheless be taken seriously in a Bourdieusian manner (1988: 778, emphasis removed); while 
most disciplinary divisions are ultimately ‘absurd’, connected to ‘false quarrels’, disciplines nonetheless 
have a causally important both objective existence, ‘as academic departments, professional associations 
(…)’, etc., and subjective existence, ‘as mental categories, principles of vision, and division of the 
social world’, etc. (Ibid.: 779, 778, 777; cf. Mills 1959: 140). Thus, when approaching – and ultimately 
transcending – disciplinary boundaries, one must adopt a classical reflexive Bourdieusian stance (see 
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1988: 784, 782), which challenges the ‘social and historical determinants of scientific practices’ by in 
this specific case simultaneously incorporating both (1) the ‘objective’ intellectual unnecessity of 
disciplinary divisions and (2) the actual subjective ‘experience’ of disciplinary specialization and the 
implications of this for the molding of research and research-related practices.       
As part of pursuing its research agenda, this study integrates various social science disciplines, 
accumulating insights from especially political science, sociology, philosophy of (social) science, 
history and economics (as well as their various sub-fields), and selectively synthesizes different types of 
work – qualitative and quantitative, social-theoretical and more applied. Moreover, the study seeks to 
go beyond a too strict ‘division into theoretical denominations’ (Bourdieu 1988: 779, emphasis 
removed), aiming to relatively agnostically and pragmatically integrate insights from different 
theoretical perspectives and schools (aiming for, as Bourdieu puts it, ‘cross-fertilization’), while at the 
same time recognizing the core tenets of certain positions and the fact that some theoretical 
combinations inherently work better than others. While this usually underrated explicit aim and 
procedure of productively integrating, synthesizing, surveying, accumulating, mapping and 
rethinking/reworking various disciplines/fields/positions/techniques/arguments/results can never be 
fully realized – accumulating different work in an integrative manner is an in principle never ending 
process, always in need of further development and always infused with certain tensions and 
inadequacies on the part of the researcher75 – it should be recognized as a time-consuming and actually 
creative analytical technique, which may potentially serve as a genuine intellectual contribution. 
Importantly, while this ideal of transcending (particularly) disciplinary and field-specific borders might 
seem daunting, it should be absolutely stressed that ‘[a] social scientist need not ‘master the field’ in 
order to be familiar enough with its materials and perspectives to use them in clarifying the problems 
that concern him [sic]’ (Mills 1959: 142). 
Despite the strictly speaking intellectual unnecesity of social science disciplines/fields, all specific 
research obviously leans more heavily towards some of these than others, and most scholars have a 
specific educational profile, skill-set, interest and specialization that steers them in certain directions 
and thus inevitably narrows the social-scientific scope. Thus, while the most appropriate or inclusive 
disciplinary/field-specific designation for a proper HTA (in relation to this study) would simply ideally 
                                                          
75 As Mills (1959: 142) points out, ‘[it] is quite impossible truly to master all of the materials, conceptions, 
methods of every one of [the] disciplines’.  
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be historically informed social research, this study nevertheless by necessity take departure in a much 
more circumscribed academic arena. At a substantive level, the study primarily takes departure in the 
two main interdisciplinary sub-fields of political economy and political sociology.76 Additionally, 
history (including the interdisciplinary sociological sub-field of historical sociology) – or, much more 
modestly, a ‘historicized’ or historically informed social science – and key insights from philosophy of 
social science are utilized and critically underpin the overall study. As for specifically the case study, 
selective insights/findings from the economics-oriented sub-fields/studies of business history, 
industrial/employment/labour relations, business administration, etc., also inform the analysis. In the 
end, this study may perhaps best be described as doing (or striving to do) historically informed political 
economy and political sociology (or, stating the same thing slightly shorter and more formally, 
historical political economy/sociology).  
 
 
5. The study seeks to explicitly accept and take seriously certain inherent trade-offs with regards to 
research choices 
This banal but underappreciated final element simply implies that (1) although every scholar would like 
to do and maximize everything – roll out every method, design, perspective and style and operate at all 
levels of analysis, etc. – this is of course not possible, and (2) because of this, trade-offs, in the form of 
conflicting scholarly choices, should be fully recognized and incorporated into assessments of scholarly 
work (cf. Gerring 2001: 23-27, 234). Because trade-offs imply that deciding on or maximizing the 
quality of one thing tends to rule out or minimize the quality of another possible thing – as is, for 
example, seen in the choice between providing historical context and running regressions or between 
running regressions and doing participatory field work – research (and particularly research design) 
inevitably, as Gerring (2001: 23) points out, becomes a question of ‘prioritization’.  
Although doing field work almost inevitably bolsters the findings of a regression scholar, this is 
rarely feasible or meaningful – and indeed rarely seen – for reasons that has to do with a compound 
battery of heterogeneous historically varying factors and typically conflicting criteria and choices, 
                                                          
76 While political economy straddles the two disciplines of political science and economics and is formally a sub-
field of the former, political sociology straddles the two disciplines of sociology and political science and is 
formally a sub-field of the former.  
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which are in no way easily or uniformly decided/agreed upon or capable of being unproblematically 
assessed in a transcendental or commensurable manner (cf. Gerring 2001: 26-7). Importantly, in 
contrast to both Gerring’s (2001: 29, emphasis removed, 30) unproductive decision to not take into 
account various ‘considerations of expediency’ or the (at one point expressed) rather unrealistic 
assumption of King et al. (1994: 13) ‘that researchers have unlimited time and resources’ – a 
decision/assumption which is integral to both of their methodological advice – this study’s call for a 
realistic HTA not only takes seriously a much broader repertoire of often conflicting decision-making 
factors (for example, as discussed, not merely an ‘epistemic appraisal’ but also a heuristic/pragmatic 
one) but also considers these inevitably integral to both the study’s logic of prioritization and any 
meaningful academic ‘appraisal’ of its results. Put simply, it is perfectly meaningful, defensible and 
productive to both (1) engage in a relatively wide and integrative macro-level examination and (2) not 
do everything or address/tackle every principally relevant question or issue while doing this.   
To briefly sum up: the specific HTA that is utilized in this study to examine governance in the 
context of the historical dynamics of legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting is not only informed by the 
preceding philosophical-cum-epistemological considerations but also non-exhaustively constituted by 
the above addressed five properties.    
 
 
4.3 Methodological strategy: Activating the HTA  
This last section of the chapter shall both outline and discuss how the overall study is organized and set 
up more concretely – notably, how and through what procedures and methods the research questions 
are going to be answered/examined – and how the case study, treated in Part IV, fits into this and has 
been selected.     
 
 
4.3.1 Outlining the overall setup 
As mentioned in the introduction, taking departure in (but also both critically historically resituating 
and analytically reworking) the LAF approach, this study has set itself the task of examining whether 
and to what extent governance has served to bridge/reconfigure/overcome the state-situated tension-
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filled relationship between legitimation and fiscal accumulation in Western European liberal-capitalist 
democratic polities. This is done by investigating the main historical, state-situated and particularly 
legitimatory conditions of possibility for the governance phenomenon.    
Arguably, ‘retroduction’ (Danermark et al. 2002: see especially 96-106), as briefly described 
above, can roughly be seen as the main procedure, tool or overarching ‘mode of inference’ through 
which the study seeks to engage with the above task and research question. Recalling the above 
description, a retroductive type of analysis, or a research design organized principally around a 
retroductive logic, aims ‘to identify foundational conditions behind concrete historical events’ (Ibid.: 
99). Specifically, as retroduction in this way concerns the search for ‘the basic conditions for the 
phenomena under study’ (Ibid.: 100), this study thus focuses on examining the three operational 
questions mentioned in the introduction: how is governance historically possible?; what state-situated 
macro-causal mechanisms are related to governance?; and, most importantly, what legitimatory 
qualities must exist for governance to be possible? It is through this basic retroductive research design 
logic – which proceeds through these three retroductive inquiries – that the main research question of 
this study is examined and sought answered.77 Moreover, the more basic and informal meta-
retroductive issue of locating the philosophical/epistemological conditions necessary for properly 
understanding and studying governance – which this and the preceding chapter has tried to do – also 
forms an integral part of the overall examination of governance. 
With some important qualifications, this study may alternatively or complimentarily be described 
as a form of ‘explaining-outcome process-tracing’ (Beach & Pedersen 2013: especially 18-21).78 In 
                                                          
77 For various reasons this study does not (at least slavishly or directly) follow the proposed ‘stages’ of a critical 
realist ‘research process’ involving retroduction (Danermark et al.: 109-11, 109). 
78 Any designation of this study as ‘explaining-outcome process-tracing’ should be heavily qualified given that: 
(1) despite sophistication it is still underpinned by the DJ distinction and the deduction-induction division (as also 
mentioned earlier); (2) in the end, it relies on a too unrealistic formalization/codification of mechanisms, which 
many studies, particularly historically informed macro-level theorizations, cannot practically utilize without 
severely sacrificing quality; (3) it is more or less hinted that a connection exists between this type of study and 
(what Patrick Jackson has termed) a ‘monist ontology’ (or at the very least pragmatism) (Beach & Pedersen 2013: 
12, 13); (4) it is improbably and thus a bit unproductively explicitly supposed to provide a ‘minimally sufficient 
explanation’, which somehow manages to ‘[account] for all of the important aspects of an outcome with no 
redundant parts being present’ (Ibid.: 18).     
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short, in this type of study, the scholar seeks to ‘explain particular historical outcomes’ – outcomes that 
are ‘particularly interesting (…) both because of their substantive and theoretical importance’ – via ‘the 
pragmatic use of mechanismic explanations’ (Ibid.: 63, 61, 11). Importantly, in contrast to other types 
of process-tracing studies, it relies on two key elements, namely ‘eclectic theorization and the inclusion 
of non-systematic mechanisms’ (Ibid.: 66). The former element refers to the ‘need to combine 
mechanisms into an eclectic conglomerate mechanism to account for a particular outcome’ (Ibid.: 34). 
The latter element refers to the need, as part of the eclectic theorization of a specific phenomenon, to 
also include ‘case-specific (nonsystematic) parts’ and mechanisms (Ibid.: 156). Generally, as may be 
evident, scholars engaging in ‘explaining-outcome process-tracing’ tend to ‘prioritize accounting for 
cases about which they care more than they prioritize theoretical parsimony’ (Ibid.: 66). In this specific 
manner, the turn to governance can be perceived as the interesting historical outcome, phenomenon or 
perhaps even single ‘case’ (more on this term below) to be historically examined and explained through 
a ‘complex conglomerate of systematic and case-specific causal mechanisms’ (Ibid.: 169).79  
The particular predominantly retroductive, and partly ‘explaining-outcome’, research logic of this 
study implies a break with the mainstream neo-positivist constitution of social science scholarly work. 
In the first instance, this implies a rejection of any misleading simplistic dichotomous separations 
between quantitative and qualitative work or positivism and interpretivism (Jackson 2011: 36, 67-8; 
Danermark et al. 2002). Secondly, it implies a break with not so much the separation made between 
field work and (so-called) ‘desk work’, but the way in which the latter is most often thought to be 
exhaustively constituted by either regression analysis or straightforward case study research. Of course, 
the mainstream assumption, particularly propounded by certain dominant social science methods 
textbooks, that anything other than field work must automatically center on, and be dominated by, 
either regression or case study analysis betrays the obvious historical fact that many of the most 
                                                          
79 From this perspective, it seems correct to say, following Beach & Pedersen’s (2013: 36, 67) argumentation, that 
the study to a large extent develops/presents ‘case-specific conglomerate’ mechanisms, which, due to the 
incorporation of nonsystematic factors, ‘cannot be exported per se to other historical cases’. Of course, this is 
relatively unproblematic since both (1) ‘explaining-outcome process-tracing’ studies are primarily ‘driven by a 
strong interest in accounting for a particular outcome’ and (2) many of the specific pre-existing or developed 
mechanisms, factors, processes or findings are ‘more generally applicable’, or ‘systematic’, and can therefore ‘be 
exported’ (Ibid.: 156, 67, 157, 36). 
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powerful and cited works within social science (whether ‘classics’ or more contemporary) do not 
confine to this rather unproductive simple codification in any meaningful or straightforward manner. 
More specifically, case study textbooks usually take for granted that the case study analysis dominates 
the overall examination; the presumption is that the weight should be heavily placed on the case study, 
that the overall research design is primarily organized around the case or that the case study design 
constitutes, or is identical to, the research design as such. As discussed above, and as a legitimate 
alternative to the two usual ‘desk work’ procedures of regression analysis or straightforward case study 
research, this study is based on a HTA: a historically informed macro-level theorization that relies on a 
retroductive questioning and search for ‘proximate’ conditions and ‘eclectic conglomerate mechanisms’ 
and (highly) informally utilizes the tools of deduction, induction, abduction, abstraction, ‘thought 
experiments’, etc., in an ideally DJ distinction-collapsing manner.      
In this study, the core historical-theoretical analysis – which is taken up in Part 1, 2 and 3 and will 
later serve as an analytical framework80 to be drawn upon for the case study in Part IV – is 
launched/developed relatively independently of the constitution of the subsequent case study analysis. 
Although there is of course an important ‘feedback’ connection between the core analysis and the case 
study (see below), the analysis/framework should not be perceived as simply pre-existing ‘theory’ or a 
pre-existing theoretical perspective or framework instrumentally taken on board in order to be applied 
to, or tested via, a specific case. Nor is the analytical framework simply something that has been 
developed on the straightforward basis of the case study analysis and is characteristically presented 
towards the end of the study. Thus, the core historical-theoretical analysis centered on the historical, 
state-situated and particularly legitimatory conditions of the governance turn launched/developed in the 
study’s three key parts – as well as more informally in this and the preceding chapter – constitutes the 
main contribution of this study; although the study itself utilizes this analysis in Part IV, it should also 
ideally speaking be considered an overall contextual analysis/framework or diagnosis that (at least) 
potentially or ideally may be engaged with by other scholars either by being employed as part of their 
own more specific work or by being further empirically tested/corroborated, theoretically reconfigured, 
etc.  
                                                          
80 In this sense, depending on timing/purpose, it can both be meaningfully characterized as a core historical-
theoretical analysis and a framework. 
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Rather than through regression or straightforward case study analysis, the above described HTA 
is mainly executed through two procedures, which are not easily separated (since they also utilize each 
other). Firstly, a productive continuous swaying juxtaposition of (1) a relatively abstract adoption, 
discussion and analytical reworking of the LAF approach and (2) an empirically informed reading and 
theorization of state dynamics and state history – both done in order to gauge and in the end, drawing 
on insights from the critical second procedure below, develop and launch a productive understanding of 
the generic features of Western European legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting. Secondly, and most 
importantly, the HTA is executed through a particular organizing historical-theoretical scheme, termed 
the ECR model, which is simultaneously used to, in a selective ideal-typical manner, both (1) 
inductively historically-theoretically summarize the ‘discoveries’ of the core historical-theoretical 
analysis (i.e., the actual method of enquiry) and (2) deductively historically-theoretically guide this 
analysis both before and as it is being launched/developed.           
Although the logic and key dimensions of this important organizing ECR model shall be formally 
unpacked in chapter 6, it makes sense to very briefly describe it. The ECR model, which shall be 
utilized for the case study analysis of the development of the automobile industry in Britain and 
Sweden in Part IV, represents an ideal-typical mapping/examination of the changing historical 
dynamics of fiscal and legitimatory state-crafting, leading towards the post-1970s governance 
phenomenon. As can be seen in figure 1 below, the ECR model not only covers the emergence (late 19th 
century-till 1945), consolidation (1945-1970s) and particularly reconfiguration (post-1970s period) of 
fiscal and legitimatory state-crafting but also connects each of these historical-theoretical periodizations 
to a distinctive status of the legitimatory and fiscal tension as well as the correlative dominant logic of 
tension-management. Each periodization shall be treated in the study (although at varying degrees): the 
emergence period in Part I, the consolidation period in Part II and the reconfiguration period in Part III 
– and all three periods in the case study analysis of Part IV.  
As explained, while concrete country experiences are variously drawn out and emphasized – and 
while the later case study zooms in on the details of the specific English and Swedish historical 
experience – the HTA-underpinned ECR model generally deliberately focuses on the generic, essential 
and shared trends/features of fiscal and legitimatory state-crafting. More geographically and historically 
specifically, the study is interested in the compound emergent configuration of modern liberal-capitalist 
democratic statehood. In its broadest sense, this roughly corresponds to the so-called OECD countries – 
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that is, so-called ‘developed’, ‘rich’, ‘advanced’ or ‘high-income’ democratic and ‘market-based’ 
polities.81 Even more specifically, this study primarily focuses on, and intends its main arguments to 
overwhelmingly pertain to, Western Europe, understood in its most inclusive, vernacular and non-
technical geographical sense.82 Undoubtedly, this study’s core analysis is implicitly biased towards a 
certain set of countries within this larger inclusive category of Western Europe, namely the ‘rich’, fully 
‘modernized’– and, utilizing the ’Welzel-Inglehart Cultural Map’,83 traditionally either ’Protestant’, 
’English speaking’ or sometimes ’Catholic’ – countries of (in no particular order): Belgium, Denmark, 
Sweden, Norway, Finland, France, The Netherlands, (West) Germany, Austria, Britain, Iceland, Ireland 
and Switzerland – and thus to a lesser extent (although this very much depends on the nature of the 
argument, the empirics available, etc.) the southern European countries of Italy, Greece, Spain and 
Portugal or the small, relatively ‘lucrative’ and alternatively constituted polities of Monaco, 
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg and Malta.84 
                                                          
81 At times, when certain trends and trajectories – or specific data/datasets – happen to refer to this type of country 
(or cluster of countries), these shall be referred to as ‘OECD-wide’.   
82 Using, for example, the ’geoscheme’ set up by the United Nations Statistics Division, this inclusive sense of 
Western Europe includes/incorporates the regional categories of Western Europe, much of Northern Europe and 
some of Southern Europe.   
83 See here Inglehart-Welzel Cultural Map (n.d.).  
84 This varies though; the implicit selection of countries is pragmatic and largely non-systematic. 
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Figure 1. The core historical-theoretical analysis/framework.  
 
This basic cross-country ideal-typification procedure is not only entirely defensible but also both 
(1) a standard implicit characteristic of some of the most productive works within social science85 and 
(2) additionally bolstered by a general historical/empirical contextualization and variously placed 
specifications. Moreover, although the focus is on Western Europe, many of the arguments of the study 
also pertain to, and include, (notably) the US experience – a typically ‘extreme’ country (1) in which 
many of the dominant factors, mechanisms, processes, etc., of interest are highly active/observable and 
(2) from which many events and factors of importance for other countries stem from. For this reason, 
since the US in many ways represents, as a contemporary Marx (1990: 90, 91) might easily have put it, 
                                                          
85 Such as those of Karl Marx, Herbert Marcuse, Pierre Bourdieu, Jürgen Habermas, Claus Offe, Fred Hirsch, 
Zygmunt Bauman, Ulrich Beck, Wolfgang Streeck, etc. The list is extensive.    
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the ‘locus classicus’ of the dynamics that the study are interested in,86 its particular ‘advanced’ 
experience, which arguably ‘shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future’, shall inevitable 
a few times be selectively drawn upon throughout the study.     
Importantly, to repeat, the above described HTA approach underpinning the constitution of the 
ECR model relies on a genuinely ‘pluralist’ approach to methodology/methods (see Danermark et al. 
2002: e.g., 152) and a broad heterogeneous repertoire of sources, data, perspectives and analytical tools 
and procedures. Although the analysis is overwhelmingly based on qualitative and integrative 
theorization, which seeks to synthesize and rework many different perspectives, arguments and 
typologies in an interdisciplinary manner, this theorization is typically contextualized through various 
types of historical literature and heterogeneous empirical findings, descriptive empirics are sometimes 
briefly utilized to corroborate an argument and a few times other scholars’ more narrow regression-
based findings are brought in. As mentioned, in this specific study the exercise of searching for and 
developing an ‘eclectic conglomerate mechanism’ (see above), which involves a productive continuous 
swaying between deductive and inductive procedures and the drawing out of many very brief 
illustrative examples and informal (so to speak) mini/quasi-‘cases’ at different levels of analysis (as in, 
e.g., chapter 10), implies the setting up of a swaying series of sub-level packages of 
arguments/‘discoveries’ and tests/’justifications’, which are not easily internally separated or codified. 
Importantly, the heterogeneous nature of such compound emergent macro-level mechanisms, whose 
internal constitution is reflective of a collapsing of the DJ distinction, usually makes sure that the 
potential weakness or refutation of a particular discrete sub-level element does not necessarily 
undermine the overall argumentative integrity of the ‘conglomerate’ mechanisms (on this, see also 
Hernes 1989: 158).  
 
 
                                                          
86 In the preface to the first edition of volume one of Capital, Marx (1990: 90, emphasis removed) famously refers 
to England as the ‘locus classicus’ of his particular analysis, which is also why it serves as, as he puts it, ‘the main 
illustration of [his] theoretical developments’.  
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4.3.2 The automobile industry case study 
As can be seen in figure 2 below – an extended version of figure 1 above which now includes the case 
study analysis – I shall map, organize and interpret the development of the automobile industry in 
Britain and Sweden using the launched/developed macro-governance analytical framework,87 and, 
specifically, the ECR state-crafting model integral to this. Thus, in Part IV of the study, the above ECR 
model, which shall be unpacked in chapter 6, shall be used as the explicit organizing tool for 
historically mapping/analyzing the British and Swedish automobile industry. The main intention of this 
case study is to place the changing historical dynamics of automobile production in the historically 
varying context of fiscal and legitimatory state-crafting; to perceive the different stages of the 
development of the automobile industry in the two countries as, in a certain sense, nationally specific 
sectoral-level articulations of the changing historical logics of state-crafting.88 Moreover, by 
juxtaposing the ECR scheme and the historical development of the automobile industry in Britain and 
Sweden, and by focusing on a sector often considered reflective of the ‘turn to governance’, the study 
intends to both highlight and qualify, through the case study analysis, some of the claims and contextual 
premises associated with the governance phenomenon.  
 
 
                                                          
87 Notice, as mentioned, that what was before considered the core historical-theoretical analysis of the study is 
now, in relation to the later case study, considered an (analytical) framework to be utilized.  
88 Besides placing the study of the automobile industry in the context of the state-crafting ECR scheme, one can 
loosely situate automobile production in a larger contextual literature looking at some of the dominant macro-
structural changes in the political economy (focused on industrial relations, economic production and managerial-
organizational practices). According to some of these a decisive shift can be observed from: (1) ‘Fordism’ to 
‘post-Fordism’ or ‘flexible accumulation’ (e.g., Aglietta 1979; Harvey 1990), (2) ‘mass production’ to ‘flexible 
specialization’ (Piore & Sabel 1984; Zeitlin & Tolliday 1987), (3) ‘organized capitalism’ to ‘disorganized 
capitalism’ (Lash & Urry 1987). Importantly, what these characterizations all share is the attempt to conceptually 
grasp, within a certain literature and sphere, what is considered an important transformation from a more 
consolidated structure to a reconfigured one from roughly the 1970s and onwards. While loosely having these 
overall contextual distinctions generically simmering in the background, the ECR model shall be used as the 
explicit organizing analytical tool for mapping the historical development of the automobile industry in Britain 
and Sweden. 
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Figure 2. The core historical-theoretical analysis/framework and case study setup  
 
 
Without necessarily taking on board Thomas & Myers’ (2015: 29-52) particular understanding of 
‘theory’ and advocacy of abduction and ‘phronesis’, I shall in the following utilize their productive 
‘typology of case study’ (Ibid.: 53-55) in order to describe and classify the nature of the case study 
research undertaken in this study. Stated upfront, and selectively using the vocabulary of Thomas & 
Myers’ (2015: 53-55) typology, this study engages in what may (formally) methodologically be 
described as: a key diachronic single case study, chosen for instrumental and explorative reasons and 
operating with semi-parallel and semi-comparative nested elements, which uses a primarily illustrative 
but also partly theory-building/testing approach and a varied or eclectic repertoire of methods and 
empirical sources.89 This specific case study and case selection logic may be graphically depicted as 
shown in figure 3 below.90  
                                                          
89 Following Thomas & Myers (2015: 7), case studies shall be defined as: ‘analyses of persons, events, decisions, 
periods, policies, institutions or other systems which are studied holistically by one or more methods. The case 
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Figure 3. The case study design 
Source: based on a selective adaption of Thomas & Myers’ (2015: 64) typology/figure.  
 
The logic of figure 3 can be explicated in the following nine-fold manner.91 Firstly, Thomas & 
Myers (2015: 6, 15, 55, 7) draw a key distinction between the ‘subject’ and ‘object’ of a case study – an 
important separation that is overlooked in many mainstream case study textbooks (which sometimes 
conflate the two): whereas the subject refers to an ‘instance of some phenomenon’, a concrete ‘person, 
place, event or phenomenon’ or a ‘practical, historical unity’,92 the object is the crucial ‘analytical or 
theoretical frame’, the theory ‘within which the study is conducted and which the case illuminates and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
that is the subject of the enquiry will be an instance of a class of phenomena that provides an analytical frame – an 
object – within which the study is conducted and which the case illuminates and explicates’. 
90 Although figure 3 draws on Thomas & Myers’ typology and figure (2015: 53-55, for their figure, see 64), the 
latter has been altered and tweaked, as shall be seen, in a number of instances for the purposes of this specific 
study. 
91 Notice, that the order of this explication does not entirely follow what might be the intuitive order of figure 3 
(or the intended order of Thomas & Myers’ scheme).  
92 The description ‘practical, historical unity’ comes from Michel Wieviorka (as cited in Thomas & Myers).  
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explicates’. Importantly, as Thomas & Myers (2015: 55, 6, emphasis in original) stress, in any proper 
case study, the subject, for example WW2, has to have a ‘theoretical, scientific basis’,93 it has ‘to be a 
case of something’, namely an ‘analytical frame’ (i.e., object), such as for example the notion of 
‘justness’ or ‘just war’. In the case study of Part IV, the subject is the automobile industry and more 
specifically the historical development of the automobile industry in Britain and Sweden from roughly 
the late 19th century-till recently. The theoretical/analytical object is the analytical framework that has 
been relatively independently launched/developed in chapter 3 and 4 and Part I, II and III (although see 
below) – that is, the study’s overall analysis of the conditions of the governance phenomenon and the 
particular state-facilitated reconfiguration of legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting implied by 
governance.   
Secondly, the automobile industry subject clearly represents a ‘key case’ – that is, a ‘classic or 
exemplary case that reveals something from in-depth study’ (Ibid.: 122, 56-7). Importantly, given the 
above ‘subject-object distinction’, as Thomas & Myers (2015: 7, 56) points out, ‘[t]he subject is in no 
sense a sample, representative of a wider population’. Rather, as a ‘key case’, or actually more precisely 
a key subject,94 the automobile industry, due to inter alia its size (and economic importance), its iconic 
style of production, the timing of its development, its infrastructural presence, its intimate connection to 
capitalist production and state intervention, etc., demonstrates and embodies many of the dominant 
features of interest for the study of governance. Arguably, the automobile industry can be perceived as 
a ‘key’ reflection or mirroring of the governance turn. In particular, the changing historical stages of the 
automobile industry, as they shall be analyzed in this study, can be seen as variant articulations – placed 
at the nationally specific sectoral level – of the changing dynamics of state-crafting. 
Thirdly, it is a ‘nested’ case study. Clearly, the subject of a case ‘can be singular or plural’ (Ibid.: 
62, emphasis removed). Thus, the ‘nested’ character of the case study stems from the fact that ‘the 
subject comprises different elements’, namely both the British and the Swedish experience, and that 
these ‘elements are nested (…) in the sense that they form an integral part of a broader picture’ (Ibid.: 
124, 125). Here, ‘the breakdown is within the principal unit of analysis’ (Ibid.: 63, emphasis in original) 
– that is, a national breakdown within the automobile industry. Although Thomas & Myers (Ibid.: 62, 
63 124-5) designate all ‘nested’ studies as automatically ‘multiple studies’, this is not necessarily 
                                                          
93 The description ‘theoretical, scientific basis’ comes from Michel Wieviorka (as cited in Thomas & Myers). 
94 It would arguably have been more precise had Thomas & Myers spoken of a ‘key subject’.  
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obvious since one might simply be dealing with one subject that legitimately ‘contain[s] more than one 
element’, as is the case with the analysis of the automobile industry in both Britain and Sweden, rather 
than a plurality of different subjects. Fourthly, the case study is semi-comparative95 in the sense that it 
concludes the case study analysis by making some informal/non-systematic comparisons between 
different ‘elements within one broader case’ (Ibid.: 125), namely between the automobile industry 
experience of Britain and Sweden.96 Fifthly, while it should be designated a ‘parallel’ case study in the 
sense that the two national experiences ‘are all happening (…) at the same time’, it is arguably only 
semi-parallel97 since in parallel studies the relevant entities are also ‘being studied at the same time’ 
(Ibid.: 125, emphasis added), which is not primarily the case in the automobile study; rather, the case 
study looks at each country separately, first Britain then Sweden, but focuses on an identical (or 
parallel) historical period.98       
It seems appropriate to provide some additional considerations on the logic of the selection of the 
two elements of the subject of the case study, namely Britain and Sweden. Firstly, and most obviously, 
Britain and Sweden are European polities and have had a home-grown automobile industry. Secondly, 
because the two countries helpfully straddle both Esping-Andersen’s (1990) welfare-state typology (the 
UK being a ‘liberal’ and Sweden a ‘social democratic’ regime), Hall & Soskice’s (2001) political-
economic typology (the UK being an ‘LME’ and Sweden a ‘CME’) and the recent ‘growth models’ 
perspective of Baccaro & Pontusson (2016) – with the UK relying relatively more on (debt-based) 
consumption-driven growth and Sweden more on a hybrid of export- and consumption-driven growth – 
one is in a better position to bring to light both the shared structural features cutting across the expected 
                                                          
95 Thomas & Myers do not use that term. 
96 Similarly as above, even though Thomas & Myers (2015: 62, 63 124-5) designate all (even slightly) 
‘comparative’ studies as necessarily ‘multiple case studies’ one might simply be dealing with a more informal or 
non-systematic comparison between the different elements of a single subject, as is precisely the case in the 
automobile industry analysis.  
97 Thomas & Myers do not use that term.  
98 While Thomas & Myers (2015: 125) define a ‘sequential’ study as one in which ‘the cases happen 
consecutively’, which means that this label obviously does not apply to the automobile industry study, there is 
nevertheless in the separately presented semi-parallel study of Britain and Sweden a slight ‘assumption that what 
has happened in one or in an intervening period will in some way affect the next’ (which is the second constitutive 
dimension of a ‘sequential’ study).   
101 
 
diversity and the specific peculiarities associated with each countries’ ‘path dependent’ history. More 
specifically, the country selection setup is intended to optimize the task of uncovering the shared 
structural attributes of the diagnosed governance turn, and the reconfiguration of legitimatory and fiscal 
state-crafting underpinning the (in practice) caricatures of the ‘extreme’ small-state liberal-market 
British regime and the ‘extreme’ welfarist coordinated-market Swedish regime.99  
Sixthly, with regards to the ‘varieties of time-use’ it is clearly a ‘diachronic’ study (Ibid.: 63). 
This is clear, since, as would be obvious, (1) the ‘diachronic study shows change over time’ (Ibid., 
emphasis removed) and (2) the case study examines the historical emergence, consolidation and 
reconfiguration of the automobile industry. Seventhly, with regards to the basic ‘purpose’ of, or ‘reason 
for doing’, the case study, the automobile industry study should be described as being both 
‘instrumental’ and ‘exploratory’ (Ibid.: 59, 64). It is ‘instrumental’ because, rather than being entirely 
‘open-ended’ (Ibid.: 76, 44) or studied ‘for its intrinsic interest’, it is primarily done ‘for a particular 
reason’ – namely to ‘illustrate’ the object (see below), i.e. the launched/developed macro-governance 
analytical framework. That said, it also has an ‘exploratory’ purpose (Ibid.: 64, 76, 79), which is more 
‘open-ended’, aiming to potentially locate or examine new or interesting explanations, findings, 
mechanisms, processes, etc.     
Eighthly, and perhaps most importantly, with regards to the ‘approach’ of the study it should be 
regarded as primarily ‘illustrative’ (Ibid.: 61, 64). According to Thomas & Myers (2015: 3, 2, 67, 59) a 
key distinction should be made between studies that are ‘theory-centered’ and studies that are 
‘illustrative’. Whereas the former type involves either a ‘theory-testing’ or ‘theory-building’ approach 
(or a combination), the latter refers to an approach that is more ‘descriptive’ and ‘picture-drawing’, that 
is ‘showing something’ – a strategy that is often seen in medicine/law where case study analysis is 
typically used ‘as a vehicle for exemplifying and illustrating novel or archetypical phenomena’ (Ibid.: 
                                                          
99 Notice, that this selection logic does not imply that the study overall accepts the core arguments of the above 
frameworks or necessarily find their ‘comparative’ typologies particularly analytically productive. Rather, the 
point of situating the choice of Britain and Sweden within the above (mostly) well-known ‘varieties’-focused 
typologies, matrixes and analytical dimensions is merely to emphasize how the specific country selection all else 
equal maximizes the opportunity to make generic claims concerning the shared dominant features and trends 
associated with legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting.  
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64, 81, 83, 5). The case study of the historical development of the automobile industry is illustrative 
because it primarily seeks to ‘illustrate the theoretical position’ or ideally ‘[demonstrate] the validity of 
an already-developed thesis’. The object of the study, ‘an already formulated theoretical position’ – i.e. 
the launched/developed macro-governance analytical framework – is thus sought ‘illuminated and 
explicated’ (Ibid.: 85, 86); the chosen subject serves as ‘the lens through which we can examine the 
theoretical object of interest’ (Ibid.: 15, emphasis added, 86).  
That said, while the more descriptive and elucidating/illuminating character of the primarily 
illustrative automobile industry case study implies that it is not supposed to, for example, ‘prove’ the 
analytical framework in any straightforward sense, like many other studies it nonetheless also contains 
some ‘theory-testing’ and particularly ‘theory-building’ dimensions.100 The automobile industry study 
is simultaneously partly a ‘theory-building’ case because (1) it has also to some extent allowed the 
analytical framework to be further ‘developed’ and helped ‘build explanations’ and (2) the case 
material was examined ‘with an open mind’ (Ibid.: 82, 76, 88). Although less so, it can also 
simultaneously be considered a partly ‘theory-testing’ case study since it also to some extent served to 
‘test’ or assess the relatively independently developed analytical framework. As usual, rather than a 
simplistic either/or one is of course dealing with relatively varying moments or intensities of either of 
these approaches.101 
                                                          
100 Thomas & Myers (2015: 67-91) goes through a number of works in their presentation of the typology that 
unproblematically combine different approaches. As they point out, ‘there are numerous valid permutations of the 
dimensions’ of their typology and thus ‘many trajectories (…) open to the case inquirer’ (Ibid.: 67).   
101 Of course, not all of these low-intensity ‘building’ and ‘testing’ procedures taking place during the context of 
discovery has been subsequently reconstructed in, or synthetically incorporated into, Part I, II and III of the 
overall study. Firstly, texts are always unfinished products, always already somewhat reflective of the actual raw 
method of enquiry as it organically progressed throughout the text. Especially due to time restraints, it is often 
difficult to perfectly synthetically reshape the final text and incorporate and import all of the continuous findings 
and the organic developments that were naturally part of the dynamics of the method of enquiry. Secondly, 
instead of, for example, necessarily recrafting the (tentatively) ‘finished’ analytical framework in accordance with 
these, some of the relevant findings or oddities of the actual examination of the case material and the specifics of 
the automobile industry of the two countries of Britain and Sweden are instead presented and explicitly addressed 
in Part IV, with the purpose of productively highlighting or discussing certain aspects.  
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Ninthly, and lastly, the case study analysis, just like the core analysis of Part I, II and III, is 
principally informed by a more or less pragmatic ‘eclecticism in the choice of methods’ (Ibid.: 80). In 
this relation, it seems principally true, as Thomas & Myers (Ibid.: 64, 73, 83) points out, that 
‘methodological eclecticism is the hallmark of the case study’ and that great case study scholarship 
ideally uses both ‘a wide range of methods’ and a ‘panoply of different sources’. That said, the 
‘eclecticism’ of this case study is of course severely limited/constrained by numerous (especially) 
practical, substantive and theoretical considerations and thus inevitably biased in certain directions. In 
practice, rather than, technically speaking, formally employing different ‘sources’ and ‘methods’, the 
case study, as well as the core analysis, should be understood as merely selectively and instrumentally 
drawing on various types/qualities of content and procedures as well as more loosely being informed by 
insights/findings from other scholars that are originally based on the employment of a variety of 
sources/methods. Thus, rather than formal ‘triangulation’ (for a review of typical neo-positivist types of 
triangulation, see Thurmond 2001), the case study analysis is (of course, ideally speaking) simply based 
on ‘the intelligent putting together of evidence’ (Thomas & Myers 2015: 75) – that is, various forms of 
theoretically focused retroductive, deductive, inductive and abductive reasoning that are ‘buttressed 
with evidence’ stemming from a variety of studies, perspectives and sources. Importantly, such a more 
informal type of ‘inclusion of (…) data, argument, reasoning and analysis is a form of triangulation that 
should not be downplayed in importance’ (Ibid.).   
Although both the core analysis and the case study may principally and overwhelmingly be 
termed a so-called ‘qualitative’ study, it nevertheless seeks to strategically, selectively and informally 
incorporate into the overall argumentation more ‘quantitative’ types of findings, trends or data. From 
the perspective of (perhaps otherwise skeptical) qualitative researchers, as Danermark et al. (2002: 174, 
175) point out, ‘quantitative analytical models can be fruitful and are undoubtedly valuable’ – they 
might be productively utilized or drawn upon, in a preferably critical-conscious manner, in order to 
both ‘explore how common a phenomenon is’ or, more theoretically relevant, to ‘indicate connections 
and conditions not to be found in qualitative analyses’. Since qualitative and quantitative procedures – 
or, perhaps better put, ‘intensive’ and ‘extensive’ approaches – often ‘complement each other’ and 
typically ‘correspond to different issues and needs’, it seems perfectly legitimate to utilize or draw on 
‘both intensive and extensive designs in [one’s] data collection’ and to let a certain phenomenon, 
development or trend be ‘described with the help of extensive studies’ that are not necessarily 
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‘performed by the author [herself/himself]’ (Danermark et al. 2002: 176, 112, 111).102 Importantly, both 
the core historical-theoretical analysis and the case study analysis at various points engage in such 
informal, selective and pragmatic incorporation of different types of data or findings from also 
‘quantitative’ scholarship. 
That said, the case study overwhelmingly draws on the ‘qualitative’ contextual accounts and 
detailed insights and findings of the mainstream historical literature on the automobile industry – a 
historical literature that thus constitutes the main source of evidence on the subject of the case study. 
Alongside historical accounts of the development of the automobile industry – and its development in 
specifically Britain and Sweden – the case study utilizes a fairly wide repertoire of additional types of 
literature and sources, which deals with both very detailed aspects of a certain relevant period, event, 
trend or country and the overall macro-contextual background within which to place the overall 
dynamics of the automobile industry (in particularly the two countries). This is a very heterogeneous 
overall cluster of additional literature and sources which includes country-specific statistics (e.g., 
OECD/Eurostat) and industry statistics, automobile industry reports, governmental reports, plans or 
white papers, country-specific publications within the sub-field of business history or business 
administration literature and scholarly work that addresses both the overall political-economic themes 
of industrial relations, economic production and managerial-organizational practices and the specific 
party-political/political-institutional history of Britain and Sweden.  
As discussed above, the treatment of this case material is inevitably and productively two-sided. 
On the one hand, the partly intrinsic historical dynamic of the case material is to some extent reflected 
in the slightly ‘neutrally’ descriptive character of the case study; the relevant historical (and additional) 
sources/literature have been allowed to organically emerge and wrap itself around the case illustration; 
the narrative has been inductively shaped by the ‘objective’ development itself. On the other hand, the 
examination and presentation of the case material have of course been fundamentally instrumentally 
organized, and structured both (1) according to the agenda and research questions of the overall study 
and (2) through the ECR model and broader repertoire of launched/developed theoretical perspectives, 
categories, mappings, etc.      
 
                                                          
102 Danermark et al. (2002: 111-2) outlines a concrete example of a scholar doing exactly this as part of her study.   
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4.3.3 The Chomskyan funnel setup 
It seems possible and productive, as a final exercise of this relatively extensive chapter, to contextualize 
the basic methodological organization of the overall study – and, specifically, the relationship between 
the core historical-theoretical analysis and the case study – through a funnel-like logic, going from a 
relatively high degree of rule-bound abstractness to an increasing degree of context-specific 
concreteness. This setup can arguably be very loosely pedagogically exemplified through a strictly 
metaphorical reference to the linguistic theory of Generative Grammar, as famously advanced by Noam 
Chomsky (see, e.g., Chomsky 1957, 2008; for an introduction, see Carnie 2013: chapter 1).103 Put in a 
short and of course simplified manner, Chomsky’s understanding of a Universal Grammar posits the 
effective existence of a more or less fixed and genetically coded, largely subconscious, innate or built-
in capacity for language – a largely invariant system of cognitive computation and prior principles. This 
finite rule-bound system or basic cognitive competence generates, in a systematic, structurally limiting 
and hierarchical manner, infinite derived and (at least superficially) variant forms of sentences, and 
linguistic outputs or performances.  
Now, as figure 4 below shows, for this study’s alternative and, again, specifically heuristic 
purposes the Chomskyan funnel setup consists of three main layers, separated by varying relative levels 
of abstraction and empirical-historical content. Firstly, at the most ‘universal’ level, one finds the 
description, discussion and surveying of the organizational-institutional properties of statehood and the 
functional dimensions of state reproduction. As seen, although formal and relatively invariant, the 
presentation of these properties is also historically-empirically informed – and, as argued above, this is 
always already the case. Secondly, freely tweaking the conventional terminology, there is what may be 
called grammatical performances (GPs).104 These are variant outputs or instantiations limited by the 
relatively invariant institutional-organizational properties of statehood (i.e., using the metaphor, the 
universal grammar). Thus, although the performances are highly context-dependent, they are always 
                                                          
103 Arguably, even though (1) I shall claim no expertise with regards to this theory, (2) the theory has been 
revised, extended and sophisticated during the last couple of decades (as witnessed, e.g., in the Lakatosian-like so-
called Minimalist Program (e.g., Chomsky 2008)) and (3) it may ultimately be a false/incorrect linguistic theory, 
the theory of Generative Grammar may nevertheless provide a productive metaphor for situating and 
understanding the varying levels of abstraction of the overall study. 
104 On the Chomskyan distinction between ‘competence’ and ‘performance’, see Carnie (2013: 17).    
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rule-bound and ordered in a systematic and causally hierarchical manner. So, GP1, in the overall setup 
of this study, includes the historically embedded cross-cutting trends and general (and temporally 
circumscribed) historical stages associated with the dynamics of legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting. 
More particularly, GP1 surveys the ‘commonalities’ and cross-cutting trends associated with the 
historical emergence, consolidation and reconfiguration of the legitimatory and fiscal functions of 
Western European liberal-capitalist democratic polities (the ECR model). 
GP2 concerns the unique, yet systematically rule-bound, specific historical trajectories of the 
British and Swedish automobile industries in the period covering the ECR model. Such historically 
embedded grammatical performances – which are systematically ordered by general state-crafting 
dynamics linked to the historically developed relationship between legitimation and fiscal 
accumulation, as outlined in GP1 – are distinguishable variant historical outputs/experiences, which 
according to for example mainstream comparative political economy interpretations are associated with 
the specific historical institutionalization of, notably, economic production (e.g., CME versus LME), 
welfarist arrangements (e.g., a Social Democratic, Conservative or Liberal regime) and growth 
models/patterns (e.g., consumer-driven vs. export-driven). Of course, causally unique variant features 
associated with the industry itself – such as the specific technological features of automobile production 
– are all factors that serve to further, so to speak, ‘muddy the waters’ (Carnie 2013: 17) of the 
competence-situated universal grammar. 
 
 
Figure 4. The Chomskyian funnel approach 
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Importantly, as may be evident, the GPs are, at varying degrees, historically-empirically 
informed; as the study moves from the universal grammar of state-crafting to GP1 and GP2, the relative 
degree of abstractness, formalism, universality and invariance decreases and the relative degree of 
concreteness, historical-empirical embeddedness and variance increases.  
Thus, as the study proceeds one can generally observe a descending level of abstraction (or, 
conversely, an increasing level of historical/contextual embeddedness). Moreover, despite this generally 
downward sloping abstraction curve, the study, in line with the logic of the above described HTA, 
remains always already varyingly historically/empirically informed. Notice, that the funnel setup is one 
representation of the analytical logic of the study, not a detailed outline of how the study is actually 
practically presented (i.e., the order, structure or titles of the different chapters); although highly 
correlated, the funnel setup and the chapter structure do not entirely correspond. 
 
This chapter has provided a thorough presentation and discussion of the study’s key 
epistemological and methodological considerations and procedures, focusing on the discovery-
justification nexus, the HTA to be utilized and the concrete methodological strategy. While extensive, 
the considerations provided in this chapter are absolutely crucial. They are not only important for 
understanding many of the key maneuvers performed in this study, especially in relation to making 
sense of Part I (coming up next), which both discusses the conditions of modern functionalist state-
crafting and develops a framework centered on legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting suitable for 
studying state-facilitated governance. The chapter has also, more generally, shed light on many of the 
necessary epistemological conditions for productively understanding and studying governance.  
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Part I    Emergence: Towards a Framework for Studying State-
facilitated Governance 
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Chapter 5. The Conditions of Modern Statehood 
 
This chapter shall examine and discuss some of the key theoretical and historical conditions of 
possibility for (studying) modern statehood. This exercise is pivotal for two main reasons. Firstly, as 
argued, despite its overall productive analytical perspective and repertoire, the LAF approach both (1) 
did not provide systematic insights into the historical context and foundations of modern statehood or 
the genesis of its two functions, operating with a postwar Golden Age-like analytical baseline, and (2) 
relied on many unquestioned or undertheorized premises concerning the status of statehood. Secondly, 
and directly related to this, as shall become clear, in order to genuinely understand the conditions of the 
governance phenomenon, it is necessary to grasp the historically situated conditions and dynamics of 
modern statehood.  
Rather than analyzing the state as such, the chapter is interested in selectively and ideal-typically 
shedding light on particular aspects associated with specifically modern statehood – aspects that are 
necessary to grasp since their proper comprehension permit and provide the possibilities for later 
developing the relatively more specific framework focused on legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting in 
chapter 6. 
The chapter is split into two main sections. The first part examines the ‘modern’ side of modern 
statehood, focusing on the historical pre-modern/modern statehood nexus, the four monopolies of the 
state and its impersonal characteristics. The second section examines the functional side of modern 
statehood, focusing on the problems of functional reproduction and the dynamics of the relationship 
between the different state functions.            
 
 
5.1 Towards the modern state 
Any attempt at defining – or at least sketching the key traits of – the modern state must somehow make 
reference to Max Weber’s work. Importantly, Weber’s treatment of the state not only involves his 
famous minimal definition of the state – as that human entity or association which ‘claims the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’ (Weber 1948: 78, emphasis 
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removed) – it also concerns his well-known conscious decision to approach or define the state through 
its (organizational) means instead of through its functions.105 Because Weber (1948: 78, emphasis 
added, 77-8, emphasis added) thought that ‘[t]here is scarcely any task that some political association 
has not taken in hand, and there is no task that one could say has always been exclusive and peculiar to 
[the modern state]’, he was convinced that ‘[u]ltimately, one can define the modern state sociologically 
only in terms of the specific means peculiar to it’. One of the main aims of this chapter is to go beyond 
this distinctive conceptual-methodological maneuver – and more generally the often seen simple 
distinction between means and functions – by explicitly defining the state through both of these two 
aspects. In one sense, Weber is of course correct in pointing out the heterogeneity of ends and tasks of 
modern states. Both historically and across the various contemporary modern states one can locate a 
seemingly diverse field of aims, tasks, ends purposes, objectives, etc. (the terms are many). But, in 
another sense, scholars following Weber’s advice to construe the state conception through its means 
and not (also) its ends/tasks arguably mistakes the concrete aims, tasks, ends, operations, purposes, 
objectives, etc., of the state for more abstract ‘state functions’ (cf. Anter 2014: 24).106 But while the 
empirically observed plurality and complexity of contemporary ‘advanced’ state operations of course is 
undeniable it does not mean, as argued in chapter 3, that one cannot group various seemingly 
heterogeneous operations/activities within larger more generic and structurally patterned functions, or, 
more generally, that it is not both possible, meaningful and productive to also construe statehood in 
functional terms. Thus, I shall try to get at the concept of the modern state from two sides, firstly 
looking at its means and secondly at its functions. I shall initiate the attempt at conceptually sketching 
out the modern state by outlining, in ideal-typical fashion, its overall traits and organizational 
characteristics. 
                                                          
105 In Politik als Beruf, Weber (1948: 77, emphasis added) starts out by claiming that ‘[s]ociologically, the state 
cannot be defined in terms of its ends’. 
106 Arguably, while Weber dismisses the idea of defining the state in terms of its ends, tasks, objectives, etc., these 
objectives are mostly understood narrowly, as concrete objectives, not more generic functions. At least one can 
conclude, as Anter (2014: 23, see also Weber 1978: 905) reminds us, that while Weber dismisses the abstract 
cataloguing of state ‘objectives’ he accepts and lists ‘an entire catalogue’ of ‘state functions’, pointing to a 
‘legislative function’, ‘police’, ‘administration of justice’, ‘the various branches of administration’ and ‘military 
administration’.  
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5.1.1 A journey: Between pre-modern and modern statehood 
An initial sensible way of approaching the characteristics of the modern state is to compare it with its 
pre-modern counterpart. The historical literature on pre-modern statehood speaks of states in the 
minimal sense of simply the existence of a relatively ‘autonomous political unit’ (Carneiro 1970: 733). 
And when discussing the gradual rise of the primitive or early pre-modern state forms, emphasis is 
typically put on the so-called ‘agricultural revolution’ initiated roughly 10-12,000 years ago – that is, 
the pivotal shift from a Paleolithic seasonal life of hunting and gathering to a Neolithic life of 
agricultural production and more permanent settlements. Importantly, the spread of agriculture and 
agricultural settlement – which appeared largely independently in many places and at different times, 
starting in the Middle East around 9000 BC (in south-eastern Turkey, Iran and the Levant) and then in 
places like China, Central and South America (e.g., Harari 2014: 77-79) – involved and triggered a 
number of key social, institutional and organizational mechanisms integral to state-formation processes.           
To start out, the agricultural revolution implied the twin dynamics of the cultivation of plants 
(implying vegetable wheats and storable cereal) and the management of domesticated animals (such as 
sheep, goats, cattle, pigs, chickens), allowing for population growth, economies of scale and new water 
and tool-making techniques (e.g., Smithsonian Institution 2011: 18-9; Diamond 2002). Harari (2014: 
80-97) describes the organized cultivation of wheat, associated with the shift towards permanent 
villages, as part of a Faustian ‘wheat bargain’: while the overall population would increase markedly, 
agricultural life, compared to that of the nomadic and sensual hunter-gatherer, was much more decease-
ridden and involved physically hard and psychologically self-disciplining work. Importantly, in contrast 
to the seasonally-based nomadic wildlife, one may argue that permanent settlement implies an 
attempted fixation of social structures over time, a territorial investment with the expectation of a 
certain continuity. Arguably, it seems, with increased temporal fixation and organizational investments 
comes increased motivation for seeking territorial protection. Partly historically approximating Hegel’s 
(2008: 265) formative analytical distinction between internal and external sovereignty, one may say that 
out of the processes of agricultural domestication – the move to farming-based permanent settlement 
and beyond – comes not only the idea of the ‘domestic’ or ’home’ but also the constitution of a ‘need’ 
for territorial protection. The process of domestication thus dialectically institutes two of the main traits 
of generic statehood (that is, whether pre-modern or modern), namely internal/domestic social and 
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resource management and externally-oriented capacities for war-making (e.g., to protect the village 
against unwelcome intruders).     
Eventually, around 3000 BC, larger, more organized and complex settlements appeared in the 
form of cities and civilizations. Uruk, the world’s first city or walled urban settlement, emerged in the 
region of Sumer in Southeastern Mesopotamia. In Uruk, pictographic writing appeared for the first time 
together with the crafting of bureaucracy and military techniques. Other city-states of southern 
Mesopotamia included, for example, Nippur, Kish, Ur. Besides the crafting of complex social and 
organizational structures, the city-states of ancient Mesopotamia were seemingly structured around 
early forms of social ‘stratification’ (Aguilera-Barchet 2015: 13). Also ancient Egypt stands out as an 
especially complex and organized form of civilization and kingdom. Under Pharaoh-based dynastic 
Egyptian rule, we see not only the flourishing of engineering, craftsmanship, arts, hieroglyphic writing, 
ship-building but also complex bureaucracy. Of course, Pharaoh-anchored bureaucracy had, as Service 
(1975: 230) puts it, a ‘patriarchal character’ – compered to modern bureaucratic practices, it can be seen 
as a form of ‘familistic aristocratic theocracy’. That said, Egyptian bureaucratic centralization 
nevertheless involved not only such positions as a ‘chief of fields’ (in charge of agriculture) and a 
‘master of largesse’ (in charge of livestock) but, notably, the Grand Vizier (Ibid.) – that is, the highest 
official, a form of ‘permanent secretary’ to the Pharaoh. Other important ancient civilizations, 
preempting modern state-formation processes, appeared in China around the Yellow River region. 
From the Shang dynasty (most likely the first Chinese dynasty emerging around 1800 BC) and 
onwards, we see a gradual process of increasing organizational complexity involving relative 
organizational centralization and stability and increased bureaucratic and military efficiency. With this 
pre-modern history in mind: in the pre-modern post-Neolithic journey from egalitarian primitive society 
(non-ruler driven bands and tribes), through politically organized or ruler-driven multi-village 
chiefdoms (whether simple, compound or consolidated), to complex city-states and empires (Service 
1975; van Creveld 1999: 1-52; Carneiro 2000), one can locate the early contours of a key mechanism of 
later modern statehood, namely the territory-centered centralization and institutionalization of political 
power (see, e.g., Service 1975: 8; Poggi 1990: 18).  
Arguably, one can learn a great deal about the generic mechanisms of state-formation when 
observing the evolution of the pre-modern types; they reveal insights that are useful for looking at the 
logic of the later modern trajectory. Firstly, in the pre-modern state-formation trajectory, we see a co-
113 
 
constitutive mixture of externality (acquisition or protection) and internality (internal evolution) (e.g., 
Carneiro 1970: 736) – a generic dialectic that is also integral to the constitution of modern statehood, 
which is typically construed as a double process involving both internal and external pressure (Møller 
2012: 20-1; Kaspersen & Gabriel 2008). Secondly, pre-modern state-formation trajectories reveal the 
internal mechanism-based character of this (doubly constitutive) process. As Service (1975: 7, 
emphasis added) points out, ‘not only did some of the archaic civilizations probably develop 
independently; they also developed surprisingly similar kinds of new cultural features’. This 
combination of independent developments producing shared outcomes – a combination that also holds 
for the initial agricultural revolution, in which agriculture spread independently at different times, in 
different regions – is important for understanding state formation: ‘since it happened several times 
independently we immediately wonder (…) what causes or repetitive processes were at work’ (Ibid.: 6-
7, emphasis in original). In this sense, one can meaningfully study generic mechanisms located across 
otherwise varying temporal, geographical and institutional settings; and as shall be seen later, and as 
argued more generally in chapter 4, it makes sense, in a parallel manner, to examine cross-cutting 
contemporary ‘commonalities’ (notably Streeck 2012b) – that is, in this study’s case, the generic and 
endogenously-anchored organizational and functional mechanisms and traits tied to liberal-capitalist 
democratic statehood.   
Thirdly, a cursory juxtaposition of pre-modern and modern statehood reveals that the distinction 
between the two categories is one of both cumulative continuation and qualitative change. In many 
ways, Weber’s work is representative of this duality. On the one hand, he placed his overall 
rationalization thesis within a long-term historical trajectory. In Weber’s (1948: 323-359) fascinating 
Intermediate Reflections (Zwischenbetrachtung) – with the translated subtitle Religious Rejections of 
the World and Their Directions – he speaks, somewhat preempting Luhmann and (less so) Bourdieu, of 
the crucial differentiation of value spheres (Wertsphären), i.e. the political, aesthetic, erotic and 
intellectual spheres, somehow leading towards, or triggering, modernity or the rationalization 
process.107 According to Weber, the differentiation and rationalization of the different value spheres 
follows from both their own internal rationalization logic and through the clash with religion, in 
particular the major universalist and ‘world-denying’ salvation/world religions emerging from around 
1000 BC, which forces each sphere to provide a ‘competing form of salvation’ (Bellah 1999: 293; 
                                                          
107 See Bellah (1999) for a productive account of Weber’s Intermediate Reflections.  
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Weber 1948: 330). In a rather complex way, Weber situates his rationalization thesis in an more than 
two millennia old value-anchored trajectory – locating ‘rationalizing potentialities’ in the Axial age 
(Bellah 1999: 280) – and even points to India, not the Western world, as the original ‘cradle of those 
religious ethics which have abnegated the world’ (Weber 1948: 323).   
Moreover, when Weber (e.g., 1978: 1402) refers to, for example, the Egyptian and Chinese 
civilizations he sometimes emphasizes their, to use Bellah’s term, bureaucratizing and ‘rationalizing 
potentialities’.108 In this way, Weber’s ‘rationalization’-oriented view – which, in contrast to Marx’s 
(1990: 874) ‘reification’-oriented historical trajectory that focuses on the relatively recent ‘process that 
divorces the worker from the ownership of production’,109 emphasizes the long-term co-evolutionary 
dialectics of institutionalized political power and capitalistic profit-making and the millennia-old 
emergence of an ideational ‘methodical way of life’ (Weber 1948: 327) – in some sense supports the 
view that modern statehood can be seen as a long-term cumulative continuation of pre-modern 
structures and mechanisms having ‘rationalizing potentialities’.  
On the other hand, Weber’s work also systematically points to the qualitative uniqueness of 
modern forms of organization and institutionalized relations of economic and political power. At the 
very same time as Weber (1978: 1402) reaches back to, for example, ancient Egypt to locate 
‘rationalizing potentialities’, he immediately qualifies this: while a non-private property state 
bureaucracy ‘would be similar to the situation in ancient Egypt’, such a situation, were it ever to be 
fully realized, would nevertheless ‘occur in a much more rational – and hence unbreakable – form’. 
While, as he points out in a conference intervention in Vienna in 1909, ‘to this day, there has never 
been a bureaucracy that could have come even close to Egyptian bureaucracy’ and that it is ‘clear that 
today we are rushing inexorably towards a development that follows precisely this model’, this is now 
done ‘on a technically refined, more rationalized, i.e., on a far more mechanized basis’ (Weber 1909). 
                                                          
108 When, towards the end of Economy and Society, Weber (1978: 1402, emphasis in original) discusses the 
possibility of statehood without private capitalism, he pessimistically argues that ‘[s]tate bureaucracy would rule 
alone’, comparing this to ‘the situation in ancient Egypt’. Reflecting on the possibilities of a full ‘machination’ of 
social life, the existence of a sublime and all-engulfing form of ‘rational bureaucratic administration’, Weber 
(Ibid.) commented that in such a situation people might be ‘as powerless as the fellahs of ancient Egypt’. 
109 Although notice that when Marx (1990: 876, fn. 1) launches his epochal historical-theoretical analysis of the 
‘primitive’ emergence of capitalism, he proceeds to study the critical case of England fully aware that it was in the 
Italian city-states ‘where capitalist production developed earliest’. 
115 
 
Compared to the modern ‘contractually employed official’, in the Egyptian ‘hydraulic’ bureaucracy 
(Weber 1978: 198), the ‘officials were slaves of the Pharaoh, if not legally, at least in fact’ (Weber 
1948: 208). With the pharaoh as ‘the source of law, governing by inspired decisions’ (Service 1975: 
230), Egyptian bureaucratic domination differs markedly from Weber’s (1948: 196-8; see also 1978: 
218-220) well-known six ideal-typical dimensions of modern bureaucracy. The same would obviously, 
and to an even larger extent, apply to chiefdoms which, although based on ‘centralized direction’, 
implied ‘hereditary hierarchical status arrangements with an aristocratic ethos’ (Service 1975: 16). 
Importantly, as I shall discuss later, a key element separating pre-modern from modern statehood is the 
latter’s relative activation of officialdom/formality and impersonality (or emergentist corporate-
institutional abstractness).  
In this context, it is uncertain whether Charles Tilly’s (1990) distinction between ‘states’ and 
‘national states’ covers the key elements that are central to the transformation from pre-modern to 
modern statehood. In Tilly’s (1990: 1, 2) framework, states are defined as ‘coercion-wielding 
organizations that are distinct from households and kinship groups and exercise clear priority in some 
respects over all other organizations within substantial territories’, while national states are defined as 
‘relatively powerful, centralized, and differentiated sovereign organizations’. But do these aspects 
adequately capture the difference between pre-modern and modern statehood? Does Tilly’s neo-
Weberian definition adequately capture the Weberian, i.e. formal and bureaucratic, character of modern 
statehood or, importantly, the significance of, as shall be argued below, the emergentist, 
impersonalized, corporate-institutional logic of a modern state? 110 Moreover, as shall be discussed 
later, conceptions in line with Tilly’s neo-Weberian, and arguably neo-positivist, explicit overemphasis 
on the immediately observable organizational means of the state, critically neglects the functional 
dynamic of modern statehood, a functional side that shall be appreciated later in this chapter and 
throughout the study more generally.         
In sum, one can say that it is useful to operate with an understanding of the modern state that is 
able to capture both the cumulative continuations and the qualitative changes instituted through the shift 
                                                          
110 Of course, Tilly might to some extent be excused since his intention with the term national state is not 
necessarily to produce a definition of the modern state but simply an intermediate concept placed in between pre-
modern states and what he calls ‘nation-states’, defined as ‘a state whose people share a strong linguistic, 
religious, and symbolic identity’ (Tilly 1990: 3). 
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from pre-modernity to modernity. As I shall argue in the next chapter, the always gradual and never-
ending character of modern statehood – our inability to locate, in a fully exhaustive manner, all of the 
defined attributes of statehood ‘out there’, i.e. the necessary discrepancy between ideal-types and real 
world entities – motivates us to operate with alternative terms such as ‘state-crafting’, which alludes to 
the always already ongoingness of statehood, the artful and always unfinished making of stateness.  
 
 
5.1.2 The four monopolies of the modern state 
Before, and partly as part of, discussing what makes the modern state modern in more details, I shall 
proceed to outline the main conceptual attributes of the modern state. Following the German tradition 
of Allgemeine Staatslehre (Jellinek 1914; Loughlin 2009), one may initially construe the generic state 
as a composite entity consisting of three aspects (Drei-Elemente-Lehre):  
 ‘Staatsgebiet’ – that is, a relatively circumscribed state territory.  
 ‘Staatsgewalt’ – that is, a state power/apparatus or some form of ruling authority.    
 ‘Staatsvolk’ – that is, a state people, or, following the first of the four components of the 
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States of 1933, the existence of a 
(relatively) ‘permanent population’. 111  
Thus, when dealing with the state, we are initially, and minimally, dealing with a territory, a people and 
state power. Importantly, as Loughlin (2009) explicates, in the Staatslehre tradition the state is a multi-
faceted ‘relational’ category, meaning both that an ‘inextricable’ connection exist between the three 
elements and that each element’s constitutive nature makes it problematic to reduce the state to only 
one of them. Thus, while any state needs, for example, a population/people (Volk), the ‘people’ does not 
exhaust the category of the state.  
Clearly, although the Staatslehre tradition does not formulate its account in a social-theoretically 
emergentist manner, one can detect a certain implicit homology between its description of the relational 
irreducibility of the constitutive elements of the state entity and the overall emergentist ontology 
adopted in this study. Besides entailing that one cannot reduce the state to any of its individual 
constitutive elements, the emergentist character of the above multi-faceted state entity has another 
                                                          
111 See Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933).  
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related important implication: its irreducible quality, the fact of it being more than the sum of its 
constituent parts, provides the social-theoretical condition for its both organizational and institutional 
presence. On the one hand, the state has an organizational existence – it is present, and comes into 
existence in its gross form, not only as a particular type of empirically recognizable social association 
with a limited membership (Verband), but as a compulsory association (Anstalt), marked by 
‘[c]ontinuous rational activity’ (Betrieb) and with a, at least when speaking of modern organizations, 
‘continuously and rationally operating Staff’ – that is, as an Anstaltsbetrieb (Weber 1978: 48-56; see 
also Dusza 1989: 76). On the other hand, the state has an institutional existence – it is present, and 
comes into existence in its abstract form, as a less directly empirically observable matrix of historically 
institutionalized (formal or informal) rules, structures and functional patterns. While the former 
dimension alludes to the more materially anchored organizational aspects of the state’s actorness, the 
latter points to the abstract cluster of enabling and constraining forces linked to the institutional 
presence of the state.  
It follows from this important dual characterization that the state’s immediate empirical-
organizational presence cannot exhaust the category of the state. While, as discussed, Weber actually 
had a much more sophisticated conception of the institutional and historically variegated structural and 
functional properties of the state, the otherwise productive so-called neo-Weberian conception of 
statehood, as for example launched by Tilly (1990) or in Evans et al. (1985a) cannot be considered 
optimal precisely because it tends to reduce statehood to its organizational presence. Since, in this view, 
states are ‘conceived as organizations’ (Skocpol 1985: 9), neo-Weberian scholars are constantly on the 
lookout for ‘specific organizational structures’ (Evans et al. 1985b: 351). In this view, the 
organizational practices of the state sufficiently constitute, or exhaust, the state. While this definitional 
approach at first glance seems perfectly meaningful, it tends to perceive a necessary aspect of statehood 
– its organizational presence – as also a sufficient aspect. Thus, as argued, while the state necessarily 
exists as an organizational entity it also necessarily exists as an emergent institutional structure.  
More generally, the neo-Weberian conception remains suboptimal because its implied empiricism 
makes it fail to appreciate the varying institutional modes of sovereignty; it makes it difficult to grasp 
the emergent and relatively immediately unobservable institutional power of the state underpinning and 
operating across different concrete organizational modes of actuality. Ultimately, as I shall argue, in 
order to understand the ‘state-crafting’ logic underpinning the turn to governance, it is necessary to also 
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recognize the abstract quality of statehood – that is, its existence as an immediately unobservable 
emergent corporate-institutional structure. In sum, in line with the distinction made in the beginning of 
this chapter, one can say that the above three-dimensional state entity has two overlapping and 
individually insufficient ontological forms of actuality.  
Within a certain relatively circumscribed territory, having a relatively permanent population, state 
power appears, or is activated, through what may be described as four types of monopolies: 1) A force 
monopoly; 2) A bureaucratic monopoly; 3) A fiscal monopoly; 4) A symbolic monopoly.112   
1) According to Weber (1978: 54), an absolutely essential, that is both historically and 
conceptually necessary, characteristic of the state is its (or its staff’s) ability to ‘successfully [uphold] 
the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order’. 
Importantly, the Weberian force monopoly centers on the domestic arena: the unique ability of the state 
to authoritatively concentrate and manage the use of physical force within the territorial domain sets it 
apart from other potentially competing internal groups (social classes or other corporate entities). 
Through the state’s monopolization of force, violence is ‘not eliminated from society, but is deposited 
and stored in a separate domain of its own’ (Dusza 1989: 88).   
2)  According to Weber (1978: 52), the modern state is a compulsory organizational enterprise 
(Anstaltsbetrieb) – that is, a historically speaking, and ultimately, involuntary formal organization with 
‘a continuously and rationally operating Staff’. That it has a ‘rationally operating staff’ does not imply a 
superior form of knowledge or extreme strategic capacity but merely that state agents formally strive to 
rationally and administratively optimize decision-making processes. In the Weberian conception, the 
modern state concentrates ‘the means of administration’ (Weber 1948: 221) and ‘possesses an 
administrative and legal order subject to change by legislation’ (Weber 1978: 56). In Bourdieu’s (1994: 
4, emphasis removed) historical-theoretical account, the modern state is conceived as the historical 
‘culmination of a process of concentration of different species of capital’ (physical, economic, cultural, 
etc.). This historical concentration has constituted the state as a bureaucratic ‘meta-field’ in possession 
of ‘statist capital’ (or ‘meta-capital’), which ‘enables the state to exercise power over the different fields 
and over the different particular species of capital, and especially over the rates of conversion between 
them’ (Ibid.: 4). For Bourdieu, the ‘statist capital’ is the modern state’s own distinctive type of power, 
namely the power to, in an authoritative way, bureaucratically organize and structure action through 
                                                          
112 See more generally Elias (1982: 268-276) on the generic logic of the ’monopoly mechanism’. 
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mobilizing resources and juridically regulating the relations of force between other (potentially 
competing) social entities.113 In this sense, the state’s bureaucratic monopoly consists in its both 
unmatched capacity for, and authority with regards to, bureaucratic (or rational-legal) social 
organization. 
3) Following Elias (1982: 104, 110) – and implicitly a range of other notable historical scholars 
(e.g., Tilly 1990; Schulze 1995; Hart 1995; Bonney 1999b) – another essential dimension of modern 
statehood is the state’s legitimate ‘monopoly of taxation’, that is, the situation in which the ‘taxation of 
the property or income of individuals is concentrated in the hands of a central social authority’. 
Importantly, more than simply centralized tax collection, the modern state relies on an overall fiscal 
infrastructure: it manages systematic budgetary activities and controls and sanctions fiscal institutions. 
Here, a decisive budgetary expression of the shift towards a public fiscal monopoly is the moment when 
‘[t]he wielder of central power, whatever title he may bear, is allocated a sum in the budget like any 
other functionary’ (Elias 1982: 110). In other words, the modern state is not simply a tax state but a 
fiscal state. One can refer to this broader fiscal dimension as the legitimate monopoly of fiscal activity, 
or simply a fiscal monopoly.  
4) Following Bourdieu (1994, 2005), the bureaucratic modern state possesses a ‘monopoly on 
symbolic power’. The genesis of the bureaucratic modern state, in Bourdieu’s (2005: 51) scheme, is the 
story of a historical ‘monopolization of the universal’ – a process enabled by, inter alia, a class of newly 
bred civil servants, particularly jurists, self-interestedly carving out an exclusive ‘public’ domain. 
Historically, states have been able to ‘influence the language and symbolism of legitimacy’ (Cerny 
1990: 33), (at least indirectly help) shape the internal structure of the ‘social fabric’ (Ibid.: 32) and 
define ‘what the goals of the collective as a whole should be’ (Beetham 1991: 46). The state manifests 
its ‘symbolic capital’ through the production of relatively taken-for-granted cognitive classifications 
and categories of thought and practices of rule-setting, nomination, standardization, harmonization, etc. 
                                                          
113 Drawing loosely on the Wittgensteinian notion of ‘games’, Cerny (1990: 1, emphasis added) seems to be 
working from a similar perspective when observing that historically the state ‘came to constitute the overall 
pattern of games, the contextual framework within which games of other kinds were increasingly to be played’. 
Also Touraine (1977: 218, emphasis added) in his own way supports this notion of the state as an (at least partly) 
autonomous agent of meta-structuring: ‘the state is the locus of the institutional system’s combination with the 
other social systems’. 
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– processes fostered, like in Althusser’s (2012) more extreme theory of ideology, particularly through 
the educational system (Bourdieu 1994: 1).   
In sum, besides being characterized by (1) an essential monopoly on the legitimate use of physical 
force (Weber), the modern state also has (2) a monopoly on the ‘means of administration’ (Weber) and 
‘statist’ or ‘meta’ capital (Bourdieu), (3) a legitimate ‘monopoly of taxation’ (Elias) and fiscal activity 
more generally and (4) a ‘monopoly on symbolic power’ (Bourdieu). 
It might make sense to specify what the monopoly dimension implies in this study. Importantly, as 
Buchanan (2002: 690, emphasis added) correctly points out, although a state always ‘attempts to 
establish the supremacy of [its] rules’, this ‘does not imply that there are no limits on state control’. 
Rather, it ‘refers to the lack of a rival for the state’s making, application, and enforcement of law within 
an assumed jurisdiction’ (Ibid.). Critically, such an understanding is ‘compatible with the scope of the 
rules it imposes being limited’ (Ibid.).114 Moreover, states may easily engage in acts of delegation, 
prescription, licensing, dispensation, etc., without this necessarily undermining its monopoly position 
(see also Ibid.; Coleman 1974, 1982). The state is, as Coleman (1974: 29, 1982: 50, 37) puts it, a 
‘special case’ or a ‘single exceptional corporate actor’ given inter alia the ‘particular allocation of 
rights’ authoritatively performed within or by the state. The state has, in this corporate understanding, a 
distinctive authoritative status in chartering or incorporating other corporate entities. 
In other words, the lack of a pure monopoly, the fact of the state’s monopoly being usually somehow 
‘limited’ – for example, in the case of the force monopoly, the existence of violent drug cartels in 
Mexico or Columbia effectively controlling some local areas or in the case of the fiscal monopoly, the 
existence of a ‘shadow economy’ amounting to roughly 20% of GDP in countries like Italy115 – does 
not a priori disqualify the notion of statehood or the basic monopoly understanding presented above. 
Recalling the jointly applied ideal-type and ‘family resemblance’ perspectives – which, as outlined in 
chapter 4, fully accept conceptual degreeism and the empirical contingency of certain properties of a 
                                                          
114 One may add that ‘the lack of a rival’ is best interpreted as the lack of a real rival, as the depiction of a pure 
monopoly situation in mainstream microeconomic theory, where the market only has one supplier, rarely, if ever, 
matches reality. In many cases, we are dealing with a monopoly situation where minor competitors (however 
unimportant) exists, or a highly asymmetrical form of oligarchy. 
115 For data on this, see Schneider (2013).   
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category – it seems sufficient to say that the state has a more or less systematic relatively unmatched 
capacity and authority with regards to the relevant monopoly.  
Clearly, roughly in line with Weber’s thinking (see more generally Anter 2014: 33), the distinctive 
constitutive authoritative status of the above four monopolies is both (1) dependent on the state’s 
concentration of symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1994, 2005) – notably, the necessary constitutive role of 
symbolic power and symbolic violence in the historical formation of modern statehood – and (2) 
critically hinges on the material quality of the force monopoly (cf., e.g., Thorup 2015: 119).116 That 
said, while Weber (1978: 54) understood that ‘the use of physical force (…) is neither the sole, nor even 
the most usual, method of administration of political organizations’, he nevertheless stressed that the 
‘threat of force, and in the case of need its actual use, is the method which is specific to political 
organizations and is always the last resort when others have failed’. In this Weberian-Schmittian sense, 
while, for example, taxation is plausibly most effectively exercised through a state monopoly, it is the 
original and underlying ultimate coercive or materially physical nature of the state that insures the 
authority of its fiscal monopoly.    
 
 
5.1.3 Impersonalization and the emergentist institutional self-interest of the state 
In the following, I shall (1) further explicate the argument that modern statehood is historically 
constituted through an increasing degree of emergent, impersonal, and corporate-institutional self-
interested action and (2) argue that these self-interest-inducing properties critically condition its 
intrinsically functional setup and orientation. Synthesizing the historical narratives of Poggi (1990, 
2003) and van Creveld (1999), I shall initiate the first of these two tasks by sketching the following 
heuristic three-stage account of the dominant Western European state-formation process.  
 Stage one – roughly 12-16th century. Central to this period is the ‘consolidation of rule’ (Poggi 
2003). Here, more fragmented patrimonial feudal structures gradually gave way to the territory-
centered (and initially) military ‘accumulation of might’ (Ibid.: 251). In van Creveld’s (1999) 
scheme, the period 1300-1648, which for him covers the initial ‘rise of the state’, is 
                                                          
116 Weber (1978: 54, emphasis removed, emphasis in original) of course spoke famously of the ‘monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force’.   
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characterized by four key partly consecutive ‘struggles’, which in the end culminated in the 
‘triumph of the monarchs’, namely the struggle against the church, the Empire, the nobility and 
the towns. In this period, we thus see the territorial concentration of private violence; one may 
say that at the end of this rivalrous process, relatively successful or stable military or force 
monopolies are set up.  
 
 Stage two – roughly 17-18th century. Central to this period is ‘the rationalization of rule’ (Poggi 
2003). Here, successful or at least surviving power centers gradually sought to ‘exercise rule in 
a more purposeful, continuous, self-conscious manner’ (Ibid.: 251). In this period, the 
accumulation of might increasingly takes on a fiscal or extractive character, administrative 
offices are set up and (self-)binding laws and procedures emerge (Ibid.: 151-2). For van Creveld 
(1999), the period 1648-1789 covers the emergence of the ‘state as an instrument’. We observe 
the emergence of bureaucratic arrangements and officials (notably ‘secretaries of state’), 
statistical and fiscal techniques and infrastructures, ‘state-owned armies and navies’, and so on 
(Ibid.: 130, 143-155, 156, passim). Via a form of enlightened absolutism or enlightened 
absolutist statehood – underpinned by a creeping ‘reason of state’ – we see the gradual coming 
into existence of a state apparatus, which, towards the end of this process, to some considerable 
degree ‘emancipated itself both from royal control and from civil society’ (Ibid.: 127).  
 
 Stage three – roughly 19th-20th century. Central to this period is, according to Poggi (2003), the 
‘expansion of rule’. Here, we see the opening up and cumulative expansion of state structures; 
an increased involvement ‘in a greater and greater number and variety of social tasks’, both 
triggering and responding to various social, economic, political and cultural ‘modernization’ 
processes (Ibid.: 252-3). For van Creveld (1999) the period 1789-1945 covers the process 
instituting the ‘state as an ideal’; the state shifts from being an instrument for ruling to 
becoming an ideal or ‘an end, and later, a living god’ (Ibid.: 190). In this period we observe the 
state formally ‘conquering money’ – that is, authorizing, printing and 
concentrating/accumulating it successfully – and, under the weight of a brewing nationalism, 
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institutionalizing intricate systems of policing and imprisonment, mass education and social 
services (Ibid.: 224-242, passim).117   
 
Another more analytical-intensive way to depict the above synthetic three-stage scheme, is to 
describe it, drawing on Bourdieu (1994, 2005), as a two-stage transition from personal to what he 
denotes as ‘impersonal’ bureaucratic power (see also Thorup 2015).118 For Bourdieu (2005: e.g., 30, 
passim), the period 1330-1630 is centered on what he (perhaps anachronistically) terms the ‘dynastic 
state’, characterized inter alia by feudal nobility and the personalized hereditary reproduction of the 
‘king’s household’. From the 17th century, Bourdieu (2005: 30, passim) argues, we observe the genesis 
of a, properly speaking, modern ‘bureaucratic state’. This Bourdieusian two-stage-transition thus 
involves a gradual shift from a feudal, hereditary, dynastic and patrimonial form of personal authority 
to a bureaucratic, administrative and differentiated form of impersonal public power. Toying with the 
notion of the ‘impersonal’ bureaucratic state, one may perceive this trajectory, which to a large extent 
corresponds to the above three-stage account of state-formation, as an overarching gradual process of 
impersonalization.119  
With regards to the dynamics of this process, both Bourdieu (2005) and van Creveld (1999) seem 
to agree on the historical importance of what may be termed the functional delegation mechanism. For 
Bourdieu (2005: 48), the bureaucratization process – the shift from personal to impersonal power – 
ultimately came about through ‘the differentiation of power and (…) the lengthening of the chains of 
authority and agency’. In particular, the regularization of law, a civil service (especially jurists) and 
new administrative procedures helped foster an understanding and notion of universality and ‘public 
                                                          
117 One might add that the ‘expansion of rule’ in this period also entails the gradual (and not always successful) 
spreading and mainstreaming across the globe of a certain version of modern statehood, developed and refined 
primarily in Western Europe, particularly after 1945 (on this, see van Creveld 1999: 263-335).     
118 Weber (e.g., 1948: 229) also speaks of bureaucracy as being ‘impersonal’. 
119 In Weber’s (1948: 334) text Intermediate Reflections (with the subtitle Religious Rejections of the World and 
their Directions) he refers to ’depersonalization’ (Verunpersönlichung) – or in some translations 
‘impersonalization’ – in connection to the bureaucratic state. Bourdieu (2005) seems to prefer other terms which 
strongly correlates with this macro-oriented process, such as ‘defeudalization’ or ‘bureaucratization’. See also 
Thorup (2015).   
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interest’ (Ibid.: 43-50). According to van Creveld (1999: 125), ‘the more absolute any monarch the 
greater his dependence on impersonal bureaucratic, military, and legal mechanisms to transmit his will 
and impose it on society at large’. From this functional monarchical impulse we see, ‘[i]n the end’, that 
‘those mechanisms showed themselves capable of functioning without him and were even destined to 
take power away from him’ (Ibid.). In this understanding, delegation, initially triggered by 
(enlightened) absolutist monarchs out of mainly functional considerations, help set in motion the first 
stage of a long and gradual process of impersonalization of ruling authority – and, eventually, modern 
bureaucratic statehood and variegated forms of advanced political-institutional embracement and fiscal 
accumulation.       
Through the process of impersonalization, we see the gradual emergence of a separate 
institutional sphere of governing. In van Creveld’s (1999: 258) words, one can say that ‘[s]tage by 
stage’ the state, or perhaps, the state-in-making, ‘separated itself from, and raised itself above, civil 
society’. Emerging out of essentially feudal structures, the modern state eventually appears as an 
‘organized power of decision’ with a sovereign authority distinguishable from that of civil society 
(Böckenförde 1991: 150). According to Quentin Skinner’s (1989, 2002, 2009) genealogical analysis of 
the concept of the state – which looks at a historical process that both in timing and content strongly 
correlates with the above outlined state-formation trajectory – Thomas Hobbes appears as the 
foundational thinker of the modern (sovereign) state. Looking roughly at the period 14th century till 18th 
century, Skinner traces the political-theoretical transformations from, amongst many other labels, 
Machiavelli’s stato (focused on princely rulership) to Hobbes’ ‘fictional’ Leviathan. From the 
perspective of Hobbes’ 17th century ‘fictional theory’, going from ‘the person of the ruler’ to the 
‘person of the state’ means to confer power on a sovereign who is ‘merely ‘personating’ the state’ 
(Skinner 2002: 9, 2009: 347). This understanding of the state, which breaks with the specific person of 
the ruler – in Machiavelli’s terms this would be princely rule, in Bourdieu’s (2005) terms this would be 
the ‘king’s household’ – entails a devaluing of ‘the more charismatic elements of political leadership’ 
(Skinner 2002: 411); instead the state becomes ‘an artificial person’, or simply ‘the seat of sovereignty’ 
(Ibid.: 410, 409). In this way, according to Skinner (1989: 112), the modern concept of the state has a 
‘doubly impersonal character’: on the one hand, the state’s authority is distinguished ‘from that of the 
rulers or magistrates’, and on the other, it is distinguished ‘from that of the whole society or 
community’. From this perspective – where the modern state is an ‘authority distinct from rulers and 
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ruled’ (Skinner 2002: 386) – the state ‘must be acknowledged to be an entity with a life of its own’ 
(Skinner 1989: 112).   
Despite Thomas Hobbes offering, as seen above, an inaccurate depiction of the actual genesis of 
the modern state (see also Sagar 2015) – loosely paraphrasing Marx (1990: 926) on the ‘primitive’ 
origins of capitalism, one can say that the state ‘comes [into the world] dripping from head to foot, from 
every pore, with blood and dirt’120 – he nevertheless implicitly provides us with an early and 
intellectually productive emergentist account of this particular entity.121 The Hobbesian-Skinnerian 
emergentist account of the state appears in the way in which Hobbes (2008: 106-7, emphasis removed) 
refers to the state as a third, separate, entity: a ‘feigned’ or ‘artifical person’, an ‘actor’ or ‘representer’. 
The emergentist element, the fact of something being qualitatively more than the simple sum of its 
aggregate parts, appears when ‘[a] multitude of men, are made one person’ – that is, a ‘unity of the 
representer (…) that maketh the person one’ (Ibid.: 109, emphasis in original). Interestingly, the 
classical frontispiece of Leviathan from 1651 precisely illustrates, as Skinner’s (2008: 185-198) 
analysis of this also seems to convey, the abstract emergent power of the sovereign state, as well as the 
challenges of graphically depicting this: Hobbes’ Commonwealth can neither be reduced to the head 
(the king) nor the body (the people, subjects, citizens, etc.) – it is a synthetic third entity.122    
Arguably, one can detect an implicit harmony between the relational emergentist character of the 
modern Hobbesian-Skinnerian sovereign state and the Staatslehre tradition’s description of the 
irreducibility of the state entity. In both cases it implicitly follows that one should problematize the 
question of the direct empirical comprehensibility of the state – a problem which seems particularly 
pertinent for scholarship working from a broadly construed ‘phenomenalist’ position (Jackson 2011: 
42). Thus, in their own distinctive phenomenalist ways, both empiricist scholarship looking at state and 
government, such as neo-Weberian conceptions of statehood (notably Evans et al. 1985a) or neo-
                                                          
120 Although Hobbes himself seems to have believed, although in a fairly qualified manner, in the historical reality 
of the State of War (Gaskin 2008: xxxii; Sagar 2015: 105), neither the early/original authorization of sovereignty 
via the Covenant nor the ruthless State of Nature ever took place or existed in the way described.  
121 Neither Hobbes, nor Skinner, social-theoretically verbalize their understanding of the modern state as being 
emergentist. 
122 According to the alternative reading of Kristiansson & Tralau (2014) we (also) see a hidden monster on 
Leviathan’s frontispiece.  
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pluralist governance scholarship (notably Rhodes 1996, 1994), and more nominalist 
constructivist/poststructuralist conceptions of advanced governing and authority, such as neo-
Foucauldian governmentality studies (notably Miller & Rose 1990; Rose & Miller 1992), tend to lose 
sight of the abstract, impersonal, irreducible and contingently observable emergentist character of the 
modern state entity.     
While Hobbes presents us with what in the Skinnerian perspective is referred to as the ‘fictional 
theory of the state’, Skinner (2009: 347) reminds us that ‘it would be a grave mistake according to 
Hobbes to dismiss the importance of the state on the grounds of its merely fictional character’. While 
the state, in the Hobbesian-Skinnerian perspective, should be regarded as an artificial or fictional person 
(persona ficta) this does not diminish its reality or its objective performativity (see also Loughlin 2009: 
8; cf. Thorup 2015).123 Two arguments (out of a potentially extensive list) in support of this may briefly 
be provided with regards to contemporary statehood. Firstly, as Skinner (2009: 344, 347) also stresses, 
one may speak of the existence and efficiency of an attribution mechanism. As Alf Ross (1961: 115, 
emphasis removed) puts it, ‘certain acts that are in reality performed by definite individuals (…) are 
spoken of as being performed (…) by a subject called ‘the State’’. International law explicitly allows 
for, and takes into account, this mechanism of attribution: the juridical character of the state – ‘a being 
which is on a higher plane and is more powerful than man’– allows various ‘organs’ to speak and act on 
its behalf (Ross 1961: 118).124 Such form of Hobbesian ‘attributed action’ (Skinner 2009: 347) is for 
example implied in the fourth criteria of statehood in The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and 
Duties of States (1933), which concerns a state’s ‘capacity to enter into relations with other states’. 
Also, a head of state, a minister of foreign affairs, diplomatic officers, etc., are considered 
                                                          
123 Against this, see for example Abrams (1988: 75, 79, emphasis in original) who believe that we should 
‘abandon the state as a material object’ or deny the ‘reality of the state’, in favor of merely stressing the ‘cogency 
of the idea of the state as an ideological power’. 
124 It should be emphasized that even though Ross (1961: 125) accepts the ‘as if’ quality of the state, (what may 
be perceived as) his legal nominalism nonetheless makes him very skeptical of ‘substantial-metaphysical’ 
understandings of statehood.      
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‘internationally protected persons’ because of their capacity to act on behalf of the state (as agents of 
the state), as if they were the state.125  
Secondly, the very fact that the state is regarded as a ‘person’ of international law (of course 
along with other important entities) – which, according to a leading textbook on this matter, entails that 
it is perceived as ‘possessing the capacity to have and to maintain certain rights, and being subject to 
perform certain duties’ (Shaw 2008: 175) – is absolutely crucial, since without a ‘legal personality’, 
without being recognized as a legal person by (international) law, the state loses its title as a state-
subject.126  
Complex emergent social entities, such as the modern state, appear, and become institutionally 
meaningful and operational, through their legal personality – that is, more generically, through 
corporate personhood. In James S. Coleman’s (1974, 1982) two books Power and the Structure of 
Society and The Asymmetric Society he makes a helpful simple distinction between two distinctive 
actors of modern society, namely ‘corporate actors’ and ‘natural persons’ (e.g., Coleman 1982: 19). 
Whereas the natural person is a tangible person of flesh and blood, the corporate actor is a ‘juristic 
person’, who/which amongst other things is able to ‘substitute functionally for a natural person’, ‘act in 
a unitary way’, ‘own resources’, ‘have rights and responsibilities’, and ‘occupy the fixed functional 
position or estate which [have] been imposed on natural persons’ (Ibid.: 14). While the business 
corporation obviously represents the exemplary or most well-known corporate actor, the modern state 
is, as Coleman (1982: 50, 37, 1974: 29) variously puts it, a ‘single exceptional corporate actor’ or a 
‘special case’. Like modern business companies (‘corporations’), modern states are corporate bodies 
that, amongst other things, accumulate and concentrate power/resources and engage with other 
corporate-institutional persons.  
Corporate-institutional entities (or bodies, actors, persons, etc.) embody modern dynamics – they 
are, as Harari (2014: 27) would have it, what makes enduring, advanced and flexible ‘large-scale 
human cooperation’ possible. From a long-term historical perspective, one can say that sapiens’ basic 
ability to imagine and tell stories becomes ‘real’ when the fictional abstractions acquire a collective 
                                                          
125 See, for example, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally 
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (1973).  
126 According to Ross (1961: 114), ‘[a] definition of the concept ‘State’ is undoubtedly required in international 
law, because the rules of international law have reference (in the first resort) precisely to ‘States’’. 
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character in the form of a legal codification or institutional-material sedimentation, which enables 
millions of humans to ‘cooperate and work towards common goals’ (Ibid.: 31).127 Importantly, the 
corporate-institutional personality critically conditions, or makes possible, a range of activities and 
situations: it allow for authorized delegation, attribution, dispersion, and distribution, etc. – processes 
which may still maintain the monopoly status of the particular entity engaging in this activity; it entails 
that complex social entities may exist, in an enduring way, as (legal, bureaucratic, administrative, 
nominal) abstractions; using Coleman’s terminology one can say that unlike ‘natural persons’, 
‘corporate persons’ can be present physically or organizationally in potentially endless locations at the 
same time.128 Moreover, from a basic Staatslehre perspective one can say that the legal-institutional 
character of the corporate body ensures that one cannot reduce it to one of its constitutive dimensions. 
Thus, even though one were to replace the specific employees (the Volk), the physical property (the 
territory) or (even) the CEO (the head of state/government), the corporate entity would nevertheless 
remain, as if for an eternity (see also Loughlin 2009: 8).  
As argued in chapter 3, the relational emergentism of complex corporate-institutional entities not 
only warrants a permanent condition of ontological (and conceptual) irreducibility and epistemological 
contingent observability, it also renders social-theoretically meaningful that social entities can 
possess/concentrate their own distinctive causal powers. Specifically, the existence of emergent causal 
powers in relation to complex corporate-institutional entities is particularly saliently expressed through 
the Hobbesian-Skinnerian modern sovereign state, which precisely should be considered an ‘entity with 
a life of its own’ (Skinner 1989: 112). Importantly, emergentism philosophically and social-
theoretically conditions the existence of a separation or a distinction between the modern state entity 
and the underlying constitutive societal structures and dynamics. It renders meaningful a historical 
process culminating in the appearance of, using the formulation of Villadsen & Dean (2012: 406), a 
                                                          
127 Historians have deemed the period 70,000-30,000 years before present as the ‘cognitive revolution’ – a great 
leap forward for homo sapiens starting with the spreading out of Africa, critical inventions such as ‘boats, oil 
lamps, bows and arrows and needles’, and the appearance of the first forms of ‘art’ (Harari 2014: 21, 3-74). 
Particularly the ‘lion-man’ ivory figurine from the Stadel Cave in Germany and the red-colored human handprint 
in the Chauved-Pont-d’Arc Cave in Southern France, both dated circa 30,000 years ago, illustrates the cognitive 
revolution in human’s ability to create fictional abstractions and collective imaginations (Ibid.: 1, 23, 20-39).  
128 Of course, modern technology at least partly allows ‘natural persons’ this privilege.  
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‘state-civil society binary’.129 As Böckenförde (1991: 151, fn. 11) reminds us, it is precisely the 
historical ‘objectivization’ of the state, ‘the formation of a state person independent of the ruler’, which 
produces a state-society distinction.  
It is precisely as part of this historical cumulative process of gradual independence – or, as above, 
impersonalization, or, perhaps, extra-individualization – that we see the emergence and eventual 
consolidation of what may be described as, using Offe’s (1984: 120, emphasis removed) expression, the 
modern state’s emergent ‘institutional self-interest’.130 Despite his general adherence to a form of 
methodological individualism, Coleman (1974, 1982) productively brings attention to the ‘interest’ of 
corporate actors (see also Swedberg 2005: 61-2) – that is, the fact that larger sociological units can have 
a self-interested agenda. Although it would be impossible to take on board his rather complicated 
framework, Touraine (1977: 218) seems correct when pointing out that although ultimately stemming 
from society – as a ‘go-between’ – ‘the state is itself an organization’. In a similar spirit, while 
Bourdieu’s understanding of the state perceives the state as a bureaucratic ‘arena of struggle for statist 
capital’ (Swartz 2013: 135, 136), it also recognizes that the state has developed into a ‘distinct field 
[that] generates its own particular sets of interests’. As Cerny (1990: 96) points out, the state has 
historically shifted from ‘being a rambling and diffuse structure (…) to being a more dense structure, 
clearly differentiated from other structures and therefore developing its own logic and autonomy’.  
The gradual consolidation of an emergent logic of statehood also points towards the emergence of 
a form of ‘organizational solipsism’ (Marchese 2012); the process of extra-individualization – the 
shaping of a sui generis corporate quality of the state – helps foster a certain causally relevant 
institutional-organizational uni-perspectivalism on the part of the state. As shortly mentioned earlier, in 
his book Seeing Like a State, James C. Scott (1998) productively points to the notion of ‘state 
simplifications’ and the existence of a ‘lens’ (particularly a ‘fiscal lens’) of the state. Importantly, for 
                                                          
129 Arguably, Villadsen & Dean (2012) primarily seek to normatively defend the maintenance of a ‘state-civil 
society binary’ rather than necessarily posit the more objective existence of the separateness of the state from civil 
society.  
130 Claus Offe uses this expression in passing, and in a mostly commonsensical way, without really elaborating on 
it. While Offe (1984: 120, emphasis removed and added) seems to speak specifically of the ‘institutional self-
interest of the state in accumulation’, my intention is to use the idea of an ‘institutional self-interest’ in a more 
expansive manner, to have it represent a more generic feature of institutional-organizational relations and have it 
cover a broader range of tasks and operations.       
130 
 
Scott (1998: 3), state simplifications, accumulated over many years of state-formation, ‘[do] not merely 
describe’ or ‘represent’ (in an always inaccurate way) they also for example ‘create’ via giving 
categories ‘the force of law’. The complexity-reducing ‘intellectual filter’ of the state’s fiscal lens 
serves to centralize decision-making and discipline it ‘by a small number of objectives’ (Ibid.: 22, 23). 
Such forms of organizational solipsism corresponds well with the attitude of the LAF approach, which, 
as I have pointed out earlier, was naturally interested in looking at crises tendencies and tensions in a 
mediated way – that is, from within the institutional or organizational perspective of the state.   
When speaking of the state’s ‘institutional self-interest’ one may naturally ask: a self-interest in 
what? One may stipulate that at bottom, the modern state ultimately seeks self-survival or self-
preservation – that is, its basic end (what has often been labeled its ‘Raison d’être’) is simply to 
maintain/maximize itself (as a state). Or one could say that the modern state is, to use Norbert Elias’ 
term, a ‘survival unit’ (on this, see Kaspersen & Gabriel 2008: 377). While, as argued, Weber proposed 
to speak of the means as opposed to the ends/purposes of the state, ‘it is possible to detect the outlines’ 
(Anter 2014: 16) of an end/purpose in Weber’s writings. Following Anter’s (Ibid.: 17, 16) reading, 
Weber, although without explicating the order concept, speaks of making ‘use of the monopoly of force 
for executive implementation of orders’, or, with regards to early state-formation, he comments that 
‘the Prince wants ‘order’’.131 That said, and while it remains fairly generic, this idea of a basic ‘interest 
in order’ (Hegel, as cited in Anter 2014: 16), nonetheless points us in the right direction: the modern 
state is a certain form of social order – an Anstaltsbetrieb in which, amongst other things, ‘organized 
activities’ are ‘oriented to the enforcement and realization of this order’ (Dusza 1989: 76). One can 
perhaps speak of a cardinal motivation: the ontological maintenance/maximization of the state as a 
social order.  
While there is admittedly a certain naivety associated with the notion of ‘interest’ or the state’s 
‘institutional self-interest’ – and although I have no space here to survey the various particularly 
sociological, economic and political science usages and understandings of the concept of interest (on 
this, see Swedberg 2005: 48-94) – one can follow Swedberg’s (Ibid.: 95, emphasis added) 
Wittgensteinian advice to ‘use the analogy of following a signpost as part of an attempt to get at the 
                                                          
131 At one point Weber (1948: 334) also boldly states that ‘[t]he state’s absolute end is to safeguard (or to change) 
the external and internal distribution of power’ 
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meaning of interest’. In this view, the signpost tells actors ‘where to go’, it points towards a ‘direction’, 
‘a certain type of activity’ (Ibid.: 106, 96, emphasis removed). Importantly, as Swedberg (Ibid.: 96) 
points out, while ‘a signpost may seem to give sure directions of where to go (…) in reality [it] only 
indicates a general direction’. In this way, while one cannot speak with certainty of the successful 
maintenance of an eternal interest of the state it is possible to point towards a historically informed 
direction and tendentiality/disposition.   
 
 
5.2 The functions of the state 
The maintenance of the institutional self-interest (from now on ISI) of the state should be specified 
through state functions – functions that are, in line with the LAF approach, typically at historically 
varying degrees problematically fulfilled. Recalling the above outlined four types of monopolies, one 
can speak of four correlative state functions: (1) a violence-security-sovereignty function, (2) a meta-
organizational function, (3) a fiscal function and (4) a legitimation function. In explicating the 
conceptual dynamics of these four state functions, a descending three-level logic (also roughly outlined 
in chapter 3) somewhat approximating Merton’s (1968: chapter 3) terminology can be proposed. 
Firstly, at the highest level – at the level of what functionalists would typically consider the organism, 
the system or the social structure – there is the ISI of the state, which have been identified with an 
ontological cardinal motivation of self-survival, self-realization, self-reproduction, etc. Secondly, at the 
intermediate level there are the four functions identified above. Thirdly, at the lowest level there are 
‘items’ (Ibid.: e.g., 81-2) – that is, concrete practices and actions, policies/regulations, beliefs, etc.  
The existence and continuous operation of a function of the state – say a fiscal function – simply 
implies that the state tendentially ‘needs’ or is ‘required’ to somehow fulfill, i.e. maintain or maximize, 
this function through various ‘functionally equivalent’ items. It is necessary to emphasize that, as also 
argued earlier, a functional need or requirement does not imply any form of necessity or determinacy – 
it rather signifies a strong structural and tendential inclination. Importantly, the fulfillment of the above 
four functions occur with the ultimate aim of maintaining/maximizing the state’s ISI. Since this is an 
important point, it is best to specify it further.   
A fiscal function implies the need to maintain/maximize fiscal activity, while a legitimation 
function implies the need to maintain/maximize, as Habermas (1973: 5) would have it, normative ‘mass 
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loyalty’. But the fulfillment of these two functions is ultimately not done to, for example, accumulate 
funds or loyalty but as a possible way of, as part of, maintaining/maximizing the ISI – that is, to ensure 
self-survival, self-realization, self-reproduction, etc. In short, the state needs fiscal means because of 
something else. From this perspective a certain policy (item) may fulfill a fiscal function, whose 
fulfilment helps maintain/maximize (the self-interest of) a greater structure, namely the state. Thus, in 
this sense, to say that an item fulfills a function means to apply the above three-level logic: that the ISI 
of the state organism is maintained/maximized through the fulfillment of a function through various 
more specific functionally equivalent items. In line with a functional-analytical procedure that, as 
explained in chapter 3, justifiably aims to classify/categorize otherwise seemingly heterogeneous and 
empirically varying properties according to their ‘common function’ (Rosenberg 2008: 159), and an 
overall adherence to a state-situated corporate functionalism, these function-fulfilling items should be 
grouped by making reference to both ‘manifest’ motivations/recognitions and ‘latent’ dimensions. Of 
course, in line with the logic of James O’Connor’s (1973: 6-7) fiscal sociological scheme – in which 
certain types of ‘expenses’ were grouped analytically, according to whether they fulfilled a 
‘legitimation’ or ‘accumulation’ function – this study is particularly interested in the LAF-relevant 
latent dimensions.  
It is important to emphasize that the relationship between the four monopolies and the four 
functions is one of strong correlation, not one-to-one identity. On the one hand, one can say that the 
four functions appear as functions because of the historical importance and nature of the four processes 
of monopolization. Put differently: the existence of a monopoly – the monopoly nature – reveals 
functional importance; it signals that the maintenance of the ISI of the state is critically connected to the 
nature and logic of the monopoly. On the other hand, the four monopolies belong to the realm of 
organizational means; they are descriptive or historical characteristics of the modern state, whereas the 
existence of the four functions obviously implies a functional dynamic and analytical framework – i.e. 
introducing these carries with it a functional baggage. The functional conception of the modern state 
advanced here thus directs the attention towards the classical (and perhaps ultimately unsolvable) 
social-theoretical issue of explaining ongoing structures of socially stratified institutional and social 
reproduction.  
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5.2.1 Problematizing functional reproduction 
Of course, as also stressed by the LAF approach, the smooth fulfillment of a function is at varying 
historical degrees problematized by exogenous factors. For this study’s purposes, at a generic level one 
can speak of three basic dynamics of functional reproduction and problematization:  
1) Both the content and the form of the functions – but less the existence of functional dynamics 
as such – are to a large extent historically determined. And the emergence and consolidation of, for 
example, a fiscal function correlates strongly with the historically situated monopolization of fiscal 
capacity. But while the monopolization process ultimately follows a historically unique (and essentially 
non-reproducible) pattern, the content of the functions – whether centered specifically on violence-
security-sovereignty, meta-organization, fiscal activity or legitimacy – may be said to depend on 
ahistorical and endogenous factors associated with relatively general attributes of social action 
(violence, organization, accumulation, justice/norms, etc.).132     
2) The internal balance of the various functions, their relative importance in maintaining the ISI, 
is in the first instance dependent on the following four factors: (1) the accumulated dynamics of the 
‘path dependent’ historically situated monopolization process; (2) the given level or (using the word 
stage hesitantly) historical stage of state-formation development, particularly the degree, form and 
sophistication of impersonalization and accumulation; (3) the structural logic organizing the 
relationship between – the relative importance of – the above mentioned relatively general attributes of 
social action; (4) the historically varying degree of social stratification and the associated relative 
material, ideational and cognitive strength of the dominant social and institutional constituencies, i.e. 
the given properties/saliency of ‘social class’ (more on this below).  
3) While the determination of what specific items ‘best’ fulfill certain functions of course depends 
on a conjunction of all of the above factors, the actual process organizing the selection of concrete 
individual items depends, in an intensified way relative to the above two dynamics, on contingent 
factors and ‘manifest’ motivational impulses.    
One can conceptually compliment the above three basic dynamics of functional 
reproduction/problematization by introducing two correlated pairs of ‘proto-concepts’133 (Swedberg 
                                                          
132 Obviously, the historical monopolization process follows a ‘path dependent’ logic. 
133 Merton defines a proto-concept as ‘an early, rudimentary, particularized, and largely unexplicated idea’ (as 
cited in Swedberg 2005: 48).    
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2005: 48), as Robert K. Merton has described it, meant to productively specify the always historically 
anchored logic of state-situated corporate functionalism. Firstly, one can speak of endogenously- and 
exogenously-driven properties and dynamics of state-situated social reproduction. Following the Oxford 
English Dictionary: that something is ‘endogenous’ means that it is ‘[g]rowing from within’ 
(Endogenous n.d.); that something is ‘exogenous’ means that it is ‘[g]rowing by additions on the 
outside’ (Exogenous n.d.). Whereas endogenously-driven properties and dynamics are more organic, 
innate and native, those that are exogenously-driven are based on more synthetic, labored and outside 
pressure. The word driven as it is used here merely implies that it is, with regards to a specific event, 
historical process, etc., the relatively speaking dominant or organizing force. Thus, as shall also be seen, 
the relative importance of the endogenous and exogenous processes varies greatly across time and 
space. Moreover, the two dynamics obviously dialectically affect each other – as is also suggested by 
the word driven. In other words, an always already historically variegated co-constitutive relationship is 
implied. In this way, a main exercise when studying state-functional reproduction consists in 
continuously analytically juggling the always already dialectical relationship between the exogenous 
and endogenous properties and dynamics of functional reproduction. 
As may be evident from the above treatment of modern statehood and its emergence, this study to 
some extent operates with an endogenously-driven or –biased conception of state-formation and 
functional reproduction. For example, as discussed above, pre-modern state-formation largely seems to 
have followed an endogenous mechanism-driven dynamic. Also, with regards to the study’s overall 
examination of Western European liberal-capitalist democratic polities, it in a similar manner, 
following both Streeck’s (2012b; Streeck & Thelen 2005: 19) explicit advice and the implicit 
understanding of the LAF approach, focuses relatively more on the common endogenous properties 
associated with this overarching category. Moreover, when looking at the postwar period and beyond 
the study shall generally argue, following the theoretical cue of especially Hirschman (1982: passim, 4-
6) and partly Streeck & Thelen (2005), that changes in societal values, normativity, preferences, etc., to 
a large extent follows an endogenous, long-term and incremental logic.  
While Streeck & Thelen (2005) focus more on ‘gradual transformation’ in the institutional sphere 
– an ‘incremental’ or non-conjunctural type of institutional change that is typically endogenous (Ibid.: 
19) – Hirschman’s (1982: 5, emphasis in original, passim, 4-6) early aim to correct the ‘exogenous bias’ 
of much contemporary research points to the importance of endogenous ‘push factors that may lie 
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behind’ collective normative ‘behavior changes’. From this one can say: macro-structural normative 
changes, at least with regards to contemporary ‘advanced’ societies, more often than not follow an 
endogenous logic – that is, the mechanisms that help shape collective preferences to a large extent 
grow, originate or are formed from within through a typically gradual, incremental and long-term 
process.   
This is, of course, not to downplay the importance of exogenous processes of change – that is, 
processes that are more actively (i.e., artificially, rationally, non-organically, etc.) formed outside the 
relevant phenomena or dynamics. Obviously, the overall state-situated approach of this study 
presupposes a certain level of exogenous change: changes initiated, nourished, managed, sanctioned, 
etc. – in short, facilitated – by the state. Of course, to put it loosely in Luhmannian terms, the state-
facilitated initiatives, or the relations between different actors or institutional or structural spheres, 
typically operate/occur from an outside or external position – that is, ‘couplings’ (as Luhmannians 
would have it) often imply variously ‘coded’ inter-(sub-)systemic relationships. Actually, many of the 
types of changes connected to governance and its conditions of possibility involve a form of indirect- or 
quasi-exogenous change.  
Moreover, many indirect exogenous changes take place through long-term causal chains and 
processes that are largely (although not necessarily) unintended. In, for example, Charles Tilly’s (1990: 
60, 117) historical analysis certain (fiscal) interventions sparked ‘new forms of political organization’; 
‘unintended burdens’ followed from the establishment of new civilian structures. Also Norbert Elias 
(e.g., 1982), as part of his so-called ‘relational sociology’ (Kaspersen & Gabriel 2008: 372-374), points 
to the way in which humans are ‘enmeshed’ in ‘interdependent webs and networks’ (ibid.: 374) and 
how certain activities and interactions help institute new modes of obligations, investments and 
responsibilities. One may perhaps invoke, or paraphrase, Churchill’s iconic statement (from a 1944 
speech in the House of Commons) that ‘[w]e shape our buildings, and afterwards our buildings shape 
us’: over time, institutional arrangements, set up for disparate and only sometimes strategic purposes, 
tend to foster certain relatively ‘path dependent’ types of political interventions, socio-cultural or socio-
psychological perceptions/ideals/norms and behavior. 
On the one hand, direct and rational exogenously-driven functional reproduction is typically 
problematic. Both Offe (1984: 83) and Miller & Rose (1990: 2) in their own ways correctly emphasize 
how, in the former’s words, ‘[d]eveloped capitalist industrial societies’ cannot directly ‘reconcile (…) 
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norms and values (…) with the systemic functional requirements’. On the other hand, while the so-
called governmentality perspective is strictly speaking correct when arguing that not all governmental 
techniques ‘emanate directly from the state, nor can they be traced to any singular power centre’ 
(Ouellette & Hay 2008: 473), one should not neglect the historically accumulated monopoly powers of 
the state – the relatively unmatched institutionalized concentration of force-related, organizational, 
fiscal and symbolic capacities. Moreover, as I shall comment on later, besides direct regulatory modes 
of social intervention one should not overlook the behaviorally ‘nudging’ (Thaler & Sunstein 2008) 
character of advanced/complex modern ‘infrastructural’ states (Mann 2003), which help socio-
psychologically organize ‘the context in which people make decisions’ (Thaler & Sunstein 2008: 3). 
Thus, again, the aim is to productively juggle the two dynamics by analytically and historically 
situating them.  
Another correlated yet slightly different way of presenting the above paired dynamic is to speak 
of a top-down and bottom-up driven mode of state-situated change and functional reproduction. As 
above, the word driven implies that it is, with regards to a specific event, historical process, etc., the 
relatively speaking dominant or organizing force. Naturally, as I shall also stress repeatedly, the relative 
importance of the two modes varies greatly across time. As before, in the first instance, the important 
properties determining the organizing principle of functional reproduction – whether top-down- or 
bottom-up driven – concern the above three basic dynamics of functional reproduction/problematization 
(and particularly number two and its associated four factors). 
More concretely, although this shall be qualified or unpacked later, one can say that as the socio-
structural – that is, socio-political/economic/cultural – leverage of the citizens and the relevant 
institutionalized/organized constituencies increase relative to the state, the more bottom-up driven 
functional reproduction becomes. Put differently, as the relative importance of a more bottom-up mode 
increases, the more the functional reproduction process is (principally) problematized – that is, 
specifically, the more necessary the obtainment of normative ‘mass loyalty’ becomes, the less direct or 
autonomous the forms and immediate functional optimality of the interventions become. Inversely, one 
can say that as the socio-structural leverage of the citizens and the relevant institutionalized/organized 
constituencies lowers relative to the state, the more top-down driven functional reproduction becomes 
and the less this reproduction process is (principally) problematized. Obviously, the relative importance 
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of the top-down and bottom-up driven mode of functional reproduction varies historically in a highly 
‘path dependent’ manner.  
Naturally, the two pairs of proto-concepts are heavily correlated. Generally, bottom-up and 
endogenous, on the one hand, and top-down and exogenous, on the other, go together. Thus, one can, 
for example, say that in a bottom-driven mode the directness of interventions is decreased. That said, 
the two conceptual pairs focus on different aspects of (what may be) similar processes. The first 
distinction – endogenously- versus exogenously-driven – looks at whether something comes from 
within (organically) or from the outside (synthetically); it primarily seeks to assess the directness of 
functional interventions. The second distinction – bottom-up- versus top-down driven – looks at the 
relative importance of social constituencies, that is, their causal, institutional and organizational 
leverage (or potentials/capacities for structural influence). Moreover, while a certain type of social 
change could be regarded as generally endogenously-driven – for example mass-based value/normative 
changes – functional reproduction, in a specific historical moment or with regards to a specific item of 
intervention, may be top-down driven.  
The above conceptual package of course indirectly touches upon the arguably ‘essentially 
contested concept’ (Gallie 1956) of (social) class. Although the theme of ‘class analysis’ cannot be 
treated in any extensive way here, it is nevertheless productive to very briefly comment on the study’s 
implicit take on this issue. Firstly, following Pierre Bourdieu’s implicit strategy,134 it makes sense to 
operate with an inclusive conception of class that straddles the dominant classical and later reworked 
contributions of the following thinkers/positions (for a useful survey/discussion of these, see Harrits 
2014): (1) Marx/neo-Marxism, which typically emphasizes the class-determining role of economic 
production, legal/ownership titles, income distribution and objective organizational positioning; (2) 
Weber/neo-Weberianism, which, besides a similar ‘economically determined’ view (Weber 1948: 180), 
typically emphasizes, in broader manner, people’s market-situated ‘life chances’ (Ibid.: 181, 183-4), as 
well as the contingent/statistical relationship between these and emotionally oriented class-based 
‘communal action’; (3) Durkheim/neo-Durkheimianism, which typically emphasizes the possibilities 
for consensual (rather than conflictual) societal reproduction, as well as the importance of both micro-
level ‘occupational associations’, which are ‘grounded in the technical division of labour’ (Grusky & 
                                                          
134 On Bourdieu’s synthetic strategy, see, for example, Harrits (2014: 126).   
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Galescu 2005: 322, 325), and the stratificatory quality of symbolic, cognitive and normative 
classifications and categories (Harrits 2014: 34-38).    
Secondly, by additionally taking on board Bourdieu’s more recent class perspective – which not 
only points to the importance of the accumulation of non-economic or non-material forms of ‘capital’, 
symbolic struggles and alternative forms of (class) distinctions (tastes, appearances, consumption 
patterns, etc.), but also places classes in a multi-dimensional space focused particularly on economic 
and cultural capital (see Harrits 2014: 126-133; Swartz 2013: 47-54) – one can construe class 
synthetically as a multi-dimensional mode of social stratification, involving an unequal distribution of 
(1) material resources (notably income from labour and wealth),135 juridical entitlements (‘ownership’) 
and specific institutional-organizational authority and leverage and (2) social (or associational), cultural 
and cognitive-intellectual resources and competences (notably educational). One might encapsulate this 
understanding of social class in the following generic way: the existence of classes simply implies a 
situation of social stratification, in the form of the above dimensions, which structurally conditions the 
unequal distribution of ‘life chances’.136 Clearly, construed in this manner, to deny the existence of 
classes not only seems empirically unrealistic (and arguably somewhat normatively suspect) but also 
unnecessarily excludes the possibility of pointing to a range of productive analytical dynamics, logics 
and impulses connected to social stratification.  
In addition to explicating the above conception, one can point to three minimal properties of a 
productive class informed analysis of relevance for this study’s agenda. Firstly, as Bourdieu and Erik 
Olin Wright respectively point out, class analysis must ultimately be empirically situated and the 
saliency of various class perspectives depends on the specific empirical questions being asked (as 
paraphrased in Harrits 2014: 132, 154). Secondly, and in a similar spirit, while it is impossible to settle 
the classical question of the relationship between the objective level focused on more material 
properties and the subjective level focused more on properties of consciousness, cognition and 
normativity (see also Harrits 2014: passim), it is necessary to try to historically situate and analytically 
                                                          
135 On the two components of income mentioned (as well as their possible data sources), see notably Piketty 
(2014: 16-19).  
136 The term ‘life chances’ is here used in the broadest possible sense (i.e., it does not only refer to, e.g., market-
determined processes).    
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juggle the correlated yet still contingently linked always already structurally patterned dialectical 
interplay between objective class positioning and subjective preferences. Thirdly, and importantly, the 
coupling versus non-coupling of the objective and the subjective dimensions of class, or, put 
differently, the degree to which, and the form in which, to put it loosely in Weberian terms, ‘life 
chances’ are causally coupled to communal or institutionalized ‘class actions’ – a dynamic which is in 
itself heavily determined by the structures of the former – crucially conditions the relative 
endogenous/exogenous mix and the relative importance of either bottom-up or top-down features of 
functional reproduction.  
With the above distinctions and conceptions in mind, it is now possible to summarize and 
preliminarily round up the overall conceptualization of state functions. To repeat: one can speak of not 
only four functions of the state (correlating the four types of monopolies) but also of the state having an 
ISI. While one can rightfully say that the functions of the state are always oriented towards something 
that is ‘outside’ themselves, this outside is associated with the ISI of the state. In other words, as have 
been discussed extensively in chapter 3, it makes sense, at least for the purposes of this study, to switch 
from total societal functionalism to state-situated corporate functionalism: functional reproduction is in 
this study perceived from within another type of ‘organism’, namely the emergent corporate-
institutional entity of the modern state.  
Obviously, state-functional reproduction is disturbed and problematized by bottom-up or 
exogenous elements. To argue that state functions are fulfilled for the sake of maintaining the ISI of the 
state is not the same as denying the existence or importance of exogenous pressures that variously 
figures into the determination of its functional reproduction.137 Specifically, as a way of conceptualizing 
and taking the existence and importance of external pressures and problematizations into account, this 
study’s historical-theoretical analysis varies between top-down- and bottom-up driven modes of state-
oriented change and functional reproduction.  
Importantly, the process of impersonalization does not imply the non-existence of personalistic 
dynamics; the notion of emergentism does not mean that the relevant lower-level forces are not 
                                                          
137 Analogously, although these entities may variously figure into its considerations/operations, The Coca Cola 
Company does not ultimately engage in its various profit-maximizing activities for the sake of its customers, 
society, etc.  
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constitutive (although they are non-exhaustive); the acceptance of an ISI of the state does not imply the 
rejection of an outside or historically situated bottom-up pressures disturbing functional reproduction. 
More generally, both the above conception of the historical process of impersonalization, the theoretical 
conception of corporate institutional-organizational emergentism and the distinction between bottom-
up- and top-down driven – as well as endogenously and exogenously-driven – modes of functional 
reproduction is meant to historicize the emergent character of the state. 
As construed above, it is analytically productive to, in the first instance, direct the attention 
towards the ISI of the state and the functional maintenance of this through various specific items. Then, 
in the second instance, it makes sense to probe into the bottom-up forces – or, looked at from the 
perspective of the state, the exogenous factors – that constrain or problematize the maintenance of the 
ISI or the fulfillment of the functions. This suggested reversal of the typical order of analysis is non-
trivial. It implies that one first operates with the existence of a separate interest of the state when 
analyzing a phenomenon and then, as an additional exercise, perhaps looks at why this interest was not 
successfully serviced. Importantly, as shall be maintained, this analytical logic makes certain events 
more understandable and helps to make certain phenomena and trends appear normal.  
 
  
5.2.2 The Maslowian hierarchy of state functions and backgrounding/foregrounding 
Taking cues from Norbert Elias (who follows Weber), one can make a historically grounded case for a 
kind of Maslowian hierarchy of state functions. According to Elias’ thesis concerning the ‘civilizing 
process’, ‘[w]hen a monopoly of force is formed’, we see that ‘pacified social spaces are created which 
are normally free from acts of violence’ (Elias, as cited in Dusza 1989: 88). In this Weberian-Eliasian 
view, in Western European modern times, ‘cruelty and joy in destruction and torment of others, like the 
proof of physical superiority, are placed under an increasingly strong social control anchored in the 
state organization’ (Elias 2000: 162).  
Arguably, as the state-formation process matures, as the struggle for the throne increasingly 
becomes a struggle that takes place within an impersonal and monopolizing state-form (as discussed 
with Skinner, Bourdieu, etc., above), physical violence is ‘economized’ (Cerny 1990: 33), concentrated 
and formalized (see also Thorup 2015). Moreover, looking at the more recent historical development of 
advanced Western European polities, as the externally based sovereignty dimension becomes 
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increasingly secured, and both legally and normatively formalized, the existential ontological violence-
security-sovereignty function becomes increasingly taken for granted. Thus, as we move up the ladder 
of the Maslowian hierarchy of state functions, the relative importance of the more ‘lofty’ functional 
properties of the state – namely, organization, fiscality and legitimation – increases. One can say that 
we have witnessed a relative backgrounding of the violence-security-sovereignty function and a relative 
foregrounding of the organizational, fiscal and legitimation functions of the state.  
It is important to emphasize the relativeness of the suggested Maslowian backgrounding process. 
Although Bauman’s (1989: 12) claim that Elias’ ‘civilizing process’ thesis posits an ‘elimination of 
violence from daily life’ seems to be exaggerated (see also Dunning & Mennell 1998: 341) – as 
Dunning & Mennell (Ibid.) point out, Elias would argue that violence would be ‘pushed increasingly 
behind the scenes’ – Bauman nevertheless correctly emphasized, more than Elias, that it was precisely a 
bureaucratically organized monopolization of violence (i.e., the ‘civilizing process’) that conditioned 
mass-based atrocities like the Holocaust.138  
More generally, despite the relative historical backgrounding, the four functions always already 
dialectically coexist – that is, they critically interpenetrate and underpin each other. For example: the 
fiscal function underpins the organizational function (and vice versa) and the violence-security-
sovereignty function (still) underpins the fiscal function (and vice versa), and so on. With regards to the 
latter case, Wacquant (2009, 2012) makes an interesting argument about the connection between 
contemporary neo-liberalism’s specific linking of commodification (‘workfare’) and punative 
paternalism (‘prisonfare’). Interpreting this view of neoliberalism through the above functional 
categorization, the ‘penalization’ of poverty/the poor arguably reveals the continued dialectical 
coalescing of the two functions of violence-security-sovereignty and fiscalism. Thus, while the relative 
intensities of the four functions vary historically, they operate simultaneously.   
It can be argued in a Schmittian manner that so-called state-of-exception events, such as the now 
infamous neoconservative response to the 9/11 attacks, tend to bring back to the foreground the 
otherwise historically backgrounded (yet always lurking and dialectically coexisting) face of the 
                                                          
138 A quick glance at the global history of wars assessed according to casualty figures reveals that WW2 (with its 
approximately 63 millions) by far ranks as number one, way above for example the total figure of the Mongol 
conquests of the 13-15th centuries (Smithsonian Institution 2011: 478).  
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violence-security-sovereignty function (see also Elias 2000: 372; Dean 2013: 119). As Dean (2013: 
118) also elaborates on behalf of Carl Schmitt, ‘[i]t is only in the exception that the law and its norms 
are brought into contact with life, that the rule and the general can be understood, and the ‘essence of 
the state’s authority’ can be revealed’. 
Additionally, it makes sense to not only speak of the backgrounding/foregrounding of state 
functions in a relative Maslowian sense – as referring to the historically situated dynamics between 
them – but also in terms of the very existence of state functions (or the idea of functional reproduction 
and the existence of an ISI of the state) being backgrounded (see also, more generally, Thorup 2015). 
Take, for example, the fiscal function. On the one hand, perceived superficially, from a day-to-day 
perspective, it may be difficult to grasp or recognize the functional logic of taxation and the fiscal self-
interest of the state. On the other hand, the very existence of taxation, its routine implementation, is 
both representative of an original coercive/extractive history of fiscal monopolization and lack of 
principal democratic foundation – as Bonney (1999: 5a) reminds us, ‘[f]or the ordinary citizen, the 
power to tax is the most familiar manifestation of the government’s ability to coerce’ – and revealing of 
the functional importance of this dimension. 
Thus, when approached in a particular historically and analytically informed manner, to be a ‘tax 
state’ means to confirm or reveal the existence of the fiscal function of the state: revenues to the state 
are secured before individuals receive their income – or, put differently, ‘[t]he power to tax, per se, 
does not carry with it any obligation to use the tax revenue in any particular way’ (Bonney 1999a: 5, 
emphasis in original); one cannot vote against the tax state and refusing to pay taxes ultimately results 
in imprisonment (i.e., the violence-security-sovereignty function is operationalized). Also, following 
the above logic concerning state-of-exception events, in economic crises – such as the 2008 financial 
crisis with its systemic bank and automobile ‘bailouts’ – the state’s fiscal function (or fiscal self-
interest) is suddenly foregrounded, or, more precisely, its deeply entrenched functional relationship to 
the economy becomes much more recognizable.  
 
 
5.2.3 Foregrounding the legitimation and accumulation functions 
As is evident, this study puts focus on the functions of legitimation and fiscal accumulation (and their 
tension-filled relationship) – that is, two of the four above described functions of modern statehood. 
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This analytical decision is of course directly connected to the study’s overall governance-directed 
agenda. Instead of repeating this agenda, or presenting an exhaustive list of reasons for why the study 
seeks to foreground specifically legitimation and fiscal accumulation, three (partly additional) factors 
shall be briefly discussed.   
Firstly, and most evidently, the decision to focus on particularly these two dimensions of 
functional reproduction is an analytically motivated move that flows directly from the prior choice to 
adopt/rework/resituate the LAF approach. I have already presented the basic properties of the LAF 
approach and their arguments concerning the tension-filled relationship between legitimation and 
accumulation – the existence and central importance of which they partly took for granted as productive 
analytical premises. Basically, internal differences notwithstanding, the overall argument of the LAF 
approach concerned how the (ultimately Marxist) antagonism between the ‘socialization of costs and 
the private appropriation of profits’ (O’Connor 1973: 9; see also Offe 1984: 49; Habermas 1973: 20-24) 
became institutionally-organizationally transferred to the increasingly ‘politicized’ democratic capitalist 
states, destabilizing and straining them, and would tendentially culminate in regular notably fiscal 
and/or legitimation crises.   
Secondly, the fact that many other notable strands of thinking in their own distinctive ways have 
pointed to the relationship between overall somewhat correlative types of forces – namely 
economic/fiscal and cultural/normative – as key to understanding the general dynamics of 
contemporary advanced Western societies, generically and indirectly bolsters the saliency of 
specifically emphasizing the tension-filled relationship between the legitimation and fiscal function of 
the state. As argued, the LAF approach provides a particular functionalist and state-situated account of 
these general dynamics that, as explained earlier, introduces a productive analytical/conceptual 
repertoire for examining the conditions of governance and particularly the post-1970s governance 
period. Specifically, taking departure in the LAF approach, this study is interested in how a forceful 
dynamic that to some extent exists ‘out there’ – as both a tension-filled dynamic of modern capitalist 
society and as a relatively generic property of social action – finds institutionalized expression in the 
modern state-form, i.e. how it plays out from within a particular institutional-organizational arena, 
namely the self-interested ‘lens’ of the modern liberal-capitalist democratic polity. In this view, the 
story of the above dynamic is also very much a story of how the two sides of the tension both become 
two monopolies of the state and, importantly, two separate state functions.   
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Thirdly, through what has been described as the Maslowian hierarchy of state functions, the study 
has presented a historically informed argument for the contemporary analytical saliency of the 
legitimatory and fiscal dimensions. Importantly, as argued above, the Maslowian logic implies, in the 
context of advanced Western European polities and their continuous historical development and 
institutional-organizational formalization, a relative historical backgrounding of the more ‘basic’ 
violence-security-sovereignty function and conversely a relative historical foregrounding of the ‘higher’ 
organizational, fiscal and legitimation functions of the state.    
Of course, the decision to focus on the tension-filled relationship between the legitimation and 
accumulation function of the state – rather than the violence-security-sovereignty or organizational 
function – to a large extent boils down to an initial analytical or heuristic choice. As mentioned, despite 
the Maslowian historical logic, the four functions always already dialectically coexist and particularly 
the violence-security-sovereignty function becomes recognizable or manifest with full force in so-called 
state-of-exception events. In this sense, any of the four functions could technically speaking be chosen 
as the focus of a separate study – a study in which this function would be granted its own (partly) 
separate history and proper treatment. Partly heuristically, then, I have chosen in this study to 
foreground the twin dimensions of legitimation and fiscalism, knowingly backgrounding the other two 
constitutive functions of modern statehood.  
Clearly, while the LAF scholars by no means would deny the existence/importance of a violence-
security-sovereignty function – it was to some extent an (at least) implicit feature of their frameworks139  
– this feature did not play a central role in their analyses. More generally, as I have argued, the LAF 
approach usually backgrounded the modern state itself; it would implicitly overwhelmingly operate 
with a postwar Golden Age typology of the Western liberal-capitalist democratic state. In contrast to 
this, although the focus is obviously on the legitimation and accumulation functions, this study, and 
particularly this chapter, explicitly foregrounds this background of modern statehood, i.e., as 
mentioned, in a sense stressing the Weberian historically informed state-situated side of the ‘Weberian 
Marxism’ coin.  
                                                          
139 Although space does not allow me to dwell on or further develop this often neglected element of his 
framework, it should for example be noted that O’Connor’s (1973: 99, 150-158) analysis spoke of the ‘warfare-
welfare state’ and tried to somewhat integrate this into his overall scheme.  
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Summing up, this chapter has performed an extensive range of maneuvers indirectly critically 
renovating, complimenting and extending the (in some ways naturally limited) LAF approach. Modern 
statehood has been tackled from two interrelated sides: its modern side centered on its modern 
emergence and characteristics, its corporate impersonalism and ISI and its functional side focused on 
the dynamics of functional reproduction and the both historical (i.e., the Maslowian hierarchy) and 
synchronically emergent connection between the four functions. Importantly, this chapter’s selective 
and ideal-typical examination of some of the key historical and theoretical conditions and dynamics of 
modern statehood has contributed to the analysis of governance in two main ways: Firstly, it has 
directly qualified a range of aspects related to both the governance perspective and the basic 
particularly historical and state-situated conditions of possibility for the shift from government to 
governance. Secondly, the above examination has indirectly contributed to the analysis of the 
governance phenomenon by facilitating the next chapter’s (and the study’s ongoing) development of a 
historically informed framework centered on legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting.  
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Chapter 6. Framing Legitimatory and Fiscal State-Crafting 
 
Informed by the critical maneuvers of chapter 5, this chapter takes things one step further: taking 
departure in the LAF approach, it shall develop, discuss and present an overall analytical framework 
centered on what shall be termed legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting, suitable for analyzing the 
governance phenomenon from a both state-situated and historical perspective. In this capacity, the 
chapter critically (directly and indirectly) reworks the LAF approach by both (1) theoretically and 
conceptually revising it and (2) historically informing and contextualizing it through notably the 
unpacking of the organizing historical-theoretical ECR model – a two-fold interconnected maneuver 
that allows (a particular reworked version of) the LAF approach to be historically reapplied in an 
analytically meaningful manner to the governance-situated post-1970s/1990s period. Of course, this 
analytical and historical reworking merely constitutes a selective exercise, a non-exhaustive 
examination of particular aspects pertaining to the tension-filled state-situated relationship between 
legitimation and fiscal accumulation.   
As discussed earlier, the study’s HTA is executed through the ECR model, which shall be 
unpacked towards the end of this chapter. Importantly, as argued and as shall be seen, this ECR model 
represents a productive continuous swaying between two maneuvers intended to simultaneously 
inductively historically-theoretically summarize the discoveries of the core analysis and deductively 
historically-theoretically guide the core analysis. 
The chapter is split into five main sections: a short section formally introducing the notion of 
state-crafting; two extensive sections briefly historically-theoretically analyzing and ideal-typically 
mapping the long-hauled historical emergence of both legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting; a brief 
section outlining the more concrete strategic toolbox of state-crafting; a last section unpacking the logic 
and key dimensions of the both deductively guiding and inductively summarizing historical-theoretical 
ECR model.    
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6.1 State-crafting 
As I have discussed above with regards to the relationship between the monopoly status of the state and 
the proper categorization of concepts, the by far most analytically productive approaches are the ideal-
type and ‘family resemblance’ perspectives. Here, although a certain attribute of the state are not found 
in a particular case or does not reflect a certain ideal-typically specified intensity/quality, it still makes 
sense to speak of, and analytically operate with, the concept of the modern state.  
That said, it naturally follows from the above conceptualization of the modern state – which inter 
alia focuses on the key process of impersonalization, four historically unique yet path dependent 
monopolies and correlative state functions – that we are dealing with a historical process, a trajectory, 
an ongoing formation and renewal of statehood, rather than the once and for all coming into existence 
of a full blown modern state entity. From this perspective, it makes sense to also conceptually highlight 
this processual insight. Arguably, one such potent way is to operate with the concept, initially drawn 
from Loïc Wacquant (2009, 2012), of ‘state-crafting’. While Wacquant loosely speaks of ‘statecraft’ 
(2009) or ‘state-crafting’ (2012) when launching his Bourdieu-inspired analyses of post-1970s 
neoliberalism, penality, advanced marginality, etc., he does not really unpack this largely ‘proto-
concept’.140 Arguably, though, the concept contains an implied Bourdieusian kernel – Wacquant 
reaches back to Bourdieu’s (1994: 1, 12) analysis of the genesis of the modern state, which particularly 
points to its ability, conditioned by its peculiar quality as a kind of ‘bank of symbolic capital’, to 
continuously ‘produce and impose (…) categories of thought that we spontaneously apply to all things 
of the social world’. Thus, while Wacquant to some extent might as well have used, for example, the 
term ‘statehood’ to roll out his arguments concerning advanced neoliberal marginality, his casual usage 
of the term state-crafting nonetheless puts productive implicit emphasis on the continuous, active and 
creative components of the modern state.  
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, ‘craft’ means to ‘attain, win’, ‘make or construct 
skilfully’, ‘use crafty devices, act craftily’ and ‘exercise one’s craft, make a job of it’ (Craft n.d.-a). 
Etymologically, it originally referred to ‘[s]trength, power, might, force’ and later, in the more 
                                                          
140 The term ‘statecraft’ is also part of James C. Scott’s (1998) broader conceptual repertoire looking at the ways 
in which the modern state, particularly in its early historically formative period, ‘sees’ or categorizes, and thus 
helps produce, its subjects.   
 
148 
 
intellectual sense, ‘[s]kill, skilfulness, art’, ‘[h]uman skill, art as opposed to nature’, ‘a device, artifice, 
or expedient’, ‘a spell or enchantment’ (Craft n.d.-b), etc. While I shall many times continue to refer to 
the state, the modern state, liberal-capitalist democratic polities, etc., this study generally prefers to 
speak of state-crafting. And when it does this it minimally implies and highlights the above 
definitional/etymological attributes. State-crafting, in this sense, means that in order to ‘attain, win’ the 
state continuously has to be ‘produced’ – it has to ‘make a job of it’ – something which requires not 
only ‘[s]trength, power, might, force’ but also ‘[s]kill, skilfulness, art’, along with a certain degree of 
‘spell or enchantment’.  
Generally, state-crafting seems to be a superior term since it helpfully reminds us of the principal 
ongoingness of the state. A finished process of state-formation would imply the outright disappearance 
of functional problematization. The term not only stresses state-formation as an always already 
unfinished project, it also conceptually admits the perennial problem of fixating or making constant the 
state entity and its relationship to its environment. While the causal saliency might be constant, the term 
state-crafting, like when the ‘–ization’ suffix is added to the stem of a term (such as neoliberalization, 
marketization, liberalization, etc.), puts emphasis on the deeply historical and processual character of 
statehood. Next, I shall describe, map and discuss two distinctive ways in which the term is put to use 
in the study by being integrated into the focus on the legitimation function (looking at the political 
sociology side) and the fiscal function (looking at the political economic side) of the state.  
 
 
6.2 Fiscal state-crafting 
This section intends to develop and discuss the notion of fiscal state-crafting. As part of doing this, it 
shall provide a brief synthetic sketch or ideal-typical mapping of the historical emergence of the fiscal 
function of the modern state. Importantly, the main intention of this section is not only to argue for, as 
Offe (1984: 120, emphasis removed) puts it, the ‘institutional self-interest of the state in accumulation’ 
but the existence and structural importance of a self-interest in specifically state or fiscal accumulation 
– what may be termed the state’s fiscal ISI. Although this may seem to already unproblematically 
reflect the logic of the LAF approach, and particularly O’Connor’s specifically fiscal-budgetary 
sociological setup, it is important to stress that the notion of an ‘accumulation function’, in this study, in 
the first instance refers to the macroeconomically oriented fiscal-budgetary activities of the state, not 
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the standard profit-maximizing engagements of private economic actors and organizations/institutions. 
This point is intricate, yet important, and thus needs to be briefly unpacked.  
As discussed earlier, in Offe’s (1984: 52) early nominal sub-systemic overall scheme – which 
Habermas (1973: 5) partly reproduces – the ‘political-administrative system’ (effectively the capitalist 
state) occupies the center in between the ‘economic system’ and the ‘normative (legitimation) system’. 
Importantly, in this scheme Offe (1984: 57-58), in agreement with O’Connor fiscal sociological 
framework, emphasizes the budgetary perspective of the state on the economic ‘environment’ and the 
importance of ‘fiscal resources’ flowing towards the state. On the one hand, this seems to indicate that 
the LAF approach, in a similar way, speaks of state or fiscal accumulation. On the other hand, the three 
LAF scholars all repeatedly refer to ‘capital accumulation’ and, to take Offe (1984: 48, 49, 57, 120, 
132, 140, 171) as an example, ‘exchange-regulated capitalist accumulation’, ‘market-regulated 
accumulation’, ‘the accumulation process’, ‘private accumulation’, ‘the accumulation process of 
capital’, ‘competitive accumulation processes’, ‘the accumulation of capital in the private sector’, etc. 
In these cases, the relevant unit/dynamic is clear: capitalistic or exchange-, market- or private-property-
based profit-maximizing activities. In other words, the entities accumulating are private and what is 
being accumulated is profit, wealth, income, etc. – hence: ‘capital accumulation’. In this sense, when, 
for example, O’Connor speaks of an ‘accumulation function’ of the capitalist state he thus seems to 
refer to a capital accumulation function. In sum, slightly confusingly, the LAF approach apparently 
construe the ‘accumulation function’ of the state from within both (1) the macroeconomic, budgetary 
and fiscal ISI of the state and (2) the capitalistic profit-maximizing perspective of ‘capital’.  
Be that as it may, the particular functional understanding of the state launched here seeks to 
explicitly construe ‘accumulation’ as fiscal accumulation and the ‘accumulation function’ as a fiscal 
function of the state. This explicit maneuver  does of course not in any way imply that the study denies 
the existence or structural importance of what both orthodox and Marxian scholars typically refer to as 
‘capital accumulation’ or the ‘capital accumulation process’, or what in, for example, the so-called 
Regulation School is referred to as a ‘regime of accumulation’ (e.g., Aglietta 1979). The particular 
fiscal function understanding implies an explicit focus on the self-interested nature of state 
accumulation and the budgetary dynamics of state revenues and expenditures. In this scheme, the entity 
that accumulates is the state, and what are being accumulated are fiscal revenues. To speak of the 
fulfillment of a fiscal function means, as argued above, in the first instance to maintain/maximize the 
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state’s budgetary activities in order to maintain the overall ISI of the state. The emphasis on a fiscal 
rather than a capital accumulation function also allows one to analytically grasp forms of modern 
statehood that excludes, dampens or at varying degrees does not yet operate with capitalistic or private-
property-oriented arrangements. More generally, speaking of a fiscal function and a fiscal ISI of the 
state allows one to not only travel back and forth in time – to, for example, go back before the proper 
consolidation of a capitalistic framework – but also to, at least principally, grasp the ‘illiberal’ 
economic growth dynamics of contemporary China or cold war Soviet state communism. As argued 
above, the notion of fiscal accumulation and fiscal function allows one to see capitalistic production as 
merely one historically contingent way of economically organizing a principally functionally similar 
overall state-crafting dynamic.  
More generally, the historically informed functionalist perspective of this study advises against 
overstating the differences between (allegedly) communist and capitalist forms of fiscal state-crafting 
(see also Bell 1976: 269, fn. 41). As, for example, Bell (Ibid.) points out, in an implicit Weberian spirit, 
‘[t]he market is only one aspect of economizing’.141 While the Soviet Union attempted to come up with 
alternative (and supposedly Marxist) ways of measuring economic production during the Cold War 
period (see Holesovsky 1961; Herrera 2010) – that is, different measures than that of the United 
Nations developed System of National Accounts (SNA) of 1953, which became the harmonized 
standard for measuring/comparing national income/production in the advanced Western economies – 
such exercises nevertheless reveal a structurally inclined institutional attentiveness to some form of 
nationally organized economic development, modernization, production, rationalization, management, 
competitiveness, etc. Stressing the fiscal function of the state implies stressing the generic 
‘economizing mode’ (Bell 1976: 269), or basic corporate budgetary perspective that is characteristic of 
most types of modern (or early modern) state-crafting.   
 
 
                                                          
141 Lindblom (1977: 97) pursues a somewhat different argument stressing (in the late 1970s) that despite producing 
‘what they are instructed to produce by higher authorities’, ‘all communist systems (…) make heavy use of the market 
system in distributing consumer goods and services and in allocating the labour force’.  
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6.2.1 The long-hauled emergence of fiscal state-crafting 
Below, I shall briefly and non-exhaustively ideal-typically sketch, in a synthetic historical-theoretical 
manner, how the fiscal monopolization process – that is, the historical monopolization of fiscal capacity 
within the Western European setting – gradually turned into a regular fiscal function and fiscal ISI of 
modern states, whose fulfillment ultimately helps maintain their overall/generic ISI focused on 
institutional-organizational maintenance/maximization.142 The suggested emergence process can 
arguably be mapped through the following four dominant stages: 
 
1) Fiscal tool-making in the Italian city-states of the Middle Ages/Renaissance. The relatively 
autonomous Italian city-states of the 13th-14th century – notably, Florence, Genoa, Venice – helped 
critically develop and shape fiscal state-crafting by advancing and formalizing one of its basic tools: 
systematic public debt-taking (on this, see particularly Braudel 1984: 89-174; Körner 1995; Macdonald 
2003; Munro 2003; Stasavage 2011).143 Here, recurrently increasing expenditures, particularly from 
war participation, was in large part financed through an intricate mixture of (1) indirect/circumlocutory 
forms of taxation (such as custom/trade or salt taxes) – since the citizenry generally disliked 
regular/income taxation (e.g., Macdonald 2003: 70, 72–74) – and (2) public loans, notably long-term 
‘forced loans’ – a form of ‘repayable taxes’ (Ibid.: 73). Importantly, these forced/compulsory public 
loans became a dominant tool of the early forms of fiscal state-crafting witnessed in the influential 
Italian city-states. While in these city-states ‘to be a citizen was, by definition, to be a creditor of the 
state’ (Ibid.: 74, passim) – hence: sub necessitate et pro militate publica (implying a civic obligation to 
help the state in times of need) (Munro 2003: 515, 516) – the relatively privileged merchant-led ‘citizen 
creditors’ nonetheless generally (1) received an interest payment on the loans and (2) were able to trade 
them (in some form) on the market.    
 
2) The 16th/17th century emanation of the tax/fiscal state. From roughly the sixteenth century, partly in 
the wake of the complex downgrading of the dominant (particularly Italian) ‘city-centered economies of 
                                                          
142 This sketch/mapping draws partly on a few sub-elements of Celik (2016a).  
143 Of course, debt-taking as such goes back around 4,000 and 5,000 years (cf. Graeber 2011; Ferguson 2001: 
107).  
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the European past’ (Braudel 1984), we see the gradual emanation of absolutist-cum-modern 
territorially-based tax or fiscal states (on this transformation, see notably Braudel 1982: 514-555; Tilly 
1990; Schulze 1995; Hart 1995).144 A recurrent need for fiscal resources stemming from war-related 
preoccupations – or, one might say, more generally, the consolidation and refinement of a violence-
security-sovereignty function – induced absolutist rulers to gradually institute a more centralized 
system of direct and ordinary/regular taxation (Hart 1995). Importantly, although direct/ordinary 
taxation did not become formalized before the 17th century, and although popular tax rebellions/frauds 
were perennial events (e.g., Schulze 1995: 273-276),145 the eventual advent of modern tax states – 
which also implied the activation of a larger repertoire of fiscal tools actively assimilated from the past, 
such as notably public borrowing – entailed a relative downplaying of commercial localism/regionalism 
and a heightened centralized fiscal intrusiveness, mediation and registration, and control over the daily 
economic affairs of the territorial subjects (Schulze 1995; Hart 1995).146    
 
3) The 18th/19th century political economy of population. Alongside and particularly in the wake of the 
enlightened absolutist emergence of bureaucratic tax/fiscal state structures, the transformative 18th 
century witnessed both the institutional formalization of a new political economy of population and the 
state-cultivated elaboration of a certain form of economically oriented citizenship. Firstly, ‘political 
economy’ appears, or becomes codified, as a distinctive so-called ‘art of government’ focused on the 
internal monitoring and optimization of population-relevant dynamics and infused with a broader and 
more sophisticated repertoire of statistical techniques and variables (Foucault 2007)147 – a development 
                                                          
144 On the notion of the ‘tax state’ (and ‘fiscal sociology’ more generally), see particularly Schumpeter (1918) and 
Goldscheid (1925).  
145 For a general mapping/listing of tax rebellions throughout history, see Burg (2004).   
146 On the more general 18th century military/revolutionary-situated shift towards more direct rule, see Tilly 
(1990: 103-114). For a specific account of (early modern) state-based simplifications and unifications of ‘local 
standards of measurement’, see Scott (1998: 29, part 1).  
147 Although space does not allow a further elaboration of this argument, Foucault’s so-called 16th-18th century-
oriented ‘governmentality’ thesis seems to exaggerate the historical move away from state-based sovereignty (see 
also notably Dean 2013: 75, 88; see also Thorup 2015: 14), and hence overlook, when arguing that the population 
apparently authentically appears as ‘the final end of government’ (Foucault 2007: 105, emphasis added), the 
functional state-crafting logics underpinning this process. Arguably, this has partly to do with Foucault’s (Ibid.: 
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signaling the increasing formalization and saliency of, in the words of Charles Davenant in his 1698 
Discourses on the Public Revenues, and on the Trade of England, fiscally relevant ‘Political 
Arithmetic’ or ‘the art of reasoning by figures’.148 Secondly, we can observe a state-facilitated 
elaboration of an economically-situated citizenry; whereas enlightened absolutist states helped activate 
a form of ‘functional individualization’, in which they ‘supported, or took over, the propagation and 
instilment of the so-called bourgeois values of order, industry and thrift, in order to gain progressive 
access to the taxability and industry of [their subjects]’ (Weber 1996: 213, 211; see also Foucault 2007: 
72-3), more liberal-minded states explicitly/actively sought to provide a normative ‘space, guaranteed 
by rights, for the pursuit of private appetites’ (Coleman 1996: xv). Importantly, this double process 
arguably indirectly helped condition the development of the so-called consumer revolution of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (cf., e.g., Weber 1996: 212-13).149    
 
4) The post-1945 constitution of the ‘public household’. While causally effective throughout its long 
development phase, the consolidation of a fiscal function only appears formally from 1945 with the 
twin invention and activation of national systems of accounts/the gross domestic product (GDP) 
measure and the macroeconomy. Firstly, we observe the important social planning-oriented and 
primarily war-related development of national account systems, which after WW2 formally sparked off 
the GDP measure as a unique way of measuring economic production/activity, mapping overall 
progress and orchestrating the national economy (e.g., Backhouse 2002: 240-245; Suzuki 2003; Perlman 
& Marietta 2005; Tily 2009; Christophers 2011). Secondly, and very much relatedly, after WW2 we 
observe the formalization of the notion, discipline and study of the ‘macroeconomy’, which, strongly 
underpinned by the Keynesian theoretical/conceptual apparatus and its later textbook and mathematical 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
87-114) particular reading of Machiavelli’s The Prince; because he seems to associate Machiavellian 
sovereignty/territory with an actual sovereign – or what Skinner calls ‘the state of princes’ (2002, 1989, 2009) – 
the historical move away from this personalistic form of rule naturally makes him link this transformation to a 
break with sovereignty, while it actually entailed a move towards (state-based) sovereignty, in the form of a 
gradually developing emergentist corporate-institutional mode of modern functionalist state-crafting.  
148 Charles Davenant (1967 [1698]: 128) spoke of ‘Political Arithmetic’ – a term that was established by the 
political economist Sir William Petty – as ‘the art of reasoning by figures, upon things relating to government’. 
149 More generally on the ‘industrious revolution’ – representing a historical ‘change in household behavior with 
important demand-side features’ – underpinning the supply-side Industrial Revolution, see de Vries (1994: 256). 
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codifications, helped transform the national economy into a complex but principally fiscally 
manageable emergent conglomerate of aggregate conceptual identities and variables (e.g., Suzuki 2003; 
Backhouse 2002: 232-236, 290-294; see also Hall 1994: 144).150    
This important postwar development can arguably be loosely described as, or categorized in the 
larger context of, the nationally constituted formalization of a proper ‘public household’ (Bell 1976: 
chapter 6, 221, 220; cf. O’Connor 1973), which both (1) in budgetary terms denotes – as opposed to the 
‘domestic household’ or the ‘market economy’ – ‘the management of state revenues and expenditures’, 
and (2) in fiscal sociological terms can be construed as ‘the arena for the register of political forces in 
the society’.151 Importantly, in this postwar setup, economic growth (as institutionally and statistically 
expressed in the GDP measure) becomes the key structural factor determining overall political 
outcomes, and nationally specific ‘growth models’ (Baccaro & Pontusson 2016) are launched and 
socially and organizationally institutionalized.  
 
Naturally, this ideal-typical survey of the Western European historical coming into existence and 
formalization of a fiscal ISI naturally raises the question of its relationship to the eventually developed 
private-property economy (along with the parallel institutionalization of distinctive private economic 
interests and corporate actors, etc.), which, it can be argued, structurally both helps reproduce and 
problematize fiscal accumulation. Synthesizing and expanding upon key insights of both broadly 
speaking institutionalist/neo-institutionalist (Veblen 1904; Kalecki 1943; Lindblom 1977; Nitzan & 
Bichler 2009) and neo-Marxist (Offe 1974, 1975, 1984; Jessop 1990: 149) scholarships one can make 
the following overall political economic four-step argument concerning, what Offe (1974: 31) calls, the 
‘selectiveness of political institutions’ in capitalist societies.    
                                                          
150 On the complex historical interrelationship between the emergence of UK-based national income accounting 
and Keynes’ macroeconomically-oriented work/activities, see especially Tily (2009) and Suzuki (2003).   
151 While loosely taking on board Bell’s (1976: 221) rather synthetic notion of the ‘public household’ for the sole 
purposes of the above mapping, this study does not share many of its key (arguably politically conservative) 
premises, such as the claim that ‘it is the agency for the satisfaction of public needs and public wants, as against 
private wants’.    
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 (1) As argued above, the modern state has a fiscal function and a fiscal ISI, which implies 
a self-interest in maintaining/maximizing fiscal accumulation.  
 
 (2) The modern state, operating in a capitalist private-property economy context, is 
principally ‘excluded’ or ‘exempted’ from directly ordering/controlling production (Offe 
1975: 126; Nitzan & Bichler 2009: 228) and from authoritatively dictating the formally 
sovereign preferences, whims and purchasing  decisions of the consumers and employees. 
This (what may be called) double-sided exclusion or exemption is absolutely intrinsic to 
the private-property economy and its ideological cousin (economic) liberalism.152 The 
word ‘private’ means ‘[r]estricted to one person or a few persons’ or ‘[t]o deprive or 
dispossess of something; to cut off (from something)’ (Private n.d.-a, n.d.-b; see also 
Nitzan & Bichler 2009: 228). In other words, exclusion, exemption or restriction is by 
definition integral to the notion of private property (cf. Burke 1987 [1790]: 44). 
 
 (3) This combination of (1) a fiscal ISI and (2) a double-sided exclusion/exemption 
activates a structural/objective mechanism of, what Offe (1975: 126-7) would describe as, 
‘dependency’: fiscal accumulation – the fulfillment of the state’s own fiscal function – 
comes to critically depend on privately organized initiatives, that is, both the profit-
maximizing considerations of private economic actors and the formally free decision-
making dynamics of consumers and ‘labour’.  
Importantly, this structural/objective dependency of the state on privately organized 
initiatives increases the causal saliency and authority of private economic actors, 
particularly businesses and consumers. From the structural/objective dependency flows 
naturally a ‘governmental concern with business performance’ (Lindblom 1977: 173). In 
this way, to put it in Lindblom’s (Ibid.: 175) terms, businessmen are granted a ‘privileged 
position’. As Veblen (1921: 1) argues, the private-property economy grants individuals or 
private enterprises a right of ‘sabotage’ – that is, a right of a ‘conscientious withdrawal of 
efficiency’, or, as Nitzan and Bichler (2000: 79, emphasis removed) describes it, an 
entitlement to let industry purposely operate on a ‘less than full potential’ for the sake of 
                                                          
152 For a theoretically oriented treatment of liberalism linking it to a ‘marketplace ideology’, see Wolfe (1977: 4). 
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profit. Implicitly, one can interpret such a principled right of sabotage as implying, in 
Kalecki’s (1943: 325) scheme, a situation in which the level of ‘private investment’ is 
linked to the ‘state of confidence’ in a private-property context – a situation which ‘gives 
the capitalists a powerful indirect control over government policy: everything which may 
shake the state of confidence must be carefully avoided because it would cause an 
economic crisis’.  
In this way, states regularly seek to provide ‘inducements’ (Lindblom 1977: 1973) 
in order to secure ‘business confidence’ (Block 1977: 16) – a ‘state of confidence’ (to use 
Kalecki’s term) which depends on the ‘sum of (…) evaluations across a national 
economy’, including not only market variables, such as wages, market size, etc., but also 
‘the capitalist’s evaluation of the general political/economic climate’ (Block 1977: 16). 
Importantly, though, businesses’ investment assessments/decisions are ultimately ‘based 
on an evaluation of the market that considers political events only as they might impinge 
on the market’ (Ibid.: 16). Although they put their case too boldly, Offe & Wiesenthal 
(1980: 86, emphasis in original) nonetheless point to something important when arguing 
that ‘[t]he entire relationship between capital and the state is built not upon what capital 
can do politically via its association (...) but upon what capital can refuse to do in terms 
of investments’.153 Of course, there is also a performative element to this question of 
securing ‘business confidence’ in a private-property context. As Nitzan & Bichler (2009: 
228, emphasis in original) for example points out on behalf of Veblen, ‘[e]xclusion does 
not have to be exercised. What matters is the right to exclude and the ability to exact 
terms for not exercising that right (…) Business enterprise thrives on the implicit threat 
(…) embedded in ownership’.   
 
                                                          
153 Naturally, there is no necessary reason to assume (1) that disinvestments should occur as a function of a 
collectively mobilized political-ideological initiative or (2) the existence of a high degree of ‘business unity’ (Falkner 
2010: 99-105) across sectors/industries with regards to very specific/concrete regulatory initiatives. As Falkner (Ibid.: 
104, emphasis removed) points out in relation to environmental politics, ‘business conflict’ emerges due to 
‘differential effects’: regulatory measures ‘rarely have a uniform effect on business as a whole, but target specific 
groups of corporations or industrial sectors, create new markets or transform existing ones’.  
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 (4) The combination of the above three points dialectically imply a certain structural 
class-relevant economic ‘selectiveness’ or ‘selectivity’ (Offe 1974, 1975) with regards to 
the determination of political output – a selectivity, which, to specify, of course is 
tendential, statistical, non-deterministic, etc., and perhaps ultimately strategically and 
relationally specified (Jessop 1990: 149). The state-oriented realization of points (1), (2) 
and (3) above, initiates the selectiveness which inserts a tendential economic ‘sorting 
process’ (Offe 1974: 36) into the determination of political output (e.g., democratic 
policy-making): ‘non-events’ appear as certain proposals or ‘events’ are systematically 
‘excluded’ from the political process (Ibid.: 36-7); political outcomes are biased in certain 
economically selective ‘class-specific’ directions (Ibid.).154  
 
Thus, as part of setting up the notion of fiscal state-crafting and briefly ideal-typically mapping 
the historical emergence of the fiscal function of the modern state, a (predominantly) structural 
argument can be provided, applying to the liberal-capitalist democratic context, pointing to the 
tendential economic selectiveness of political output. As argued, while forceful, and while the 
importance/implications of the above argument is sometimes neglected despite it being accepted (e.g., 
in terms of the constraints it puts on political decision-making, democratic practices, etc.), it is 
nonetheless also necessary to make reference to the more specific organizational and institutional forms 
in which the economic selectiveness takes place, which is precisely what the case study of Part IV, 
focusing on Britain and Sweden, seeks to do. More generally, although this argument cannot be fully 
                                                          
154 Besides this four-step structural argument concerning economic selectiveness in a liberal-capitalist democratic 
context one can of course shortly add further theoretical considerations tentatively bolstering it. For example, 
although Bourdieu (1997: 54, 47; see also Harrits 2014: 132) sought to open up the universe of forms of capital, 
he nonetheless speaks of economic capital as being ‘at the root of all the other types of capital’ and as 
‘immediately and directly convertible into money’, which gives it a ‘quantifiable’ quality. One could also make 
reference to basic Marxist insights – notably those of Marx himself, Rosa Luxemburg and David Harvey – 
pointing to the self-reinforcing logic of the ’expanded reproduction’ of capital accumulation. Notably, Harvey’s 
(2003: 144, 1982) reworking of core Marxian concepts and particularly his notion of ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’ seeks to extend Luxemburg’s classical work The Accumulation of Capital by pointing to the 
accumulation process as ‘an ongoing process’, as opposed to, notably, an external/foreign ‘primitive’ one, a self-
expanding recurrent systemic compulsion to include new areas of life into the commodification process.      
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explicated or formally rolled out in this study (despite its indirect application through the case study 
analysis),155 the above described economic selectiveness of political output can arguably be 
productively specified through nationally embedded ‘growth models’ (Baccaro & Pontusson 2016), 
observable at least from the 1990s, which (1) insert a further and more concrete ‘sorting process’ into 
the determination of political output and (2) tendentially favors/disfavors specific types of interests and 
policies.  
Implicit in the above four-step argument is the claim that businesses and states, as two different 
corporate actors, have separate basic ISI’s. Generally speaking, private economic corporate actors, 
operating in a private-property economy context have, as contemporary economic textbooks also 
explicitly testify, an ISI in maximizing capital accumulation – that is, (currently speaking) profits, 
productivity and competitiveness.156 The modern corporate state, operating in a liberal-capitalist 
democratic context, have, as described above, a fiscal ISI, or an ISI in maintaining/maximizing fiscal 
accumulation – that is, (currently speaking) budgetary sustainability and GDP/GNP growth. While this 
relatively simple distinction – which, as shall be seen, naturally serves to make various aspects 
associated with the ‘turn to governance’ more analytically comprehensible – may seem obvious, it is 
not always (correctly) drawn or taken seriously. The difference between the two basic ISI’s have, at 
least after WW2, been codified, consolidated and represented through the two well-known genres of the 
discipline of economics (and their corresponding types of textbooks), namely micro- and 
macroeconomics.157 Importantly, while the former ‘sees’ – in Scott’s (1998) sense – things from the 
micro perspective of the individual economic human or corporate actor (the CEO/manager, board of 
directors, company, etc.) (cf. Thorup 2015: 302-3), the latter ‘sees’ society through fiscal-budgetary 
variables, through the macro or aggregated ‘lens’ of the state.  
Obviously, while the identified diverging basic ISI’s are objective, in the sense that they are 
structurally situated, they operate, as with everything, in a highly tendential/statistical manner: they can 
                                                          
155 Hopefully/ideally, this can be explored in a separate future study.   
156 Sometimes the goal of profit-maximization is described even more generically as simply ‘value maximization’.  
157 One could of course also see the difference as being represented through the split between business administration 
(which is more practically oriented and mostly studied at business schools) and (general) economics (which is more 
theoretical/mathematical and mostly studied at universities).      
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be disturbed, organizationally (that is, internally) misread, pressured by ‘outside’ forces and vary 
historically with regards to their institutional-organizational articulation and expression. Moreover, 
while one can surely point to factors intrinsic to a liberal-capitalist setup that may problematize fiscal 
accumulation, the historically informed corporate functionalist approach of this study generally focuses 
on how fiscal state-crafting may problematize the reproduction of private economic interests.  
 
  
6.3 Legitimatory state-crafting 
In the same overall manner as above, this section seeks to both develop/discuss the notion of 
legitimatory state-crafting and synthetically sketch the historical emergence of the legitimation function 
of the modern state; the aim, like before, is to briefly historically-theoretically substantiate the existence 
and structural importance of a self-interest in specifically legitimation – what may be termed the state’s 
legitimatory ISI. 
Taking departure in the LAF approach, I have already tried to shortly carve out an argument 
concerning both the requirement of legitimacy and the production of mass-based legitimatory demands. 
Of course, while the ‘legitimation function’ was simply partly axiomatically posited, the three LAF 
scholars also specified legitimation in different ways or pointed to different types of legitimation. While 
Habermas’ convoluted LC framework is primarily informed by its well-known belief in rationality and 
its communicative-normative kernel, Offe’s CWS and, particularly, O’Connor’s FCS implicitly put 
relatively more emphasis on the materialist components of legitimation (see also Barker 1990: 94-5). In 
O’Connor’s (1973: 6, 8, 7) view, the state needs to ‘maintain or create the conditions for social 
harmony’ or ensure ‘mass loyalty’ through various ‘social expenses’. In Offe’s (1984: 52) early 
scheme, which Habermas (1973: 5) at least nominally shares, ‘mass loyalty’ flows (or is supposed to 
flow) from the ‘normative (legitimation) system’ to the center, the ‘political-administrative system’. 
Mass loyalty, which from the state’s perspective is considered a ‘regulatory resource’ on par with 
‘fiscal inputs’, is defined as ‘the ability of the administrative system to win genuine acceptance for its 
structures, processes and actual policy outcomes’ (Offe 1984: 60).158 Importantly, besides generally 
                                                          
158 Of course, as Keane (1984: 23) also points out, what Offe actually means by ‘genuine acceptance’ is 
ambiguous.  
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approximating Habermas’ overall understanding of legitimacy (as presented in LC), implicitly for 
O’Connor and (less so) Offe, the production/securing of mass-based loyalty, harmony or acceptance 
(i.e., legitimacy) partly occurs through sources that are simply materially based (fiscal rewards, social 
expenses, etc.).  
Of course, one can locate a broader political sociological literature theorizing the basic ‘need’ or 
requirement of legitimation. Notably, as Beetham (1991: 42, more generally 42-63) argues in his crucial 
work The Legitimation of Power, all power-infused forms of social organization ‘stand in need of’ 
legitimation. In this view, one should reject the possibility that ‘all power is necessarily legitimate’ 
(Ibid.: 57, emphasis added). In order to enjoy more than simply legal validity or ‘de facto power’, 
stemming from, for example, coercion, power structures associated with (or producing) negative social 
externalities also needs ‘moral authority’ (Ibid.: 57, emphasis in original). Moreover, not only does the 
state stand in need of legitimation it also commonly has to ‘satisfy a general interest criterion’ (Ibid.: 
135). 
Typically, legitimacy is simply understood or defined as a situation in which power, authority, 
rule, etc., is found ‘lawful’ or normatively ‘valid or acceptable; justifiable, reasonable’, as, for example, 
expressed in the Oxford English Dictionary (Legitimacy n.d.). A Gilley (2006: 502) argues, legitimacy 
is ‘normative by conceptual definition’. From such a perspective, state support relying on material 
rewards, effectiveness, etc., does not at first glance really qualify as legitimacy, since it (seemingly) 
does not rely on any genuine moral-normative orientation (e.g., Lipset 1959). But the perspective taken 
here seeks to collapse Lipset’s (1959) famous distinction between effectiveness/performance (as an 
instrumental dimension) and legitimacy (as an affective/evaluative dimension) and include within the 
study’s conception of legitimation both ‘input’ and ‘output’ legitimacy (Scharpf 1999) and so-called  
‘performance legitimacy’ (Zhao 2009), and construe, as for example Holbig & Gilley (2010) and Zhao 
(2009) does on behalf of contemporary China, many types of forces or strategies – associated with 
religion, nationalism, ideology, legalism, etc. – as potential sources of legitimacy. A minimal 
requirement, which is strictly definitional, for something to be meaningfully referred to as or 
contributing to legitimacy is that it entails a non-trivial degree of what may be called (with a Weberian 
accent) inner-normative identification – that is, authentic voluntary self-identification, i.e. a meaningful 
non-violent or non-coercive normative correspondence between the structural-functional dynamics of 
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the social order, or a specific emergent corporate-institutional entity, and the individual’s inner-
normative status (cf., e.g., Beetham 1991; Held 1996: 155, 197-8).     
It follows from this multidimensional conception that while legitimacy by definitional fiat has to 
be consensual or voluntarily, it need not have a fixed or necessary content. As I shall discuss more 
carefully in chapter 11, this view tends to go against the (at least implicit) perspectives of notably 
Boltanski & Chiapello (2005) and Streeck (2011, 2014). To put it simply, and flagging the later 
discussion, the content or the sources of legitimacy varies historically and ultimately depends on the 
(generally) endogenously-driven production of values/preferences or normative outlooks – or, put 
differently, the historically specific status or quality of legitimatory demands.  
One can further unpack this conceptualization of legitimatory state-crafting by pointing to three 
arguments concerning the generic dynamics of state legitimation:   
 (1) While rejecting his distinction between effectiveness and legitimacy, one should, 
along with Linde & Ekman (2003: 397, 399-400, 405-6), follow Lipset’s (1959: 91) idea 
that ‘[p]rolonged effectiveness which lasts over a number of generations may give 
legitimacy to a political system’. Thus, it can be argued that regimes that continuously, 
over longer periods of time, are able to (as Herbert Marcuse would have it) ‘deliver the 
goods’159 tend to enhance their normative and principled support (Linde & Ekman 2003).   
 (2) One should go beyond Gilley’s (2006: 502, emphasis in original) argument that 
performance legitimacy only makes sense – that is, that one can only speak of 
performance as a dimension of legitimacy – to the extent that citizens asses ‘state 
performance from a public perspective’. According to Gilley (ibid.), a ‘citizen who 
supports the regime ‘because I have a job’ is not’ expressing a proper or meaningful 
conception of legitimacy. While such public-private distinctions may be productive in 
some instances, this study’s conceptualization of legitimatory state-crafting seeks to not 
only include both dimensions but also synthesize this divide. Arguably, as I shall also 
discuss later, the manner in which citizens perceive, experience and live their daily lives 
cannot be disentangled from their conceptions of the justifiability of authoritative systems 
of power and decision-making. Questions of ‘the good life’ inherently compounds and 
                                                          
159 For a full transcript of the famous 1967 lecture in which Marcuse speaks of this, see Marcuse (1967). 
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dialectically crystallizes questions concerning both ‘what is good for society?’ and ‘what 
is good for me?’ 
 (3) Partly agreeing with Gilley (2006: 502), who follows Joseph Bensman, it should be 
emphasized that when treating legitimacy we are more concerned with ‘rightfulness ‘as 
believed’ by citizens (…) than rightfulness ‘as claimed’ by rulers’ (cf. Beetham 1991: 8-
14). But while this conception of legitimation stresses, like Gilley (2006), the subjective 
aspects of legitimacy – that is, the extent to which citizens perceive state activities to be 
normatively/morally reasonable and justified – it is of course less meaningful to detach it 
from any structural or materialist basis (see also Beetham 1991). Three sub-points can be 
made regarding the dialectical relationship between these two levels:  
o a) An actual ‘good’ performance may be subjectively misperceived or an actual 
‘bad’ performance may be subjectively registered or experienced as a ‘good’ 
performance (see also, more generally, Holbig & Gilley 2010: 400). Moreover, 
citizens’ ability to causally link a certain good or bad performance (or non-
performance) to a given institution/organization ultimately affects the extent to 
which it is held ‘responsible’ (in the state-situated LAF sense). Here, 
‘displacement’, an important notion in the adoption/reworking of the LAF 
approach, becomes a key mechanism: it entails a depoliticizing process, partly a 
strategic exogenous quality of certain corporate entities, in which questions of 
organizational performance is (actively sought) untied from subjective questions 
of responsibility. 
o b) Relatedly, states, as organized forms of ‘power relations’, may arguably, 
within limits, exogenously help nourish the targets or ‘the evidence needed for 
their own legitimation’ (Beetham 1991: 60, cf. 108-9).  
o c) As a preliminary proposition, it is arguably the case that the relative extent to 
which the state is required to adhere to the normative principles of the citizenry 
(as part of its functional reproduction) positively correlates with the relative 
necessity for the citizens to actually subjectively believe in the system (i.e., the 
degree of their inner-normative identification).  
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As with fiscal accumulation above it is important to specify the study’s functional understanding 
of legitimatory state-crafting. As before, the fulfillment of the state’s legitimation function implies a 
need to secure legitimacy in order to maintain/maximize its overall ISI; or in order to support the other 
three functions – they, as mentioned, always already dialectically coexist – as a way of, again, 
ultimately maintaining/maximizing the ISI. At first glance, state legitimacy seems to be the ultimate 
example of normative principles having to be catered to, or tasks having to be serviced, for the sake of 
the citizenry. But it is important to not only see ‘legitimacy as a distinctive phenomenon’ but also 
‘legitimacy as a distinct characteristic of states’ (Barker 1990: 101, 99). In this study’s view, certain 
arrangements, activities or items may fulfill the state’s legitimation function in the sense that they 
‘confer legitimacy’, to use Beetham’s (1991: 12, emphasis in original) formulation, on the state. From 
this, one may naturally refer to such arrangements/activities/items as legitimacy-conferring. 
Importantly, while one can of course observe the production of legitimatory demands or pressure for 
legitimation targeted at the state, this does not mean that states engage in legitimacy-relevant activities 
ultimately for the sake of servicing the citizenry (e.g., Weber 1948: 334; see also Kaspersen 2008: 31). 
Although Weber’s (1948: 334) writings arguably appear before the heyday of the Western 
European welfare state, one can approximate his general perspective: ‘In the final analysis, in spite of 
all ‘social welfare policies’, the whole course of the state’s inner political functions, of justice and 
administration, is repeatedly and unavoidably regulated by the objective pragmatism of ‘reasons of 
state’’. More generally, democratically oriented welfare activities should ‘be considered in the context 
of state power’ (Wolin 1987: 470: see also Kaspersen 2008: 30-39). The social welfare legislations 
launched by Otto von Bismarck in the late 19th century may provide a useful exemplification. The 
mainstream interpretation is precisely that this restricted form of political inclusion was strategic and 
state-conservative: the social initiatives were not genuinely intended to serve a social purpose but rather 
to dampen (radical) socialist/social democratic political activity, or, in the above terms, intended to 
maintain/maximize the legitimation function of the state and ultimately the ISI of the state. 
 
 
6.3.1 The long-hauled emergence of legitimatory state-crafting 
Now, as in the previous section, I shall briefly and non-exhaustively ideal-typically sketch, in a 
synthetic historical-theoretical manner, how the monopolization of symbolic power – that is, the state’s 
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historical ‘monopolization of the universal’ (Bourdieu 2005: 51) – moves in tandem with and 
eventually helps spark the emergence of a regular legitimation function and legitimatory ISI, whose 
fulfillment ultimately helps maintain an overall ISI of the state.160 This legitimatory emergence process 
can arguably be ideal-typically mapped through the following five partly overlapping dominant 
processes: 
 
1) Towards enlightened bureaucratic publicness. As addressed in chapter 5, the bureaucratic efficiency-
seeking initiatives of (enlightened) absolutist monarchs helped set in motion a long-term 
impersonalization and delegation process, which gradually and indirectly served to institutionalize and 
organizationally formalize ‘publicness’ and ‘universality’ and thus, inter alia, principally open up the 
general space for subsequent political-institutional embracement and advanced forms of expression of 
social grievances. Importantly, intrinsic to this gradual historical forging of bureaucratic publicness, is 
the successive expectation that the activities and dynamics of (emerging) modern statehood should 
somehow, like all powerful entities/structures/systems, ‘satisfy a general interest criterion’ (Beetham 
1991: 135).  
 
2) A new individualized space. From the fifteenth/sixteenth century, we see the gradual emergence of a 
new form of subjectivity underpinned by major ideologically/epistemologically-situated events and 
forces such as the Protestant Reformation and a generally more humanist understanding (e.g., Weber 
1996: 192-200). Religious conviction and the relationship to Christendom became more inward-
oriented and the private or domestic responsibility of the individual towards the sovereign slowly 
softened, allowing a greater scope for, for example, personal ‘aesthetic’ expression (e.g., Coleman 
1996: xiv) – a dynamic that, as addressed, arguably indirectly turned out to have economically 
functional benefits.   
 
3) The ‘civilianization’ of rule. From the eighteenth century a shift appears from paid mercenaries to the 
nationalization or state-based mass-situated domestication of military force and capabilities together 
with the increasing formalization of a more direct, interventionist and centralized form of rule (Tilly 
1990: 103-4, see more generally 103-14). Importantly, the more regularized and increasingly 
                                                          
160 This sketch/mapping draws partly on a few sub-elements of Celik (2016a). 
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penetrating forms of state intervention both increased political-institutional claims, ‘incited popular 
collective action’ and more generally helped create ‘new forms of political organization’ (Ibid.: 99, 98). 
From the mid-19th century an increasing military specialization appears; we see the gradual 
subordination of the military to an increasingly civilian/representative form of rule, together with the 
largely ‘unintended’ strongly correlative diverting of fiscal resources toward nonmilitary expenditures 
(Ibid.: 29, 114-15, 117, 122-26; more generally on the historical turn towards public social spending, 
see Lindert 2004).  
 
4) A national popularization of rule. The revolutionary character of the period surfacing from the 18th 
century also witnessed the post-1789 authoritative socio-political and ideational modern anchoring of 
the ‘people’ and the principle of popular sovereignty (see, e.g., Wallerstein 2011: 1). Two key heavily 
overlapping processes flowed from this. Firstly, a new socio-political terminological repertoire appears, 
introducing notably the notions of ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ – later formalized and popularly consolidated as 
the two ends of the dominant party-political spectrum – and ‘ideology’ (e.g., Kennedy 1979; 
Mavrogordatos 1987), together with the historical codification and later variegated development of the 
three pivotal modern political ideologies (or ‘political metastrategies’) of conservatism, liberalism and 
socialism (Wallerstein 2011: 1, 1-20).161 Secondly, as a process naturally linked to the newfound 
authoritative status of the ‘people’, we see the institutional accession and discursive intensification of 
the ‘nation’ and ‘nationalist’ arguments; the nation would become the basic unit in which ‘the 
sovereignty of the people’ was to be implemented, and the important question increasingly came to 
concern ‘what difference the politics of a nation would make for the lives of ordinary people’ (Ibid.: 24, 
24-26).  
Nationalism, construed as arguably a partly state-facilitated process (e.g., Tilly 1990: 116; 
Bourdieu 1994: 7-8), gradually became both a direct legitimacy-conferring resource and an indirect 
means of fiscal reproduction for states. Firstly, both (a) processes of cultural, moral, linguistic and 
administrative unification and homogenization (e.g., Tilly 1990: 116), (b) states’ ongoing increasing 
authoritative concentration/monopolization of ‘public capital’ and ‘universality’ (Bourdieu 2005: 51, 
emphasis removed, 1994: 8), (c) the coupling of the nation with the positively connoted principles of 
                                                          
161 Wallerstein (2011: 1, 5) productively construes (political) ideologies as ‘political metastrategies’, as opposed 
to more moral/metaphysical political philosophies. 
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popular sovereignty, citizenship, self-determination, community and, importantly, universality162 and 
(d) the cumulative institutional and semantic identification of state and nation, all dialectically served to 
enhance the effective linkage between the ISI of the state and the so-called national interest. Secondly, 
while accepting Liah Greenfeld’s (2001) overall historical argument concerning the conditioning force 
of nationalism on capitalist growth and economic modernization, its makes sense to complimentarily 
stress the underlying state-facilitative functional component of the nation: as an indirect resource of 
fiscal reproduction, states’ appeals to nationalist sentiments/subjectivities and generally homogenizing 
practices helped mobilize and unify their populations around growth- and work-conducive activities. 
Interestingly, integral to the party political trajectory that shall be described below, the three 
dominant post-revolutionary political ideologies of conservatism, liberalism163 and 
radicalism/socialism, which can be seen as three different reactions to not only the new authority of 
popular sovereignty but also the modern ‘normality of change’ (Wallerstein 2011: 6, 11) – conservatism 
wanted to ‘reverse’ or ‘limit’ it, liberalism wanted to consciously organize and ‘reform’ it and socialism 
wanted to radicalize and ‘accelerate’ it (Ibid.: 3, 6, 11) – gradually transformed their original/principal 
hostility towards the state into a de facto practical partnership (Ibid.: 14-15). Importantly, against their 
own (at least early) discourse, and as is also evident from the below characterization of the 
emergence/development of representative party politics, the three main political ideologies historically 
ended up structurally mingling with and in most cases boosting the nationally-situated state apparatuses 
(Ibid.: 14) – in effect, one might contend, like most ideational positions or ideological programs,  
‘selling out’ and gradually aligning themselves to the changing historical institutional-organizational 
realities164 – and, as Wallerstein (Ibid.: 16) argues, providing different more or less (i.e., historically 
                                                          
162 For the positive Hegelian state-as-universality conception, see Hegel (2008: section three); for the critique of 
this, see Marx (1977).    
163 According to Wallerstein (2011: 2, emphasis added), ‘liberalism as an ideology is itself a consequence of the 
French Revolution, and not a description of its political culture’.  
164 This general mechanism of (what may arguably be productively described as) ‘selling out’ – whether 
concerning the always already historical and institutional-organizational contextualization of macro-situated 
political parties and ideologies or the authentic micro-situated gradual normative alignment with the prevailing 
structural-functional dynamics – is something that I would like to formally explore and theorize in-depth in a 
possible future work.   
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decreasingly) ‘embarrassing’ excuses for their statism: the state would help either safeguard ‘traditional 
rights’ (conservatism), enhance ‘individual rights’ (liberalism) or actualize ‘the general will’ 
(socialism).   
 
5) The nationalization of interests. Taken together, the above two revolutionary processes facilitated the 
emergence of nationally constituted party systems, or, in short, party politics – a process that from a 
state-oriented perspective marks the pivotal appearance of a specifically (modern representative) 
democratic or ‘electoral’ form of legitimacy (Beetham 1991: 150-8). From particularly the late 19th, so-
called extra-parliamentary or ‘externally’ established Western European socialist or social democratic 
‘mass parties’ gradually appeared, organizing societal grievances and expressing the particularistic 
interests of certain large constituencies and largely intruding on the ‘internal’, elitist and generally 
liberal/conservative early form of parliamentarianism – constituted by individuals/notables and later 
groups and committees – and the underlying status quo-maintaining state structure (on this, see notably 
Duverger 1964; Manin 1997; Scarrow 2006; Krouwel 2006; Bardi et al. 2014: 238–239).165  
Gradually, as universal suffrage and representative democracy institutionalized and the mass 
parties formalized and matured throughout the 20th century, and as the major parties particularly after 
WW2 transformed into ideologically watered down, professionalized and electorally-obsessed nation-
state oriented so-called ‘catch-all’ parties (on this, see Kirchheimer 1966), the modern political party 
system helped boost states’ overall legitimacy by instituting an ‘electoral mode of consent’ (Beetham 
1991: 150), as well as enhance/solidify their, using Mann’s (2003) expression, ‘infrastructural’ 
competences. Importantly, this consolidation and state-facilitated embracement of the political party 
system, represents what may be described as a gradual nationalization, or class-neutral national 
harmonization, of party interests (e.g., Kirchheimer 1957; see also more generally Przeworski 1980: 38-
44) and historical political-institutional displacement of legitimation from the state to a separate arena 
of party politics (see also later).   
    
                                                          
165 This ‘external’ intrusion notwithstanding, the objective of the early socialist/social democratic electoral 
participation was not, as also expressed above, to do away with the state or parliamentarianism but to hopefully 
control/utilize these for tactical socialist socio-economic purposes (e.g., Przeworski 1980).  
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The above ideal-typical mapping, and especially the brief sketch of the changing historical 
relationship between the state and the emerging and gradually maturing party system, also stresses two 
important additional issues (appearing, more often than not, as potential sources of confusion). Firstly, 
in light of governance scholars’ built-in tendency to posit a shift from government to governance, it 
seems important to, in the first place, historically separate the two categories of state and (democratic 
party) government. As implicitly addressed above (as well as indirectly in the previous chapter), we 
have seen a state-facilitated shift from state to party government – notably involving what may be 
termed the preceding turn to government. Importantly, as I shall also touch upon later, this process or 
turn is revealing of the both original and still greatly enduring state-crafting conditions of possibility for 
governance.       
Moreover, such historical separation of state and government also helpfully addresses a 
complication associated with how to properly asses the LAF approach’s claims about a fiscal and/or 
legitimation crisis. Scholars with both a theoretical and empirical bent have criticized the LAF approach 
for not adequately distinguishing between a lack of support for (1) the state or democracy and (2) the 
government or incumbents (see, e.g., Weil 1989: 683; Beetham 1991: 169). In this vein, using Easton’s 
(1975; see also Linde & Ekman 2003: 392-3; Dahlberg & Holmberg 2014) terminology, one can say 
that the LAF scholars not only failed to make a distinction between ‘diffuse support’ and ‘specific 
support’ but, more importantly here, between different levels/objects of support, such as the ‘political 
community’ (or nation), the ‘regime’ or the ‘political authorities’.166 One may for example ask: did the 
legitimation crisis refer to a crisis of confidence in the generic/abstract principles of the nation, the 
state, or liberal-capitalist democracy, or did it simply imply a negative evaluation of the performance of 
the regime, or a lack of trust in concrete parties or officeholders? In light of these questions, which I 
shall return to and further discuss in chapter 11, as well as the above historical background of the 
emergence of the legitimation function of the state, this study shall infuse the LAF approach with a 
two-level view of macro-political legitimacy, which operates with a historically informed distinction 
between state legitimation and party-level legitimation.  
Secondly, as I have argued above, legitimacy does not necessarily imply democratic legitimacy. 
While seemingly obvious, many scholars treating contemporary political dynamics arguably fail to 
either consider this insight or seriously incorporate it into their analyses. Rather, as addressed, one 
                                                          
166 This Eastonian list of objects/levels can of course be extended (see Linde & Ekman 2003: 393).  
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should conceive of representative democracy (particularly the party system, political parties, etc.) as a 
form of ‘electoral’ legitimacy or ‘electoral mode of consent’ (Beetham 1991: 150).     
 
 
6.4 Three strategies of state-crafting 
As part of launching the above conception of state-crafting, one can set up a more specific vocabulary 
for examining the historically dynamic relationship between fiscal and legitimatory state-crafting 
underpinning the recent turn to governance. More specifically, I shall introduce three specific strategies 
of state-crafting that, in their own ways, cross-cuts the two dimensions of fiscal and legitimatory state-
crafting: market-conforming re-regulation, normative mobilization-control and claim-reduction.167  
 As argued by both Cerny (1997) and Vogel (1996), while one should of course acknowledge the 
existence of deregulation, it generally make much more sense to speak of, and put emphasis on, 
‘reregulation’ – that is, ‘the reformulation of old rules and the creation of new ones’ (Ibid.: 3). 
Such a ‘re-regulatory’ view sits particularly well with that of the LAF approach, and the overall 
state-crafting approach taken here; it not only approximates but directly underpinned the 
analysis of, for example, Offe (1984) who spoke of ’administrative re-commodification’ or 
O’Connor (1973), whose budgetary perspective focused systematically on the state’s various 
types of expenditures. Wacquant (2012) speaks in some instances of state-crafting or state 
policies as being ‘market-conforming’. Arguably, this seems to be a productive way of 
indicating the general direction of certain policies, an indication of whose interests that are 
relatively speaking being favored. Put together, one can thus speak of market-conforming re-
regulation as a way of referring to regulatory-relevant activities or items, sanctioned, nourished 
or facilitated by the state, which to some non-trivial degree conform to either the general 
dynamics of capital accumulation or the specific interests of private economic (corporate) 
                                                          
167 These strategies may be somewhat compared to those of Offe (1984: 69-73). That said, Offe’s less easily 
decipherable framework (1) speaks of both strategies and therapies, (2) sets up more than three strategies and (3) 
joins or separates elements that are presented above in a different three-fold manner (and which stem from 
alternative insights). In other instances, Offe (Ibid.: 125) speaks, for example, of other types of unrelated 
‘instruments of state policy’.         
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actors. Importantly, while the study shall maintain that re-regulation that is considered market-
conforming is still ultimately pursued for the sake of maintaining the ISI of the state, one may 
additionally speak of fiscally-conforming re-regulation as a way of referring to specific 
activities/items that are explicitly or more overtly undertaken for the sake of 
maintaining/maximizing fiscal accumulation (and thus may disturb the ISI of private economic 
(corporate) actors). 
 The second strategy of claim-reduction (cf. Offe 1984: 69-71) refers to regulatory or budgetary 
activities or items, sanctioned, nourished or facilitated by the state, which seeks to reduce, 
distribute, transfer or displace expenditure-relevant claims and entitlements of (particularly) the 
citizenry on the state. Using the vocabulary of the LAF approach, and particularly that of 
Habermas (1973), claim-reduction can be perceived as the attempted weakening of the degree 
of ‘politicization’ in order to diminish ‘responsibility’ for negative social externalities, a way to 
untie the subjective and objective components of legitimation. Specifically, with regards to the 
fiscal sociological budgetary framework of O’Connor (1973), one can perceive claim-reduction 
activities or items as ways of minimizing, or making more flexible, various types of both 
fiscally- and legitimacy-relevant expenditures.  
 The third strategy, which may be called normative mobilization-control, refers to extra-
regulatory activities and items, sanctioned, nourished or facilitated by the state, which seeks to 
normatively mobilize the citizenry, or control the generally endogenously-driven process of 
mobilization, for functional purposes. Somewhat similarly, Offe (1984: 70) speaks of a 
governmental strategy (seemingly without giving it a name) that ‘[operates] in the realm of 
socialization’ and ‘is directed to the institutions of social control, to the agencies that regulate 
the formation and preservation of social norms as well as cultural and political value 
orientations’.168 The notion of normative mobilization-control is intended to put emphasis on 
the generally extra-regulative and endogenous character of preferences, values and principles of 
legitimation and the typical indirectness of initiatives controlling their formation or change. The 
emphasis on mobilization-control is intended to emphasize both the indirect- or quasi-
exogenous character of normatively-oriented state-facilitated initiatives/items and the active 
                                                          
168 A bit confusingly in terms of the above three strategies, Offe (1984: 69-70) construes this as the second 
‘strategy’ or form of ‘implementation’ of the overall therapy of ‘claim reduction’.   
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functional or strategic character of these. To ‘mobilize’, according to the Oxford English 
Dictionary, means to ‘render (an individual or group of individuals) active or capable of action’, 
to ‘prepare’ or ‘summon’, to ‘realize or make available’, to ‘make mobile’ or ‘render capable of 
motion or change of location’, to ‘assemble, organize, and utilize (…) for a particular purpose’, 
‘press into service’ or ‘adduce in support’ (Mobilize n.d.). Thus, while a strategy such as 
normative mobilization-control in some instances may be considered a form (or sub-category) 
of claim-reduction (cf. Offe 1984: 70), it is important to emphasis the active, or as the neo-
Foucauldians would put it, ‘productive’ aspects of this category – that is, it may just as easily 
enter into an overall active/expansive strategy of fiscal/market-conforming re-regulation.       
   
Clearly, as mentioned, these three strategies, like O’Connor’s (1973: 7) two main types of 
expenditure, do not apply neatly or directly to either the legitimation or fiscal function of the state. As 
shall be seen, all of the three strategies can be used simultaneously as ways of maintaining/maximizing 
legitimation or fiscal accumulation. 
 
 
6.5 Unpacking the ECR model 
The above developed arguments and analytical categories should be placed in the context of the earlier 
presented important organizing ECR model (see figure 5 below), which is now going to be outlined and 
unpacked in more details than before. As a way of both concluding this chapter and preparing for the 
subsequent examination, I shall explicate the main properties of this historical-theoretical model. 
Recalling chapter 4, this ECR model constitutes not only a swaying emergent mixture of theoretical 
application, analytical reworking and historical-theoretical examination but also both a discovery-
driven summary of the core analysis and an analytically-oriented scheme intended to guide, coordinate 
and help develop this examination.  
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Figure 5. The core historical-theoretical analysis/framework.  
 
As can be seen, the ECR model covers three distinctive and successive ideal-typical 
periodizations: (1) an emergence period stretching roughly from the late 19th century until 1945, (2) a 
consolidation period stretching roughly from WW2 until the 1970s, and (3) a reconfiguration period 
covering the post-1970s period. Importantly, each of these three historical-theoretical periodizations is 
analytically associated with a distinctive legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting tension-status and logic 
of tension-management.  
As opposed to the consolidation period, which is going to be examined in Part II, and the 
governance-situated reconfiguration period, which is examined in Part III, the emergence period has 
already been ideal-typically mapped above. Importantly, more so than the examination of the 
consolidation and (especially) reconfiguration period, the above two accounts of the long-hauled 
emergence of fiscal and legitimatory state-crafting should mostly be considered brief instrumental 
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mappings, serving as historical-theoretical contextual backgrounds for the later more specific analyses. 
But whereas the above two brief ideal-typical sketches of the emergence of the legitimation and fiscal 
functions covers a very long period, the ECR model does not formally concern the pre-modern or early 
modern period – more specifically, it does not start before the late 19th century. There are two main 
reasons for this. Firstly, because the model is utilized for the later case study of the historical 
development of the automobile industry in the UK and Sweden, it is naturally less meaningful to go 
back further than the mid/-late 19th century. Secondly, the late 19th century seems not only a more 
pragmatically feasible/convenient starting point but also a fairly analytically well-chosen one: it is in 
this period that party politics more formally enters the scene – a thrilling and still very historically 
contingent period in which liberal-capitalist institutional arrangements are simultaneously popularly 
and institutionally cultivated and challenged. The ECR model can be further unpacked in the following 
manner: 
 
1) Emergence. In the emergence period, which stretches roughly from the late 19th century until 1945, 
the tension between legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting is gradually institutionally-organizationally 
born and formalized; the tension is in its late development phase, on its way to being fully constituted. 
But, although they are both gradually emerging and causally effective throughout their long 
development phases, the two legitimation and fiscal accumulation functions are not yet fully 
established, the state’s monopoly status with regards to legitimation and fiscal accumulation have not 
yet materialized or been fully secured. In line with the study’s reworking of the LAF approach’s 
particular functionalist and state-situated perspective, it makes sense to understand this emergence 
period as one in which a partly generic and largely pre-democratic forceful tension – or, loosely using 
Lipset & Rokkan’s (1967) terminology, dominant ‘social cleavage’ – contingently operating ‘out there’ 
gradually consolidates and receives it particular formal institutional-organizational  materialization in 
the modern functional state-form. In this emergence period, as the two sides of the tension increasingly 
become two monopolies/functions of the state, the tension little by little becomes a fully activated and 
constituted state-functional tension.169  
                                                          
169 As I shall also indirectly address later, it should be stressed that the degree of popular recognition of these two 
functions does not necessarily coincide with the moment of their actual full constitution.  
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2) Consolidation. In the consolidation period, which stretches roughly from after WW2 until the 1970s, 
the two functions both institutionally-organizationally and popularly formally solidify and the tension 
between legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting formally consolidate. In this period, the tension-filled 
relationship between the two functions of modern liberal-capital democratic statehood is generally 
temporarily bridged, stabilized and managed. As shall also be addressed in chapter 7, after WW2 – 
during the so-called Golden Age period – many of the major macro-mechanisms of interest (i.e., that 
are relevant for understanding the later turn to governance) are both (1) simultaneously activated and 
emergently united and (2) causally and empirically intensified. As states’ fiscal and symbolic 
monopolies officialize and their two correlative functions consolidate, a strongly increasing 
institutional-corporate functional pressure – construed non-deterministically, as argued in chapter 3, as 
a strong structural and tendential inclination or disposition – to service these functions can be observed. 
As arguably partly an indirect effect of this postwar development, in which (particularly) the individual 
fiscal-functional ‘lenses’ of states are fortified and cemented, what have been described as corporate 
functionalism (and its analysis) naturally becomes increasingly causally salient.  
 
3) Reconfiguration. Partly anticipating the examination itself and the discussion of the study’s main 
research question, in the reconfiguration period, which covers the post-1970s governance-oriented 
development until the financial crisis of 2008, the tension between legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting 
is sought altered. More specifically, while not genuinely overcome and qualitatively integrated and 
transformed, it is reconfigured, i.e. displaced, externalized, fragmented and ‘co-produced’. Put more 
simply, one can observe a relatively more displaced, externalized, fragmented and ’co-produced’ 
tension. A reconfiguration implies, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, an ‘alteration of a 
configuration’ (Reconfiguration n.d.). And while the verb configure means ‘to fashion by combination 
and arrangement’ or ‘to put together in a certain form or figure’, to reconfigure (with the ‘re-’ prefix) 
means ‘to rearrange’, ‘to configure again or differently’ or, more strongly put, ‘to adapt’ an entity ‘to a 
new task by altering its configuration’ (Configure n.d.; Reconfigure n.d.). Against the backdrop of both 
the preceding chapters, Part I, II and particularly the historical-theoretical analysis of the post-1970s 
reconfiguration period of Part III, chapter 11 shall both theoretically examine and discuss the 
nature/logic and extent of this suggested state-situated ‘aufhebung’ and rethink the main 
arguments/prophecies of the LAF approach in light of the governance turn. 
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As can be seen when looking at the entire ECR model, the turn to governance is not only 
interpreted in light of the post-1970s dynamics of legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting but is inserted 
into and construed against the background of an even larger state-functional development, which is 
ideal-typically outlined in the ECR model, focused on the historical emergence, consolidation and 
particularly reconfiguration of the state-situated tension-filled functional relationship between 
legitimation and fiscal accumulation.  
 
Briefly summing up: the chapter has engaged in a range of important tasks, amongst other things 
serving to rework the LAF approach by developing, discussing and presenting an overall analytical 
framework centered on legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting. Firstly, the chapter has argued for the 
analytical productiveness of the notion of state-crafting. Secondly, it has both argued for the analytical 
productiveness of the two notions of legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting and ideal-typically mapped 
some of the core dynamics of their individual historical emergence. Thirdly, the more concrete strategic 
toolbox of state-crafting has been developed. Fourthly, and lastly, the chapter has unpacked the logic 
and key dimensions of the historical-theoretical ECR model organizing the study.  
As mentioned, both the above developed and launched analytical framework centered on 
legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting and the ECR model shall be further developed in the remaining 
parts of this study, namely Part II, III and IV: while the emergence period has already been treated 
(being embedded in this chapter), Part II of the study (the next chapter) shall focus on the consolidation 
period and the post-WW2 production of expectations and escalations and Part III shall focus on the 
reconfiguration period and the state-facilitated governance turn; Part IV of the study shall then roll out 
the entire ECR model through a case study analysis examining the emergence, consolidation and 
reconfiguration of the automobile industry in the UK and Sweden.  
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Part II     Consolidation: The Post-WW2 Production of Expectations and 
Escalations 
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Chapter 7. Consolidation: The Golden Age Consumer-Citizen 
 
This chapter, which focuses on the historical consolidation of legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting, 
seeks to examine certain selected properties associated with the so-called Golden Age (GA) period of 
Western Europe stretching roughly from 1945-till the late 1960s/early 1970s. This is to some extent a 
well-known overall periodization within particularly political economy; while the period itself is 
actually more rarely examined, political economic scholars addressing specific contemporary issues 
nevertheless often, in their own ways, make an at least casual reference to the postwar decades, 
primarily as a way of drawing a loose comparison to more recent developments and changes. Put 
briefly, this chapter aims to spend some (extra) time shedding light on a couple of the key macro-
situated socio-historical postwar conditions of possibility for governance and the post-1970s 
reconfiguration period more generally. In this capacity, it of course represents a particular reading of 
the postwar period – a reading in which certain forces and trends of relevance for understanding the 
later post-1970s turn to governance have been heuristically selected and sought analytically brought 
together, and specific pre-existing arguments have been sought formalized, qualified and/or bolstered. 
For this reason, the chapter is primarily structured in an argumentative and analytical manner, as 
opposed to a more straightforward historical/chronological one.  
Whether the ‘Golden Age’ term is linked to its particular Greek/Roman literary heritage or, as in 
this study, a specific postwar consolidation period, it is meant to bombastically describe, as the Oxford 
English Dictionary formulates it, ‘[t]he first and best age of the world (…) the period in which a nation, 
etc., is at its highest state of prosperity, or in which some department of human activity is at its acme of 
excellence’ (Golden age n.d.). More specifically (and more than anything), the Western European 
postwar GA period refers to a specific period of historically unparalleled increasing socio-economic 
prosperity (for works quantitatively addressing this, see notably Eichengreen 2008; Crafts & Toniolo 
2010; Piketty 2014; see also Judt 2005: 324-5) – which is why it has also been labeled or addressed via 
the categories of, for example, ‘Les trente glorieuses’, the ‘Age of Affluence’, ‘The Affluent Society’ 
(as famously formulated by John K. Gailbraith) or the ‘Wirtschaftswunder’ (referring to West 
Germany), and so forth. Of course, a certain degree of empirical romanticism – and, almost by 
definitional necessity, what historians of ideas call ‘conceptual anachronism’ – underlies the GA period. 
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Arguably, as shall be maintained in this study, in quite intricate and complex ways the GA label 
signifies both (1) a relatively speaking genuinely transformative and prosperous period and (2) a 
powerful ex post performative categorization taken up in the post-1970s period by analysts, institutional 
elites, novelists, laymen, etc., in order to compare and diagnose society and its recent changes.    
As shall be argued, key features integral to the postwar consolidation period – which saw the 
effective popular and state-situated institutional-organizational anchoring of many of the modern post-
revolutionary (political, commercial, industrial, etc.) categories and principles – helped both gradually 
transform the overall socio-psychological profile of the Western European citizenry and eventually 
critically reconfigure the prevailing tension-filled dynamics of liberal-capitalist democratic state-
crafting; this emergent long-term development has had reverberations that still underpin many of the 
key contemporary trends and socio-political questions. As will also be argued throughout the next 
chapters treating the post-1970s period, many of the core properties linked to the post-consolidation era 
should simultaneously and dialectically be conceived as being both (1) symptoms of the transformation 
associated with the GA period and (2) critically associated with certain institutional-organizational 
state-crafting strategies for tension-managing this development.    
The chapter is split into six main sections. The first section provides an empirically anchored 
overview of many of the key properties of the GA period. The second section provides a particular 
analysis of the key mechanisms of postwar escalation. Relatedly, the third section discusses the 
dynamics and implications of different types of postwar socio-psychological and fiscal 
expectation/claim escalations and frustration scenarios. The fourth section examines some of these GA 
dynamics from a distinctive party political angle. The fifth section reflects on crucial issues concerning 
time and timing. The sixth section provides some extended concluding remarks.    
 
 
7.1 Contextualizing the consolidation  
In order to properly set the scene for the below more mechanism-based argumentation, it makes sense 
to first provide a brief contextual overview of some of the main cross-cutting historical properties and 
well-known descriptive trends associated with the GA consolidation period. To a large extent, the GA 
label can be understood as an attempt at conceptually capturing the relatively speaking temporally 
coherent coexistence of an array of important so-called statistically correlated and mutually interacting 
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macro-social characteristics. Most importantly, of course, the GA periodization – and specifically the 
period 1950–1973 – is characterized by a historically ‘exceptional’ average economic growth rate in 
Western Europe (Eichengreen 2008: 15-20; Crafts & Toniolo 2010: 299-301; Piketty: 72-99).      
Compared to both previous periods, for example 1913–50, and the post-1970s era, the average 
annual growth rate of GDP (both as per capita and not) of Western Europe in the GA period is simply 
historically unique (Eichengreen 2008: 16-7; Crafts & Toniolo 2010: 299; Piketty 2014: 94).170 Of 
course, this generalized extensive cumulative/compound GDP expansion varied in intensity across the 
Western European countries; the frontrunners were countries like (West) Germany, Italy, Austria and 
France, whereas countries like Switzerland, the UK, Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Ireland 
demonstrated a relatively speaking lower growth performance. With regards to the two countries 
chosen for the later in-depth case study analysis, namely the UK and Sweden, it is worth pointing out, 
as I shall also address later, that even though GDP expansion in the two countries in the 1950-73 period 
was lower than in some of the other comparable Western European cases, both the UK and Sweden’s 
growth performance was much greater than in any of their respective previous periods as well as 
subsequent phases (Eichengreen 2008: 16-7; see also Hansen 2001: 314).171      
Unemployment rates in the GA period were historically speaking very low and, as opposed to the 
post-1970s period, most of the Western European polities managed to secure so-called ‘full 
employment’ throughout this phase (e.g., Eichengreen 2008: 263-5; see also Judt 2005: 332).172  
As Piketty’s (2014: particularly 316-20, 323-4) now seminal quantitative-historical economic 
analysis of inequality trends shows,173 income inequality across the advanced Western world has 
generally followed a ‘u-shaped’ pattern since the early 20th century, involving a ‘period of decreasing 
                                                          
170 This is so whether the post-1970s period is measured as 1973-2005, 1973-2000, 1970-1990, 1990-2012 or 
1980-2012.  
171 Average annual GDP growth in the UK in the GA period was for example comparable to that of the United 
States (or North America) in the same period (e.g., Hansen 2001: 314; Piketty 2014: 96-99) – a period that is 
arguably conceived, at least in the contemporary public debate in the US, as one of economic 
expansion/prosperity.    
172 Full employment is here understood in the classical Beveridgian sense of a circa 3% unemployment rate (on 
this, see, e.g., Robinson 1945: 71). 
173 Piketty (2014: 16) generally focuses on two main forms of inequality, namely wealth-related inequality and 
income-related inequality.     
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inequality followed by one of increasing inequality’.174 Looking back, against Simon Kuznets’ 
optimistic data-driven prophesy that ‘income inequality would automatically decrease in advanced 
phases of capitalist development’ (Ibid.: 11) – Kuznets’ pioneering postwar work, operating so to speak 
at the bottom of the actual ‘U-curve’, erroneously but meaningfully extended the available historical 
data showing a fall in income inequality into the future, giving rise to a hypothetical ‘bell curve’ – the 
postwar period’s relative compression of inequality has (so far) turned out to be a peculiar historical 
anomaly (Ibid.: 11-15, 24).  
The world population growth rate peaked in the postwar period; as Piketty’s (2014: 78) numbers 
show, ‘the period 1950– 1970’ saw the ‘the absolute historical record of 1.9 percent’ average annual 
growth. While the population growth rates generally slowed down from around the 1960s, the Western 
European population grew heavily in the GA period (Judt 2005: 331; World Bank 2016d).175 Also, 
childbirths/fertility experienced a quick upswing in Western Europe in the early years after WW2, life 
expectancy levels rose and infant mortality rates decreased (Judt 2005: 331; Baines et al. 2010: 404-6, 
407-9).   
Across the Western European countries, both interregional and total exports (measured as average 
annual growth rates) were higher in the 1950-1973 period than in the years of 1974-2002 (Eichengreen 
2008: 25). The Western European export/GDP share exploded after 1950 and its share in world exports 
increased (Eichengreen & Boltho 2010: 268-9), correlating with a bolstering of this regions’ overall so-
called ‘terms of trade’ status vis-à-vis the ‘Third World’ (Judt 2005: 326). Compared to, for example, 
the interwar period, investment rates across the European countries also generally saw an upswing in 
the GA period (Eichengreen 2008: 22; Hansen 2001: 316). 
Tax-financed social expenditure (focused on unemployment, education, health, pensions, housing, 
family dynamics) became a both popularly and institutionally-organizationally formalized and stably 
increasing fiscal phenomenon after WW2 – a firm nationally cross-cutting (i.e., Western European-
                                                          
174 Obviously, as is very often the case, (1) national and regional variations, and very different starting points, can 
be observed – the UK and Sweden appear in each end of the spectrum in the European setting – and (2) the US 
represents an extreme case of the overall development (Piketty 2014: e.g., 324).     
175 For example: the population in the UK grew by 13%, while that of Sweden grew by 29% in the years 1950-
1970 (Judt 2005: 331).    
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wide) development that continued until circa 1980, where a general stagnation or only slight increase, 
but not a fall, in social transfers (as a % of GDP) can be observed (Lindert 2004: 6, 11-15; see also 
Baines et al. 2010: 392-396). Obviously, national and regional variations on this general postwar 
pattern can be observed: for example, both quantitatively and qualitatively the heavy mushrooming of 
social expenditure in the GA period, a process gradually initiated already around 1880 (Lindert 2004: 
11), seems to have clustered around certain regionally-situated socio-economic configurations – 
whether such clustering actually points to the existence of, for example, three ‘regimes’ (Esping-
Andersen 1990) or, strictly within the European setting, four ‘groups’ (Baines et al. 2010: 394; 
European Commission 1995: 9-10) or not.   
This historical rise in social spending obviously correlates with a rise in tax revenues (Lindert 
2004); looking at the three European countries of Sweden, France and Britain (together with the US), a 
long-term sharp rise in total tax revenue (as a % of GDP) can be observed since around 1910 (starting at 
circa 10%), which continues throughout the postwar period and then starts to stagnate around the 1970s 
(ending somewhere between 30-50%) (Piketty 2014: 457). 
At the international political economic level, it is likely that a combination of both (1) the Bretton 
Woods system – the postwar international monetary system, which triggered the two major entities of 
the IMF and the World Bank (formerly IBRD) and importantly sought to simultaneously maintain both 
stable/fixed (‘pegged’) and adjustable exchange rates – (2) the GATT – the postwar agreement set up to 
regulate, organize and liberalize international trade, which would later find formal corporate 
institutional-organizational expression in the WTO – and (3) ongoing European economic integration – 
gradually organizationally developing from the 1951 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and 
the 1957 (Treaty of Rome signed) ‘Common Market’ or European Economic Community (EEC, later 
EC) towards the 1993 establishment of the European Union (EU) and its ‘Single Market’ – served to 
bolster the rise in exports and trade (on this argument, see, e.g., Eichengreen 2008: 24, 40, 198; cf. 
Eichengreen & Boltho 2010; more generally, see Hansen 2001: 269-73).  
The GA period, at least until divorce rates started to increase and marriage rates started to fall in 
the industrialized countries around the late 1960s/early 1970s (OECD 2009, 2016a), was generally 
constituted by a gendered ‘breadwinner-homemaker household’ – epitomizing the so-called ‘nuclear 
family’ – which became an increasingly widespread phenomenon from the mid-19th century and 
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onwards as women and children gradually disengaged from direct (labour) market activities (de Vries 
1994: 262).  
Along with rising wages and household purchasing power, the Western European populace 
experienced the emergence-cum-consolidation of a prosperous toy industry, a mass-based ‘tourist 
boom’ in the 1950s, increasingly indispensable domestic devices such as the fridge, the washing 
machine and, in the 1960s, the television (Judt 2005: 338-9, 342, 345). Of course, as I shall examine in 
detail in the later case study analysis, to put it in Tony Judt’s (Ibid.: 339) words, ‘[t]he greatest single 
measure of European prosperity’ – which ‘had its most significant impact not in the home but outside’ – 
had to be ‘the revolution wrought by the family car.’ ‘Young people’ and ‘teenagers’ appeared on the 
scene – as both conceptual categories, sociological entities and increasingly targeted advertising 
segments – together with an increasingly penetrating cultural-capitalist form of ‘Americanization’ 
accelerated through popular commodities, music, movies, commercials, etc. (Ibid.: 347-8, 350-3). 
‘Consumer society’ also became solidified across the advanced liberal-capitalist democratic polities 
after WW2 through the emergence-cum-consolidation of consumer movements and heavily state-
facilitated consumer protection regimes (Hilton 2007).176  
Although not necessarily as Friedrich Hayek (1944) pessimistically foresaw it, WW2 did 
profoundly condition the general postwar orientation towards the capitalist economy; it both left the 
Western European polities with war-torn but principally fiscally mobilizable citizenries, industries and 
bureaucracies (e.g., Judt 2005) and, as mentioned, helped bring to life national account systems, the 
GDP measure and a macroeconomic framework. The new generalized postwar political economic 
outlook,177 which has sometimes been described as ‘interventionist’, ‘Keynesian’, ‘mixed’, ‘managed’, 
etc. – labels that given the overall state-crafting perspective of this study of course almost appear as 
pleonasms – obviously appeared in nationally/regionally specific formats (see notably Shonfield 1965). 
                                                          
176 Of course, despite it being a generalized trend, and the fact that a great deal of it would become 
harmonized/standardized through international/supranational organizations and bodies (notably the EU), 
consumer protection naturally emerged and developed in nationally/regionally specific forms in the 1950s (Hilton 
2007).   
177 Writing in the pre-WW2 period, the sociologist Karl Mannheim was certain that ’planning was inevitable’; as 
he saw it, ’there is no longer any choice between planning and laissez-faire, but only between good and bad 
planning’ (Mannheim as cited in Smith 1979: 70, emphasis in original).    
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More generally, pace Hayek, warfare/military defense, bureaucracy, organization, management, etc. – 
in short planning – is both historically and logically irreducibly linked to modern capitalist market 
dynamics (e.g., Weber 1978, 1948: chapter VIII; Sennett 2006: 20-23; Chang 2011: especially 199-
209). Arguably, the WW2 case, in particular, reveals (in an extreme manner) the way in which and the 
degree to which, as argued, states’ generally backgrounded but always already lurking and occasionally 
fully activated violence-security-sovereignty functions are intricately connected to foregrounded fiscal-
functional dynamics.  
Looking back, as opposed to both previous and subsequent eras, the Western European (and the 
US) postwar consolidation period was constituted by a reciprocal and emergent economic configuration 
simultaneously combining (1) high productivity, exports and investments with (2) a steady-going 
relatively dispersed growth in real wages (e.g., Eichengreen 2008; Piketty 2014).178 Arguably 
minimally somewhat materially underpinned by a generalized basic Keynesian (or ‘Left Keynesian’), 
and specifically wage/income/consumption-focused, ‘aggregate demand’ perspective (for a theoretical 
discussion of this perspective, see notably Bhaduri & Marglin 1990), postwar fiscal considerations 
became increasingly infatuated with the behavior of consumers and the intensity of their preferences 
(see also more generally Przeworski & Wallerstein 1982: 54-58).     
 
 
7.2 The mechanisms of escalation 
Against the background of the above empirically anchored contextualization, the Western European 
postwar GA period can be interpreted, as shall now be done, as a specific socio-temporal configuration 
in which distinctive analytically informed macro-mechanisms of interest for understanding the 
governance phenomenon are simultaneously present, emergently coupled and intensified.  
The overall argument concerning the distinctive importance of the GA period that shall be put 
together and formalized in this section partly takes initial and loose departure in what has been called 
the (renewed) ‘embourgeoisement thesis’. In brief, this theory, which increasingly started to occupy 
                                                          
178 Following Baccaro & Pontusson (2016: 184), it can be argued that ‘all large advanced capitalist economies 
were ‘wage-led’ in the sense that a rising wage share was positively associated with GDP growth’.  
 
184 
 
particularly British empirical sociologists from the 1950s and 1960s, argued that the emergence of the 
so-called ‘affluent worker’ of the postwar period helped trigger a growing normative and behavioral 
‘embourgeoisement’ of the proletariat/working-class – increasing its overall ‘middle-classness’ and 
‘political conservatism’ (see notably Goldthorpe et al. 1967: 11, 13).179  
This is of course a particular postwar-oriented version of a classical particularly Marxian-
revolutionary observation: Friedrich Engels, in particular, both in letters to Marx and in the preface to 
his The Condition of the Working Class in England, inter alia complained that ‘the English proletariat is 
actually becoming more and more bourgeois’ (as cited in Lenin 1916c; see also Goldthorpe et al. 1967: 
12). Lenin, in notably his Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism and particularly his Imperialism 
and the split in socialism, also provided a distinctive skeptical observation on this matter: imperialist 
finance-oriented monopoly capitalism allows ‘superprofits’ to accrue to a Western ‘labour aristocracy’ 
and monetarily ‘bribes’ for example English workers (or certain higher layers of the working-class) into 
cooperation and enhances self-interested behavior (Lenin 1916a). In Lenin’s (1916a, 1916b) view, 
rather than necessarily suffering from ‘false consciousness’, the (Western) working-class had a 
spontaneous, realistic and materialistic orientation (on this, see Eyerman 1981: 45-6), which made it 
partly understandably susceptical to embourgeoisement.  
Besides post-Lenin Marxian thinkers like Lukács and Gramsci, who in particular helped deepen 
the theorization of ideology and false consciousness (see Eyerman 1981), the above inversion of the 
orthodox Marxian ‘immiseration’ thesis of course found sublime manifestation in the work of the early 
Frankfurt school (such as, e.g., Herbert Marcuse’s pessimistic 1964 classic One-Dimensional Man). 
Although it of course requires both qualification/nuancing and bolstering, the embourgeoisement 
argument, as applied to the GA period and understood in its later sociological form, points to an 
important transformation, which for this study’s particular purposes may be condensely restated as 
follows: postwar ‘affluence’ over time helped spark a general embourgeoisement of the working-class, 
tweaking behavioral and normative patterns in an overall status quo-maintaining and fiscally functional 
direction. 
                                                          
179 Goldthorpe et al. (1967) overall rejects the embourgeoisement thesis. Although space does not allow a more 
intricate assessment of the study, their conclusions are arguably hampered by some theoretical, conceptual and 
empirical shortcomings.  
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Although he has reached very different conclusions from the above (see also below), the overall 
claim that a socio-economically-induced gradual popular normative change has taken place since WW2 
has been productively taken up by Ronald Inglehart (e.g., 1971, 2000, 2008), as part of his larger multi-
country empirical research on ‘post-materialism’. Put simply, Inglehart’s (2008: 131, 142-3; 2000: 26) 
post-materialism thesis, or more generally his ‘theory of intergenerational value change’, argued that a 
‘shift from materialist to post-materialist priorities has been occurring’ amongst the ‘West European 
publics’ since the postwar period – a development associated with an increasing emphasis on for 
example ‘life style’, ‘subjective well-being’ and more generally ‘self-expression values’, involving a 
transformation of attitudes towards ‘gender roles, sexual orientation, work, religion, and childrearing’. 
What is particularly productive about Inglehart’s argument concerning a shift in ‘value priorities’ is its 
distinctive macro-mechanism-oriented logic: Macro-level socio-economic development – especially 
associated with the extraordinary material/economic prosperity and security of the postwar period, 
along with rising educational levels, ‘postindustrialization’, etc. – helped introduce a popular ‘value 
change’ (principally operating at the individual or interpersonal level), which in turn has had political-
institutional implications (notably bringing forth new political movements and political parties and 
party agendas focused less on class and more on identity, gender, environment, etc.).   
Built into Inglehart’s (2008: 131) argument is not only a reasonable Maslow-oriented ‘scarcity 
hypothesis’ suggesting that ‘under conditions of prosperity, people become more likely to emphasise 
(…) goals such as belonging, esteem, and aesthetic and intellectual satisfaction’ but also a productive 
emphasis on ‘intergenerational’ processes. Based on the well-documented claim that ‘one’s basic values 
reflect the conditions that prevailed during one’s pre-adult years’, Inglehart (2008: 131, 136, 142, 133, 
1971: 991) makes the argument that ‘the post-war cohorts’, which have ‘grown up under higher levels 
of existential security than those that shaped the formative years of the older cohorts’ – experiencing an 
‘unprecedentedly long period of unprecedentedly high affluence’ – increasingly tend to ‘replace the 
older, more materialist cohorts’ and push ‘the prevailing values of society’ in a more post-materialist 
direction.   
Although focusing on a different issue (and in general reaching different conclusions), Robert 
Putnam’s (e.g., 1995) empirical studies of the development of ‘civic engagement’ (or ‘social capital’) in 
the US supports this Inglehartian focus on postwar cohorts. Evidence from the General Social Survey 
(GSS), which traces individual cohorts, stresses the importance of a so-called ‘generational effect’ 
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when assessing levels of civic engagement. As opposed to so-called ‘life-cycle effects’, which points to 
ahistorical properties associated with the different life cycles, Putnam’s (Ibid.: 674-7) examination of 
generational effects reveals the existence of a ‘long civic generation’ born in the period 1910-1940. 
Importantly, after this generation, social capital falls. Thus, the data shows that ‘each generation who 
reached adulthood since the 1940s has been less engaged in community affairs than its immediate 
predecessor’ (Ibid.: 675). Importantly, rather than for example focusing on the 1980s as the crucial 
period of civic disengagement (thereby perhaps linking it to, e.g., ‘neoliberalism’), Putnam (Ibid.: 676) 
emphasizes the peculiarity of the 1940s and 1950s: ‘it is as though the post-war generation were 
exposed to some mysterious X-ray that permanently and increasingly rendered them less likely to 
connect with the community’.  
The historical particularity of the GA period, as Wolfgang Streeck (2011: 5) puts it (focusing on 
specifically capitalism), ‘still dominates our ideas and expectations of what modern capitalism is, or 
could and should be’. It has to some extent transformed our understanding of and standards for 
assessing previous and particularly subsequent decades: as Tony Judt (2005: 456-7) for example (only 
partly correctly but nevertheless very productively) argues, speaking of the economic crisis of the 
1970s, ‘[i]t was not the 1970s that were unusual so much as the ‘50s and ‘60s’. More specifically, the 
growth-enclosed GA period has also helped shape the popular conception of what is economic 
normalcy and what is crisis: as Schmelzer (2012: 1006, 999) for example points out as part of his case 
study of the intellectual debates taking place amongst the OECD personnel in the period 1968-74, in 
contemporary understandings ‘economic crisis is often constructed as a crisis of growth’, that is, as the 
‘absence of economic growth’.  
Importantly, while, as mentioned, it was partly spawned during the revolutionary 18th century (see 
also Been 1988) and increasingly developed throughout the first half of the 20th century, the GA period 
served to popularly and institutionally-organizationally consolidate a cross-national Western European 
growth-oriented and consumption-optimizing agenda. As I shall attempt to argue, implicitly going 
against the Inglehartian conclusions (but not the generic framework), the unrivaled economic expansion 
and popular distribution of affluence of the GA period gradually served to stabilize a popular socio-
psychological expectation of ever-widening economic growth and consumption prospects, eventually 
culminating, or articulating itself, around the late 1960s and early 1970s, in what may be described (in 
the overall spirit of the ‘ungovernability’-oriented terminology of the 1970s) as a socio-psychological 
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and fiscal expectation/claim escalation. Below, in addition to the above intergenerational case for a 
transformation of the popular ‘value priorities’ of the Western European citizenry, some of the possible 
key mechanisms underpinning this escalation thesis have been selectively put together for closer 
examination.    
Firstly, a strong argument can be made for the built-in ‘irreversibility of consumption on growth’ 
(Trezzini 2011: 550). What Trezzini (Ibid.: 539) calls the ‘asymmetric behavior of consumption’ 
implies that ‘[w]hile consumption tends to increase more or less readily when income rises, it proves to 
be much more inelastic with respect to decreases in income’. Put differently, this means that ‘[d]uring 
booms, consumers tend to acquire new and higher standards of consumption that are not readily 
reversed’ (Ibid.).180 Importantly, one can perceive this irreversible consumption asymmetry – in which 
we tend to see ‘the continuous acquisition of growing standards of consumption’ – as a highly 
endogenous or built-in ‘mechanism that causes the economy to grow and accumulate’ (Ibid.: 554). In 
other words, not only does consumption-situated capitalist growth in itself  ‘[tend] to generate a 
permanent, and more or less substantial, increase in the level of consumption’, this irreversible form of 
consumption is endogenous to economic growth, its asymmetrical logic is ‘essential in determining the 
net increase in income over the cycle’ (Ibid.: 544). Naturally, Trezzini’s theoretical-logical 
argumentation and his reasonable assumption that it is more likely that ‘a longer boom allows a more 
lasting acquisition of a higher standard of consumption than a shorter one’ (Ibid.: 344), seems to apply 
particularly well to the described unrivaled economic expansion and popular distribution of affluence of 
the GA period; self-escalation (of in this case consumption expectations) seems to be a salient feature 
of this configuration. 
Secondly, the overall expectation/claim escalation thesis can be further, complimentarily, 
bolstered through what drawing on Fred Hirsch (1976: 7) can be called the ‘frustration in affluence’ 
argument.181 As opposed to the Club of Rome’s famous 1972 report entitled The Limits to Growth, 
which focused on the finite material conditions for future growth, Fred Hirsch’s highly 
                                                          
180 While Trezzini’s (2011: 358, fn. 1) argument is primarily logically constructed, he also points to empirical 
evidence for this consumption asymmetry.  
181 Although Hirsch generally embeds this argument within the larger notion of the ‘paradox of affluence’, I have 
preferred this formulation, which he merely uses in passing, in order to put stress on the ‘frustration’ element.  
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underappreciated 1976 book Social Limits to Growth put focus on the social ‘frustration’ associated 
with consumption-oriented economic growth. Hirsch distinguished between ‘material’ and ‘positional’ 
goods (and, respectively, the material and the positional economy). As opposed to the material 
economy, the positional economy concerned properties ‘that are either (1) scarce in some absolute or 
socially imposed sense or (2) subject to congestion or crowding through more extensive use’ (Ibid.: 27). 
Positional goods (Ibid.: 32, 37, 41, 2), such as for example ‘leisure land’, ‘suburban living’, ‘leadership 
jobs’ or ‘education’, etc., are inherently socially relative and scarce and their quality and consumptive 
enjoyment intrinsically depends on ‘consumption by others’. Thus, the positional economy is 
characterized by ‘satisfactions that in their nature are possible only for a minority’; typically, in such 
type of system, ‘individual satisfaction in a specific activity’ is found to be ‘obstructed by the similar 
activity of others’ (Ibid.: 23, 22).  
Significantly, according to Hirsch in advanced capitalist societies the positional type of economy 
increasingly dominates: ‘generalized material growth’ has triggered a more positional outlook; ‘as 
demands for purely private goods are increasingly satisfied, demands for goods and facilities with a 
public (social) character become increasingly active’ (Ibid.: 7, 4). Moreover, it seems clear that ‘as 
general standards of living rise, demand for luxuries becomes more extensively diffused throughout 
society’ (Ibid.: 1978: 66). Importantly, this relative dominance of positional goods has crucial societal 
consequences: because a built-in condition of the positional economy is that ‘individuals chase each 
other’s tales’ because ‘what each of us can achieve, all cannot’, frustration naturally increases (Ibid.: 5, 
567). In a situation where ‘if everyone stands on tiptoe, no one sees better’, ‘intensified positional 
competition involves an increase in needs for the individual, in the sense that additional resources are 
required to achieve a given level of welfare’ (Ibid.: 4, 67). In other words, following Hirsch’s 
argumentation, and specifically targeting this chapter’s focus on the GA period, one can say that ‘the 
frustration in affluence results from its very success in satisfying the previously dominant material 
needs’ (Ibid.: 7).  
In his own way, Albert O. Hirschman (1982: 10, emphasis in original, 44), in his insightful 
writings on the logic of ‘disappointment’, similarly noted the way in which consumption, besides 
providing satisfaction, tends to ‘also yield disappointment and dissatisfaction’. But whereas Fred Hirsch 
focuses on the frustration associated with the competition for positional goods that are intrinsically 
scarce, as described above, Hirschman (Ibid.: 61) stresses the disappointments ‘that come from 
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experience with goods that are available and affordable, but simply do not yield the sort of satisfaction 
which were expected of them’. One of the most important endogenous factors that Hirschman (Ibid.: 
44) points to is the high ‘disappointment potential’ of both durables (e.g., a refrigerator or a car) and 
services (e.g., health or education) – two types of goods whose sales/consumption both increased during 
the postwar period (on the main sectoral trends, see, e.g., Houpt et al. 2010).182 Firstly, as opposed to 
relatively ‘disappointment-resistant’ nondurables (e.g., sex or food), which provide ‘pleasure’, 
‘comfort-yielding durable goods’ over time tends ‘to be taken for granted’ (Ibid.: 32). Arguably, given 
Hirschman’s additional argument that ‘disappointment could be especially widespread in a society in 
which mass diffusion of durables first occur’, this durables-comfort property seems particularly 
applicable to the GA case. Secondly, the ‘high disappointment potential’ associated with services stems 
from both ‘the high degree of variability in the quality and efficacy of the thing acquired’ and the 
typical ‘drop in quality consequent upon expansion’ (Ibid.: 40, 41). Importantly, this overall frustration 
in affluence argument, which in this study implies a synthetization of insights from both Hirsch and 
Hirschman that is applied to the postwar cohorts, is arguably indirectly/implicitly empirically 
corroborated through Richard A. Easterlin’s extensive four decade long empirical work on the 
connection between happiness and income/economic growth (see particularly Easterlin et al. 2010; 
Easterlin 2003; Clark et al.: 2008).183   
 
                                                          
182 Hirschman (Ibid.: 44), writing in 1982, also points out that durables and services ‘have greatly gained in 
importance in recent decades’.   
183 Notably, Easterlin’s work, which has given rise to the famous ‘Easterlin paradox’, overwhelmingly reveals that 
‘among countries, at a point in time happiness and income are positively related, but over time within a country, 
happiness does not increase as income goes up’ (Easterlin et al. 2010: 22467). These findings also seem to hold 
for developing countries (Easterlin et al. 2010). Specifically, in Western Europe, ‘there has been no obvious 
increase in life satisfaction over a thirty-year period, even though real incomes per capita have increased sharply’ 
(Clark et al. 2008: 96-7). Although one can observe a ‘positive short-term association between life satisfaction’, 
when looking at things ‘[o]ver the life cycle (…) as income increases and then levels off, happiness remains 
unchanged, contradicting the inference that income and well-being go together’ (Easterlin et al. 2010: 22466; 
Easterlin 2003: 11180). For a strong recent rejection of some of the main denouncements of the ‘Easterlin 
paradox’, see Easterlin et al. (2010). 
190 
 
7.3 Expectation/claim escalation and beyond 
Against the above mechanism-oriented background, and in the overall spirit of the embourgeoisement 
thesis, an argument can be made for a postwar socio-psychological and fiscal expectation/claim 
escalation. This escalation thesis can be unpacked, bringing forth two distinctive yet interrelated logics 
and trends. Firstly, it implies a socio-psychological expectation escalation – a process that, as argued, is 
largely endogenously triggered: notably, the irreversibility/asymmetry of consumption, intensely 
activated during the unrivaled economic expansion and popular distribution of affluence of the GA 
period, helped stabilize a popular socio-psychological expectation of ever-widening economic growth 
and consumption prospects. Secondly, it implies a fiscal claim escalation – an, as argued, equally 
largely endogenously triggered process: properties associated with the overall frustration in affluence 
process, which increasingly intensified throughout the GA period, eventually served to increase 
disappointment and thereby enhance the potential for escalating popular fiscal claim-making and, to 
some extent, organized criticism of the prevailing institutional-organizational status quo. Of course, it 
makes sense to ideal-typically differentiate between two overall types of expectations/claim-makings 
(or, more precisely, expectation/claim escalations): (1) a household-atomistic/consumptive type and (2) 
a societal/anti-alienation/alleviatory type.  
Arguably, these two logics of escalation can be roughly correlated with two types of historically 
situated frustrations. Hirschman, as part of his examination of the disappointment logic associated with 
consumption, at one point loosely speculates on the possible consequences of this. The first proposed 
scenario, which Hirschman (1982: 43, 42) explicitly mentions partly mirrors James O’Connor’s ‘fiscal 
crisis of the state’ perspective, ‘is that costumers (or patients) will become angry at the institutions, 
firms, or individuals that supply disappointing goods or services, and [would] clamor for improvement 
and reforms’. In the second potential scenario, which Hirschman mostly mentions ad hoc and does not 
really pursue further or formally integrate into his overall framework, ‘the disappointment the purchaser 
feels could well be turned against himself’ (Ibid.: 43). In this second scenario, one would thus see ‘the 
mutation of disappointment with the thing purchased and with the seller into a disappointment with 
oneself’ (Ibid.: emphasis in original). Placed in the overall historical and analytical context of this 
study, these two possible Hirschmanian consequences may, in all modesty, be described as frustration 
scenarios, which, from the individual- or socio-psychological perspective, can be differentiated into 
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two types, namely (1) claim-based frustration and (2) ‘privatized’ frustration.184 Importantly, this study 
seeks to both historically situate and substantively inform these two frustration scenarios in relation to 
the overall turn to governance of the post-1970s period.  
Now, as part of briefly describing how this study intends to productively historically situate the 
two frustration scenarios, it makes sense to provide another correlation, this time with a two-fold 
subjectivity distinction. Informally anticipating the more careful development of this in chapter 12 – 
which, drawing on, discussing and critically expanding upon relevant literature, more formally 
theorizes the micro-situated basis of state legitimation – it is possible to outline two ideal-typical forms 
of class-anchored legitimatory subjectivities: (1) an inner-normatively identifying subject/subjectivity 
that ‘misrecognizes’ (in the largely Bourdieusian sense) the functional-objective dynamics of the social 
and institutional-organizational order, i.e. a functionally favorable form of subjectivity characterized by 
a non-trivial degree of authentic inner-normative identification with the macro-structural status quo. (2) 
A critical-cynical subject/subjectivity that (in the largely Sloterdijkian (1987) and Zizekian (2012a, 
2012b) sense) is (a) critically ‘enlightened’ concerning the functional-objective dynamics of the status 
quo but nevertheless (b) objectively aligned with this order and unable to alter it (due to a low degree of 
global agency in a context of heightened societal corporatization), and therefore (c) tendentially 
develops a sharpened cynical attitude and behavioral pattern.185  
Firstly, and importantly, the unrivaled economic expansion and mass-based distribution of 
affluence of the GA period, which served to popularly and institutionally-organizationally stabilize a 
cross-national Western European growth-oriented and consumption-optimizing agenda, helped 
gradually consolidate an inner-normatively identifying subjectivity. The generalized appearance of this 
inner-normatively identifying postwar ‘consumer-citizen’ subject can be seen as the culmination of a 
                                                          
184 Although it is not possible to pursue this point further it can be argued that this second ‘privatized’ frustration 
scenario represents a peculiar third alternative to the two options informing Hirschman’s larger work, namely 
‘exit’ and ‘voice’. At one point, although without addressing this further, Hirschman (1982: 66) also seemed to 
have noticed this conceptual ‘identification problem’.  
185 These two ideal-typical subjectivities do not exclude but run parallel to each other, and their relative 
distribution and intensity, along with their emergence, consolidation and reconfiguration, vary historically. 
Moreover, this historical variability is class-situated: it is heavily determined by the prevailing biased distribution 
of both (1) material resources, juridical entitlements and specific institutional-organizational authority/leverage 
and (2) social, cultural and cognitive-intellectual resources/competences.  
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long-term intergenerational transformation of both popular value priorities – notably entailing a 
possibly irreversibly heightened socio-psychological expectation of ever-widening economic growth 
and consumption prospects – and behavioral patterns, together implying a heightened micro-situated 
normative and practical alignment with the prevailing fiscal-functional dynamics.186  
Secondly, the consolidation of a more demographically exclusive critical-cynical subjectivity 
appeared both more gradually, later in time and in the context of two overall stages. In stage one, 
initiated around the mid/late 1960s, Western Europe (and the US) experienced the emergent 
simultaneous interaction of the above two types of expectation/claim escalations, namely both the 
household-atomistic/consumptive and the societal/anti-alienation/alleviatory one. In conjunction, and in 
the context of the LAF approach, the two types of expectation/claim escalations – which eventually 
ends up being associated with, and lumped together as part of, what in the 1970s was famously 
pessimistically described as an ‘ungovernability’, ‘legitimacy’ or ‘fiscal’ crisis – can be described as a 
short-term stage of politicization.  
The first type of expectation/claim escalation was underpinned by the unrivaled economic 
expansion and mass-based distribution of affluence of the GA period and implied an escalation of both 
household-atomistic/consumptive expectations and fiscal claim-makings. The second type of 
expectation/claim escalation implied, first of all, an intensified frustration with the prevailing social and 
institutional-organizational order – an order which, as I shall also discuss below, in the postwar period, 
given the by then relatively successful backgrounding of the functional and particularly legitimatory 
properties of state-crafting, overwhelmingly (although not exclusively) effectively entailed the 
immediately observable political-institutional entities, i.e. ruling governments, the party political 
system, politicians, big corporations, etc. In other words, it implied the above claim-based frustration 
scenario, and more specifically an escalation of societal/anti-alienation/alleviatory claim-makings. In 
partial conclusion, the critical side of the critical-cynical subject – what, very selectively integrating 
Inglehart’s findings, one might identify as the initial formalized but in the end class-situated and short-
term articulation of the shift in value priorities in the direction of post-materialism – emerged in the 
                                                          
186 This study uses the term ‘consumer-citizen’ in a colloquial or non-formal sense, without referring to any 
particular type of usage or really defining it further. Thus, in this sense it remains a ‘proto-concept’. For the first, 
and similarly non-substantive/ad hoc, mention of this term that I know of, see Hirschman (1982: 19, 62, 74, 121).  
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context of the claim-based frustration scenario, which implied an expectation/claim escalation of the 
societal/anti-alienation/alleviatory type. 
In the second stage, i.e. the above ‘privatized’ frustration scenario, which is gradually unpacked 
during the messy 1970s and formally initiated from the 1980s, the cynical side of the critical-cynical 
subject appears and eventually takes substantive shape. In this stage, while household-
atomistic/consumptive expectations both endogenously intensify, and are exogenously state-facilitated, 
the correlative type of claim-makings is sought actively deescalated. As for the societal/anti-
alienation/alleviatory type, both socio-psychological expectations and fiscal claim-makings, which both 
tend to be downward rigid, are sought actively deescalated and tweaked/reconfigured in a fiscally 
favorable direction. Eventually, as I shall discuss in chapter 10 and 11, the claim-based frustration 
scenario (stage one) increasingly transforms into a privatized one (stage two). Importantly, as part of 
this process, the originally critically ‘enlightened’ consciousness, because it is gradually forced to 
materially align itself with the functional-objective dynamics of the status quo, eventually becomes 
fused with an intensified cynical attitude and behavioral pattern, bringing forth a critical-cynical 
subjectivity. Arguably, as shall also be discussed in later chapters, practically all of the indicators that 
are associated with Inglehart’s post-materialism concept, self-expression, green thinking, gender, well-
being, etc., have eventually become corporatively absorbed into – or perhaps incorporatized187 by/into 
– the emergently constituted private-property and state-situated accumulation logic (cf. more generally, 
e.g., Zizek 2012a, 2012b; Boltanski & Chiapello 2005; Thrift 1997).  
In sum, this study’s conceptualization of both the stabilization of an inner-normatively identifying 
consumer-citizen subjectivity and the appearance of a critical-cynical subject, which shall be discussed 
later, not only historically situates Inglehart’s work, but also, importantly, twists the claimed 
transformation of value priorities in a consumptive and fiscally functional direction.188  
                                                          
187 Meaning both corporatized (in the sense established earlier, i.e. whether by private or public entities) and 
incorporated (in the colloquial sense of simply integrating something into something else). Incorporatized, in 
other words, refers to a situation in which an entity is incorporated into something else in a corporatized manner.  
188 Arguably, it is not so much a case of Inglehart being wrong, as a case of him both (1) simply 
overlooking/underestimating the above mentioned process and (2) overestimating the importance of self-reported 
measures of normativity, attitudes, etc., vis-à-vis actual behavioral patterns (an important issue that shall be 
touched upon more generally later).     
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7.4 The postwar party political articulation 
Before, and partly alongside, the initiation of the claim-based frustration scenario around the mid/late 
1960s (as well as the even later privatized frustration scenario), one important way in which the above 
described mass-based consolidation of an inner-normatively identifying postwar consumer-citizen 
subject found political-institutional representation was through the generalized appearance of party-
political ‘catch-allism’ (on this, see Kirchheimer 1957, 1966; Krouwel 2003, 2006). Briefly put, in Otto 
Kirchheimer’s view the mass-parties within Western Europe, particularly those on the center-left, were 
turning into ‘catch-all’ parties, characterized by (1) a ‘professionalization’ of the party organization, (2) 
an ideological watering down and ‘centrism’ and (3) a class-neutral vote-maximizing agenda and 
obsession with the electoral consequences of socio-structural change (Kirchheimer 1957, 1966; 
Krouwel 2003, 2006). Notably, the catch-all party, and eventually the catch-all party system, of the 
postwar period is representative of a general ‘waning of opposition’ implying some of the following 
properties: 
 The catch-all ‘parliamentary party’ is doubly harmonizing, ‘[i]t harmonizes first the conflicting 
claims within its ranks, and on this basis participates in interparty adjustments on the 
governmental level’ (Kirchheimer 1957: 149) 
 The major parties increasingly seek to ‘exchange effectiveness in depth for a wider audience 
and more immediate electoral success’ (Kirchheimer 1966: 184-185). 
 After particularly WW2, we see the formal (what have been described as) class-neutral 
nationalization of party interests, implying inter alia (1) a changing working-class that is 
‘[i]ncreasingly enmeshed in the fortunes of the national economy’ (Kirchheimer 1957: 148) and 
(2) a ‘[f]urther strengthening of top leadership groups, whose actions and omissions are now 
judged from the viewpoint of their contribution to the efficiency of the entire social system 
rather than identification with the goals of their particular organisation’ (Kirchheimer 1966: 
190, emphasis added).  
 
Importantly, the overall macro-causal process underlying the historical consolidation of 
Kirchheimer’s ideal-typical Western European catch-all party (on this, see also Williams 2009, 
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Krouwel 2003) to some extent mirrors the above described generic causal model of Ronald Inglehart as 
well as Lipset & Rokkan’s (1967) political-sociological ‘cleavage’ framework. Loosely following 
especially William’s (2009) reconstruction, it can be argued that Kirchheimer proposed the following 
casual scheme: Large-scale socio-structural cleavage-reconfiguring transformations – particularly 
associated with postwar socio-economic ‘objective factors of social development’ (Kirchheimer 1957: 
150) – altered electoral dynamics (party identification, voting behavior, class-voting, etc.) and triggered 
an ideological-strategic shift amongst the major increasingly vote-maximizing/office-seeking mature 
mass parties, forcing them to put a ‘[d]e-emphasis on the class gardée (…) in favour of recruiting voters 
among the population at large’ (Kirchheimer 1966: 190). Kirchheimer’s (1957: 148, 153, 1966) scheme 
put particular emphasis on the party political reverberations of the transformation of Western European 
class structures: prosperity, mass consumption, the rise of ‘a substantial new middle class’, etc., implied 
new more pragmatic voting preferences – preferences which ‘all major parliamentary parties’ 
increasingly strategically pay attention to. Thus, in this way, from Kirchheimer’s (1957: 148) 
perspective ‘diminished social polarization and diminished political polarization are going hand in 
hand’.189 Thus, while generic objective class-related dynamics persist throughout the affluence-
generating postwar period, their causal relationship with the subjective, attitudinal and political-
                                                          
189 Data on class-voting trends – using, notably, the classical ‘Alford index’, which ‘[subtracts] the percentage of 
persons in nonmanual occupations voting for ‘Left’ parties from the percentage of persons in manual occupations 
voting for ‘Left’ parties’ (Alford 1962: 422) – indeed reveals a fall in Western Europe (and the US) since roughly 
WW2 (e.g., Clark et al. 1993: 312). Also, Nieuwbeerta & Ultee’s (1999) more specialized examination bolsters 
these findings. That said, these results have been powerfully critically reinterpreted by Van der Waal et al. (2007), 
who arguably correctly insists on the continuing party political importance of class-voting and ‘class-based 
economic interests’. The observed patterns have ‘been caused by an increase in crosscutting cultural voting, 
driven by a cultural dynamic that is rooted in educational differences’ (Ibid.: 416-7). As they argue, ‘the increased 
tendency of those with low levels of education to vote for rightist parties, accounts for most of the shift of the 
working class toward rightist parties’ (Ibid.: 415). In any case, whether or to what exact extent the working-class 
still votes for left-wing parties, it is evident that the substantive meaning of left-wingness (or right-wingness for 
that matter) has been considerably reconfigured over time. In this relation, Stephanie Lee Mudge’s (2011) 
mapping of the political-ideological development of mainstream ‘center’ parties across the OECD since 1945, 
which uses party/election programs as data, reveals a generalized particularly post-1970s trend of parties 
increasingly ‘neoliberalizing’ their political agendas.  
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sociological dimensions of class becomes increasingly reconfigured and obscured. As shall be seen, this 
tendency intensifies throughout the post-1970s period.   
As mentioned, postwar ‘catch-allism’, with its class-neutral nationalization of party interests, 
formally marks the correlated double process of (1) the backgrounding of both the existence of an ISI of 
the state and the principle of state-functional reproduction and (2) the political-institutional 
displacement of legitimation from the state to a separate arena of party politics. On the one hand, this 
development is representative of a more bottom-up driven mode of change/reproduction; a historical 
period characterized by both gradually rising consumer-citizen expectations and a gradually rising 
party-political obsession with electoral dynamics, popular preferences, etc. On the other hand, this 
preoccupation with the electorate simultaneously took on an increasingly institutionally self-interested 
and fiscally selective character, increasingly concerning itself with functionally maintaining an overall 
national growth-oriented and consumption-optimizing agenda. As this study shall also argue later when 
unpacking and slightly analytically tweaking Katz & Mair’s (1995; see also Mair 2013) understanding 
of the post-1970/1990s ‘cartel party’, the development initiated from catch-allism and onwards implies 
an interrelated two-legged process, which should be explicitly unpacked: on the one hand, the 
intensification of a bottom-up driven consumption-situated symbolic media-fetishizing agenda, 
implying a strengthening of the party-strategic leg, and, on the other hand, the intensification of a top-
down driven fiscally functional state-crafting agenda, implying a strengthening of the state-
administrative leg.190  
 
 
7.5 Time and timing 
The analysis of the GA period put forward in this chapter deserves to be further temporally theorized. 
Firstly, and briefly, the long-term character of the above described processes should be stressed. 
Irrespective of the validity of his findings, Inglehart (1971) productively labeled the observed ‘value 
changes’ a ‘silent revolution’, thereby stressing, as I have also discussed more broadly, the gradual, 
long-term and intergenerational fashion in which popular values are transformed. With regards to the 
specific type of shift in popular value priorities that have been argued for in this chapter – notably, a 
                                                          
190 Arguably, this type of unpacking at least implicitly underpinned Kirchheimer’s catch-all analysis.  
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stabilized popular socio-psychological expectation of ever-widening economic growth and consumption 
prospects – it makes sense to briefly dwell on the particular silentness of this development. While large-
scale social transformations are often immediately empirically ambiguous or unobservable when 
viewed from the individual persons’ naked day-to-day perspective, as I shall also argue in chapter 12 
when discussing the micro-situated dynamics of state legitimation, it is typically precisely the emergent 
connection between micro-level habitual normalcy and static macro-level reproduction that 
paradoxically serves to introduce changes and over time alter the quality and composition of factors. 
From the micro-situated consumer-citizen perspective, the particular repetitive nature of postwar 
capitalist consumption, its increasingly routinized and regularized pattern, over time arguably served to 
gradually alter the individual household’s value priorities.191 At the mass-based macro-level, as argued 
above, the described unrivaled economic expansion and popular distribution of affluence of the GA 
period – the very fact that both GDP and consumption prospects increased in such a stable long-term 
manner, i.e. the fact that this overall macro-pattern persisted – served to alter popular expectations. 
Importantly, these two levels of micro- and macro-situated static reproduction are irreducibly 
connected, and only when emergently activated can they gradually and cumulatively alter values 
priorities. 
Secondly, the peculiarity of the timing of many of the processes that in this chapter have been 
associated with the GA period should be addressed. The above overall arguments concerning the 
direction, mechanisms and political-institutional consequences of long-term incremental shifts in 
popular value priorities in the GA period also has implications for how to assess the timing of, and 
conceptually periodize, key properties of the post-1970s period. Arguably, many of the features that are 
popularly associated with ‘neoliberalism’ (of, say, the 1980s) were already being consolidated during 
the GA period. In this sense, the crisis of the 1970s – whether a ‘stagflation’, ‘ungovernability’, 
‘legitimacy’ or ‘fiscal’ crisis – can be seen as the political-institutional culmination of dynamics that 
had undergone a consolidated maturation during the GA period. Interestingly, Putnam’s (1995) above 
discussed US-based analysis of civic disengagement, which observed an increase in people ‘bowling 
alone’ already in the postwar period, not only generally implicitly corroborates this chapter’s emphasis 
on the importance of key unique ‘path dependent’ properties of the GA period for understanding the 
                                                          
191 As Bauman (2000: 203) puts it more generally, the ‘commonality’ of the prevailing ideology ‘is taken for the 
proof of its sense’. 
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later governance phenomenon but also points to an important element of what may be described as the 
generally belated/sluggish logic of long-term socio-structural transformations: ‘[t]he full effect of 
generational developments generally appear several decades after their onset, because it takes that long 
for a given generation to become dominant in the adult population’ (Ibid.: 676).192  
In a partly similar sense, the relatively successful tension-bridging performance of the postwar 
period is greatly connected to the basic fact that the key macro-mechanisms underlying the 
expectation/claim escalation process were being gradually consolidated in this period – that is, not all of 
them were fully emergently activated, or the conditions of their empirical possibility were not strong, 
before well into the 1960s. Thus, a bit bombastically, it can be argued that the governance turn 
appeared before the governance turn. By logical extension, this would mean that the governance turn 
cannot be considered a proper causal factor explaining governance (i.e., since this would mean it caused 
itself). An alternative and more precise way of putting this, which more or less solves the logical 
problem, is probably to say that the actual initial turn to governance appeared before the governance 
phenomenon had later more exhaustively materialized and before the mainstream interpretation 
periodized it. Interestingly, the classical works of the early Frankfurt school arguably indirectly 
corroborate this timing specification with regards to the GA period and the governance turn. Key 
members of the Frankfurt school, like Adorno, Marcuse, Fromm, etc., concerned themselves with the 
cultural dynamics of capitalist commodification both before, during and at the height of the GA period 
– aspects that are typically considered ‘neoliberal’ and thought to belong to the post-1980s period.  
Also, as seen, Kirchheimer’s above discussed pioneering work on the ‘catch-all party’ – another 
type of Frankfurt-anchored research situated at the parliamentary level – corroborates the claim that key 
properties of the turn to governance were consolidated during the GA period. Importantly, as shall be 
seen, many of the features and trends associated with Katz & Mair’s (1995) notion of the post-
1970/1990s ‘cartel-party’ was described and foreseen by Kirchheimer already in the 1950s (on this, see 
also Krouwel 2003: 24). In sum, it arguably makes sense to operate with the following initial temporal 
distinction in line with the general terminology established in this study: (1) a GA period consisting of 
the two sub-periods of (a) an emanating consolidation and a mature consolidation (the second of which 
                                                          
192 In this relation, Putnam (Ibid.) points to the ‘postwar boom in college enrollments’ as a critical factor 
‘forestalling’ or ‘delaying’ an otherwise underlying drop in electoral turnouts.  
199 
 
roughly starting around the late 1950s), and (2) a post-1970s period, which, when looked at as a whole, 
can be described as a period of reconfigured intensification.193  
 
 
7.6 Concluding remarks 
By way of conclusion, two implications of the above arguments concerning the GA period shall be 
highlighted. Firstly, as mentioned, the suggested macro-causal process underpinning the generalized 
consolidation of an inner-normatively identifying postwar consumer-citizen subjectivity should be 
understood as a gradual, long-term and primarily endogenously-driven process. But, as discussed in 
chapter 5, these types of changes usually involve indirect- or quasi-exogenous forms of state-
facilitation. In the case of the GA period, largely institutionally self-interested fiscal state-crafting 
practices associated with consolidating and maintaining/maximizing national growth-oriented and 
consumption-optimizing agendas, including nourishing a certain level of normative and importantly 
behavioral alignment, indirectly, in the before mentioned Churchillian fashion, and largely 
unintendedly, served to gradually and possibly irreversibly reconfigure popular value priorities. Thus, 
in this peculiar manner, the intergenerational value transformations of the GA period should be placed 
in the context of states’ ongoing tension-consolidating functional activities. Specifically, although it 
should not be considered a necessarily active strategy, consciously laboured over by foreseeing state 
planners or elite party politicians, etc., the gradual normative alteration of the postwar period can be 
perceived as a form of growth-led state-crafting, which through facilitating an overall national 
consumption-situated economic growth agenda, indirectly, intergenerationally and ‘infrastructurally’ 
tweaks value priorities and behavioral patterns in a more fiscally functional direction (see also more 
generally, e.g., Bonefeld 2013; cf. Foucault 2008; Miller & Rose 1990).  
Secondly, both many of the post-2008 crisis neo-Keynesian politico-economic proposals for 
remedies and the various strands of social-liberal, social-democratic or left-leaning (at least implicit) 
romantic outlooks regarding the GA period, tend to ignore or underestimate the above argued 
irreversible asymmetric endogenous logic of consumption-situated economic growth and its frustration-
                                                          
193 I shall of course specify and unpack the post-1970s period when examining it in the subsequent chapters.   
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escalating properties. More generally, as a way of providing a crucial historical-theoretical background 
for the next chapters treating the post-1970s period, this chapter’s analysis has put focus on the GA 
period’s consolidation of a possibly irreversibly heightened socio-psychological expectation of ever-
widening economic growth and consumption prospects. While contemporary scholars tend to stress the 
‘decommodification’ leg (Esping-Andersen 1990) of the GA period – or perhaps its democratic virtues 
(e.g., Streeck 2011) – less emphasis is usually put on the necessary commodification leg (which 
logically, given the term decommodification, has to be a somehow active component). More so than 
decommodificatory, the GA period was fiscally commodificatory; indirectly and gradually, through a 
long-term intergenerational growth-led form of fiscal and legitimatory state-crafting, this period helped 
give birth to an inner-normatively identifying postwar consumer-citizen subjectivity, which has greatly 
and perhaps irreversibly altered subsequent state-crafting dynamics. In the next chapters (Part III) – 
under the general historical-theoretical banner of (tension) reconfiguration – I shall examine the state-
crafting-relevant reverberations of the GA period and the particular reconfigured intensification of the 
described expectation/claim escalation throughout the decades of the post-1970s period.  
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Part III     Reconfiguration: The State-facilitated Governance Turn 
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Chapter 8. Prelude: The 1970s/1980s 
 
Rather than trying to provide a more linear and historically exhaustive account of the Western European 
development of the 1970s and 1980s, in this first brief chapter covering the reconfiguration period I am 
primarily interested in examining the analytical status of these two decades in relation to not simply the 
overall approach and agenda of this study but also the previous GA period and the later 1990s and 
2000s. In this sense, this chapter is to a large extent supposed to operate as a kind of orientation-
facilitating prelude to the subsequent chapters also treating the reconfiguration process. Attention is 
particularly put on the state-crafting-relevant functions, logic and historical implications of the 
generalized steering/governing-situated bewilderments activated during the crisis-beset 1970s. While 
the brief and selective analysis and discussion of this chapter naturally partly swings back and forth 
between the decades, the examination centers on the incredible both attitudinal and objective 
governance-relevant organizing qualities of the 1970s.  
The chapter is split into three main sections. The first, and most extensive one, looks at two 
overall types of bewilderments activated during the 1970s. The second section very briefly discusses 
some of the key dynamics of the shift from bewilderment to the inflated firmness of the 1980s. Thirdly, 
as a way of also setting up the next chapter, the last section tries to briefly analytically and empirically 
unpack some of the so-called ‘neoliberal’ trends and dynamics of the 1980s (and partly 1990s).   
 
 
8.1 The bewilderments of the 1970s 
The 1970s was a time of widespread bewilderment, in many ways a both popular and institutional-
organizational question mark. Western elite politicians and administrative authorities wavered in two 
ways (and stages): firstly, for a short moment, while for decades programmed to legitimately maintain a 
growth-oriented and consumption-optimizing agenda they were suddenly unsure of precisely what type 
of ‘goods’ that should be delivered. Secondly, not long after, they were primarily unsure of how this 
agenda, which was consolidated during the GA period, could be firmly reactivated, giving rise to a 
string of unsuccessful initiatives throughout the 1970s, whose immediate failure of course further 
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compounded the confusion. In other words, the 1970s was ideal-typically constituted by, first, a short-
lived end-oriented form of bewilderment and, second, a means-oriented one, which in altered ways to 
some extent would spill over into subsequent decades (becoming perennial). Taken together, as will be 
suggested, these two forms of bewilderment – which shall be further unpacked below – found 
symptomatic representation in the iconic figure of US President Jimmy Carter (as described below, the 
firmness of the 1980s found equivalent representation in President Ronald Reagan).   
 
 
8.1.1 (1) End-oriented bewilderment: Short-lived politicization 
The first end-oriented bewilderment was of course associated with the claim-based frustration scenario 
described above, and particularly the escalation of societal/anti-alienation/alleviatory claim-makings. It 
was end-oriented not only because, as mentioned, uncertainty appeared as to whether the popular 
conditions of the growth-oriented and consumption-optimizing agenda could be re-activated; for a 
moment the governing authorities experienced a newfound disturbing inconclusiveness regarding the 
status of the overall normative-legitimatory setup consolidated during the GA period. Although spoken 
towards the end of the decade, President Carter’s now infamous 1979 ‘Crisis of Confidence’ speech, by 
the very fact that these issues were addressed at this level, can be perceived as a good reflection of the 
general disorientation of the times: approximating particularly the neo-conservative diagnosis of the 
crisis-ridden period, Carter (1979) spoke, for example, worriedly of an ‘erosion of our confidence in the 
future’ and ‘a growing disrespect for government and for churches and for schools, the news media, and 
other institutions’.194 Much more than a purely technical economic phenomenon, the crisis signaled, as 
he argued, a ‘growing doubt about the meaning of our own lives’.  
Importantly, though, the first end-oriented bewilderment did at no point manifest itself in a 
system-crippling state-situated ‘legitimacy crisis’ for the simple fact that, as argued, a basic historically-
situated distinction should be made between state legitimation and party-level legitimation. 
Specifically, as addressed, the relative shift from state legitimation to party-level legitimation served to 
sediment and boost state legitimacy: it allowed states to restrict effective intrusions and dampen the 
future possibility of being directly presented with overly disintegrative or functionally-damaging claims 
                                                          
194 A full transcript of Carter’s speech can be found in Carter (1979).   
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(see also, more generally, Beetham 1991: 169-71). Thus, with the functional dynamics of state-crafting 
being relatively backgrounded, the politicization of tensions associated with the claim-based frustration 
scenario now mainly effectively (that is, popularly speaking) concerned the party political level. While 
both the neo-conservative and neo-Marxist diagnoses more or less implied a condition of systemic 
ungovernability – although the details of the levels of analysis were mainly left ambiguous – the 
addressed popular legitimatory-epistemological displacement from state to government helped keep the 
bewilderment specific and only quasi-systemic, i.e. focused on the prevailing immediately observable 
governing elites, incumbents, personalities, etc.  
Moreover, and more generally, the politicized claim-making frustration scenario was short-lived, 
it was not really constitutive of the 1970s. While at the normative-legitimatory level the mechanisms 
underpinning the general bewilderment have largely remained active in the subsequent decades – 
although migrating into two different class-specific forms (to be discussed below) – at the objective 
level, the feared potentially functionally-interrupting overt politicized behavior was soon kept in check; 
it did not genuinely materialize. As Bensman & Vidich (1972: 63) drily argued already in the early 
1970s, many of ‘those who have freaked out’ – as extreme representatives of ‘the new consciousness’ – 
‘have already freaked back in’.195 As Schmelzer’s (2012) analysis also reveals, while intellectual 
debates amongst high-ranking OECD analysts concerning some of the systemic social and ecological 
problems tied to the prevailing growth orientation briefly surfaced in the organization in the period 
1968-1974, the economic distress linked to the ‘stagflation crisis’ in itself helped stifle growth-skeptical 
intellectual orientations, relatively quickly redirecting attention back to stimulating economic 
productivity. In light of the above depiction of the 1970s as a largely futile and mostly already 
incorporatized decade, which goes against the popular conception of it (particularly its association with 
intellectual dissent and radicalism), it makes somewhat sense to provocatively view the flourishing of 
‘post-structuralism’, the ‘linguistic turn’, the often lamented Marxist ‘take over’ of the universities, etc., 
                                                          
195 In hindsight, Bensman & Vidich (1972: 64, 63) seems to have provided an overall correct prediction: writing 
in 1972 they prophesized that the observed ‘freaked-out way of life’ of the times would most likely not ‘cripple 
seriously the technical and bureaucratic values on which our society is based’.   
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as in some ways temporally delayed and inflated discursive phenomena – like laugh tracks (or rather: 
booing sounds), still running while the show is objectively over.196 
 
 
8.1.2 (2) Means-oriented bewilderment: Competing diagnoses of the crisis 
This means-oriented bewilderment (i.e., the second form), which spilled over into the subsequent 
decades, concerned findings ways to reactivate the conditions for the growth-oriented and consumption-
optimizing agenda consolidated during the GA period. In functionalist terms this involved the selection 
of ‘items’ – which in hindsight can be analytically construed through, for example, the presented three-
legged strategic toolbox of state-crafting strategies – that would possibly either (1) again bridge, 
stabilize and manage the underlying tension-filled relationship between the two functions of 
legitimation and fiscal accumulation or alternatively (2) alter (reconfigure or genuinely overcome) this 
tension. Thus, the first series of ‘crisis management’ attempts throughout the 1970s were explicitly 
construed within a GA frame of mind (which of course to some extent still continues today), while, as 
the unsuccessfulness of these attempts became obvious, the second round, as I shall discuss concerning 
the post-1980s period, increasingly involved a belief in the overcoming of, or concrete attempts at 
transforming or ‘privatizing’, the tension itself.  
The bewilderment regarding, and concrete unsuccessfulness of, the prescription of fiscal cures 
throughout the 1970s – the two aspects of course reinforcing each other – was underpinned by an 
overall confusion concerning the (still puzzling) question of the overall macro-mechanisms, besides the 
oft-mentioned two ‘external’ oil shocks of 1973 and 1979, etc., underpinning the generalized 
‘stagflation’ crisis of the 1970s. While high unemployment was obviously one of the main symptoms of 
the crisis, the inflation dimension, which deserves to be touched upon in some more detail, arguably 
appears, in a peculiar way, as not only a representation of the crisis but also partly as a cause of it (cf., 
                                                          
196 This is of course an exaggeration. Generally, as I shall discuss later, the historical dynamics of (broadly 
speaking) ‘critical’ academic thinking/research during the post-1970s period are of course non-trivial, and thus 
worth considering: It simultaneously (1) indirectly informed practices and (2) underwent its own principled 
transformation, which, in complex ways, served to spontaneously align it with the prevailing systemic-functional 
logics – a latter process whose qualitative and quantitative extensiveness corroborates the above argument 
concerning the objectively delayed and inflated character of the initial radical intellectual/academic surge.   
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e.g., Streeck 2011: 10-12).197 While ‘full employment’ was still an official target, i.e. something which 
authorities strove or promised to maintain (although decreasingly so), throughout the 1970s inflation 
increasingly became analytically and institutionally perceived as one of the main sources of the 
economic problems, as for example evidenced by the so-called ‘McCracken Report’ (McCracken et al. 
1977; see also McCracken 1978), a highly policy-influential and inflation-concerned OECD report from 
1977 entitled Towards Full Employment and Price Stability.198 Besides the usual international 
economic variables, this report, written by economists, stressed the importance of domestic non-
economic factors (on this, see Keohane 1978), in a manner partly resembling the neo-conservative 
diagnosis of the crisis, such as expanding ‘aspirations’, and ‘wage bargaining’, etc. Governmental 
activities were of course complicit in this, regularly engaging in forms of ‘administered inflation’, 
which served to ‘directly push costs and prices to higher levels’ (McCracken 1978: 16). 
Importantly, the solutions and recommendations addressed by the authoritative McCracken 
Report not only directly linked up to the distinctive inflation-concerned diagnosis but also stands out as 
particularly paradigmatic and prophetic given the subsequent post-1980s development: Specific 
expensive ‘programs and regulations’ should be assessed through ‘careful cost-benefit analysis’ 
(McCracken 1978: 16); ‘the resistance to strong pressure for channeling a growing proportion of the 
national income through the public sector’ should be ‘increased’ (Ibid.: 10); governments should 
generally ‘stand firm’ (Ibid.: 11) and be ‘willing to accept more immediate slack in the economy’ 
(Ibid.: 13); ‘skill wage differentials’ may be productively widened through a better linking of it to ‘the 
pricing system’ (Ibid.: 15); and so on. In short, the report strongly advised OECD governments to adopt 
a firm stance with regards to monetary policy (McCracken et al. 1977: e.g., 17-19; see also Keohane 
1978: 111-2) – a recommendation which, given the above mentioned generic underlying sociological 
character of the report’s diagnosis, entailed a broad ‘disciplining’ of many strictly speaking non-
economic facets and spheres possibly relating to or conditioning inflationary increases.  
                                                          
197 In Streeck’s (2011: 10-12, cf. 2014: 32-46) narrative, inflation seems to be construed, fairly ambiguously, not 
as the crisis (or part of it), but as a particular solution to the crisis – a crisis which itself seems to be perceived as 
having been activated by lowered growth (which of course begs the question as to what put an end to the growth 
expansion of the GA period in the first place).   
198 The similarly entitled 1978 paper Towards Full Employment and Price Stability provides a slightly updated 
short overview of the key arguments of the OECD report.    
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The inflation dimension is complex, not only because it inherently compounds many interacting 
factors but also because it is associated with an underlying confusion regarding the conditions of 
possibility for the GA period. While a strong narrative associated with the work of Barry Eichengreen 
(e.g., 2008; see also, e.g., Tonioli 2008) has stressed the importance of a nationally cross-cutting ‘wage 
moderation’ trend – and more generally a ‘tripartite’ form of militancy-decreasing social 
bargaining/partnership, etc. – for stimulating high investment and productivity rates during the GA 
period, more recent convincing evidence suggests the opposite relationship: high real wage growth, not 
wage moderation, stimulated economic activity in many countries (see notably Hatton & Boyer 2005; 
Naastepad & Storm 2006; Bengtsson 2015). Two overall aspects may be stressed in this relation. 
Firstly, the question of whether real wage growth disturbs or stimulates economic activity most likely 
depends on whether growth is, for example, more ‘profit-led’ or ‘wage-led’ (Naastepad & Storm 2006; 
cf. Bhaduri & Marglin 1990; Baccaro & Pontusson 2016).199 Secondly, it seems fairly clear that: (1) 
looking across the OECD polities wage restraint has been a much more salient characteristic of the pre-
GA period and, particularly, the post-1980s period, than the GA period (e.g., Western & Healy 1999: 
233-4); (2) very high wage increases – or ‘wage pressure’ – were seen from the mid/late 1960s to the 
early 1970s (Ibid.; on the Scandinavian countries, see Bengtsson 2015, on the UK case, see Hatton & 
Boyer 2005); (3) neither the generalized wage restraint nor the reinstatement of profitability of the post-
1980s period – the former factor reinforcing the latter – have entailed a level of employment or 
economic growth resembling that of the GA period (Naastepad & Storm 2006: 217-221, passim).    
Importantly, construed from the analytical vantage point of this study, and particularly the 
escalation thesis launched in chapter 7, the ‘stagflation’ crisis of the 1970s should be understood as a 
combination of different types of claim-makings associated with, notably, (1) wage pressure and 
consumption-optimization (i.e., the more household-atomistic/consumptive type) and (2) both the 
cumulative effect, and sudden activation in relation to the marked rise in unemployment itself in the 
1970s, of programs and (in O’Connor’s terms) ‘social expenses’ that were gradually codified during the 
                                                          
199 According to Naastepad & Storm (2006), looking at the period of 1960-2000, the United States and Japan 
stand out as distinctive ‘profit led’ economies, while the UK, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy and Spain are 
considered ‘wage led’.   
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GA period (i.e., the more societal/anti-alienation/alleviatory type). In this way, the inflation dimension 
comprises, and compounds, a series of claim-making components, involving, as argued, both a socio-
psychological expectation of ever-widening economic growth and consumption prospects and genuine 
concerns, both general (i.e., integral to the above described mechanisms of escalation) and distinctive to 
the crisis of the 1970s itself, associated with the production of negative social externalities – concerns 
which both (1) were partly institutionally-organizationally sheltered in nationally specific ways 
throughout the 1970s via the activation of so-called ‘automatic stabilizers’ and, precisely due to this, (2) 
of course in itself helped exacerbate the fiscal escalation symptoms.     
 
 
8.2 From bewilderment to inflated firmness 
As argued, the both analytical and institutional perception of (a largely impoverished understanding of) 
inflation as the main domestic cause of the crisis – and the in some ways logical conception of 
monetary firmness as the cure – found paradigmatic expression in the (ironically partly symbolically 
inflated) firmness of the anti-Carter political leaderships of notably Ronald Reagan and Margaret 
Thatcher. As would increasingly become the norm, the US (and partly the UK) led the way: the 
aggressive and technically speaking successful 1979 disinflation campaign of the Carter-hired 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Paul Volcker symbolically as well as substantially marked the advent 
of a new more firm and self-punitive decade (on this, see also, e.g., Streeck 2011: 12-4). Soon, ruling 
governments all across Western Europe more or less followed suit, and, whether launched by the 
increasingly large group of explicit ‘inflation targeters’ or not, since the late 1980s/early 1990s a clear-
cut ‘inflation convergence’ focused on ‘anti-inflation policies’ could be observed across the OECD 
(Hyvonen 2004; see also Arestis et al. 2014).  
While, symptomatically, two important Nobel Prizes in economics were given in the 1970s to 
Friedrich von Hayek (in 1974) and Milton Friedman (in 1976),200 the dominant interpretation emerging 
around the late 1970s and early 1980s should more precisely be described as being associated with the 
‘New Classical’ school of macroeconomics (and ‘real business cycle theory’), which amongst other 
                                                          
200 For more on these two decisions, see the following press releases: ‘The Prize in Economics’ (1974, 1976).   
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things sought to toss out the ‘Phillips curve’ and upgrade the authority of ‘rational expectations’ (e.g., 
Woodford 2009).   
Although drawn from the US context, the two ‘extreme’ cases of Carter and Reagan serves as 
productive rough illustrations of some of the differences that have been addressed above between the 
two decades of the 1970s and the 1980s: put simply, Carter’s presidency epitomized the general 
bewilderment of the 1970s, while Reagan’s expressed the newfound firmness of the 1980s.201 While 
Carter in his 1979 ‘malaise’ speech spoke bewildered of a loss of ‘confidence’, Reagan, in his firm 
1980 election eve address, could ‘find no national malaise’; rather  than something being ‘wrong with 
the American people’, they were as ‘sturdy and robust as they have always been’.202  
That said, both figures, speaking either at the very end or at the very beginning of the decade, 
seemed to have reached the same conclusion concerning the new basic premises of fiscal and 
legitimatory governing in the post-1970s period, although they differed slightly in their specific framing 
of the necessary strategies. Carter (1979), speaking in 1979, after a long and continually unsuccessful 
decade of means-oriented bewilderment, had finally realized his administration’s both principled and 
intensified incapacity to directly or exogenously govern the consumer-citizens, humbly admitting that ‘I 
realize more than ever that as President I need your help’. Reagan (1980), promoting a new and inflated 
ideological agenda – an agenda that was critically conditioned by an extraordinary ideational tailwind, 
which had been materially prepared for through roughly three decades of GA consumer-citizenship – 
spoke more optimistically of ‘reforms that will get government off our backs, out of our pockets’. In 
both cases, although Reagan in the end did not effectively deliver on his promises, it was clear that the 
search was on for strategies to fragment, displace and ‘privatize’ tensions. As shall be discussed later, at 
the socio-psychological level, this in the end implied findings ways to weaken citizens’ ability to 
causally link a certain bad/good performance (or non-performance) to the operations of the state – that 
is, it entailed an attempted untying of the question of the state/government’s institutional-organizational 
                                                          
201 As chapter 4 also argued in relation to Marx’s particular implicit methodological usage of the UK case, the US 
now serves as the overall ‘locus classicus’ of the relevant developments – while the UK then takes second place, 
serving as, so to speak, the USA of Europe; the US case, to repeat Marx’s (1990: 90, 91) words originally directed 
at the UK once again, ‘shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future’.  
202 For a full transcript of Reagan’s speech, see Reagan (1980).  
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performance from popular subjective questions of ‘responsibility’. But, as shall be seen looking at the 
post-1990s period, new and more sophisticated strategies (like, for example, forms of fiscal 
mobilization-control) had repeatedly to be selected and activated, strategies able to somehow facilitate 
and take into account the complexity of the largely endogenously-driven long-term and 
intergenerational production and organization of value priorities.    
 
 
8.3 Unpacking the ‘neoliberal’ 1980s 
Stereotypically, the 1980s is considered the decade of, amongst other things, increased de-regulation, 
competition, privatization and financialization – in other words, the decade of ‘neoliberalism’. There is 
indeed crude evidence for this, although, as shall be seen and discussed, (1) the 1990s is when many of 
the trends actually intensified/formalized and, moreover, (2) as argued earlier, the analytical association 
of neoliberalism with notably de-regulation problematically ignores the state-crafting mechanisms 
constitutive of the post-1980s developments. 
Firstly, as Nicoletti & Scarpetta’s (2003: 18, 19; see also Conway & Nicoletti 2006: 43) important 
quantitative OECD/World Bank-based analysis finds looking inter alia at regulation trends across the 
OECD from the 1980s, ‘[o]n average, policies have become friendlier to market mechanisms’. Overall, 
product market regulation, which is OECD’s summary measure of the regulation of the ‘intensity of 
product market competition’ (Nicoletti et al. 2000: 8), has been less restrictive (or more ‘market-
friendly’) since the 1980s (Nicoletti & Scarpetta 2005: 17). As Potrafke’s (2010: 140) descriptive data 
shows, looking at seven key industries,203 regulatory restrictions (particularly with regards to ‘entry 
barriers’, and less so ‘public ownership’) decreased from the (mid) 1980s, a trend which intensified 
from particularly the 1990s.204   
Secondly, with regards to privatization trends, privatization amongst European Union members 
states – whether measured through total revenues/proceeds or transactions – expanded greatly during 
                                                          
203 These seven industries are: rail transport, postal services, electricity, gas, air passenger transport, 
telecommunications and road freight (Potrafke 2010: 140). 
204 It was particularly within the airlines and road sectors that ‘market-friendly’ reforms were undertaken in the 
1980s across the OECD (Conway & Nicoletti 2006: 50).  
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the 1980s and eventually ‘peaked in the mid-1990s’ (Privatization Barometer 2013: 7; see also Clifton 
et al. 2006: 742). As the study by Clifton et al. (2006: 741-3) specifies, in the Western European 
context, while the UK can be considered a ‘pioneer’ due to the early timing and relative radicalness of 
its privatization program, and while significant non-UK privatization cases associated with, for 
example, the Spanish (Socialist) government or Mitterrand’s (re)privatization agenda could be observed 
in the 1980s, the formal convergence amongst European countries around privatization did not, as 
mentioned, kick in before the early 1990s. Interestingly, while the ‘big privatizers’ have (not 
unjustifiably) usually been considered countries like the UK, France and Italy, when assessing 
privatization revenues in terms of the economy’s size – which allows for a better assessment of the 
genuine ‘privatization effort’ – countries like Finland, Sweden and Austria have had high privatization 
rates, and otherwise ‘average’ countries such as the Netherlands and Denmark have also ‘made 
significant efforts to de-invest’ (Ibid.: 744, 742, 743).   
Thirdly, as is by now fairly empirically uncontroversial, the advanced Western world, and 
particularly the ‘Anglo’ economies, has undergone a process of ‘financialization’ since especially the 
1980s (e.g., Sweezy 1997; Krippner 2005; Lapavitsas 2013).205 Lapavitsas & Powell’s (2013) 
comparative empirical analysis of the trends in financialization overall simultaneously shows that (1) 
‘[t]here is no standard form of financialisation’ and (2) there is evidence of a ‘commonality of 
underlying tendencies’ across countries.  
Of course, in the end, the professed radicalness of the various nationally constituted ‘weak state’ 
ideological agendas was overall not actually activated; notably, as shall be discussed later, neither 
facilitative functional state procedures/dynamics nor public expenditure, whether in the US or across 
Western Europe, did actually diminish. Importantly, although for example various forms of 
privatization – whether involving private economic actors, citizens or civil society – may be perfectly 
                                                          
205 According to Krippner (2005: 181) financialization can be defined as ‘a pattern of accumulation in which 
profit making occurs increasingly through financial channels rather than through trade and commodity 
production’. Following Lapavitsas & Powell (2013: 5-6), the process of financialization involves ‘three 
constitutive underlying tendencies’: (1) the financialization of MNCs, (2) the redirection of the activities of large 
banks, turning these ‘toward mediating transactions in open financial markets, thus earning fees, commissions and 
proprietary profits instead of simply accruing interest rate spreads through lending’, (3) the integration of 
households and household dynamics into the financialization process.      
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meaningful from the ISI of the state (depending on both the specific form and substantive implications 
of this) (see also, e.g., Barker 1990: 100-1), straightforward ideologically-promoted programs aiming to 
effectively dismantle the authority of the state or its four constitutive monopolies makes less sense. The 
very fact that the ideological radicalness of the 1980s was largely inflated is telling: even the decade 
often deemed as the most extreme did not actually manage to actualize what, from the ISI of the state, 
to some extent would have been considered self-punitive policies.     
This of course points to a larger underlying issue, namely the necessity of unpacking the concept 
of neoliberalism. Here, it seems helpful to (at least) introduce three types of distinctions. Firstly, an 
understanding of neoliberalism as primarily operating at either (1) the ideational, ideological or 
programmatic level or (2) the material or institutional-organizational level.206 Analytically separating 
these two levels allows for a better understanding of the historically changing dynamics of their actual 
intermingling – notably, the historically specific institutional-organizational selectiveness of this 
process – and thus serves to make better sense of the discrepancy between the ideologically-driven 
rhetoric of neoliberalism and the materially speaking largely non-event of shrinking statehood. 
Secondly, an understanding of neoliberalism as primarily involving either (1) a ‘weak state’ or (2) a 
‘strong state’. This understanding makes sense on both of the above two levels: at the ideological level, 
a distinction may for example be made between two stereotypical intellectual programs, namely a more 
‘weak state’ Chicago School view and a more ‘strong state’ Ordoliberal view (e.g., Gamble 2006; 
Foucault 2008; on specifically the Ordoliberal view, see also Bonefeld 2013), while at the ‘actually 
existing’ material level, as also indirectly discussed earlier, it makes sense to operate with 
regionally/nationally specific neoliberal trajectories – e.g., a US versus a Western European experience 
or (within the latter) a UK vs. Swedish one, etc. – patterned around a shared overall transformation 
pointing in a cross-cutting direction. 
Thirdly, it seems helpful to also introduce an overall ideal-typical historical distinction 
concerning neoliberalism – notably, following Peck & Tickell (2002: 384), a distinction between a 
more ‘destructive’ ‘roll-back neoliberalism’ of the 1980s and a more ‘constructive’ ‘roll-out 
                                                          
206 This latter level may be helpfully characterized as ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ (Wacquant 2012). See also 
more generally Peck & Tickell (2002).  
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neoliberalism’ of the 1990s. Somewhat similarly, and more generally concerning the post-1980s period: 
Offe’s (2009: 555-6, emphasis in original) helpful analytical distinction between the two ‘normative 
premises’ regarding ‘state intervention’ underpinning the governance phenomenon – namely (1) the 
more ‘social-democratic-statist’ perspective focused on the ‘intelligent extension’ of the state through 
finding ways of actively ‘unburdening’ it and (2) the more ‘market-liberal’ perspective focused on the 
more genuine ‘substitution of the state as the designer and guarantor of social order’ – can arguably be 
reinterpreted as also representing an overall historical separation between the 1980s and the post-1990s 
period (which of course nevertheless partly temporally overlap, particularly at the ideational level).  
In the end, as should be evident, both the Chicago school and the Ordoliberal programs are 
mainly ideological fantasies, selectively implemented particularistic visions.207 More generally, specific 
ideological, regional/national and temporal distinctions notwithstanding, the substantial overall political 
sociological and politico-economic developments of the post-1980s should be construed as being not 
only both deeply, historically, continually and increasingly state-facilitated but, specifically, anchored 
around the ISI of the state and the historically changing dynamics of legitimatory and fiscal state-
crafting.  
 
Summing up, this chapter has served as a brief reflection on the generalized bewilderment of the 
1970s and more generally an analytical orientation-facilitating prelude to the subsequent chapters also 
treating the reconfiguration process. Firstly, two overall types of steering/governing-situated 
bewilderments where discussed – a short-lived end-oriented bewilderment and an apparently 
perennially activated means-oriented one. Secondly, a short critical reflection on the illustrative shift 
from the Carter-associated bewilderment of the 1970s to the inflated Reagan-associated firmness of the 
1980s was provided. Thirdly, and lastly, some of the key empirical trends of the 1980s were surveyed 
and the analytical status of the so-called ‘neoliberal’ 1980s was discussed. Informed by this short and 
analytically selective prelude on the 1970s/1980s, the next chapter shall proceed to analyze – in greater 
depth and looking at multiple domains – key dynamics of the shift towards (what shall be described as) 
a more co-productive hybrid tension-displacing order of the post-1990s, focusing specifically on its 
                                                          
207 Although if one was forced to choose, the Ordoliberal agenda would probably most accurately approximate 
real life dynamics (for an argument implicitly along this line, see, e.g., Bonefeld 2013).  
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connection to the reconfigured dynamics of the tension-filled functional relationship between 
legitimation and fiscal accumulation.   
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Chapter 9. The Post-1990s: Towards a Co-Productive Hybrid Tension-
Displacing Order 
 
In this and the next two chapters looking at the post-1990s period, I shall examine and discuss a number 
of ways in which the tension-filled functional relationship between legitimation and fiscal accumulation 
have been reconfigured; more specifically, emphasis is put on the different ways in which the tension-
management strategies and concrete practices of Western European polities have reconfigured in 
relation to the changing status of the relationship between legitimation and fiscal accumulation – a 
development notably associated with the dynamics of the described GA period, which consolidated a 
certain growth-oriented and consumption-optimizing agenda and a generalized inner-normatively 
identifying consumer-citizen.  
As I shall argue, the post-1990s period put another governance-related twist on this form of 
subjectivity: the turn to governance is representative of a particular ‘co-producing’ consumer-
citizenship, which can both be perceived as an intensification of the GA form and as implying a more 
substantive reconfiguration. Co-production – an, as discussed earlier, essential and increasingly salient 
feature of the governance perspective – transcends the political-institutional domain; it also 
symptomizes the commercial arena, explicitly or indirectly appearing as a constitutive element of 
everything from marketing to basic commodity production. As shall be discussed, in the specific 
context of this study co-production presupposes and analytically encapsulates a reconfigured dynamic 
of particularly post-1990s state-crafting: a reconfigured status of political legitimation, a reconfigured 
mode of fiscal accumulation and, symptomatically integrating these two, the generalized appearance of 
what can be described as reconfigured hybrid tension-displacing formations.  
Firstly, as particularly chapter 11 shall look more formally into, the long-term intergenerational 
change in value priorities constitutive of the GA period – which consolidated a popular socio-
psychological expectation of ever-widening economic growth and consumption prospects and thus 
tweaked behavioral and normative patterns in an overall status quo-maintaining and fiscally functional 
direction –  has implied, especially in its more recent intensified form, a relative historical shift in the 
prevailing mode of post-1970s political legitimation (and particularly state legitimation).  
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Secondly, a great deal of state fiscal activity in the post-1970s period consists in functionally 
encouraging, and facilitating and maintaining the various conditions for optimizing, an overall national 
consumption-situated economic growth agenda – an overall agenda that both, as argued, indirectly and 
over the long-term helps tweak the prevailing value priorities in a certain direction and, contrary to 
what might be the instinctive expectation, effectively implies extensive state involvement in a 
principally endless number of societal dynamics. Importantly, this form of fiscal state-crafting of the 
post-1970s, and particularly post-1990s, is not only faced with the perennially intrinsic incapacity to 
directly govern functionally-optimized values and behavior (as addressed in chapter 5) or the increased 
demands with regards to the sophistication of the specific modality of fiscal state-crafting stemming 
from the more recent intensified dynamics of the specifically co-producing form of consumer-
citizenship. Fiscal state-crafting in the co-productive post-1990s period is also faced with, or inherits, 
the tension-filled dynamics and tendencies integral to the consumption-situated economic growth 
agenda itself: notably, as addressed earlier in relation to the frustration in affluence argument, the 
systematic production of frustration associated with growth-led state-crafting. Although this process 
always principally contains the possibility of re-politicization, of a return to ‘responsibility’ of a certain 
systemic kind, this is, for numerous reasons elaborated on earlier and to be discussed later, increasingly 
less likely; rather, as shall be seen, the systematic state-facilitated maintenance of a consumption-
situated economic growth agenda not only serves to further organically intensify a non-systemic, 
idiosyncratic and overall ‘privatized’ form of political legitimation; this fiscal-functionally optimizing 
process’ production of frustration is tendentially associated with a set of destabilizing dynamics such as 
rudeness, crime, ignorance, lowered trust, gossip, etc., (the list is potentially endless) – a set of 
dynamics that, as shall be seen, in particular comes back to haunt the bottom-up dynamics of party 
politics.  
Typically, as value priorities have become tied to a certain GA anchored level of economic 
growth, ‘crisis management’ to a large extent translates into growth management. But, in a situation of 
non-GA growth rates, from the ISI of the state, crisis management increasingly becomes a question of 
expectations and claim-makings management. Specifically, as shall be discussed, co-production, 
construed critically in this way, inter alia entails a displacement onto citizens, notably implying a co-
production of economic growth.  
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Thirdly, co-production implies the proliferation of hybrid and supposedly tension-overcoming 
narratives and structures (which simultaneously symptomatizes both the reconfigured status of political 
legitimation and mode of fiscal accumulation). Obviously, the hesitation implied by the word 
supposedly connects to the larger question of the reconfiguring versus overcoming character of the 
overall post-1970s development, which shall be both explicitly and implicitly touched upon in this and 
particularly the next two chapters. This chapter, in particular, examines the appearance and 
development of the reconfigured nationally cross-cutting co-productive hybrid tension-displacing order 
of the post-1990s. As shall be seen below, this order, and its various discursive and institutional-
organizational formations, operate and are visible at different overlapping levels of analysis and in 
different analytically selected causally cross-cutting domains. Importantly, these various hybrid co-
productive formations are both symptomatic representations of the overall reconfigured mode of state-
crafting of the post-1990s and causally active tension-displacing strategic exercises associated with this. 
While the focus of this chapter is clearly on the 1990s, the examination also sometimes goes back to the 
1970s and 1980s and (more frequently) extends into the 2000s (which shall be treated in more details in 
the next chapter).  
The chapter is split into four main sections, each one analyzing the shift towards a co-productive 
hybrid tension-displacing order from within different domains. Firstly, it examines the dynamics of co-
productive consumption. Secondly, it discusses and problematizes the co-productive dynamics of 
governance. Thirdly, shifting gear and domain, it provides a relatively extensive account of the unequal 
intermingling of state and party in the post-1990s period. Fourthly, and lastly, it provides an empirically 
anchored analysis of some of the key post-1990s fiscal sociological reconfigurations.  
    
 
9.1 Co-productive consumption 
In OECD polities, consumption constitutes the most essential component of aggregate demand and thus 
economic growth; since circa 1945 the average share of consumption expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP has been above 50 percent (OECD 2013: 40-3; World Bank 2016c).208 Importantly, this essential 
                                                          
208 As usual, the US (and the UK) case stands out with a ‘household final consumption expenditure’ (as a 
percentage of GDP) around 68% (and 64% for the UK) in 2008 (World Bank 2016c). 
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position of consumption can be perceived as both a driver and a symptom of the co-producing nature of 
post-1970s fiscal state-crafting. On the one hand, it entails that governmental activity, as part of 
maintaining a growth-oriented and consumption-optimizing agenda, comes to put a relatively high 
premium on measuring, facilitating, mobilizing and adapting to the prevailing socio-psychological 
value priorities and behavioral patterns of the consumer-citizens.209 Naturally, although the relative 
shift is sometimes exaggerated, the Western European-wide turn to the ‘service economy’ witnessed 
since the late 1960s/early 1970s (for data on this, see Crafts & Toniolo 2010: 316-317) – besides being 
representative of, inter alia, some of the changing sociological dynamics of work – also helped trigger 
or reinforce the new governmental recognition that economic growth increasingly had to be 
institutionally-organizationally activated through a more mobilization-control-oriented strategy, that is, 
through the facilitation and mobilization of more elusive, soft and socio-psychologically complex 
channels and variables.  
On the other hand, it is symptomatic of the relative shift witnessed since the post-1945s, and 
particularly the post-1970s period, from a production orientation to a consumption preoccupation (for 
particular diagnoses of this, see, e.g., Bauman 2000; Sennett 2006; Streeck 2012a). As Bauman (2000: 
76) for example points out, although slightly exaggerating the turn away from production, work, etc., 
the contemporary period ‘engages its members primarily in their capacity as consumers rather than 
producers’. Despite this process being continuously underpinned by an underlying mass production 
logic, new engineering and production methods/organizational forms broadly associated with a newly 
articulated model of ‘flexible specialization’ (Piore & Sabel 1984) – alongside a mutually correlated 
ever-increasingly intensified significance of so-called ‘planned obsolescence’, subcultural dynamics 
and market segmentation practices – allowed for a supposedly more smooth, accurate and dynamically 
evolving correspondence between the form of the product being produced/sold and the supposedly 
intangible identity, preferences, etc., of the individual consumer-citizen (e.g., Sennett 2006; see also 
Streeck 2012a).  
                                                          
209 As Schwarzkopf (2010: 8, 9) outlines, already in the 1940s, in the overall context of the rising ‘scientification 
of market research tools’, the ’Consumer Sentiment Index’ was developed in order to ‘give a more accurate 
indication of the future course of the national economy than could be gauged from producers’ expressed intention 
to invest in production capacity’.  
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Whether or not this process actually implies a an understanding of the individual as a ‘consumer 
sovereign’ (for a particular critical understanding of this concept, see Schwarzkopf 2011), it is 
structurally supportive of a type of commercial dynamic – increasingly salient of the post-1990s period 
– that seeks to optimize and discursively awaken individualized participation, involvement, 
responsibility, etc., i.e. co-productive consumer-citizen activity. This is of course particularly visible in 
contemporary companies’ marketing/advertising practices, which, for example, sometimes, as Sennett 
(2006: 148-9) discusses drawing on Ervin Goffman, present ads with ‘half-finished frames’ that ‘invite 
the consumer to participate by filling in the picture’. In this form of ‘imaginative participation’, which 
arguably drafts the individual for ‘the process of magnifying differences’, the ‘consumer is engaged by 
his or her own mobility and imagination’ (Ibid.: 150, 148, 149). The ideal-typical Mad Men-like 
paternalistic and essentially clumsy logic of GA advertising has thus transformed in the post-1990s into 
a more sophisticated marketing dynamic increasingly revolving around cooperation and involvement 
and, as Harvie Ferguson (as cited in Bauman 2000: 75) puts it, a ‘liberation of wishful fantasies’.210 In 
sum, from particularly the 1990s it seems evident that consumer-citizen ‘co-producership’ has 
increasingly become an essential ingredient of both the profit-engulfed considerations of private 
economic corporations and the growth-oriented dynamics of fiscal state-crafting.   
 
 
                                                          
210 Potent concrete cases of this can of course easily be anecdotally provided. For example, the internet-driven 
company Amazon tracks and utilizes information provided by potential customers when, as they write on their 
homepage, ‘you search, buy, post, participate in a contest or questionnaire, or communicate with customer 
service’ as a way of inter alia purportedly ‘customizing future shopping for you, improving our stores’, etc. (see 
Amazon Privacy Notice n.d.). Another more explicit manifestation would be the increasingly diffused ‘self-
service’ practices of (particularly) retail corporations. See also for, example, the industry report by Cognizant 
(2012), which advises companies to, and provides strategic indications of how best to, ’involve’ their customers 
and their ‘external resources’ more generally, or Nike’s online participatory shoe campaign NIKEiD (see NIKEiD 
n.d.).   
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9.2 Co-productive governance  
As also mentioned earlier, the mainstream governance literature has integrated and indirectly provided 
its own conception and advocacy of the proliferation of co-production. This dimension, which operates 
at both an explicit and implicit level, seems particularly salient in the case of some the contributions of 
the 2000s within especially political science and comparative politics, which generally focuses less on 
privatization and New Public Management (NPM), etc., and more on private-public partnerships and 
‘New Public Governance’ (NPG) (on NPG, see, e.g., Osborne 2006). Thus, throughout the 1990s and 
2000s a supposedly more ‘democratic’, ‘collaborative’ or ‘participatory’ governance appears (e.g., 
Imperial 2005; Ansell & Gash 2008; Sørensen & Torfing 2011). Ansell & Gash (2008: 544) define 
‘collaborative governance’ as a ‘governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly 
engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-
oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs 
or assets’. Importantly, this form of ‘collaborative governance’ – which, according to the characteristic 
governance perspective of Ansell & Gash’s (2008: 544), not only ‘emerged as a response to the failures 
of downstream implementation and to the high cost and politicization of regulation’ but also ‘as an 
alternative to the adversarialism of interest group pluralism’ – overwhelmingly emphasizes the 
particularly means-oriented usefulness in relation to the governance of citizen- or user-based ‘dialogue’, 
‘consensus’, ‘collaboration’, ‘trust’, etc.  
This trend, which in many instances is welcomed by governance scholars, is of course premised 
on two key constitutive elements that are widely shared across the governance perspective. Firstly, the 
overall understanding of a fragmented and pluralistic ‘polycentric state characterized by multiple 
centres’ (Rhodes 1996: 657). Secondly, a general organizational pragmatism/instrumentalism – which, 
although operating on another political-normative level, to some extent resembles the largely 
underemphasized ontological/epistemic pragmatism of much neo-positivist thinking (e.g., Friedman 
1966) or the basic causal-functionalist logic of ‘functional equivalence’ particularly salient within 
large-scale emergent corporate entities  – with regards to whatever entity performs the relevant 
governing activity: companies, networks, NGO’s, PPPs, citizens, etc. As Rhodes (1996: 658) for 
example argues, a meaningful component of governance may inter alia be the condition that ‘services 
[are] provided by any permutation of government and the private and voluntary sectors’. In sum, co-
production (broadly construed) appears as a constitutive element of the governance literature; in the 
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context of a widespread post-GA economic growth-oriented means-bewilderment, co-production 
presents itself as part of an overall universe of largely functionally equivalent forms of governing.  
Clearly, this academically-situated focus on less hierarchical and dialogical forms of 
‘participatory governance’ should be placed in the wider context of a systematically intensified 
production and proliferation of hybrid co-production-like and supposedly tension-overcoming 
discourses within the political-institutional and social-scientific arenas (see also more generally e.g., 
Chouliarki & Fairclough 1999; Boltanski & Chiapello 2005; Thorup 2015: 308). Examples of such 
hybrid tension-displacing discursive formations would be (varyingly institutionally formalized) terms 
such as ‘flexicurity’ ‘co-steering’, ‘green growth’, ‘human capital’, and so on. Each of such 
hybridizations – whose individual material-discursive history of course would need to be examined in 
separate studies in order to be exhaustively grasped – include within themselves their own optimistic 
logic and attempted form of tension-displacement.211 Naturally, the Tony Blair-led New Labour version 
of The Third Way represents an extreme example of this overall trend towards tension-displacing 
discursive hybridizations within the political-institutional arena. As notably analyzed by Norman 
Fairclough (e.g., 2000: 181, 185) looking at speeches, Green papers, etc. (in the context of his larger 
program of Critical Discourse Analysis), New Labour frequently presented so-called ‘but also’ or ‘x but 
also y’ combinations: for example, ‘from welfare to work’ or ‘we benefit but we pay’ or statements 
such as ‘reciprocal duties between government and the individual’ or ‘we keep a welfare state from 
which we all benefit, but on terms which are fair and clear’.  
Arguably, as a wider development in which the academic governance turn should be placed, one 
can observe a correlated overall trend within the social-scientific sphere. Two overall elements seem 
particularly salient here. Firstly, academically-situated critical social theory – and ‘critique’ more 
generally construed – have to some extent been strategically ‘hijacked’ by management/organizational 
textbooks, public administrations, consultancy firms/experts, etc. (e.g., Thrift 1997; Boltanski & 
Chiapello 2005; Willig 2009). Although not a perfect one, Pierre Bourdieu’s critical sociological work 
provides one loose illustration: his well-known work on capital forms has, for example, been extended 
                                                          
211 Arguably, a notable distinction can be made within this overall group of optimistic discursive formations 
between those that implicitly or explicitly either (1) reject the existence or importance of a tension-filled 
relationship between the relevant components/entities and/or (2) posit the productive or synergistic relationship 
between these.   
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via Catherine Hakim’s (2010) conceptual introduction and overall normative embracement of ‘erotic 
capital’ and his ‘social space’ theorization has been selectively taken up by neo-positivist segmentation-
focused scholarship/analysts.212    
Secondly, the need for selectively ‘hijacking’ elements of critical social science/theory decreases 
as formally politically dispassionate utilizability increasingly becomes a constitutive component of 
more contemporary social scientific work itself. For example, from particularly the 1990s and 2000s 
one can observe an intensified focus on networks and network-like processes – a generalized 
preoccupation that goes beyond the governance perspective’s specific stress on ‘networks’ (particularly 
of the ‘self-governing’ kind) or, for example, Bruno Latour’s contribution to Actor-Network Theory, 
etc.213 Such perspectives tend to shift attention away from tension-filled class-situated relationships and 
dominating organizational structures and instead put ontological primacy on the network and its internal 
processual dynamics. Importantly, from the ISI of the individual corporate actor, the generalized 
network perspective brings an almost endless list of utilization opportunities to the table: as functionally 
equivalent entities, networks can be used for anything (to fire, hire, sell, relocate, manage, etc.) or by 
anyone (the HR personnel, the CEO, the marketing department, the administration, etc.).  
Basically, the presupposition of a supposed genuine tension-overcoming that implicitly underpins 
consumer-citizen co-producership stands in opposition to the overall analytical perspective of this study 
focusing on the state-situated tension-filled functional relationship between legitimation and 
accumulation. Co-production is, to put it simply, a problematic notion. Arguably, some of the problems 
concerning both the notion and practice of co-production seem to be associated with a more general 
problematic trait of the governance concept, namely, as Offe (2009: 551) diagnoses it, its tendency 
towards an ‘ideological, premature and undifferentiating harmonization’. As Offe (2009: 551, emphasis 
in original) points out, the governance concept ‘lacks a clear opposite’: emphasizing ‘power to’ rather 
than ‘power over’, much of the mainstream governance literature ‘logically and politically can do 
without opposition’ since ideally speaking ‘all relevant actors are included in cooperative networks’. 
                                                          
212 For example, one study by Blasius & Mühlichen (2009: 87), which empirically draws on and tests Bourdieu’s 
‘social space’ perspective as a way of examining ‘audience segments’, points out that an advantage of ‘the 
lifestyle typology introduced in the present work is its practical use in the advertising field’.  
213 For Latour’s amusing but problematic rejection of (some corners of) critical social science, see Latour (2004).  
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Some of the following additional problematic aspects concerning hybridized co-production 
arrangements could briefly be mentioned. (1) The network focus obviously problematically sidesteps, 
for example, the historically constituted monopoly processes underpinning modern statehood (as 
discussed in chapter 5).214 (2) Following Offe’s (2009: 555-6, 559) earlier mentioned distinction, co-
production activity may be perceived as part of an ‘intelligent extension’ of the state (i.e., an extension 
through ‘unburdening’). More generally, as argued in chapter 5, the attribution mechanism integral to 
corporate-institutional actors, and in particular modern states, allows for authorized state-facilitated 
processes of delegation, attribution, dispersion, distribution, etc., that can still maintain and in many 
instances even enhance the state’s monopoly status. (3) With regards to specifically the UK case, the 
key governance presuppositions explicitly launched by R.A.W. Rhodes (1996: 657) of a fragmentation 
and crumbling of the center/state/government and the diffusion and relatively strengthening of ‘self- 
and co-regulation’, overlooks the continuing and perhaps increasingly centralizing qualities and 
coordination- savviness of the ‘core executive’ (on this argument, see Taylor 2000; Holliday 2000; 
Marinetto 2003). (4) The notion of ‘consumer sovereignty’ is underpinned by a battery of problematic 
assumptions (e.g., Schwartzkopf 2011: 119-124). (5) discourses advocating hybrid tension-displacing 
forms of co-producership are arguably implicitly underpinned by problematic and generally 
overdramatized sociological premises – such as those articulated by Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens 
– concerning the supposed contemporary erosion/insignificance of ‘class’ and class study (for a critique 
of such ‘death of class’ perspectives, see Atkinson 2007a, 20007b).  
Overall, as interpreted within this study, hybridized co-production-based formations should be 
construed in the context of overall tension-displacing activity – they appears as part of a, using Offe’s 
(1984: 168) formulation, ‘constant search for non-political forms of decision-making’. Thus, rather than 
necessarily implying increased ‘participation’ they more generally involve increased responsibility on 
the part of the consumer-citizens. Moreover, increased participation and engagement, etc., typically 
either effectively implies increased consumption choices or, as I shall discuss in the next section, 
increasingly concerns itself with largely immaterial issues and areas of life (gossip, absurdities, elite 
lifestyle, celebrities, scandals, local cultural-ethnic specificities, personalities, media events, strategy, 
and so forth). As shall be seen below, situations of increased bottom-up driven modes of ‘participation’ 
                                                          
214 Although it has many redeeming qualities, a similar overall argument could be made against the so-called neo-
Foucauldian governmentality perspective (as also briefly touched upon earlier).   
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neither rules out simultaneous trends of state-crafting-underpinned top-down dominance nor 
presuppose a specific quality of ‘voice’: the specific content and status of the bottom-up driven mode of 
party politics depends on both the historically specific quality and direction of the prevailing value 
priorities and the interlinked relationship between the structural dynamics of state-crafting and the 
meso-level properties of the party political system (as well as the specific intermingling of these two 
levels). Thus, as shall be (perhaps a bit provocatively) argued, the specific form of ‘participatory’ 
bottom-up driven pressure of the post-1990s period has not necessarily been progressive; rather, if 
anything, it has in some ways come to haunt party politics.  
 
 
9.3 The post-1990s unequal intermingling of state and party 
It makes sense to, so to speak, transfer the above examination of the proliferation of hybrid and 
supposedly tension-overcoming narratives and structures to the party political level, to both see how 
these dynamics play out in this arena and to look into some of the mechanisms conditioning this 
process. As mentioned earlier, Kirchheimer was able to grasp and foresee many of the dynamics 
associated with Katz & Mair’s (1995) notion of the post-1970/1990s ‘cartel-party’ already in the 1950s 
(through, for example, his notion of a ‘state-party cartel’) (on this, see also Krouwel 2003: 24). As 
argued, this of course corroborates the point made about the highly governance-consolidating/preparing 
setup of the GA period: the governance turn should be construed as a reconfigured intensification of 
consolidated GA dynamics in an overall co-productive context. 
Considering developments at the party political level provides another way to examine key 
elements of the turn to governance, in particular the dynamics of a heightened governing fetishism and 
the state-facilitated and policy-selective logic of political-institutional displacement. As for the latter 
element, the governance phenomenon can in the context of this party political section inter alia be 
construed as the second of two overall state-facilitated political-institutional displacements – the first 
one, as discussed earlier, from state to (party) government – namely from parties to civil society or 
profit-maximizing corporate actors (i.e., from government to governance). Thus, examining the 
governance-situated co-producership of the 1990s at the party political level allows for a better 
understanding of both how legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting dynamics (through, for example, both 
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the functional encouragement and facilitation/maintenance of the conditions for optimizing the growth 
agenda) underpins governance and how governance also effectively reenergizes and further sediments 
state legitimacy. Moreover, it allows for a meaningful analytical understanding of the peculiar 
coexistence of two of the core governance trends, namely the alleged dissipation of governmental 
authority and the societal dominance of particularly fiscally functional forms of governing.   
In the post-1970s period – and in particular from the 1990s as so-called Third Way parties entered 
into office all across Western Europe – the so-called ‘cartel party’ model (Katz & Mair 1995) 
increasingly started to formally dominate the party political scene. Notably, this party form implies: 
 An increasingly ‘self-referential’ and professionalized form of party politics (Ibid.: 19). 
 That parties have become increasingly simultaneously (1) unfastened from civil society 
dynamics and (2) merged with the state (Ibid.: passim; see also more generally Mair 2013).  
 A shift from a heightened ‘catch-all’ type of inter-party competition to a form of ‘inter-party 
collusion’, in which competition is either engaged with by the colluding parties ‘in the 
knowledge that they share with their competitors a mutual interest in collective organizational 
survival’ or outright positively discouraged/downplayed (Katz & Mair 1995: 19-20). Moreover, 
and more specifically, when parties actually compete, inter-party competition increasingly 
‘takes place on the basis of competing claims to efficient and effective management’ (Ibid.: 19).   
 A weakened party political emphasis on ‘voice’ and an increased stress on ‘order’ (Mair 2013: 
97); or, put differently, a downgrading of ‘responsiveness’ and an upgrading of ‘responsibility’ 
(in the ordinary non-LAF sense) (Mair 2009).    
 
Empirically speaking, as Mair (2013: chapter 1) also showcase, the bleak diagnosis of 
representative democracy that underpins the cartel thesis seems generally well supported, with the first 
symptoms of a nationally cross-cutting dissatisfaction with an increasingly fragmented, exhausted and 
debilitated party political system appearing already from the late 1960s.215 For example:  
 Although not an entirely ‘unidirectional’ trend, electoral turnout has generally fallen 
across Western democracies since the 1970s and particularly the 1990s (Mair 2013: 22-
29). Firstly, ‘record lows now come with greater frequency, and in a greater number of 
                                                          
215 That said, the mainstream neo-positivist data gathered to measure such things is unfortunately many times non-
exhaustive, too static or unable to genuinely measure the relevant properties.   
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polities’ (Ibid.: 27). Secondly, voter apathy is connected to levels of income inequality 
(which, as is now well-known, has generally risen in the last couple of decades): ‘the 
more unequal a country is, the higher it rises’ (Schäfer 2012: 24).216 Parallel to this voter 
turnout trend has been an increase in ‘unconventional participation’ – a form of 
participation ‘that is heavily biased to the detriment of the resource-poor’ (Ibid.: 33).  
 Electoral volatility has risen, particularly from the 1990s (Mair 2013: 29-34). As 
Drummond (2006: 629) also finds, looking at the period of 1970-1995, ‘[m]ean measures 
of volatility, elasticity and variability of party support are on the rise in the overwhelming 
majority of countries’. 
 Party membership levels have fallen markedly: on average, across the 19 European 
democracies surveyed by van Biezen et al. (2012: 33), ‘[party] membership levels in 
terms of absolute numbers have been nearly halved since 1980’.  
 Similarly, trade union density rates have gone down since the 1970s (Visser 2006; van 
Biezen & Poguntke 2014: 210-11): as van Biezen & Poguntke (2014: 210) finds, ‘trade 
union membership has undergone a similar decline to that of party membership in the vast 
majority of countries’.  
 Partisanship or socio-psychological party identification has declined markedly throughout 
the last three-four decades (Mair 2013: 35-7). 
 The substantive meaning of particularly left-wingness has been considerably reconfigured 
over time. For example, as also mentioned earlier, Mudge’s (2011) manifesto-based 
examination of mainstream ‘center’ parties across the OECD since 1945 reveals a 
generalized particularly post-1970s trend of parties increasingly ‘neoliberalizing’ their 
political agendas.217 
 
                                                          
216 A similar class-bias holds for satisfaction with ‘the functioning of democracy’ and trust in ‘parliaments and in 
politicians’, which both lowers (increases) as income lowers (increases) (Schäfer 2012: 38).  
217 For an updated description of the relevant ’Manifesto Corpus’ and the availability of this data, see Merz et al. 
(2016). On the British case in details, see for example Hakhverdian (2009). On the Danish case, see for example 
Klemmensen et al. (2007). 
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With regards to this study, what is crucial about Katz & Mair’s (1995: 17, 6) notion of the ‘cartel 
party’ is the observation concerning an increasing ‘interpenetration of party and state’ or an ‘ever closer 
symbiosis’ between the two. Importantly, despite pointing to the increased ‘anchoring of parties within 
the state’ – or presenting statements hinting that parties have become ‘agents of the state’, etc. – Katz & 
Mair (Ibid.: 15, 5, 16, 25) arguably generally operate with an undertheorized conception of both the 
state-level and the proper status of the state-party relationship: their perspective is either ambiguous 
about this relationship or, more often, explicitly insinuate that the state is ‘invaded by the parties’, 
which are perennially craving funds/resources/aids, institutional/regulatory infrastructure, etc., and that 
the position of parties ‘has strengthened’. Arguably, as I shall argue further below, this understanding 
both downplays the extent to which state-crafting dynamics increasingly has taken primacy and the 
specific tendentially unequal dynamics of the relationship between the state level and the party level. In 
this relation, at least implicitly/indirectly, Kirchheimer’s (e.g., 1957) early notion of ‘state–party cartel’ 
– which not only prefigured many of the trends associated with the ‘cartel party’ but also stressed how 
the fact that parties would become ‘amalgamated with the state’ implied a transformation of politics 
into ‘state management’ and ‘a rationalisation of [parties’] structures and procedures’ (Krouwel 2003: 
31, 34; see also Krouwel 2006: 258-9) – seems to do a better job at unpacking the status of the state-
party nexus of the post-1970s/1990s period. Importantly, in light of both the overall state-situated 
approach of this study and the question of the proliferation of hybrid bottom-up driven or co-productive 
tension-displacing formations of this chapter, Kirchheimer’s and Katz & Mair’s cartel process can be 
productively specified and analytically tweaked in the following manner.  
The development initiated with the appearance of catch-allism and in particular the cartel party 
implies what may be described as an interrelated two-legged division of political domination. On the 
one hand, this entails an observable intensification of a bottom-up driven consumption-situated 
symbolic media-fetishizing agenda, implying a strengthening of the party-strategic leg – a trend 
arguably associated with what Edelman (e.g., 1985), as part of his general analysis of the symbolic and 
strategic use of language, has referred to as the ‘political spectacle’ (on the symbolic dynamics of 
contemporary politics, see also, e.g., Sennett 2006; Streeck 2012a).218 In the contemporary party 
                                                          
218 Interestingly, Kirchheimer spoke early on of the increasing ‘symbolic participation of the mass of the people in 
the political process’ (as cited in Krouwel 2003: 32).  
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political context one can unproblematically casually point to some of the following anecdotal properties 
underpinning this party political symbolic/surface-level intensification:219 
 An excessive self-referencing meta-reflexive infatuation with the strategic or ‘process-
based’ aspects of party organization and inter-party competition.  
 An increasing ‘personalization’ of politics in the form of a disproportional attention being 
put on assessing the leadership qualities as well as the intricate biographical details of 
MPs.  
 A marked increase in the media personnel operating inside the party organization (in the 
form of so-called ‘Spin Doctors’ or public relations staff, opinion pollsters, etc.).  
 An increase in particularly quantitative political science scholarship, which focuses on 
‘voting behaviour’ and provides statistically representative survey information to political 
parties and state personnel about the so-called ‘public opinion’.   
 An increasing attention to and permanency of party campaigning (the ‘permanent 
campaign’) along with a constantly growing amount of financial resources being used for 
this purpose.  
 
On the other hand, the two-legged division of political domination entails an observable 
intensification of a top-down driven fiscally functional state-crafting agenda, implying a strengthening 
of the state-administrative leg. Specifically, this trend involves an increased subjection of particularly 
ruling governments and politically-appointed ministers to a largely ‘path dependent’ budgetary-
concerned state-crafting logic, entailing a heightened governing fetishism and the relative dominance of 
                                                          
219 It seems reasonable to link this intensified production of largely immaterial strategic dynamics and discourses 
to the earlier addressed state-facilitated societal corporatization. Corporate actors systematically produce and 
disseminate, in a usually perfectly routinized (i.e., nine to five-like) manner, what may be described as 
professionalized tension-displacing rhetoric; agents/members within specific corporations – often operating in the 
context of larger (e.g., marketing/administrative) units – are often contractually inclined to engage in the (from the 
perspective of the average ‘natural person’) above-average production of strategic forms of communication 
optimizing the ISI of the specific entity. Naturally, states and large profit-making corporations are at the forefront 
of this process.  
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fiscally functional governance.220 As Rose (1990: 263) arguably indirectly/implicitly and more 
generally described the dynamics of this state-administrative leg: ‘the legacy that [politicians] inherit is 
carried forward by institutional commitments grounded in laws, organizations and budgets that are 
more important than the preferences of individuals’. 
Importantly, as is evident, this two-legged division of political domination, which underpins the 
intermingling of state and party, is highly asymmetrical: whereas the party-strategic leg tends to 
dominate largely immaterial issues and areas of life, the state-administrative leg tends to dominate non-
trivial core, for example, legal and political-economic questions. Interestingly, the very simultaneity of 
the above two trends not only serves as a source of confusion within the more mainstream and 
empirically-oriented party political literature regarding how to properly diagnose recent developments 
(since the tendencies seemingly point in different directions) but also indicates that they are in fact 
emergently connected. In this relation, Peter Mair’s above mentioned argument concerning the shift 
from the ‘responsive’ to the ‘responsible’ party may be productively specified/unpacked in the 
following manner: parties (particularly those in office) are unresponsive (and responsible) with regards 
to the non-trivial administration of the state, but highly responsive (and less responsible) with regards to 
the immaterial strategic and symbolic aspects of party politics. This dynamic can also be described in a 
different manner: ‘responsible’ non-trivial steering goes up alongside an increase in ‘responsive’ 
immaterial dynamics.  
This two-legged division of political domination involves an additional element. The 
development of an increasingly self-referencing and self-serving meso-level of party politics, with inter 
alia its particular form-oriented dynamics of electoral cycles and campaigning, etc., introduces, at 
historically varying degrees, a ‘foreign’ quality into state-crafting and its functional servicing of 
legitimation and accumulation. Thus, as party politics becomes increasingly emergent, the 
intermingling of state and party, the ‘state-party cartel’, remains not only unequal but also an always 
already unfinished symbiosis. However the above dialectical relationship and dynamics are described, 
                                                          
220 Of course, historically constituted national differences in bureaucratic traditions – for example, the relative 
replacement rates of public officials and the administrative personnel – may tweak this process in certain 
directions. For 2010 OECD-wide descriptive data on the ‘level of politically influenced turnover’ in relation to ‘a 
change in government’, see OECD (2011b: 94-5).  
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we are witnessing a substantive weakening of, in Offe’s (1984: 167) terms, the institutionalized 
‘articulation of conflict’.  
The party political trends of the post-1990s period, characterized by an unequal intermingling of 
state and party, is representative of both the spread of co-productive tension-displacing hybridizations 
and a pragmatic (functionally equivalent) and heightened governing fetishism (both of which are key 
elements of the governance turn); from the ISI of the state, it signals that the specific mode of state-
crafting – whether explicitly and directly state-facilitated, public or private, or whether working through 
parties or interest groups, private economic actors, citizens, etc. – is less relevant than whether 
resources are being mobilized and tweaked in an overall fiscally functional direction. Overall, the 
development taking place in the post-1990s period at the party political level signals an effective 
intensification of top-down driven fiscal state-crafting considerations. While this development has 
taken place amidst a seemingly bottom-up driven co-productive turn, the bottom-up dynamic 
camouflages the fact that it has been underpinned by an intensification of a largely immaterial party-
strategic leg, implying an overall ‘co-produced’ form of political legitimation (to be discussed later) and 
production of frustration stemming from a reconfigured intensification of the state-facilitated 
maintenance of a fiscal functionally optimizing agenda. Co-production, in this sense, effectively 
remains a policy-selective top-down driven affair. That said, despite the described two-legged division 
of political domination, the increasingly emergent quality of the party-strategic leg still prevents a full 
state-party symbiosis: the absurd dimensions of bottom-up driven co-producership occasionally comes 
to unnerve bureaucratic political-institutional dynamics in idiosyncratic and unexpected ways.  
 
 
9.4 Fiscal sociological reconfigurations  
This last section seeks to play out the post-1990s issue of hybrid co-productive tension-displacing 
formations in yet another arena (whose dynamics are also simultaneously considered drivers and 
symptoms of this development), namely that of fiscal sociology. In this relation, the main intention is to 
briefly, and obviously non-exhaustively, analytically consider – drawing on the general fiscal 
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sociological terminology presented by James O’Connor (1973) – some selected properties of the overall 
shared fiscal (and more broadly political economic) experience of the post-1990s period.221  
As argued earlier, after WW2 the nationally constituted formalization of a proper ‘public 
household’ takes place inter alia involving both (1) the twin invention/activation of national systems of 
accounts/the GDP measure and the macroeconomy, (2) a general sharpening of the budgetary-situated 
organizational solipsism and fiscal lens of the state and (3) the societal and institutional-organizational 
development and later formal anchoring of nationally specific ‘growth models’. In this overall post-
WW2 fiscal context, in O’Connor’s (1973: 6-7, passim) budgetary-oriented scheme, as elaborated upon 
earlier, the two functional requirements of capitalist statehood appeared as a fiscally-situated 
requirement to simultaneously service two types of overall expenditures, namely ‘social capital 
expenditures’ (mainly associated with the ‘accumulation’ function) and ‘social expenses’ (mainly 
associated with the ‘legitimation’ function). Although the two expenditure categories to some extent 
always already empirically overlapped, analytically speaking ‘social capital expenditures’ (which was 
split into two sub-dimensions, namely ‘social investment’ and ‘social consumption’) could roughly be 
construed as ‘expenditures required for profitable private accumulation’, whereas ‘social expenses’ 
could roughly be understood as various kinds of welfare-oriented ‘projects and services which are 
required to maintain social harmony’ (Ibid.). Importantly, as shall be argued towards the end of this 
section, the fiscally-situated development of the post-1990s period can be construed as implying a 
critical reconfiguration of this basic O’Connor-like fiscal sociological setup: it implies a tension-
displacing hybridization of the basic conceptual distinctions.  
 
 
9.4.1 Unpacking the key dynamics 
Against potential expectations, state expenditures – and particularly general government spending (as a 
% of GDP) – in Western European polities have generally not been scaled back during recent decades 
(OECD 2016c; Eurostat 2016; World Bank 2016a, 2016b; see also Lamartina & Zaghini 2011: 151). 
                                                          
221 Whenever relevant – for example depending on the data, argument, etc. – this also implies looking at the post-
1970s period more broadly.  
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Disaggregating this overall category, the same pattern can be observed with regards to, for example, 
social expenditures (OECD 2016i; Lindert 2004), health care expenditures (OECD 2016d, 2016e)222 or 
pension expenditures (OECD 2016h).  
This experience arguably indicates at least two things, both of which automatically and 
structurally go against construing governance as implying a ‘downsized’ state/government. Firstly, it 
indirectly corroborates the argument of the overall legitimation and accumulation approach concerning 
the private-property system’s tendential requirement of continuing expenditure-heavy fiscal support and 
regulatory maintenance, which, in O’Connor’s budgetary terms, and construed from within the tension-
filled fiscal-functional ISI of the state (as presented in this study), implies both accumulation-oriented 
social capital expenditures and (legitimation-oriented) social expenses. Secondly, when functionally 
disaggregating state expenditures across Western Europe it is clear that the ‘social protection’ category 
trumps all other types of spending (e.g., ‘education’, ‘defense’ etc.) – in fact, with the notable exception 
of the US, this is the case in all OECD polities (OECD 2015: 73).223 Arguably, this not only confirms 
the general analytical saliency of legitimatory state-crafting – notably implying a perennial and shared 
functional pressure towards the routinized activation and firm institutionalization of social expenses – it 
also signals the general, but of course highly historically variable, way in which ‘social protection’ 
additionally critically underpins (notably growth-oriented and consumption-optimizing) fiscal 
accumulation.224  
Of course, it makes sense to also ideally try to qualitatively unpack the dynamics of the fiscal 
non-downsizing trajectory, for example concerning the specific dynamics, logic, consequences, type 
and relative apportioning of expenditures, coverage, uncertainty, liability, etc. (see also more generally 
Hacker 2014). Also, as to some extent seems to be a standard (at least Keynesian-leaning) insight: 
because the maintenance of a growth-oriented and consumption-optimizing agenda (particularly of the 
                                                          
222 Of course, with regards to health care expenditure, the US markedly sticks out compared to Western Europe, 
showing a very large increase since the 1970s.   
223 Concerning the US: looking at 2013 numbers, the ‘social protection’ category is slightly exceeded, as the only 
one, by health care spending (OECD 2015: 73).   
224 As briefly mentioned earlier, although O’Connor actually acknowledges this, his framework generally 
underestimated the extent to which his two overall expenditure categories functionally overlapped: ‘social 
expenses’ not only ‘maintain or create the conditions for social harmony’ (O’Connor 1973: 6) but also (at least 
indirectly) usually stimulate or help maintain accumulation dynamics (see also Mosley 1979). 
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kind consolidated during the GA period) requires a systematic/regular expansion of expenditures and 
productive activities, a stagnating (or even only slightly increasing) level of spending or GDP may 
imply – or be experienced as – an effective relative dwindling. Moreover, besides the fact that the 
observed economic expansion of the post-1990s period was weaker than in the GA period it also seems 
to have been synthetically maintained by the cross-country expansion of monetary ‘stopgaps’ (Streeck 
2011) – notably public debt in the 1990s and, as shall be examined in the next chapter, household debt 
in the 2000s (Crouch 2009).  
It also seems relevant to take fiscal decision-making opportunities and taxation into consideration. 
Firstly, as Streeck & Mertens (2010: 3) argue looking at Germany and the US, there has been a decline 
in ‘fiscal flexibility’ – that is, a ‘shrinkage of democratic control over budget priorities’ over time. As 
Rose (1990: 264) more generally put it, ‘[p]ublic sector organizations institutionalize the legacy of past 
governments’. Secondly, the OECD-wide total tax revenue (as a % of GDP) seems to have peaked 
around the year 2000 (Brys et al. 2011: 8-10; see also Streeck 2014: 122).225 Disaggregating taxation 
trends across the OECD, a clear fall in both corporate tax rates and the top personal income tax rate can 
be observed (e.g., Loretz 2008: 641-4; see also Brys et al. 2011: 4-5), generally implying an increasing 
‘tax burden’ on labour relative to capital (Winner 2005: 671-2).  
Broadening the scope a bit – from fiscal properties narrowly construed to wider political 
economic dynamics – it is, first of all, clear that a generalized class-selective transformation of the form 
and logic of industrial relations has taken place since the 1970s (and particularly the 1990s) (see, e.g., 
Howell & Givan 2011; Baccaro & Howell 2011). More specifically, it is possible to outline a couple of 
tendencies pointing towards a class-situated decreasing relative strength of ‘labour’.  
 As mentioned earlier, trade union density rates have gone down since the 1970s, as have party 
membership levels (Visser 2006; van Biezen & Poguntke 2014).  
 Since the 1980s strike rates have gone down markedly (e.g., OECD 2007).  
 An expansion of low-wage jobs can be observed across sectors and countries, not simply in the 
US and the UK but also in countries such as Germany and the Netherlands (Appelbaum 2010). 
                                                          
225 See Streeck (2014: 64-5) for graphs showing the development in specific OECD countries.   
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 Although it is not a completely uniform trend and high national variability exists, atypical forms 
of work (notably temporary or part-time employment) has generally increased (Kalleberg 2000; 
OECD 2002). 
 A decentralization of wage bargaining can be observed across Western Europe (Baccaro & 
Howell 2011). 
 Since the 1980s, ‘labor income shares’ has declined in Europe, particularly in unskilled sectors 
(IMF 2007: 168-9).  
 
Looking more closely at labour market dynamics/policies a couple of transformations can be 
observed since the 1990s. Firstly, Boeri’s (2011: 1184-6) examination of the European trends in labour 
market and social reforms – looking at activation and early retirement agendas, employment protection 
legislation (EPL), unemployment benefits (UB), etc. – not only reveals the generally high volume of 
reforms enacted (particularly in the case of UB and EPL) but also shows the primary direction these 
reforms have taken since the 1980s: towards lowered protection, lowered generosity and increased 
activation.  Secondly, and related to the above, in recent decades, and particularly the 1990s, so-called 
active labour market policies (ALMP) have been promoted and increasingly fiscally supported across 
Western Europe (e.g., Immervoll & Scarpetta 2012; Bonoli 2010). While this ‘activation’ trend 
obviously varies a great deal across the different countries – seemingly making it possible to speak of 
different types or logics of ALMP (Bonoli 2010) – it nevertheless generally implies a shared relatively 
stronger focus on, as Immervoll & Scarpetta (2012: 1) formulates it, so-called ‘make-work-pay’ or 
‘back-to-work’ approaches, involving ‘the enforcement of strict eligibility criteria for benefit recipients 
together with the provision of effective re-employment services’.226  
Thirdly, the activation preoccupation of the post-1990s period is strongly correlated with the 
Dutch-originated so-called ‘flexicurity’ phenomenon (e.g., Wilthagen 1998). Clearly, the flexicurity 
notion is premised on ‘win-win’ types of solutions/fallouts (Wilthagen 1998: 1-2); it ‘promises the best 
of both worlds, and emphasizes that flexibility and security are not necessarily incompatible’ (Mailand 
2010: 242; see also Hansen & Triantafillou 2011: 205-6). Flexicurity has been variously entangled with 
                                                          
226 Although this discussion is beyond the scope of this study, a general affinity between the notion of ‘human 
capital’ – whether associated with Gary S. Becker, Anthony Giddens or The Third Way (more generally) – and 
the primacy of activation is of course evident.  
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EU-driven dynamics from an early point: from its connection to the European Employment Strategy (as 
for example expressed in the 1998 Employment Guidelines) to the ‘common flexicurity principles’ 
proposed by the Commission and adopted by the Council in 2007 (Mailand 2010; see also Hansen & 
Triantafillou 2011: 205-6).227 The Lisbon Strategy should also be mentioned here. As for example 
Hansen & Triantafillou’s (2011) Foucauldian-oriented paper on the Lisbon Strategy argues, it can be 
perceived as an EU tactic for ‘aligning economic and social concerns’. 
In this context, a new optimistic logic revolving around ‘social investments’ started to appear 
from the 1990s, partly sparked by the ideas and recommendations of notably Anthony Giddens (1998), 
the OECD (1997) and Esping-Andersen (2000) (see also more generally, e.g., Taylor-Gooby (2008) on 
the appearance of a ‘social investment strategy’). As articulated by, for example, the OECD (1997: 18) 
summary report Beyond 2000: The New Social Policy Agenda, ‘a ‘social investment’ approach’ should 
preferably ‘guide developments in social policy’. According to Esping-Andersen’s (2000: 22) 
characteristic recommendations of the early 2000s, reforms should generally have a clear ‘social-
investment bias’, and social policy should strive to ‘actively mobilize and maximize the productive 
potential of the population so as to minimize its need for, and dependence on, government benefits’.   
This type of perspective implies a switch from, to draw on Lunt (2009: 30-1), a ‘safety net’ type 
of social policy, understood as a ‘drag on market mechanisms’, to a form of ‘social investment’ that is 
construed as an ‘essential lubricant or dynamo of market mechanisms’. Moreover, it also involves a 
preoccupation with future spending sequences (see also Ibid.) – an intensified focus on what may be 
described as fiscal forestalling: in the context of the budgetary-situated organizational solipsism and 
sharpened fiscal lens of the state, fiscal-functional practices increasingly revolve around deterring, in an 
ideally timely fashion, potentially costly future social behavior – possibly using various kinds of 
evidence-based ‘risk’ categories and scenarios drawn from for example social work-oriented practice 
                                                          
227 As the ‘Council Resolution of 15 December 1997 on the 1998 Employment Guidelines’ for example states: 
‘the social partners are invited to negotiate (…) agreements to modernise the organisation of work, including 
flexible working arrangements, with the aim of making undertakings productive and competitive and achieving 
the required balance between flexibility and security’ (see Council of the European Union 1997).  
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and analysis (on such categories, see, e.g., Fraser et al. 1999) or relevant neo-positivist policy-oriented 
quantitative economic/sociological analyses.228    
Importantly, from the perspective of the legitimation and accumulation functions approach, and 
specifically the critical fiscal sociological perspective of James O’Connor, the above described post-
1990s fiscally-oriented tension-displacing development can be construed as implying an important 
analytical tweaking of O’Connor’s state-situated conceptual setup. Above all, the post-1990s period has 
involved a relatively intensified state-facilitated and co-productive tension-displacing hybridization of 
the two main categories of ‘social capital expenditures’ and ‘social expenses’: as a gradual process that 
has been systematically underpinned by state-crafting strategies – and, as I shall expand upon later, that 
is both critically premised on and has helped condition an underlying tweaking of popular value 
priorities – legitimation-oriented social expenses and accumulation-oriented social capital expenditures 
have become increasingly hybridized. More specifically, social capital expenditures – seemingly 
considered a fiscal state-crafting property – have increasingly become a way of 
maintaining/maximizing legitimatory state-crafting. Rather than dissolving O’Connor’s analytical 
setup, this claim critically historically tweaks it. While O’Connor partly accepted that the two types of 
expenditures would sometimes functionally overlap, the argument is more that the post-1990s period 
has seen a non-trivial and tension-displacing intensification of this functional hybridization: social 
capital expenditures has increasingly come to also serve the legitimation function, and thus increasingly 
come to depress a potential corresponding pressure for activating social expenses (or for activating 
these in a manner or form that is not also somehow linked to social capital expenditures). Moreover, 
and very much related to this, contrary to O’Connor’s (1973: 6, emphasis added) general argument that 
social expenses should be construed as being ‘not even indirectly productive’, the post-1990s 
development implies a situation in which social expenses has become increasingly ‘indirectly 
productive’, and, from the fiscal ISI of the state, ideally speaking directly productive.    
                                                          
228 As the Beyond 2000: The New Social Policy Agenda summary report for example puts it: ‘interventions which 
take place early in the life-cycle will have a long pay-off period and a correspondingly greater chance of 
expenditure costs being outweighed by social benefits. Hence, there is a need for increased emphasis on 
anticipating and preventing social distress among children and young adults’ (OECD 1997: 18-9). Or as Esping-
Andersen (2000: 23) argued in his A Welfare State for the 21st Century report: ‘the highest priority should be 
assigned to social investments in children, who represent the future productive potential of society’.  
237 
 
Arguably, this O’Connor-oriented question of the unproductive versus indirectly/directly 
productive dynamics of certain types of expenditures can also partly be linked up with Esping-
Andersen’s (1990) well-known ‘de-commodification’ concept, as well as his later altered understanding 
of this, particularly when additionally exposed to Offe’s (1984, 1991) writings on this.229 Firstly, like 
O’Connor, Esping-Andersen’s (1990: 50) de-commodification concept, which famously focused on 
‘market-independence’ as its key overall attribute, seems to erroneously construe alleviatory measures 
as generally necessarily ‘unproductive’ or anti-market. As Offe (1991: 1555, emphasis removed) for 
example asks in his review of Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism: ‘could it be that, 
instead of decommodification’s being the opposite of the treatment of labor power as a commodity, it is 
in part also a precondition of such treatment and its social viability?’.230   
Secondly, in this relation, and in a peculiar manner, Esping-Andersen’s more recent ‘social 
investment’-focused perspective seems to be implicitly infused by an important historically updated 
neo-positivist and policy-oriented version of O’Connor’s basic fiscal sociological perspective (a version 
that, in a sense, indirectly has taken Offe’s above comment into account). For example, as Esping-
Andersen (2000: 3, fn. 2) advises in his report A Welfare State for the 21st Century it makes sense to 
‘rethink our existing accounting systems so as to recognize that many social outlays are direct or 
indirect investments with a calculable economic payoff’. Or as he relatedly complaints in an equally 
updated yet principally pure O’Connor-like moment: ‘[c]ontemporary systems of national accounts are 
unable to distinguish between social expenditures which play an ‘investment role’ and those which do 
not’ (Ibid.: 23, fn. 36). 
Thirdly, Esping-Andersen’s switch from de-commodification to what, fittingly using Offe’s 
(1984) terminology, can be perceived as ‘administrative recommodification’ can be construed as 
sociologically-normatively symptomizing a relative intensification of the specifically co-productive 
moment of commodification, that is, the relative degree and desirability of labour market-based self-
commodification. To be clear, both the particular understanding of the GA period presented in this 
study and the above understanding of the general functional overlap of O’Connor’s two types of 
                                                          
229 For a critical take on Esping-Andersen’s academic trajectory, see also Hansen & Triantafillou (2011).  
230 Interestingly, Esping-Andersen (1990: 37) originally at one point seemed to partly acknowledge this when stating: 
‘decommodification should not be confused with the complete eradication of labor as a commodity’.   
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expenditures makes it analytically untenable to accept what to some extent have become a mainstream 
implicit conception of the postwar period, namely that it actually and accurately reflected a ‘de-
commodification’ era. Nevertheless, as has been argued, the post-1970s/1990s period implies, to 
historically tweak Esping-Andersen’s (1990) terminology, a relative historical downgrading of the 
dynamics and popular desirably of ‘market-independence’ and a corresponding relative historical 
upgrading of the dynamics and popular desirably of ‘market participation’. 
As a final O’Connor-directed observation on the fiscal development of the post-1990s period, to 
preface this study’s subsequent examinations, it makes sense to construe this process as being both 
strongly symptomatically indicative of and critically causally linked to a more general reconfiguration 
of state legitimation characterizing the post-1970s period – a particular type of legitimatory 
reconfiguration which I shall address and argue for in the next two chapters.   
 
This chapter has analyzed some of the key dynamics of the appearance and development of the 
nationally cross-cutting and multi-domain co-productive hybrid tension-displacing order of the post-
1990s. Attention has particularly been put on its connection to the reconfigured dynamics of the 
tension-filled functional relationship between legitimation and fiscal accumulation. As argued, the 
various examined hybrid co-productive formations are both symptomatic representations of the overall 
reconfigured mode of state-crafting of the post-1990s and causally active tension-displacing strategic 
exercises associated with this.   
The first section discussed how consumer-citizen co-producership has increasingly become an 
essential ingredient of the dynamics of both corporatized profit-making and fiscal state-crafting. The 
second section discussed and problematized the proliferation of co-produced governance dynamics 
(questioning, for example, some of the socially progressive elements purportedly connected to this). 
The third section provided a more extensive analysis of the intricate unequal relationship between 
bottom-up and top-down driven dynamics in the post-1990s period by putting analytical attention on 
the two-legged division of political domination. The fourth and last section both empirically outlined 
some of the key fiscally relevant trends of the post-1990s and amongst other things provided an 
analytical tweaking of O’Connor’s fiscal-budgetary setup in view of the fiscal sociological 
reconfigurations of the recent decades. 
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Informed by the above overall analysis, the next chapter shall zoom in on the dynamics of co-
produced legitimation in the 2000s. This is done through a brief empirically anchored but analytically 
directed examination of the case of the pre-2008 crisis expansion of growth-spurring household debt-
taking.  
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Chapter 10. Co-Produced Legitimation 
 
In this empirically anchored mini-chapter I shall examine particular aspects of the generalized 
expansion of economic growth-sustaining mortgage-situated household debt-taking in the 2000s (up 
until the 2007-8 crisis) – what has been described as a pre-crisis regime or growth model of ‘privatized 
Keynesianism’ (from now on PK) (Crouch 2009; Watson 2010; see also more generally, e.g., Hay 
2011; Streeck 2011, 2014). Rather than attempting to provide an either exhaustive or straightforward 
account of this PK phenomenon or the 2000s more generally (whatever this would mean), the intention 
of this chapter is more modestly to simply single out key aspects of relevance to this study. Importantly, 
construed very loosely from the earlier discussed case study perspective, the PK phenomenon – or more 
precisely, selected properties pertaining to this – appears as a key illustrative case (i.e., subject) of this 
study’s overall historical-theoretical analysis/framework and arguments concerning the reconfiguration 
of state legitimation in the post-1970s period (i.e., object). 
Notably, as shall be argued, it is highly illustrative of a particular mode of co-produced 
legitimation or co-produced tension-management characteristic of the post-1970s governance period. 
Also, since all three types of state-crafting strategies launched/developed in chapter 6 are in place and 
empirically activated in the PK case, it provides a productive way of analytically rolling out this 
strategic toolbox. Moreover, the case is obviously intrinsically important due to its indirect link to the 
2007-8 financial crisis (as shall be seen below); thus, at least partly, examining the PK phenomenon 
implicitly helps shed light on the particular state-crafting dynamics underpinning the recent economic 
crisis and the larger development of the post-1970/1990s governance period. In this overall capacity, 
the particular analysis launched in this chapter allows for a productive articulation of some of the 
shortcomings of a more capitalism-focused take on the PK phenomenon (and partly, by extension, the 
2007-8 crisis or neoliberalism). In this overall sense, the PK case to a certain extent encompasses, 
compresses and causally intensifies many of the relevant macro-mechanisms of analytical interest.     
The chapter is split into two brief main sections. The first section analyzes some of the key 
macro-mechanisms and empirically observable factors associated with the PK phenomenon by 
analytically activating the strategic toolbox of state-crafting. The second section reflects on and 
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discusses the analytical status and implications of the first section’s analysis for understanding the 
governance-situated dynamics of legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting in the reconfiguration period.     
 
 
10.1 Pre-crisis household credit expansion: Activating the strategic toolbox of state-
crafting 
Crouch (2009) construes PK as a particular ‘demand management’ regime of particularly the 2000s, 
appearing in the overall context of a largely de-regulated and financially globalized neo-liberal ‘free-
market’ turn, driven by housing-oriented private debt-taking.231 According to Streeck (2011: 17), who 
roughly places the phenomenon in the same overall de-regulatory and liberalized context, PK refers to 
‘the replacement of public with private debt’ in the late 1990s/early 2000s, and is thus in this way 
perceived as yet another monetary ‘stopgap’ averting a potential economic crisis (stemming from the 
perennial contradiction between capitalism and democracy).  
Empirically speaking, there is clearly support for the descriptive claim that household credit-
demand increased markedly and widely across Western European (and OECD) polities during 
particularly the 2000s (e.g., Cecchetti et al. 2011; OECD 2016f; André 2016: 7-9; see also Streeck 
2011: 19). Importantly, with the exception of Germany, household debt expansion was clearly a shared 
Western European trend – a common development that cut across specific institutional, regional or 
‘regime’-type clusters.232 The argument concerning a switch from public to private debt also seems 
well-supported: while public debt saw stagnating growth in the 2000s (before the crisis), household 
debt rose rapidly in the same period (e.g., Cecchetti et al. 2011; OECD 2016b, 2016f; see also Streeck 
2011: 19). 
As argued, the PK case provides a productive illustration of not only the contemporary 
reconfigured functional dynamics of legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting but also the logics and 
                                                          
231 This section draws partly on elements from Celik (2016a). 
232 Interestingly, while the Netherlands and Denmark stand out as having particularly high household debt rates 
(as a % of disposable income), the UK (and, if looking at the OECD, the US) experienced a very steep expansion 
in the late 1990/2000s (e.g., OECD 2016f; André 2016: 7-9).        
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empirical effects of the emergent interplay between the three more specific state-crafting strategies of 
market-conforming re-regulation, claim-reduction and normative mobilization-control. In this relation, 
this section seeks to very briefly and (highly) non-exhaustively trace or survey some of the relevant 
state-crafting-situated macro-mechanisms and empirically observable factors associated with the PK 
phenomenon in an analytically directed manner, which groups the relevant processes conceptually 
through the three strategies rather than, for example, necessarily temporally.          
Firstly, and most obviously, market-conforming re-regulation was heavily activated, particularly 
in the form of a positive implementation of a cluster of indirect and direct credit-optimizing policies. At 
the international regulatory level, in the context of a politically and legally empowered proliferation of 
over-the-counter (OTC) financial products and financial innovation more generally, particularly the 
Basel II banking agreement is understood to have promoted or reinforced a market-conforming 
regulatory setup, most likely buttressed by multilevel lobbying and so-called ‘regulatory capture’, 
which would underpin the inflated pre-2007-8 crisis growth dynamics (Underhill & Zhang 2008; Baker 
2010; cf. Young 2012). With regards to monetary policy, historically low interest rates could be 
observed during the 2000s – not simply in the US but also across Europe (the monetary decisions of the 
Fed and the ECB also being correlated) – spurring risky and immoderate financial and mortgage-
oriented decisions (Taylor 2008: 1-8).233   
Nationally specific policies directly or indirectly facilitating homeownership and debt-taking 
(whether for consumption, housing, etc.) were implemented throughout Western Europe, such as, for 
example, Thatcher’s ‘right-to-buy policy’ or New Labour’s more general institutionalized 
encouragement of a more ‘financialized’ and ‘investor’-oriented population in the UK (e.g., Watson 
2010) or the pre-crisis government-mandated combination of a 2002 property tax freeze/ceiling, new 
mortgage loan types, the liberalization of the so-called cooperative housing associations and a generally 
expansive fiscal policy in Denmark (e.g., Rangvid et al. 2013).234 Or, for example, the nationally and 
institutionally varying innovation in mortgage products/services also observed in, for example, the 
                                                          
233 As Taylor (2008: 5) points out, housing booms were more severe in countries with lower interest rates.  
234 In the US, which of course remains the key case concerning the pre-crisis years, well-known aspects could of 
course be mentioned: for example, the amendments made to the Community Reinvestment Act (boosting 
lending), the state-backed activities of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae or the signing of the Commodity Futures 
Modernizations Act (unfastening OTC derivatives).  
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Netherlands, Ireland and Spain (e.g., Miles & Pillonca 2008; Rouwendal 2007; Doyle 2009; European 
Central Bank 2009).  
Secondly, and in an irreducibly related manner, diverse nationally specific extra-regulative 
strategies of indirect normative mobilization-control were of course also triggered. This would include 
everything from educational courses, reports, analyses, informational campaigns, urban projects, 
ministerial communication agendas or speeches or TV-show bits by high-ranking political figures, etc., 
directly or indirectly fostering such things as ‘entrepreneurship’, credit card spending, ‘nuclear family’-
oriented homeownership forms, and so on (see also, e.g., Allon & Redden 2012). This necessarily more 
elusive and multifarious process should of course be placed in the overall context of state’s ongoing 
growth-led tension-displacing functional activities and considerations, which through the reconfigured 
intensification of the maintenance/maximization of national growth-oriented and consumption-
optimizing agendas in the 2000s, indirectly served to further endogenously tweak popular value 
priorities and behavioral patterns in a more fiscally functional debt-driven direction. Importantly, 
practices associated with the macro-level strategy of normative mobilization-control are generally 
concerned with tapping into, supplementing and re-energizing ongoing processes of micro-situated 
marketization, self-commodification, etc.235  
Thirdly, the PK phenomenon was also linked to a generalized but of course nationally diverse 
strategy of claim-reduction. For the sake of argument, I shall only focus on two elements of this larger 
strategy, which are (as shall be seen) critically linked, namely the observed rise in inequality in recent 
decades and the increased arguably co-productive dimension of economic growth expansion. First, 
there is by now well-known strong empirical evidence that income (and wealth) inequality has risen 
across the OECD polities in the last couple of decades – not simply in the US and the UK (where it 
increased sharply), but also more recently in, for example, the Nordic countries (e.g., OECD 2008, 
2011a; Cingano 2014; Piketty 2014). Secondly, a range of scholars, looking primarily but not 
exclusively at the US case, have linked the rise in inequality to the observed rising household debt 
accumulation and thus in this way suggested a possible macro-process underpinning the 2007-8 crisis 
(e.g., Barba & Pivetti 2009; Guttmann & Plihon 2010; Goda et al. 2014). The argument, in short, 
suggests that the growth-decreasing effects of inequality on consumption (particularly amongst lower-
                                                          
235 Marketization/commodification processes that have of course been more generally diagnosed and examined by 
figures such as Marx, the early Frankfurt School members or more recently, for example, Zygmunt Bauman.   
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income households) were roughly compensated for by (particularly mortgage-related) household debt, 
which in turn was famously complexly linked up to financial sector innovations, the housing boom, etc. 
This inequality-debt-crisis link indirectly provides an empirical articulation of some of the 
elements and effects of the overall claim-reduction strategy of the 2000s. Debt-taking helped governing 
authorities, particularly in the US and the UK, ‘privatize’ private-property-based negative social 
externalities and thereby assisted in, using Offe’s (1984: 71) formulation, relocating state-functional 
tensions ‘into extra-political ‘market’ domains’. In this way, the PK phenomenon can be said to imply, 
using Ulrich Beck’s (1992: 137, emphasis removed) formulation – but without taking on board his 
larger class-overlooking analysis (for a critique of this, see also Atkinson 2007b) – the activation of 
‘individualized institutional situations’, situations in which ‘how one lives becomes the biographical 
solution of systemic contradictions’.  
While it is less clear whether this rather convincing inequality-debt-crisis association – which 
seems to apply particularly well to the US and the UK (especially with regards to the existence of a 
strong link between inequality and household debt (see, e.g., Iacoviello 2008)) – also holds for 
countries such as Sweden and Denmark (e.g., Goda et al. 2014; Baccaro & Pontusson 2016),236 it is 
obvious that growth-spurring household debt-taking has been a widespread and general trend cutting 
across ‘regime’-patterns, national institutional differences etc.237 Arguably, this generalized rise in 
household debt-taking can be critically related to the mechanisms of escalation discussed in chapter 7. 
Most importantly, in the absence of strong counteracting mechanisms, the irreversible asymmetric 
endogenous logic of consumption-situated economic growth and its frustration-escalating properties 
make sure that consumption-demands (and by extension demand for debt, whether credit card-oriented 
or housing-based) are not only continuously reproduced but also reproduced in a new and more intense 
form. In this way, even without high (rising) inequality the reconfigured intensification of a popular 
                                                          
236 The inequality-debt-crisis story obviously does not hold for Germany (with its more ‘export-led’ growth 
model), since this country stands out for not having seen an increase in household debt in the relevant period (see 
also Goda et al. 2014).     
237 A household debt-taking trend that is infused with a clear class-bias. Generally, as one OECD working paper 
points out, ‘low-income indebted households tend to be more leveraged, to carry a higher debt burden relative to 
income (…) to have lower liquidity buffers than more affluent ones (…) to be more vulnerable to negative income 
shocks and unemployment’ (André 2016: 11).  
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socio-psychological expectation of ever-widening economic growth and consumption prospects served 
to expand household debt-taking. Of course, inequality most likely reinforces this mechanism, 
intensifying the consumption dimension of popular preferences.238 This would provide one (of course 
partial) explanation for why countries which experienced a relatively lower increase in inequality also 
expanded household debt accumulation.  
However this is precisely understood, the PK case, as argued (and as construed above), appears as 
a key illustrative case of the dynamics of legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting in the 2000s – notably, 
the emergent combination of the three above strategies – and in particular the governance-situated 
reconfiguration of state legitimation in the post-1970s period. This can be observed in a number of 
ways, which shall now be more formally outlined and discussed.  
 
 
10.2 Co-producing legitimation 
Firstly, the PK phenomenon should be construed in the overall context of the emergent combination of 
the three strategies of state-crafting. In their own empirically distinctive yet partly functionally 
overlapping ways, the strategies of market-conforming re-regulation, normative mobilization-control 
and claim-reduction – or the particular form in which they were activated in the 2000s – appear as both 
representations of the larger co-productive hybrid tension-displacing order of the post-1990s and as 
active tension-displacing forces in their own right. With regards to this latter causal property, the 
activation of the strategic toolbox of state-crafting served to simultaneously reduce, distribute, transfer 
or displace expenditure-relevant claims and entitlements of the citizenry and push the dynamics and 
conditions of fiscal accumulation in a more co-productive direction.   
Secondly, the PK case provides an exemplary empirical articulation of the reconfigured status of 
post-1970s legitimatory state-crafting (the dynamics of which I shall address more carefully in the next 
chapter). Importantly, the generalized household debt-situated mode of fiscal accumulation of the 2000s 
was arguably premised on not only a heightened micro-situated normative and practical alignment with 
                                                          
238 As Bauman (2000: 88) for example generally observes: ‘[t]he more choices the rich seem to have, the less 
bearable to all is a life without choosing (…) the poor cannot avert their eyes; there is nowhere they could avert 
their eyes to’. 
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the prevailing fiscal-functional dynamics but also an intensification of both the output/performance 
propensity of state legitimation and the marketized-fiscalized content of this increasing 
output/performance-orientation (see chapter 11). 
Thirdly, and highly related to the above, the PK phenomenon, as construed above, should be 
understood analytically as a peculiar unequal combination of a both bottom-up and top-down driven 
mode of state-functional reproduction – as an alternative manifestation of the earlier argued two-legged 
division of political domination of the post-1990s. On the one hand, it is representative of the larger 
hybrid tension-displacing co-producing order – in particular the extent to which, and the way in which, 
consumer-citizen co-producership has increasingly become an essential ingredient of both profit and 
fiscal maximization activities. In this specific sense, the PK phenomenon can be perceived as a 
particular bottom-up driven mode of fiscal state-crafting. On the other hand, as argued, it should be 
understood in the context of the active activation of the tension-displacing strategic toolbox of state-
crafting and the overall state-facilitated maintenance of a fiscal functionally optimizing agenda. In this 
sense, PK can be understood as a largely top-down driven phenomenon. Moreover, understanding the 
PK phenomenon from the state-crafting perspective of this study also implies taking into account the 
reconfigured content and substance of the bottom-up dimension, notably the appearance and absurdity 
of commercialized symbolic media-fetishizing agendas and popular discourses and the generalized 
intensification of largely immaterial issues and areas of life, all implying an overall ‘privatized’ form of 
political legitimation. From this perspective, the PK phenomenon should be understood in the context 
of a peculiar emergent combination of a both bottom-up and top-down driven mode of state-functional 
reproduction, in which state-crafting considerations and practices to a large extent seek to – through 
both active market-conforming re-regulation and indirect extra-regulative means – reinforce a largely 
independently unfolding or endogenously-driven gradual intergenerational tweaking of both popular 
value priorities and behavioral patterns in a more fiscally functional direction (a process which of 
course plays out through a series of micro-situated channels, which shall be theoretically discussed 
later). In other words, the PK phenomenon implies a situation of an unusually high correspondence 
between the dynamics of fiscally functional reproduction and the authentic inner-normatively 
identifying value priorities and behavioral patterns of the consumer-citizens.  
Fourthly, and again closely relatedly, the state-crafting-facilitated co-productive component 
underpinning the PK phenomenon seems evident: on the one hand, the consumer-citizens increasingly 
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co-produce private-property-based negative social externalities; on the other hand, they increasingly co-
produce economic growth. As argued, the PK phenomenon should be construed both in a symptomatic 
manner – i.e., as emergently containing various articulations of the larger co-productive hybrid tension-
displacing order – and in the causal context of a series of more or less active tension-displacing forces. 
With regards to this latter element, the PK phenomenon can be understood as part of a larger state-
functional agenda focused on increasing the co-productiveness of legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting. 
Importantly, as seen above, in the context of the PK phenomenon – as well as this study’s analysis of 
the larger post-1990s order – a relative increase in co-productiveness implies, in the first instance, an 
intensification of social stratification, that is, the unequal distribution of both material resources, 
juridical entitlements and specific institutional-organizational authority/leverage and social, cultural and 
cognitive-intellectual resources and competences. In the second instance, and more generally, increased 
co-productiveness in relation to the PK phenomenon entails a simultaneously bottom-up and top-down 
driven relative tilting of burdensome/distressful responsibility onto the consumer-citizens; they are 
increasingly expected to help ‘co-produce’ consumption, debt-taking, fiscal accumulation, social 
services, etc.    
Clearly, the particular co-production of fiscal accumulation through household debt-taking of the 
2000s is revealing of the tension-displacing nature of post-1990s state-crafting: rather than an 
overcoming of micro-situated consumer-citizen tensions (associated with, e.g., the private-property-
based production of negative social externalities) it has implied a ‘privatization’ of the tension-filled 
state-functional relationship between legitimation and accumulation, a relative socio-psychological 
untying of the question of state/government activities from popular subjective questions of 
responsibility. Whether and to what extent this from the ISI of the state implies a reconfigured status or 
genuine overcoming of the tension-filled functional relationship between legitimatory and fiscal state-
crafting shall be (further) discussed in the next chapter.  
Fifthly, and lastly, the PK case provides a productive way of illustrating the salient governance-
relevant dynamics of post-1970s legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting argued for in this study – and, by 
extension, how state-crafting considerations and activities have critically underpinned the 2007-8 crisis, 
capitalism, neoliberalism, etc., more generally. To a certain extent, because the PK case encompasses, 
compresses and causally intensifies many of the relevant macro-mechanisms of analytical interest it 
provides a critical test: a failure to acknowledge and analytically perceive the underlying state-crafting 
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dynamics in this case – which should not simply be associated with the activation of the strategic 
toolbox but more generally with the overall functional encouragement and facilitation/maintenance of 
the conditions for optimizing the growth agenda – implies a more general failure to conceive of the 
governance-situated post-1970s period as being, as argued, both deeply, historically, continually and 
increasingly anchored around the ISI of the state and the historically changing dynamics of legitimatory 
and fiscal state-crafting.  
In this relation, to take a notable example, Streeck’s (2011, 2014) recent otherwise intriguing and 
empirically rich analysis of the neoliberal period seems to critically implicitly misconstrue the PK 
phenomenon. Placed within the context of his democracy versus capitalism framework, Streeck fails to 
properly take into account the myriad of state-crafting dynamics underpinning PK, the crisis and 
neoliberalism more generally.239 Interestingly, while the problematic analytical ramifications of this for 
his framework is overall not adequately taken into account, Streeck’s (2011) own notion of monetary 
‘stopgaps’ (in the form of inflation, public debt and private debt) – which in the context of this study 
can be understood as output/performance-situated economic measures – is actually implicitly logically 
conditioned on the type of arguments made above (and later) concerning the critical state-facilitated 
reconfiguration of political legitimation.240 Importantly, Streeck’s particular capitalism-driven 
conception of the PK phenomenon both reveals and is a function of his general underappreciation of the 
almost literally endless manners in which the 2007-8 crisis, neoliberalism and the post-1970s period 
more generally has been critically predicated on state-functional dynamics. In sum, the PK case is 
analytically productive: as argued, given the PK phenomenon’s multifaceted intrinsic connection to the 
2007-8 crisis and post-1970s period, it can be meaningfully argued, by extension, that the fact that the 
case is particularly revealing of the dynamics of legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting logically tells a 
great deal about the generally state-crafting-situated nature of the co-productive turn to governance and 
its functionally patterned class-biased existence.  
                                                          
239 While, to be fair, Streeck does seem to briefly and nominally acknowledge the importance of a ‘strong state’ 
(e.g., 2014: 55–7; see also more recently Streeck 2015), this insight is not integrated into his overall democracy 
versus capitalism analysis and would arguably in any case be analytically inconsistent with it.   
240 Again, while Streeck’s Buying Time (2014: e.g., 31, 58–9, 61, 69, fn. 39, see also Streeck 2012a) provides 
arguments pointing in the direction of a more marketized popular culture, this insight is not unpacked and 
adequately incorporated into his framework (and would, again, arguably analytically implode it if it was).  
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Briefly summing up: activating the analytical framework and particularly the strategic toolbox of 
state-crafting, this chapter has engaged in a concentrated empirically anchored and analytically directed 
examination of the case of the pre-2008 crisis expansion of growth-spurring household debt-taking. 
Above all, the PK phenomenon has been construed as a highly illustrative case of the particular 
reconfigured mode of co-produced legitimatory state-crafting characteristic of the post-1970s period. 
Informed by this analysis (as well as the preceding ones), the next chapter – chapter 11 – shall provide 
an important formalized explication, analysis and critical discussion of the reconfigured status and 
dynamics of state legitimation in the post-1970s period.    
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Chapter 11. Towards Self-Legitimating Fiscal Accumulation 
 
This chapter seeks to do three overall things. Firstly, on the basis of the above analysis, it shall 
analytically explicate the implications for state legitimation of the turn to governance by, in particular, 
formalizing the arguments made concerning the reconfigured status of the tension between legitimatory 
and fiscal state-crafting in the post-1970s period. Secondly, as a brief and necessarily bounded exercise, 
this formalization of the arguments concerning the reconfigured dynamics of post-1970s state 
legitimation shall be juxtaposed with the key arguments and prophesies of the LAF approach of the 
1970s. Thirdly, the arguments concerning the reconfigured status of the legitimatory and fiscal state-
crafting tension shall be further unpacked and explicated through a brief and confined theoretical 
discussion of two recent post-millennial works looking (in their own ways, and at least partly or 
indirectly) at some of the dynamics of, and changes in, the antagonistic structures of the post-1970s 
period. As shall be seen, the three tasks of this chapter – which are performed in three separate sections 
– approximate an at least partial and tentative discussion of the Marcusean sub-question of this study.   
 
 
11.1 Figuring out the reconfiguration  
Arguably, the post-1970s co-productive governance phenomenon, as construed in the context of the 
preceding analysis focusing on the historically evolving dynamics of legitimatory and fiscal state-
crafting, presuppose, and were allowed for by, two types of heavily interrelated socio-ontological 
conditions of possibility.  
Firstly, a main sociological and socio-psychological condition of possibility for the governance-
situated reconfiguration of state legitimation has been the generalized appearance of an inner-
normatively identifying postwar consumer-citizen subject, which can be perceived as the culmination of 
a long-term intergenerational transformation of both popular value priorities – notably entailing a 
possibly irreversibly heightened popular socio-psychological expectation of ever-widening economic 
growth and consumption prospects – and behavioral patterns, together implying a heightened micro-
situated normative and practical alignment with the prevailing fiscal-functional dynamics.  
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Secondly, historically re-situating and analytically tweaking the arguments and terminology of the 
legitimation and accumulation functions approach of the 1970s, the post-1970s/1990s governance-
situated transformation arguably presuppose a reconfiguration of state legitimation, involving a relative 
historical shift towards a more self-legitimating mode of fiscal accumulation (cf. Brown 2005: 41–2, 
143, fn. 6; cf. more generally Cerny 1997). This reconfiguration arguably involves two key 
components. (1) While political legitimacy generally tends to be ‘output’-anchored (Rothstein 2009; 
Dahlberg & Holmberg 2013: 3) – i.e., focused on ‘performance-based’ legitimacy, that is, whether, to 
use Herbert Marcuse’s (1967) famous formulation, the system ‘delivers the goods’– the above 
transformation signifies a relative historical intensification of this output/performance dimension. (2) 
The content of state or governmental legitimacy has been relatively altered, implying an increasing 
popular attention to day-to-day financial security, ever-widening economic growth and consumption 
prospects (i.e., ‘economic welfare’). Whereas the former component puts emphasis on an increasing 
output/performance propensity, the latter puts emphasis on the historically specific marketized-
fiscalized content of this increasing output/performance-orientation.241 
                                                          
241 It is arguably difficult to provide analytically productive longitudinal empirical or quantitative data showing 
the relative intensification of marketized/fiscalized popular value priorities going back to the 1970s. That said, 
besides the conglomerate package of processes, mechanisms, arguments and examples variously presented 
throughout this study, once can of course briefly and non-exhaustively point to a few anecdotal symptomatic 
indications of a gradual tweaking of value priorities in a more output/performance-based marketized/fiscalized 
direction.   
As the more static and mostly US-based empirical socio-psychological work by John T. Jost and his 
colleagues show, what they denote a ‘fair market ideology’ seems to be a basic/underlying salient feature – that is, 
‘people living under market economies tend to believe that market-based processes and outcomes are inherently 
fair and just’ (Jost et al. 2003a: 79). Moreover, low-status/disadvantaged groups have a higher tendency to 
ideologically embrace and justify the prevailing system/status quo (Jost et al. 2003b), not simply in the US but 
also cross-nationally (Jost et al. 2005). Arguably, when coupled with the rising inequality trend of recent decades, 
this latter element provides an indirect case for hypothesizing an intensification of ‘system-justifying’ 
marketized/fiscalized value priorities (cf. the general argument in Jost et al. 2005: 329).  
At the party-political level, as discussed earlier, both a decline in class-voting (Alford 1962; Clark et al. 
1993; Nieuwbeerta & Ultee 1999) – which, albeit, should be construed in a particular manner (Van der Waal et al. 
2007) – and a generalized ‘neoliberalizing’ of parties’ ideological agendas (Mudge 2011) can be observed over 
time. A few much more heterogeneous and fragmented symptomatic class-situated trends of recent decades could 
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It makes sense to further specify this overall argument. Firstly, as argued in chapter 6, against, for 
example, Lipset’s (1959) distinction between effectiveness and legitimation and the often observed 
ahistorical contemporary implicit or explicit equation of legitimation with specifically democratic 
legitimation, state legitimation should be construed in a multidimensional and temporal manner, 
analytically allowing for a historical reconfiguration of both the type/source/content of legitimacy and 
this source’s relative propensity. Thus, while legitimacy by definitional fiat has to somehow be 
consensual or voluntarily, it need not necessarily be infused with a historically specific logic or content 
centered on, for example, democratic or socially progressive ideals and criteria. Importantly, in this 
sense, the above argument concerning the relative historical reconfiguration of state legitimation 
underpinning the governance phenomenon in no way implies the absence of normatively-based 
conception-formations or the irrelevance of legitimatory state-crafting. Rather, it involves not only a 
relative historical reconfiguration of the content of the state-situated macro-level but also the principal 
normative assessment-logic underpinning the ongoing formation of normatively-based conceptions 
itself (on this more generally, see also Zhao 2009: 418). With regards to specifically this latter element: 
rather than implying a diminishing or weakening of state legitimacy, the relatively historically 
heightened attentiveness to output/performance signals an increasing propensity of a specific dimension 
of state legitimation; it implies an intensification of a specific socio-psychological normative 
assessment-logic, focused on whether and to what extent goods are ‘delivered’, which equally 
authentically underpins the ongoing process of normative conception-formation.  
Secondly, the argument made in chapter 6, following the general cues of Lipset (1959: 91) and 
Linde & Ekman (2003: 397, 399-400, 405-6), that regimes that continuously, and in a long-term 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
perhaps be loosely and non-exhaustively mentioned, such as, for example, an increase in: childhood obesity rates 
and overweightness in developed and particularly English-speaking ‘market-liberal countries’ countries (and on a 
global level) (De Onis et al. 2010; Offer et al. 2010), the total yearly revenues of McDonalds, the consumption of 
Coca Cola, online advertising (e.g., Evans 2008), etc. Other meaningful anecdotal symptomatic pre-2007-8 crisis 
indications would also for example be an increase in: sports betting (e.g., internet gambling), the dumbing-down 
or ‘tabloidization’ of news/media outputs, cosmetic surgeries, fitness activities, commercials, books, music, films 
and TV-shows emphasizing aggressive/competitive/entrepreneurial/self-interested behavior, and so on. Trends in 
McDonald’s revenues/sales can be examined by looking at the various annual reports (see McDonald’s 
Corporation n.d.). For Coca Cola trends, see The Coca-Cola Company (n.d.).  
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manner, are able to ‘deliver the goods’ tendentially enhance their normative support, can be applied in a 
particular and slightly analytically tweaked manner to this study’s discussion of the GA period. As 
argued, the unrivaled economic expansion and popular distribution of affluence of the GA period 
gradually served to stabilize a popular socio-psychological expectation of ever-widening economic 
growth and consumption prospects. In this relation, it can be argued that the generalized continuous and 
long-term capacity to actually ‘deliver the goods’ during the GA period gradually served to both 
intensify the relative importance of the ‘delivering’ dimension of legitimation and increasingly 
associate the content of this heightened output/performance-based dimension of legitimation (the goods 
to be delivered) with a specifically growth-oriented and consumption-optimizing agenda. 
Thirdly, going beyond Gilley’s (2006: 502, emphasis in original) argument that one cannot speak 
of ‘state performance’ in legitimacy terms unless it is ‘from a public perspective’ (as argued in chapter 
6), the above suggested post-1970s reconfiguration of state legitimation precisely implies the gradual 
co-productive tension-displacing hybridization of the two stereotypical normative questions of ‘what is 
good for society?’ and ‘what is good for me?’. The nationally specific growth-oriented and 
consumption-optimizing agendas that were consolidated during the GA period and intensified during 
the post-1970s period provide a good illustration of the increased synthetization of the ‘private’ and the 
‘public’ facets of the output/performance-based form of legitimation: here, consumption activities (a 
stereotypical ‘private’ dynamic) are seemingly intrinsically connected to GDP expansion (a 
stereotypical ‘public’ dynamic).242 More generally, the generally co-productive dynamics of the post-
1970s period – whether related to consumption, debt, fiscal accumulation, etc. – are particularly 
revealing of the way in which the salient output/performance-based dimension is increasingly 
underpinned by a hybridization of the private concerns of the consumer-citizens and the extra-
individual corporate fiscal-functional ISI of the state.  
Fourthly, as have been seen throughout the study, the reconfiguration of state legitimation relies 
on an emergent mixture of endogenously- and exogenously-driven processes. While, as argued, a large 
portion of the fiscally functional tweaking of value priorities has occurred as part of a gradual long-term 
                                                          
242 The ‘trickle-down’ logic of taxation may also provide a good exemplification. See Bauman (2013: 3) for a 
short account of the increased ideological acceptance of arguments, such as the ‘trickle down theory’, positing 
that ‘the pursuit of individual profit also provides the best mechanism for the pursuit of the common good’.   
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and endogenously-driven intergenerational process, active state-crafting dynamics have nevertheless 
played a major role in reinforcing this reconfiguration of legitimation of the post-1970s period. 
Importantly, many of the state-crafting strategies and considerations referred to in this study – which, as 
discussed in chapter 6, involves a certain level of ‘[s]kill, skilfulness, art’ and ‘spell or enchantment’ 
(Craft n.d.-b), and are thus always already underpinned by the state’s Bourdieusian ‘symbolic 
monopoly’ – can partly be perceived as ways for states to help nourish, to use Beetham’s (1991: 60; cf. 
108-9) formulation, ‘the evidence needed for their own legitimation’. Notably, the state-facilitated 
intensification of co-producership implies an indirect manner of fostering a tension-displacing 
hybridization of the private concerns, preferences and activities of the consumer-citizens and the fiscal-
functional ISI of the state; it implies a linking of the criteria for successful macro outputs/performances 
to ‘privatized’ dynamics (e.g., consumption prospects) – a process which in purely state-situated 
legitimatory terms actually effectively ends up socio-psychologically untying questions of institutional-
organizational output/performance from popular subjective questions of responsibility.   
 
 
11.2 Historically re-situating the LAF approach 
It is important to, again, specify the argument actually being made. Firstly, the argument implies a 
relative historical shift, a non-trivial relative intensification of both the output/performance propensity 
and the specifically marketized-fiscalized content of this increasing output/performance-orientation. 
Obviously, legitimatory state-crafting still implies the effective activation of other types/sources of 
legitimation than those revolving around an output/performance-based marketized-fiscalized content. 
Secondly, and relatedly, it does not imply the irrelevance of legitimatory state-crafting or the earlier 
mentioned ‘general interest criterion’. Rather, the argument addresses a historically specific 
reconfiguration of both the content of legitimation (i.e., relatively more marketized/fiscalized) and the 
principal socio-psychological normative assessment-logic underpinning the ongoing formation of 
normatively-based conceptions itself (i.e., relatively more output/performance-based).  
Returning to the arguments of the legitimation and accumulation functional approach, it is clear 
that all of the three scholars presumed the necessary functional insufficiency of a purely ‘bourgeois’ 
normativity. For Habermas (1973: 76), for example, but also implicitly for Offe and O’Connor, it was 
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both the case that ‘[c]apitalist societies were always dependent on cultural boundary conditions that 
they could not themselves reproduce’ and that contemporary ‘[m]otivational structures necessary for 
bourgeois society are only incompletely reflected in bourgeois ideologies’. While particularly 
Habermas emphasized the more conservative/traditional moral aspects of the constitutive feature of 
extra-capitalist normativity, they all also focused on the necessity for state-situated functional 
reproduction of ‘compensatory regulation’ (Offe 1984: 49) or expenditures, whether as a way of 
sustaining the self-debilitating commodification process or obtaining/maintaining ‘social harmony’ 
(O’Connor 1973: 6). In either case, status quo skeptical politicization was thought to result from the 
necessary increased interventionist practices of the state; an interventionism sparked by the private-
property conditioned production of negative social externalities, and a politicization constituted by the 
necessity of fulfilling a legitimation function and more generally, at the micro-situated level, the 
existence of ‘norms requiring justification’ (Habermas 1973: 69).  
In this relation, the post-1970s governance-situated analysis of this study does not imply a 
rejection of the necessity of legitimatory state-crafting but rather a specification of the non-trivial 
relative historical reconfiguration of the dynamics and properties of legitimation. The LAF approach 
was less wrong about the functional requirement of fulfilling the two functions itself than simply under-
assessing the possibilities for this tension-filled relationship to be critically reconfigured (cf. Held 1996: 
196-201; Barker 1990: 101; Streeck 2014).  
Arguably, this under-assessment was to some extent a priori analytically conditioned. All of the 
three scholars – and particularly Habermas – implicitly identified the process of politicization with a 
specific content, namely a democratically-situated socially progressive commodification/status quo 
skeptical normative orientation.243 Implicitly, it was largely thought that ‘[a]s long as motivations 
                                                          
243 To be clear, as also hinted at earlier, although this appears at varying degrees and neither of them 
systematically reflect on the consequences of this for their overall arguments, all of the three scholars can be said 
to implicitly presuppose a certain minimal level of output/performance-based legitimation. For example, although 
this is not really systematically taken into consideration with regards to his legitimation crisis thesis, Habermas’ 
(1973: 5) nominal sub-systems scheme (which stems from Claus Offe) assumes that the ‘Socio-Cultural System’ 
produces ‘Mass Loyalty’ on the basis of both inputs from the ‘Economic System’ and ‘Social Welfare 
Performances’ from the ‘Political-Administrative System’. As also partly addressed earlier, the 
output/performance-based dimension is relatively more (again implicitly) salient in the case of Offe and 
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remain tied to norms requiring justification’, politicization-inducing interventionist processes might, in 
a seemingly socially progressive manner, ‘break out in a questioning, rich in practical consequences’ 
(Habermas 1973: 69). Importantly, as should be evident, the problem, which implicitly or not involves 
all of the three scholars, is not the argument that norms require justification but the implicit a priori 
analytical assumption that the content, logic and form of these norms and justifications are of a certain 
kind. To put it rather bluntly and provocatively, partly like Wolfgang Streeck (which I shall discuss 
later) the three scholars seem to a priori expect that legitimatory demands have a certain socially 
progressive quality, that they are generally more or less based on the kinds of norms and justifications 
that they themselves support or find meaningful and productive (see also Barker 1990: 89-90, 96). Their 
notion of politicization implicitly reflects a specific understanding of the prevailing status of 
normativity, which, in hindsight, most likely partly stems from the particular (but not long-lasting) 
crisis-engrossed societal and academic context of the late 1960s and early 1970s that have been touched 
upon earlier.   
From this perspective, it can be argued that the normative underpinnings of the approach’s 
understanding of politicization (and thus, by extension, the legitimation/fiscal crisis) remains stuck in, 
and to a certain extent universalizes, the first of the two earlier discussed frustration scenarios, namely 
the short-term claim-based one (and in particular the societal/anti-alienation/alleviatory type of 
expectation/claim escalation), all the while, as analyzed, the socio-psychological ‘privatized’ frustration 
scenario would actually become gradually activated throughout the post-1980s period. Arguably, this 
also reflects a partly inaccurate diagnosis of the GA period: as argued throughout this study, this period 
saw the gradual consolidation of a possibly irreversibly heightened socio-psychological expectation of 
ever-widening economic growth and consumption prospects, a critical process which, although it was 
partly interrupted by a short-term stage of ‘politicization’, extended into the post-1980s period in a non-
trivial reconfigured intensified manner.   
The above discussed argument concerning the politicized pressure for ‘compensatory regulation’ 
and the legitimatory necessity of ‘norms requiring justification’ was analytically predisposed to 
overlook some of the important dynamics of post-1970s state legitimation. While Offe (1984: 49) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
particularly O’Connor, for whom the capitalist state for example services the legitimation function through ‘social 
expenses’.  
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correctly argued that ‘the capitalist state has the responsibility of compensating for the processes of 
socialization triggered by capital in such a way that neither a self-obstruction of market-regulated 
accumulation nor an abolition of the relationships of private appropriation of socialized production 
results’, he seems to have both: (1) over-assessed the general degree to which ‘the exchange process 
requires compensatory regulation’ (Ibid.) and (2) under-assessed the possibilities for the dynamics of 
‘the responsibility of compensating for the processes of socialization’ to be critically reconfigured. 
Notably, as argued earlier in relation to O’Connor’s fiscal-budgetary framework, the post-1980s 
development has implied a process in which ‘social capital expenditures’ have increasingly come to 
also serve the ‘legitimation function’ and ‘social expenses’ has become more (at least indirectly) 
‘productive’. As for the legitimatory necessity of ‘norms requiring justification’ the quality of both the 
norms and the justifications has changed. In the context of the governance-situated reconfiguration of 
legitimatory state-crafting, the norms, which still require some form of justification, have to a relatively 
increasing degree been both (1) underpinned by an alternative principal normative assessment-logic 
(focused on output/performance) authentically underpinning the ongoing process of normative 
conception-formation and (2) infused with an alternative marketized/fiscalized content.  
One element that stands out when historically reinterpreting the arguments of the LAF approach 
is, as argued earlier, the gradual co-productive tension-displacing hybridization of the ‘private’ and the 
‘public’ facets of the intensified output/performance-orientation implied by the post-1970s 
reconfiguration of state legitimation. As argued, the co-productive turn to governance has involved an 
intensified hybridization of the increased private-level output/performance-orientation – associated with 
the private concerns of the consumer-citizens – and increased ‘public’-level output/performance-
orientation – associated with the extra-individual corporate fiscal-functional ISI of the state.244    
                                                          
244 Partly referring back to the argument made above, the extensiveness of this process can be symptomatically 
observed, to take one notable example, not only through the increased synthetization of micro- and 
macroeconomic insights but also simply the general way in which contemporary mainstream macroeconomic 
textbooks non-emergently and normatively conceptualizes the dynamics and preferred direction of the aggregated 
national economy: (aggregated) micro-level consumption activity (C), amongst other variables, enhances the 
macro-level volume of economic activity (Y), which, because a maximization of Y in macroeconomic textbooks 
authoritatively serves as the legitimate manner in which the general interest is served, is positively encouraged.   
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Generally, in hindsight, the LAF approach of the 1970s, focusing on the restrained, tension-filled 
and debilitating logics of state-based ‘steering’, thought too little of the active exogenously-driven 
state-crafting forces underpinning legitimatory dynamics (see also Held 1996: 197; Barker 1990: 100-
1). Its general pessimism with regards to the state not only made the approach generally relatively 
under-asses the Bourdieusian symbolic monopoly of the state but also analytically prevented it from 
being able to foresee, as have been argued, how both the indirect gradual tweaking of value priorities 
through the overall fiscal-functional maintenance/maximization of a national growth-oriented and 
consumption-optimizing agenda and the diverse effects of the activation of the three strategies of state-
crafting would critically underpin the post-1970s reconfiguration of legitimation.   
This study’s particular analysis of the post-1970s governance-situated reconfiguration of state 
legitimation has introduced an important additional set of arguments, which encourages a further 
remodeling/reinterpretation of some of the key claims/prophesies of the LAF approach. Overall, this 
study has stressed the importance of firmly analytically integrating the emergent dynamics of party 
politics, of infusing legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting with a historically situated party political 
content – a maneuver which allows for a refinement of the understanding of the dynamics of post-1970s 
state legitimation. This is seen in at least two ways.  
Firstly, as argued, the LAF approach of the 1970s may be criticized for not adequately 
distinguishing between a lack of support for (1) the state or democracy and (2) the government or 
incumbents (see, e.g., Weil 1989: 683; Beetham 1991: 169). In relation to this unclarity with regards to 
the intended level/unit of analysis, which makes it difficult to assess the approach’s claims/prophesies 
about a fiscal and/or legitimation crisis,245 it makes sense to apply a simple but analytically productive 
two-level view of macro-political legitimacy which operates with a historically-situated distinction 
between (1) state legitimation and (2) party-level legitimation. Importantly, by implication this two-
level view of macro-political legitimacy minimally entails that, as argued above, legitimacy does not 
necessarily imply democratic legitimacy. 
                                                          
245 For example, a quite interesting trend can generally be observed: while ‘satisfaction’ with abstract system-level 
democratic principles seems to be intact (or rising), trust/satisfaction levels – as the Eurobarometer, the European 
Values Study, etc., show – with regards to specific political institutions, parties or individuals are (increasingly) 
low (on this distinction, see Linde & Ekman 2003).   
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Secondly, as mentioned earlier, the historical-theoretical analysis of this study reveals, and places 
the governance phenomenon in the overall context of, the historical institution of two overall political-
institutional displacements. The first, and perhaps most important, one involves the displacement from 
state to (party) government. The second overall political-institutional displacement involves the post-
1970s shift of overall legitimatory-relevant ‘responsibility’ not from state to party government (as in the 
first round) – introducing national variations of ‘cleavage’-based party politics – but from parties to 
civil society or profit-maximizing corporate actors, i.e. from government to governance. 
This transformation from the state to a separate arena of party politics – the first overall political-
institutional displacement – arguably involved (what has earlier been described as) a backgrounding 
process: by instituting an ‘electoral mode of consent’ (Beetham 1991: 150), it helped performatively 
popularly camouflage the ‘corporate’ character (or perhaps very idea) of the ISI of the state and the 
existence of state functions (or the idea of functional reproduction).  Specifically, the relative shift from 
state legitimation to party-level legitimation, which correlates with the above described first 
displacement from state to (party) government, sediments and boosts state legitimacy: party democracy 
allows the state to restrict effective intrusions and dampens the future possibility of being directly 
presented with overly disintegrative or functionally-damaging claims (see also Beetham 1991: 169-
71).246 Through the relative shift towards party-level legitimation, the dynamics of claim-making – and 
politicization more generally – are increasingly transferred to the party system (with its reshuffling of 
office-holding parties): new claims or objections are supposed to pass through the democratic-
competitive (Schumpeterian) party channel; unsatisfied claimants should simply, as it is often said, 
either vote for another party next time around or perhaps politically mobilize themselves.  
With regards to the post-1970s governance turn, as described, the unequal intermingling of state 
and party of the post-1970s/1990s period has involved a further policy-selective diminishing of 
‘politicization’. Importantly, as this particular policy-selective downgrading of ‘responsiveness’ – in 
which certain areas are sought (at least nominally) displaced whereas other areas remain increasingly 
formally controlled/managed – seeks to depoliticize the party system, the turn from government to 
governance constitutes the second, and most recent, overall political-institutional displacement; a 
                                                          
246 At the socio-psychological level, this displacement process implies a weakening of citizens’ ability to causally 
link a certain bad/good performance (or non-performance) to the operations of the state.  
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displacement further backgrounding the politicization process, and pushing it one step further away 
from the state and its still operating functional activities.  
 
 
11.3 A discussion: Two tension-filled frameworks  
In this concluding section I shall try to further unpack and explicate the above arguments concerning 
the reconfigured status of the legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting by very briefly theoretically 
discussing selected elements of Wolfgang Streeck’s (2014) recent book Buying Time and Boltanski & 
Chiapello’s (2005) The New Spirit of Capitalism. As mentioned earlier, while very different, these two 
post-millennial works at least indirectly focus on some of the dynamics of, and changes in, the 
antagonistic structures of the broadly construed neoliberal period.247 To be clear, no attempt at a 
comparison between the two works shall be made. More importantly, this short exercise is by no means 
exhaustive; it should merely be perceived as a very brief consideration of selected elements for the 
purposes of analytical illustration and discussion.248  
 
 
11.3.1 Questioning democratic capitalism 
Although Streeck’s (2014: 14) book Buying Time at first glance sets up his book as a kind of recasting 
of what he loosely terms the ‘Frankfurt crisis theories of the 1970s’ for the neoliberal period – 
seemingly referring to Habermas, Offe and O’Connor – Buying Time does not explicitly/directly take 
                                                          
247 The original French version of The New Spirit of Capitalism was published in 1999.  
248 Another point to bear in mind: this study’s overall analysis does not take departure in the same analytical unit 
of analysis as the two works to be discussed. While this study perceives things from the ISI of the state and 
focuses on the governance-situated dynamics of legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting, Streeck (2014) analyzes 
neoliberalism in relation to the contradictory relationship between democracy and capitalism and Boltanski & 
Chiapello (2005), arguably operating at a relatively more ideational level, concentrates their energy on the 
dialectical historical relationship between ‘critique’ and capitalism. This principally dissimilar analytical 
perspective obviously implies very different mechanisms, empirical interests, theoretical implications, etc. – 
differences which cannot be systematically treated in this study.   
261 
 
on board their perspectives/insights.249 Instead, Buying Time, and Streeck’s (2011) earlier New Left 
Review article, sets up an alternative analytical framework for analyzing the neoliberal period focused 
on the crisis-inducing contradictory relationship between democracy and capitalism – what might be 
termed a democracy versus capitalism approach. Through this approach he, amongst other things, 
construes the post-1970s period as a series of near-crises temporary cancelled by the three monetary 
‘stopgaps’ of inflation, public debt and private debt. According to Streeck (2014: 57) these 
crises/stopgaps were ultimately triggered by the antagonistic relationship – the ‘very old tension’ – 
between democracy and capitalism. More generally, Streeck (Ibid.: 58) argues, the post-WW2 period of 
so-called ‘democratic capitalism’ institutionalized two ‘competing principles of distribution’, namely 
‘market justice’ and ‘social justice’.250  
While it is of course not possible to go through or tackle the myriad of aspects that are usually 
interestingly examined by Streeck – let alone his analysis of the emergence of a Hayekian-neoliberal 
EU-based order or his pessimistic diagnosis of the post-2007-8 crisis period more generally – it is 
productive for the purposes of this study’s above discussion to put emphasis on two key problems of his 
democracy versus capitalism approach.  
Firstly, and most importantly, Streeck’s (e.g., 2014: 55-63, 173) approach effectively a priori 
analytically identifies democracy and (what he terms) ‘democratic politics’ with ‘social justice’, that is, 
socially progressive (i.e., egalitarian-redistributive) forces.251 Because his approach in this way (1) 
implicitly equates legitimation with specifically democratic legitimation – and more generally allows 
him to sidestep the question of (state) legitimation altogether252 – and (2) tends to infuse democracy 
with a socio-economically progressive content, his analysis is less able to construe state legitimation in 
a multidimensional and temporal manner. Importantly, this makes it difficult for him to analytically 
                                                          
249 This section draws partly on elements from Celik (2016b). 
250 In Streeck (2011: 7) he, in a similar manner, presents democratic capitalism as being ‘ruled by two conflicting 
principles (…) of resource allocation’: while the one operates ‘according to marginal productivity’, the other 
operates according to ‘social need or entitlement’. 
251 In Streeck (2011: 7) he also explicitly identifies democratic politics with ‘democratic claims for protection and 
redistribution’. More recently, in a footnote, Streeck (2015: 59, fn. 10) effectively reveals that he equates his 
understanding of democracy with social democracy as such. 
252 Streeck’s Buying Time does generally not engage in elaborate social-theoretical or analytical discussions of key 
terms such as the state, legitimation, politics, etc.  
262 
 
operate with different historically propensity-varying institutional forms or sources of legitimation – or 
more specifically: it makes his approach analytically unable to adequately grasp the above argued post-
1970s reconfiguration of state legitimation. Had he directly/explicitly applied the legitimation and 
accumulation functions approach – or perhaps this study’s modified version – he would arguably have 
been better able to grasp the fact that, as argued above, a main sociological and socio-psychological 
condition of possibility for the post-1970s development has been the long-term intergenerational 
transformation of popular value priorities and behavioral patterns, entailing a possibly irreversibly 
heightened popular expectation of ever-widening economic growth and consumption prospects and, 
more generally, a heightened micro-situated normative and practical alignment with the prevailing 
fiscal-functional dynamics.  
While Buying Time (2014: e.g., 31, 58–9, 61, 69, fn. 39, see also Streeck 2012a) a few times 
alludes to a more marketized popular culture and Streeck’s empirical account of the neoliberal period 
generally tends to implicitly showcase a popular erosion of ‘social justice’ conceptions – as argued, 
largely unknowingly his conception of monetary ‘stopgaps’ implicitly presuppose a more 
output/performance-based form of legitimation – his democracy versus capitalism approach prevents 
the analysis from incorporating these insights and thus rejecting the untenable presupposed necessary 
equation of democracy with ‘social justice’; his analytical approach makes the analysis systematically 
overlook the causal effectiveness of the existence of a mass basis for the neoliberal development and 
the dynamics of the legitimatory reconfiguration of the post-1970s notably involving a relative 
historical shift towards a more self-legitimating fiscal accumulation.  
In a somewhat similar manner as the LAF scholars (see above) – and particularly Habermas – 
Streeck infuses his conception of democracy (and thus the contradiction between democracy and 
capitalism) with a historically specific content, which implicitly generally involves assuming that the 
consumer-citizens share his socially-progressive preferences.253 Like also partly discussed earlier, this 
feature most likely stems from an inaccurate conception of the GA period – and thus by extension a 
faulty analytically opposition between this period and the post-1970s one – which identifies it too 
exclusively with ‘de-commodification’ and the Golden Age of ‘social justice’ rather than the 
                                                          
253 For a particular argument against construing democracy as having a specific content, see more generally, for 
example, Ross (1946).   
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consolidation of an overall national growth-oriented and consumption-optimizing agenda, possibly 
irreversibly activating a range of socio-psychological mechanisms of escalation, etc. While the LAF 
approach may partly share the urge to implicitly imply certain normative priorities (for example 
through its conception of politicization, as discussed above), contrary to Streeck’s alternative 
democracy versus capitalism approach, it principally analytically allows for a multidimensional and 
temporally-based conception of state legitimation; in other words, without breaking with the core 
analytical tenets of the approach, it principally allows for the possibility of different historically 
propensity-varying institutional forms or sources of legitimation, as argued for above.  
Secondly, and very much relatedly, had he directly/explicitly applied the LAF approach he would 
have been better able to perceive the state-crafting dynamics and strategies critically underpinning the 
post-1970s governance-situated period, as discussed throughout this study. Although, as argued, a 
couple of times briefly and nominally recognizing the importance of a ‘strong state’ (e.g., 2014: 55–7; 
see also more recently Streeck 2015) – although without systematically thinking through the analytical 
consequences of this – Streeck’s Buying Time (2014: e.g., 4, 20, 28, 39, 40, 45, 159) generally 
effectively construes neoliberalism in a stereotypical capitalism-skeptical manner, as implying both a 
self-regulatory, de-regulated, privatized, and liberalized order and a defensive, hollowed out, shrinking 
and private-sector-controlled form of state/government. In light of the overall state-crafting framework 
launched/developed in this study, this is of course unproductive, to say the least.   
One problematic implication of this (out of several) may be highlighted. For example, while 
Streeck (2014: 10-20) correctly points out both that (1) the ‘financialization’ of capitalism was not 
really foreseen by the ‘Frankfurt crisis theories of the 1970s’ and that (2) they generally overrated the 
possibilities for a popular ‘legitimation crisis’, his argument that it was actually the ‘revolt of capital’ 
(ibid.: 3), which, ‘in the shape of its organizations, its organizers and its owners’ (ibid.: 16), broke the 
postwar social contract, is less productive. Most importantly, by putting most of the causal weight on 
the ‘revolt of capital’ – a maneuver which of course is informed by his capitalism-oriented critique of 
neoliberalism and his analytically less flexible overall democracy versus capitalism approach – his 
analysis unfortunately fails to take adequately into account not only the important reconfiguration of the 
socio-psychological value priorities of the consumer-citizens and the broader legitimatory dynamics of 
the post-1970s period, as discussed above, but also the almost endless state-crafting-facilitated forces 
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and dynamics critically underpinning the PK phenomenon, the 2007-8 crisis and neoliberalism more 
generally.  
 
 
11.3.2 Questioning the dialectic 
Like Streeck, although writing more than a decade earlier and in a more discursively-situated 
sociological vein, Boltanski & Chiapello’s (2005) book The New Spirit of Capitalism can be understood 
as a synthetic capitalism-skeptical analysis of the dynamics and antagonistic forces of the neoliberal 
period. Although, as mentioned, their de facto primarily discursively-situated analysis focuses on 
principally different mechanisms, empirical interests, theoretical considerations, etc. – and although, 
like in the case of Streeck, this selective exercise makes it impossible (and less relevant) to 
systematically reflect on all the analytical implications of the many arguments and dimensions of their 
book in this study – it is arguably nevertheless productive to briefly discuss a few aspects of Boltanski 
& Chiapello’s book. Abstractly put, The New Spirit of Capitalism, in its own way, productively engages 
with the general question of the (necessary) extra-economic conditions of possibility for economic 
organization.   
Very briefly and non-exhaustively put, The New Spirit of Capitalism nominally or rhetorically 
draws on Weber’s Protestant Ethic work – although rejecting his claim about capitalism no longer 
requiring a supporting ethical/transcendental structure (Boltanski & Chiapello 2005: 46, fn. 21) – and 
points to the historical succession, based on a reading of management texts/literature, of three ‘spirits of 
capitalism’ that are manifested in correlative distinctive organizational/leadership typologies. These 
spirits of capitalism are ideological, mainly serving to maintain motivational support for capitalist 
profit-maximization but also to smoothly withhold this dynamic (see Chiapello & Fairclough 2002: 
187, passim). Importantly, capitalism (or the spirits of capitalism) is dialectically connected to various 
forms of capitalism-skeptical ‘critique’; these extra-capitalistic critiques and justificatory demands are 
both ontologically constitutive of capitalism (pivotal for its functioning) and have been sought 
strategically ‘assimilated’ by it.   
For the specific purposes of this study, three arguments against Boltanski & Chiapello’s overall 
framework may be selectively highlighted. Firstly, and perhaps most importantly, in a manner 
somewhat resembling Streeck’s approach, Boltanski & Chiapello seem to a priori assume that 
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capitalism’s requirement of a dialectically constitutive moral/justificatory basis necessarily has a 
‘critical’ (in the sense of socially/culturally progressive) content or at least is of an extra-capitalistic 
origin. The question is less whether critique and ‘justifications’ are causally constitutive than, as has 
been argued, what kind/type of overall normative assessment-logic historically prevails and what 
specific content underpinning the legitimatory order dominates.254 As Willig (2009: 516, 513) for 
example argues, critique is not only increasingly regarded as a ‘strategic weapon’, it has also ‘become 
an internal affair’; it has shifted from being ‘externally-oriented’ to being more ‘introverted’.  
Secondly, their framework is tension-filled. While analytically presupposing the ontologically 
constitutive necessity of ‘critique’, Boltanski & Chiapello (2005: xliii) nevertheless admit/recognize 
that the post-1980s may have seen a period of a temporary ‘waning of critique’. Thus, in this way, they 
accept a temporary ‘disarmament’ or ‘ideological neutralization’ of critique (Ibid.: 41); for a certain 
period of time, capitalism is able to somehow ‘evade the obstacles critique creates’ (Ibid.: 42). 
Importantly, besides the fact that the question of how, why and through whom (or what mechanisms) 
this ‘disarmament’ of critique operates remains ambiguous, it is also unclear why an extra-capitalistic 
critique should necessarily reappear (let alone in the same form or infused with the same content, 
etc.).255 In other words, they seem to be stuck: if they insist on pushing the argument of a ‘waning of 
                                                          
254 Although inter alia operating at a different analytical level, Polanyi’s (1944) analysis, launched in his classical 
book The Great Transformation, seems to make a somewhat similar problematic assumption. For example, his 
countermovement concept arguably not only relies on a certain socio-psychological consciousness of negative 
market externalities but also an implicit assumption about the existence of the effective political-organizational 
means to mobilize this contingently experienced indignation. While the countermovement may be a constitutive 
element of economic organization, this neither guarantees that it necessarily implies socially protective measures 
nor technically speaking excludes the possibility that a full ‘disembedding’ might occur, since the ‘fictitious’ 
status of land, labour and money as commodities is technically speaking (i.e., not normatively) questionable (on 
this latter point, see also Nitzan & Bichler 2009: 86-7, fn. 1; Fraser 2014: 547-8). More generally, like Streeck and 
Boltanski & Chiapello, although of course in markedly different ways, Polanyi a priori analytically 
underappreciates the possibilities for a non-trivial reconfiguration of both the normative-assessment logic and the 
content of legitimatory dynamics.  
255 As they admit, they do not consider the ‘conditions on which the degree of effectiveness of critique in 
determinate historical situations depends’ (Boltanski & Chiapello 2005: 41). Again, a brief comparison with the 
Polanyian perspective may be loosely drawn. While the Polanyian perspective, as Block (2001: xxv) formulates it 
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critique’ to the end – which they explicitly refuse to do, arguing for example that the ‘dialectic of 
capitalism and its critique necessarily proves interminable’ (Ibid.: 40, emphasis added) – their 
analytical framework critically breaks down; if they do not, they have a weak basis for construing, 
within their particular framework, the reconfiguration of legitimatory dynamics of the post-1970s 
period, as argued above.  
Thirdly, as shall also be touched upon in a more general manner later, The New Spirit of 
Capitalism overall seems to under-asses the historically speaking relatively increasing degree to which, 
as Weber (2001: 214, emphasis added) might put it, the system ‘rests on mechanical foundations’, 
rather than a motivating ideological ‘spirit’ (see also Darmon 2011) – although as an empirical and 
historical observation it should be stressed at the outset that such former component (for sociological 
reasons, not principal ones) in no way exhausts the dynamics of state-functional reproduction.  
 
 
11.4 Concluding discussion 
It seems meaningful to end this theoretically-oriented chapter by very briefly reflecting on the 
implications of the above discussion for the Marcusean sub-question posed in this study’s introduction. 
Although this has in many ways been indirectly discussed above, it seems productive to for example 
more formally ask whether and to what extent the legitimatory dynamics underpinning the post-1970s 
governance turn has implied a bridging, reconfiguration or genuine overcoming of the tension-filled 
relationship between legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting? 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
in his authoritative introduction to the 2001 edition of the book, implies that popular resistance emerges ‘as the 
consequences of unrestrained markets become apparent’, it is not clear what historically stable mechanisms 
ensures that negative market externalities necessarily ‘become apparent’ at the micro-situated socio-psychological 
level. As Block (Ibid.: xxviii, emphasis added) formulates it on behalf of Polanyi: the ‘movement toward a 
laissez-faire economy needs the countermovement to create stability’. Or: the ‘protective countermovement had to 
happen to prevent the disaster of a disembedded economy’ (Ibid.: xxviii, emphasis in original). While this is 
historically speaking less controversial, although things did not necessarily proceed in this manner, there is no 
necessary reason why the countermovement or the re-embedding should reappear again.  
 
 
267 
 
As argued, the post-1970s co-productive governance phenomenon presuppose, and were allowed 
for by, two types of heavily interrelated socio-ontological conditions of possibility: on the one hand, a 
tweaking of popular value priorities and behavioral patterns and on the other, a relatively historical shift 
towards a relatively more self-legitimating mode of fiscal accumulation. Whereas the former pattern 
implies both a possibly irreversibly heightened popular socio-psychological expectation of ever-
widening economic growth and consumption prospects and a heightened micro-situated normative and 
practical alignment with the prevailing fiscal-functional dynamics, the latter implies a non-trivial 
relative intensification of both the output/performance propensity and the specifically marketized-
fiscalized content of this increasing output/performance-orientation. Perceiving things against this 
background, it is clear that the development has been non-trivial: it has entailed a considerable 
loosening of the state-situated tension-filled relationship between legitimation and fiscal accumulation. 
Moreover, as have been argued continuously throughout this study, the transformation of the dynamics 
of legitimatory state-crafting should to a very large extent be construed in the context of the ISI of the 
state and the historically changing dynamics of legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting.  
That said, it is less productive to speak of a genuine overcoming of the tension-filled relationship 
between legitimation and fiscal accumulation. Firstly, as argued, the development has implied a relative 
historical shift and thus neither a rejection of the necessity of legitimatory state-crafting nor the 
effective deactivation of alternative types/sources of legitimation. Moreover, in this relation it is of 
course principally likely that the dynamics of legitimatory state-crafting characteristic of the post-1970s 
period at one point may be retracted – although this should be considered a both empirically unlikely 
event given the overall direction of the various trends and, in any case, an analytical sluggish dynamic 
given that, as argued, the tweaking of value priorities take place through a partly irreversible long-term 
gradual intergenerational process.   
Secondly, rather than an objective overcoming of societal tensions as such – which was the level 
at which Marcuse’s question operated – the specifically state-situated tension-filled relationship 
between legitimation and fiscal accumulation has become increasingly co-produced; as legitimation has 
become more co-produced, the specifically state-situated tension has become increasingly socio-
psychologically untied from the dynamics of state-crafting. More generally, in the context of the kind of 
corporate functionalism advocated in this study – in which inter alia states are perceived as functionally 
believable transcendental and administratively formalized organizationally- and institutionally-
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emergent juridical actors with a high degree of agency and a strong historically concentrated self-
interested orientation – what matters is the extent to which a certain tension-filled relationship exists 
within the state, i.e. whether it exists from the perspective of the ISI of the state. Thus, broadly in line 
with the critical realist philosophy of social science orientation discussed in chapter 3, in a situation in 
which the tension-filled relationship between two of the state’s functions increasingly subjectively 
appears as a series of more fragmented tension dynamics, it is less a genuine objective overcoming of 
tensions as such than a specific displacement-situated socio-psychological untying of the dynamics of 
legitimation and ‘responsibility’ from state-crafting dynamics. Importantly, while tensions remain as 
generic activated objective forces, the increased co-production of specifically state-functional tensions 
allows for a broadening of the scope for these societal tensions to take on increasingly absurd, 
spectacular, idiosyncratic and disassociated forms.  
In sum, it is arguably not only possible but also analytically productive to argue for a governance-
situated reconfiguration of state legitimation while firmly maintaining the utility of the LAF approach. 
That is, the discussed post-1970s reconfiguration of the tension-filled functional relationship between 
legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting has been analytically meaningfully argued for from within this 
approach, utilizing its overall arguments and core concepts. As discussed, contrary to, for example, 
Streeck’s approach – which also more generally suffers from inter alia under-assessing the causal 
significance of statehood more generally – this study’s analysis has arguably not been hampered by a 
principal tension between the analytical framework and the empirical dynamics of the governance-
situated post-1970s development. Thus, although it has both been theoretically modified (in key 
instances) and historically reinterpreted, the legitimation and accumulation functions approach presents 
an analytically meaningful and productive initial analytical toolbox for analyzing the post-1970s period 
of governance.  
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Chapter 12. The Micro-Situated Dynamics of State Legitimation 
 
In this chapter I shall briefly theoretically discuss some of the main micro-situated dynamics and 
mechanisms underpinning state legitimation. This is largely done in an attempt to make the arguments 
developed and launched previously concerning the macro-level reconfiguration of legitimatory 
dynamics more plausible; to both make the reconfiguration more social-theoretically credible and to 
allow for a meaningful consideration of the reproduction of the governance turn at the micro-level. 
Since the overall focus has especially been on the state-crafting-situated legitimatory conditions of 
possibility for the governance phenomenon, this chapter primarily focuses on theorizing the processes, 
forces and mechanisms underpinning the argued non-trivial gradual tweaking of value priorities in an 
overall more fiscally functional direction. In this capacity, although it has partly been touched upon in 
relation to the GA period in chapter 7, the chapter is interested in theorizing how the generalized 
appearance of an inner-normatively identifying postwar consumer-citizen subject can be meaningfully 
analyzed when theoretically engaging with this process at a micro-level of analysis.    
Indirectly, this to some extent provides an alternative micro-situated way of discussing two 
interrelated larger questions. First, the question of how – or through what mechanisms – state-
functional reproduction takes place (particularly in the governance period) in a situation in which, as 
argued, the formation and tweaking of value priorities generally operate through a long-term and 
endogenously-driven process. Second, the question of the relative importance of state legitimation and 
legitimatory functional pressure vis-à-vis a Weber-like ‘mechanical’ state-functional reproduction. 
Although this is not the main objective, towards the end of this chapter this latter discussion shall 
briefly be indirectly engaged with through a discussion of an alternative ideal-typical critical-cynical 
subject/subjectivity (as also shortly informally mentioned in chapter 7). Through these two relatively 
axiomatically construed ideal-typical subjectivities – whose relative distribution and intensity, along 
with their emergence, consolidation and reconfiguration, vary historically and in a heavily class-
situated manner – the chapter shall present a series of tentative causal propositions regarding the micro-
situated dynamics of state legitimation (to ideally be tested or engaged with in another research 
context).  
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Two things should be stressed from the outset. Firstly, as also generally argued earlier, the usually 
productive (although not required) decision to examine aspects of a certain phenomenon at the micro-
level in no way necessarily implies the rejection of macro-mechanisms or the presupposition that the 
relevant causal factors are (human) actor-centric (or even interpersonal). Secondly, this chapter’s 
theorization is, obviously, a non-exhaustive and perennially unfinished exercise, which naturally 
requires further theoretical consideration and empirical corroboration.256 Rather than intending to 
necessarily present novel views on the micro-situated dynamics of legitimation, the objective is 
primarily to both accumulate theoretical ammunition and analytically synthesize various mechanisms 
for the purposes of bolstering some of the arguments concerning the governance-situated legitimatory 
changes of the post-1970s made in the earlier chapters.  
The chapter is split into two main sections. The first section theorizes two overall types of micro-
situated processes and mechanisms (or sets of mechanisms) underpinning state-functional reproduction. 
The second section tentatively and briefly theorizes the question of the necessity of legitimation and the 
distinction between normative/value priorities and behavior more generally.  
 
 
12.1 The two-legged logic of micro-situated reproduction 
As mentioned, the task of this chapter is to theoretically outline, based inter alia on a selective 
analytical synthesis of some of the extant relevant literature, some of the key micro-situated processes 
and mechanisms underpinning state-functional reproduction. More specifically, the aim is to theorize 
the emergent consolidation of an inner-normatively identifying consumer-citizen subject – that is, a 
form of subjectivity that ‘misrecognizes’ (in the largely Bourdieusian sense) the functional-objective 
dynamics of the social and institutional-organizational order, i.e. a functionally favorable form of 
subjectivity characterized by a non-trivial degree of authentic inner-normative identification with the 
macro-structural status quo. Clearly, whether this specific terminology should be altered or not, this is 
another specific way of addressing and generally accepting the effective operation of so-called ‘false 
                                                          
256 It should be considered part of an ongoing informal theorization of mine – ideally speaking a small step in an 
imaginable future larger research agenda focused on, as mentioned earlier, the generic process and mechanism of 
‘selling out’.  
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consciousness’. As Lukes (2005: 9) authoritatively argued in the context of discussing his ‘third face of 
power’, it is not meaningful to ‘dispense with a defensible understanding of the notions of ‘real 
interests’ and ‘false consciousness’’.257  
It is helpful to initially introduce an analytical (and in that sense empirically artificial) distinction 
between two overall types of processes/mechanisms, namely (1) those that are more generic and 
ahistorical (and thus operate relatively independently of whatever specific context that may be of 
interest) and (2) those that are more historically volatile and heavily correlated with specific corporate-
functional dynamics.258 Obviously, while overall proceeding on the basis of this analytical distinction, 
many of the processes and mechanisms outlined in this chapter always already dialectically straddle the 
two overall types, and the chapter thus many times strays from maintaining this grouping.   
 
 
12.1.1 The generic/ahistorical leg 
Starting with the generic/ahistorical leg, I shall highly non-exhaustively point to seven aspects worth 
considering in relation to the micro-situated dynamics of state legitimation. Firstly, for Bourdieu (1998: 
77, 2000: 177, 175), a ‘relation of ontological complicity’ or ‘immediate, tacit agreement’ exists 
‘between mental structures and the objective structures of social space’: that is, more specifically, in a 
                                                          
257 Arguably, whether they explicitly acknowledge this or not, and whether it is (neo-)Foucauldians speaking in 
their own ways of forms of ‘subjectification’ or (neo-)Marxists speaking of ‘mystification’ or ‘fetishization’, etc., 
most contemporary analytical perspectives or ‘schools’ share a minimal level of de facto acceptance of the 
principle of false consciousness.  
258 Somewhat similarly, as Burawoy (2012: 192, emphasis removed) argues in relation to the reproduction of 
domination, a fruitful question is whether it is dependent on (1) ‘social relations independent of the particular 
individual’ or whether it appears through forces that are (2) ‘at least partially independent of the particular social 
relations into which an individual is inserted’. For example, in specific relation to Bourdieu, Burawoy (Ibid.: 202) 
productively emphasizes the former’s general underestimation of the importance of ‘the configuration of 
institutions’ for ensuring domination. That said, Burawoy’s analysis unnecessarily dismisses the Bourdieusian 
perspective (the second perspective above). Importantly, the two sides addressed by Burawoy are not mutually 
exclusive. Rather, they are critically mutually reinforcing.  
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manner broadly consistent with the philosophy of social science of this study, ‘[t]he symbolic order is 
based on the imposition on all agents of structuring structures which derive part of their consistency and 
resistance to the fact that they are (…) adjusted to the objective structures of the social world’. In this 
relation, two dimensions, focusing on relatively ahistorical and deep-seated bodily-encoded forces, of 
Bourdieu’s work seem particularly productive.  
 (1) Bourdieu (1998: vii, 2000: 138) famously points to the importance of the ‘habitus’ – that is, 
‘incorporated structures’ and dispositions, the ‘systems of schemes of perception, appreciation 
and action’ that are ‘inscribed in [the body] by past experiences’.  
 (2) The notions of ‘symbolic power’ and ‘symbolic violence’, which emphasizes the functional 
performativity or causal importance of the mechanisms of domination being unregistered, 
concealed or hidden, etc., i.e. ‘misrecognized’ (see also Burawoy 2012; Swartz 2013).  
 
Secondly, an argument concerning the abstract micro-situated mechanisms of state reproduction 
can also be drawn from the realm of philosophy of social science. In the overall and implicit spirit of, 
for example, György Lukács, the early Frankfurt School members, Bourdieu’s sociology and Roy 
Bhaskar’s critical realist thinking,259 it can be argued that the contemporary scientific primacy of the, 
broadly speaking, neo-positivist philosophy of science (on this, see also, e.g., Jackson 2011) has 
gradually mutated and descended into what may be described as a micro-situated neo-positivism.260 Put 
simply, this micro-situated neo-positivism implies the existence of a correspondence between the 
necessarily empiricist and (pace Durkheim, usually) methodologically individualist properties of 
scientific neo-positivism – as outlined in chapter 3 (see also notably Bhaskar 1975, 1979) – and the 
patterns of micro-situated activity; that dynamics associated with scientific neo-positivism serves to 
                                                          
259 On Lukács’ and the Frankfurt School’s general understanding of ideology, see, for example, Eyerman (1981).   
260 Although it of course requires further elaboration, this shift can to a certain extent be conceived as alternatively 
or simultaneously implying a shift from an (more Peircean-like) epistemological/methodological to an (more 
Deweyan-like) ontological understanding of the so-called ‘pragmatic theory of truth’ – that is, a mutation of the 
pragmatic concept of epistemological/methodological truth into a pragmatic concept of ontological truth.  
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tendentially incline agents to disregard the emergent, structural, macro-mechanism-based or 
unobservable aspects of micro-situated activity.261     
Thirdly, the argued tendential disregard for extra-individuality is corroborated by socio-
psychological literature which speaks of the generalized operation of a so-called ‘fundamental 
attribution error’ – that is, the ‘general tendency to overestimate the importance of personal or 
dispositional factors relative to environmental influences’ (Ross 1977: 184; see also more generally 
Gilbert & Malone 1995).262 From this perspective, decisions and orientations at the micro-situated level 
tend to promote the drawing of ‘hasty conclusions’, which generally weigh ‘personal dispositions’ over 
the ‘relevant environmental forces and constraints’ or the ‘potency of situational pressures and 
constraints acting upon all subjects’ (Ross 1977: 184). Arguably, the tendential downgrading of 
structural factors integral to this attribution error provides a basic non-exhaustive socio-psychological 
condition for the reproduction of social stratification (structurally conditioning the biased distribution of 
‘life chances’). In other words, it is possible to locate a self-reinforcing structural homology between 
the attribution error and the neo-positivist model.    
Fourthly, the above addressed continuous micro-situated emergent meshing of subjective-
cognitive computations and material-objective textures and forces has also found implicit expression in, 
and been indirectly analytically and empirically corroborated through, Karl E. Weick’s (e.g., 1988, 
                                                          
261 The specific process through which this mutation from scientific to micro-situated neo-positivism occurs is of 
course more difficult to unpack. Two tentative mutually reinforcing processes, pending further theorization, might 
be non-exhaustively mentioned – the first flowing from scientific to micro-situated practices and the other from 
micro-situated to scientific practices. (1) To the extent that scientific dynamics causally influence practical (e.g., 
policy-oriented) dynamics, the effective mainstreaming of neo-positivism within the (social-)scientific realm, 
which all else equal tends to tweak scientific questions, discussions, explanations, results, etc., in a more 
empiricist direction, indirectly serves to tendentially increase micro-situated ‘phenomenalist’ thinking. (2) The 
ongoing nourishing and reproduction of micro-situated neo-positivism itself helps to form the dynamics of 
scientific practices: academic work, recruitment processes, student activity, etc., are, in a Bourdeusian-like always 
already deep-seated and bodily-encoded manner, tweaked in a neo-positivist direction.  
262 Gilbert & Malone (1995: 21) speaks of the ‘fundamental attribution error’ in the larger context of a more 
generic ‘correspondence bias’, which refers to ‘the tendency to draw inferences about a person’s unique and 
enduring dispositions from behaviors that can be entirely explained by the situations in which they occur’.   
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1993; Weick et al. 2005) ‘sense-making’ conception. Partly through analyses of empirical events, and 
notably examinations of ‘crisis situations’ such as the case of the famous ‘Mann Gulch fire disaster’, 
Weick (1993: 635) has developed an understanding of sense-making that ‘emphasizes that people try to 
make things rationally accountable to themselves and others’ and focuses on agents’ constant ‘efforts to 
create order and make retrospective sense of what occurs’. For Weick (1988: 306), as for the 
pragmatists, ‘action is a means to get feedback, learn, and build an understanding of unknown 
environments’. Importantly, Weick et al. (2005: 415) speaks of sense-making, in a pragmatist vein, as a 
‘redrafting of an emerging story so that it becomes more comprehensive, incorporates more of the 
observed data, and is more resilient in the face of criticism’. It thus involves a micro-situated 
rationalization process: it can be construed as the ‘ongoing retrospective development of plausible 
images that rationalize what people are doing’ (Ibid.: 409). Importantly, there is clearly a conservative 
dimension to this process: for example, as Weick et al. (Ibid.: 409) argue, in the context of crisis events 
or subjective disruptions, agents ‘look first for reasons that will enable them to resume the interrupted 
activity and stay in action’.263 
Fifthly, this in many ways conservative dimension of the sense-making process has indirectly 
been strongly confirmed by empirically-oriented scholarship examining the micro-situated socio-
psychological process underpinning status quo-maintaining attitudes. For example, as Crandall & 
Beasley (2001: 80, 79) point out, the individual ‘perceptual system prefers a simple, clear, harmonious, 
uniform perception of moral value’, implying that agents seek to avoid mentally demanding 
‘ambivalent representations’ and ‘are motivated to preserve simple affective representations’. 
Moreover, questions of legitimacy and moral worth seem to be greatly connected to the ‘attribution of 
controllability’ – that is, the extent to which a person or an entity is perceived to be causally 
responsible, or in control of the relevant situation (Ibid.: 80-3). Connecting this to both the attribution 
                                                          
263 This conservative micro-situated dimension has also been implicitly engaged with by Thomas Leithäuser 
through his social-psychological notion of ‘everyday consciousness’ (on this, see Illeris 2003: 403-4). Put simply, 
everyday consciousness tends to block learning processes and rearrange, through an ‘automatic sorting 
mechanism’, the daily fragmented series of stimuli through the structured activation of underlying thematic ‘pre-
understandings’ (Ibid.: 403). Importantly, the everyday consciousness’s activation of such ‘semi-automatic 
defense mechanisms’ serves as ‘a massive defence of the already acquired understandings’ (Ibid.: 404, 403).    
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error mentioned above and the motivation for simple, harmonious and controllable units, it is arguably 
possible to observe a ‘conservative’ and individualist bias (stressing, e.g., individual ‘intent’) 
underpinning micro-situated justificatory perceptions, which all else equal tends to reinforce the macro-
societal status quo.  
   As part of Olson & Hafer’s (2001: 158) socio-psychological examination of the observed 
relatively passive toleration of social marginalization by (objectively speaking) ‘outgroups’, they inter 
alia emphasize the following three factors, assumed to ‘influence the behavioral tolerance of 
deprivation’: 
 (1) People generally want to believe in a ‘just world’ – a discomfort-minimizing 
motivation that ‘can serve to ‘bolster the status quo’’ (Ibid.: 163).  
 (2) Agents, for various reasons, may be motivated to deny or minimize the extent of 
actual personal discrimination or deprivation (Ibid.: 163).  
 (3) Agents are motivated to ‘understate their anger about personal deprivation’ – a 
process induced by mechanisms of ‘self-representation’, for example, trying to avoid 
‘creating an impression of incompetence, selfishness, or being a whiner’ (Ibid.: 168).       
 
Sixthly, the mechanisms of family reproduction arguably also play a role in tendentially fostering 
a generally status quo-maintaining outlook.264 In this relation, the following tentative proposition, 
which of course ultimately requires further analytical and empirical corroboration, etc., may be 
suggested: for both biological-reproductive and moral reasons – linked to, for example, the general urge 
not to want to diminish the child’s future opportunities, etc. – having children all else equal downgrades 
the revolutionary potential of parents (and thus upgrades the conservative dynamics of micro-situated 
activity).  
                                                          
264 Historically speaking, the nuclear family appears as a relatively stable social entity: although neither 
necessarily ‘a universal model’ nor ‘the most ancient institution of human communities’, an interdisciplinary team 
of scientists examining a burial recently discovered in the Eulau region (in Germany) dating back around 4,600 
years, have ‘established the presence of the classic nuclear family’, providing ‘the oldest authentic molecular 
genetic evidence so far’ (Haak et al. 2008: 18229).  
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Seventhly, there is a strong temporal component to the micro-situated reproduction of state 
legitimation. In this relation, Bourdieu’s understanding of the deep-seated bodily-encoded forces, 
activated at an early age, conditioning the continuous micro-situated emergent meshing of subjective-
cognitive computations and material-objective textures and structures sits particularly well with the 
earlier argued broadly speaking long-term endogenously-driven intergenerational case for the particular 
transformation of popular value priorities unfolding during both the GA period and (appearing in a 
reconfigured intensified manner) in the post-1970s period. As argued, the post-WW2 consolidation of a 
cross-national Western European growth-oriented and consumption-optimizing agenda initiated a 
gradual cohort-based irreversible asymmetric endogenous logic of consumption-situated economic 
growth (associated with a number of frustration-escalating properties). As also argued earlier, the 
emergent connection between micro-level habitual normalcy and static macro-level reproduction 
arguably paradoxically serves to introduce changes and condition the micro-situated emergent meshing 
of the subjective-cognitive and the material-objective levels: the long-term persistence of the unrivaled 
economic expansion and popular distribution of affluence of the GA period and the particular repetitive 
nature of postwar capitalist consumption, its increasingly routinized and regularized pattern, over time 
arguably served to gradually tweak the value priorities of the individual household.  
 
 
12.1.2 The historically contextual/institutional-organizational leg 
As argued, besides the more generic/ahistorical ones, it also makes sense to speak of 
processes/mechanisms that are both more historically contextual and heavily correlated with specific 
institutional-organizational corporate dynamics. While these dynamics have in various ways been 
placed at the center of the previous chapters – they are integral to the very state-crafting framework of 
this study – the intention of this section is merely to briefly and non-exhaustively put emphasis on a few 
theoretical aspects associated with this more historically contextual/institutional-organizational leg for 
understanding the micro-situated processes and mechanisms underpinning legitimatory state-crafting.  
The first important aspect to be discussed is the micro-situated implications of what, in the 
context of James S. Coleman’s work, has earlier been described as a governance-situated generally 
historically heightened societal corporatization – that is, the combination of both (1) a quantitative 
proliferation of corporate persons and (2) a qualitative intensification of the (so to speak) 
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corporativeness of corporate persons, two historically contextual trends which together can be said to 
signify the growing ‘marginality of natural persons to corporate actors’ (Coleman 1974: 35, 35-38). It is 
arguably possible to non-exhaustively point to five general implications for the understanding of the 
micro-situated reproduction of the state-functional status quo of this state-crafting-
underpinned/facilitated corporatization process.   
 (1) As agents of organizations/corporations take up roles, positions and offices, they are 
typically ‘replaceable’ (Coleman 1974: 36). In a corporate society, ‘the power held by corporate 
bodies (…) is in the hands of no person, but resides in the corporate actor itself’ (Ibid.: 37). In 
this relation, it can be argued that the corporatization process generally implies a decrease in 
what has earlier been described as global agency – that is, a person’s capacity to positively and 
genuinely affect, change, control or help restructure the key dynamics of certain geographically 
and causally encompassing and comprehensive large-scale social structures.  
 (2) As a function of the above, as corporate entities become increasingly emergent, the relative 
causal saliency of its constitutive bottom-up or lower-level elements all else equal decreases.   
 (3) The process can be construed as implying both the quantitative proliferation and qualitative 
intensification of organizational solipsism and the relative upgrading of the importance of the 
ISI dimension.  
 (4) The process tends to diminish individual responsibility (see also more generally Arendt 
1963; Bauman 1989).  
 (5) The general growing ‘marginality of natural persons to corporate actors’, which is integral to 
the process of corporatization, intensifies a ‘greater sense of powerlessness’ at the 
subjective/psychological level (Coleman 1974: 35, 51).  
 
The second important related aspect concerns the proposition that systematic involvement in 
specific institutional-organizational contexts over time serves to gradually tweak micro-situated value 
priorities in a corporate functional direction – and/or in a concentrated manner further intensify a 
similar ongoing and more long-term generic process. In this relation, Weber’s understanding of work in 
a market-capitalist context – as interpreted by Darmon’s (2011: 201, 204) reading of him and, for 
example, Weber’s assistance in the development of a survey initiated by the German Association for 
Social Policy probing issues related to industrial work – seem to offer a helpful understanding of this 
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temporal-institutional process of ‘inner attuning’ (Eingestelltheit) or ‘inner bonding’ (Bindung) to the 
relevant technical/organizational practices. Although uncertain of the extent to which this was a 
plausible or relevant scenario, and although primarily stressing the unfreedom and the disciplinary and 
coercive aspects of the historical condition of ‘formally free labour’ in a market-capitalist context, 
Weber also took seriously the possibility of ‘the inscription of an habitual orientation to the job as 
unintended consequence of imposed discipline’ (Ibid.: 202, 204).  
Importantly, in light of the overall social-theoretical view of this study, this proposition 
concerning the temporal ‘inner attuning’ process should not merely be considered a feature of, for 
example, the specific institutional configurations of the market-capitalist labour market, but a general 
feature of the active engagement with and enrollment within corporate actors: since, as argued earlier, 
corporate actors are not only hyper-strategic and functionally hardwired but also extraordinary in their 
emergentist powers – i.e. the higher than usual independent extra-individual causality that is 
institutionally and organizationally concentrated and possessed – it is reasonable to expect that 
systematic lower-level entanglement with such entities over time tends to intensify the above argued 
micro-situated emergent meshing of subjective-cognitive computations and material-objective textures 
and structures.        
 
 
12.2 Further legitimatory considerations 
This theoretical outline of some of the implications of corporate activity for micro-situated legitimatory 
dynamics indirectly links up to the larger questions of the necessity of legitimation and the distinction 
between normative priorities and behavior more generally – questions which, although they can merely 
be briefly and tentatively addressed, shall be discussed in this last section.      
As argued earlier, while legitimacy need not have a fixed content, it must, by definition, be based 
on some form of acceptance or consent, which according to the Oxford English Dictionary entails, 
respectively, a ‘[b]elief in or agreement with an idea, theory, statement’ (Acceptance n.d.) and 
‘voluntary agreement to or acquiescence in what another proposes or desires’ (Consent n.d.). Thus, as 
stated earlier, as construed in this study, legitimacy minimally has to entail a non-trivial degree of 
authentic voluntary self-identification, i.e. a meaningful non-violent or non-coercive normative 
coordination between the structural-functional dynamics of the social order, or a specific emergent 
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corporate-institutional entity, and the individual’s inner-normative status (cf., e.g., Beetham 1991; Held 
1996: 155, 197-8). In other words: the question to ask oneself is less whether legitimacy implies 
voluntary acceptance/consent – since this question is, as argued, settled by definition – than whether 
legitimacy is strictly speaking necessary for state-functional reproduction. The answer to this complex 
question must remain double-sided.  
One the one hand, briefly answering this question seems rather simple: while legitimation may be 
sufficient, it is not strictly speaking necessary. Or put differently, functionally-sufficient behavior does 
not necessarily have to imply voluntary acceptance/consent or legitimacy-supporting value priorities.265 
This argument is in line with that of, for example, Abercrombie et al. (2012: 164) who going against 
prevailing Marxist notions of ideology argued that ‘[i]deology is not a necessary condition of existence 
of the economic base’. Also, although without elaborating on this, and seemingly going against his own 
conception of misrecognition and symbolic power, Bourdieu at one point in the postscript of his late 
collective work The Weight of the World seems to share the argument concerning the non-identity 
between value priorities and behavior. While arguing for the continuing importance of ‘[breaking] 
through the screen of often absurd, sometimes odious projections, that mask the malaise or suffering as 
much as they express it’, he next points to the following (perhaps depressive) fact: ‘[p]roducing 
                                                          
265 In this relation, Burawoy’s (2012: 198) otherwise insightful article on The Roots of Domination seems unable 
to systematically distinguish between normative priorities and behavior. Long story short, Burawoy uses his 
participatory field work experience from working in a South Chicago factory to argue for the importance of 
‘workplace games’ – specifically, the game of ‘making out’, which ‘[made] time pass quickly, enabling workers 
to endure otherwise meaningless work’ and helped workers ‘secure ‘compensatory satisfactions and consolation 
prizes’’ and ‘[win] freedom at the margins’ (Ibid.: 193, 195) – for producing a consensual ‘mystified’ form of 
domination. But Burawoy overlooks the non-necessity of mystification and voluntary consent – something which 
his own field work experience unknowingly corroborates. The very fact that Burawoy, as a conscious critical 
neo/post-Marxist sociologist, was simultaneously aware of the logic of ‘making out’ and unable to alter this logic 
of domination reveals the non-necessity of mystification or false consciousness. At one point Burawoy (Ibid.: 
194) makes the argument, in relation to the mentioned workplace games, that ‘[y]ou can’t be serious about 
playing a game (…) if, at the same time, you question its rules and goals’. But this questioning of the rules is not 
impossible; it was actually precisely what Burawoy (as a sociologist) did. The point is rather than it did little to 
change the material dynamics underpinning the institutionally specific forces of domination integral to the factory 
work.   
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awareness of these mechanisms that make life painful, even unlivable, does not neutralize them; 
bringing contradictions to light does not resolve them’ (Bourdieu 1999: 629, emphasis added). Also 
Helm (1971: 57), although arguing in a different context, stressed the need to separate ‘recognition and 
intention’: ‘a consequence can be recognized without being intended, it is not necessarily the case that 
anything at all will happen as a result of a person’s coming to recognize the consequences of his [sic] 
action’. Held (1996: 155, 197-8; cf. Barker 1990: 37-40) also analytically distinguishes between 
different reasons for actors complying with something, differentiating between, inter alia, coercive 
situations and situations of normative acceptance (reserving legitimacy for the latter).266  
On the other hand, even if conformity does not technically speaking necessarily have to imply 
voluntary acceptance/consent or legitimacy-supporting value priorities – this is in principle a logically 
possible scenario – strictly behavioral conformity neither empirically exhausts the category of state-
functional reproduction nor provide a sociologically realistic account of it (see also, more generally, 
Barker 1990: 61-3; cf. more generally Darmon 2011). While the possibility for strictly behavioral 
conformity is particularly salient in the context of corporate actors (with their hyper-strategic, 
functionally hardwired and higher than usual emergentist powers), it is clear that (1) the degree of 
emergentism is, as argued earlier, empirically and historically relative and (2) corporate activity does 
                                                          
266 Although this cannot be treated extensively here, Beetham’s (1991) position on this seems very ambiguous. On 
the one hand, Beetham’s (1991: 20, 18) notion of legitimacy is based on three constitutive/necessary dimensions: 
(1) ‘legal validity’, (2) ‘justifiability of rules in terms of shared beliefs’ and (3) acts ‘expressive of consent’. Thus, 
Beetham’s (1991: 17) second dimension expresses the widely held idea that ‘power is legitimate to the extent that 
the rules of power can be justified in terms of beliefs shared by both dominant and subordinate’. On the other 
hand, Beetham (Ibid. 19, 18, emphasis in original, 90) not only argues that his definition requires ‘the public 
expression of consent’ but that these public expressions are only important because of ‘the contribution they make 
to legitimacy’, not because they offer ‘evidence’ of legitimacy-supporting beliefs. But if acts ‘expressive of 
consent’ does not offer evidence of ‘shared beliefs’, it is unclear how Beetham will ever be able to verify the 
activation of his second necessary dimension. This problem leaves Beetham’s perspective in a problematic 
position. If he dismisses his own second constitutive criteria, namely the existence of ‘shared beliefs’, it would 
unsettle his entire understanding of legitimacy. But if he accepts that the only way to verify the necessary 
existence of ‘shared beliefs’ is to look at acts ‘expressive of consent’, then he simultaneously accepts a very 
superficial and problematic understanding of value priorities that would identify these with behavioral patterns.  
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not exhaust social activity. Empirically speaking, non-consensual behavioral conformity and 
conformity based on consensual legitimacy-supporting value priorities operate together, at historically 
and contextually varying degrees, usually dialectically reinforcing each other. While, technically 
speaking, voluntary legitimacy-supporting value priorities might be sufficient for producing 
conformity, this is equally both empirically problematic and sociologically unrealistic to imagine 
without the simultaneous activation of mechanisms that enforce purely behavioral conformity. Another 
reason why a scenario of exclusively non-consensual behavioral compliance appears unrealistic is, as 
argued, that there are strong forces associated with corporate activity that over time encourages an 
‘inner attuning’ to the particular relevant tasks and objectives: over time, the active engagement with 
and enrollment within corporate actors (as the most functionally believable entities) tends to intensify 
the micro-situated emergent meshing of subjective-cognitive computations and material-objective 
textures and structures.        
 
 
12.2.1 Cynical micro-corporatization 
In this study, a case has been made for the generalized production of voluntary legitimacy-supporting 
popular value priorities, not only in relation to the GA period’s consolidation of a popular socio-
psychological expectation of ever-widening economic growth and consumption prospects but also 
through the processes and mechanisms outlined in this chapter – whether associated with the 
generic/ahistorical leg or the historically contextual/institutional-organizational leg – generally moving  
attitudes in a more fiscally functional direction. The production and relative intensity of voluntary 
legitimacy-conferring value priorities is class-situated: it to a large extent depends on the prevailing 
biased distribution of both resources, entitlements and institutional-organizational authority/leverage 
and social, cultural and cognitive-intellectual resources/competences. The observation that, as pointed 
out earlier, low-status/disadvantaged groups have a higher tendency to ideologically embrace and 
justify the prevailing system/status quo (Jost et al. 2003b; Jost et al. 2005) can, in the overall spirit of 
the early Frankfurt School, be analytically construed as an inverted orthodox Marxian conception: the 
degree and spread of inner-normatively identifying subjectivity is positively correlated with the degree 
of social stratification (cf. Burawoy 2012: 195-7).   
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Of course, this also means that there are alternative ideal-typical forms of subjectivities in play. In 
this relation, the above arguments concerning the general implications for the understanding of the 
micro-situated reproduction of the state-functional status quo of the state-crafting-
underpinned/facilitated corporatization process seem relevant – particularly the point about the 
intensification of a ‘greater sense of powerlessness’ stemming from the overall growing ‘marginality of 
natural persons to corporate actors’ (Coleman 1974: 51, 35). Importantly, this process not only all else 
equal implies a decrease in global agency, it also simultaneously, although this is critically dependent 
on the particular patterns of the class-situated context, might heighten (at least in the short term) the 
possibilities for an increased production of societal and corporate cynicism and the fostering of a 
critical-cynical subjectivity. As addressed earlier, selectively and loosely drawing on the overall 
theoretical contours of Sloterdijk (1987) and Zizek (2012a, 2012b), this ideal-typical critical-cynical 
subjectivity implies a subject that is: (1) critically ‘enlightened’ concerning the functional-objective 
dynamics of the status quo but nevertheless (2) objectively aligned with this order and unable to alter it 
(due to a low degree of global agency in a context of heightened societal corporatization), and therefore 
(3) tendentially develops a sharpened critical attitude but a cynical behavioral pattern. 
According to Sloterdijk (1987: 5), traditional false consciousness has transformed into a cynical 
‘enlightened false consciousness’, which implies, inter alia, ‘that modernized, unhappy consciousness 
on which enlightenment has labored both successfully and in vain’. Moreover, ‘[w]ell-off and miserable 
at the same time, this consciousness no longer feels affected by any critique of ideology; its falseness is 
already reflexively buffered’. Importantly, for Sloterdijk (Ibid.), ‘present-day cynics’ are ‘borderline 
melancholics, who can keep their symptoms of depression under control and can remain more or less 
able to work’. Thus, they ‘know what they are doing, but they do it because, in the short run, the force 
of circumstances and the instinct for self-preservation are speaking the same language, and they are 
telling them that it has to be so’ (Ibid.).  
Zizek’s (2012b: 312; see also Zizek 2012a) writing on ideology, which takes initial departure in 
this Sloterdijkian understanding of cynical enlightened false consciousness, presents the shift as 
involving an inversion of Marx’s definition of ideology as ‘Sie wissen das nicht, aber sie tun es’ in the 
following way: ‘they know very well what they are doing, but still, they are doing it’ (Zizek 2012b: 
312). In this way, the cynical subject ‘recognizes [and] takes into account, the particular interest behind 
the ideological universality, the distance between the ideological mask and the reality, but still finds 
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reasons to retain the mask’ (Ibid.: 313). Importantly, the Zizekian approach to ideology ‘aims above all 
at the ideological fantasy efficient in the social reality itself’ (Ibid.: 318). By analogy to the mechanisms 
of objectification/reification associated with Marx’s notion of commodity fetishism, Zizek (2012b: 317, 
emphasis removed) argues that the subjects ‘no longer believe, but the things in themselves believe for 
them’.  
On the one hand, this Sloterdijkian-inspired Zizekian view of the contemporary dynamics of 
ideology provides a helpful indirect theoretical support for the argument that a principal distinction 
should be made between value priorities and behavior. For example, employees may (at least in the 
short term) despise their job, while behaviorally complying with its routines.267 This principal (but by 
no means empirical) non-identity may also help explain some of the well-known discrepancies between 
the results of surveys/polls and actual behavior (e.g., in the case of election polls, consumer surveys, 
etc.). In the specific context of the above points concerning corporate activity, Zizek’s (2012b) 
argument can be understood as implying a situation in which specific institutional-organizational 
settings in a certain sense embody, sediment, fixate, objectify, materialize and externalize the false 
consciousness. From this study’s generally corporate functionalist perspective, the ideal-typical critical-
cynical subjectivity tendentially appears in a situation in which there is simultaneously (1) a low degree 
of global agency and (2) a high degree of critically-oriented ‘enlightened consciousness’. In this way, 
although critically dependent on the patterns of the class-situated content, corporate activity provides a 
possible non-necessary and individually insufficient condition of possibility for the development of a 
critical-cynical subjectivity.     
On the other hand, the above Zizekian view is also problematic. Firstly, at the more theoretical 
level, it is questionable whether it is conceptually meaningful to conceive of certain objective structures 
as embodying a ‘false’ ideology. Secondly, and much more importantly, the Sloterdijkian-inspired 
Zizekian view seems to problematically universalize an arguably very class-specific privileged ‘post-
modern’ cynical subject – a type of ‘death of class’ perspective reminiscent of for example Ulrich Beck 
                                                          
267 Interestingly, according to an article in The Independent (see Gander 2015), a Chinese service company in 
Handan at one point implemented a ‘No-Face’ day, in which the staff was allowed to wear masks hiding their real 
facial expressions.   
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(for a critique of this, see notably Atkinson (2007b).268 Thirdly, while the Sloterdijkian/Zizekian view 
assumes a pivotal shift from false consciousness to cynical ‘enlightened false consciousness’, there is 
simply no good reason why the critical-cynical subjectivity should exclude the inner-normatively 
identifying one: although heavily unequally relatively distributed in a class-situated manner, the two 
types temporally coexist.  
In sum, it is possible to ideal-typically speak of both an inner-normatively identifying and a 
critical-cynical subject/subjectivity. Whereas the former implies a functionally favorable form of 
subjectivity characterized by a non-trivial degree of authentic inner-normative identification with the 
macro-structural status quo, the latter implies a combination of a critical attitude and a cynical behavior 
stemming from a particular class-situated mix of both a low degree of global agency and a high degree 
of critically-oriented ‘enlightened consciousness’. Obviously, as argued, the relative distribution and 
intensity, along with the emergence, consolidation and reconfiguration of these two ideal-typical 
subjectivities vary historically. In practice, this implies a class-correlated spectrum – a spectrum of 
historically situated relative degrees of inner-normative identification (on one end) and critical-
cynicism (on the other end). 
 
 
12.3 Conclusion: Looking pessimistically forward 
Concludingly, a few propositions might be very briefly outlined with regards to the question of the 
future development of the linkage between value priorities and behavior and the dynamics of the two 
ideal-typical subjectivities. These propositions obviously remain speculative, not the least because this 
study’s analysis of the governance-situated post-1970s period only covers the development up until the 
financial crisis of 2008 – an event which to some extent muddies things and introduces some new 
variables. Looking forward, two trends appear particularly salient, although they seemingly push things 
in opposite directions. On the one hand, the quantitative diffusion and qualitative intensification of 
state-facilitated corporate activity, integral to this study’s analysis of the governance-situated post-
                                                          
268 As Atkinson (2007b: 356) for example points out in his convincing (and otherwise analytically-oriented) 
critique of this ‘death of class’ view: ‘even a cursory glance at some statistical indices [reveals] the continued 
influence of class on income, access to consumption goods, health and (…) the chances of living beyond infancy’. 
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1970s development, at first glance provides a possible non-necessary and individually insufficient 
condition of possibility for the further development of critical-cynical subjectivity – particularly when 
coupled with the relative (mostly academic but also partly popular) re-politicization of some of the 
negative social externalities of private-property dynamics initiated by the 2008 crisis.     
On the other hand, the development of a critical-cynical subjectivity is hampered by at least three 
factors. Firstly, class-situated dynamics. The critical-cynical subject not only remains an exclusive 
category; the dynamics of social stratification of recent decades (including the post-2008 crisis 
development), which have been associated with rising inequality, also provides an indirect case for 
hypothesizing, as also argued earlier, an intensification of marketized/fiscalized value priorities. 
Secondly, even if the 2008 crisis (and the post-crisis low-growth pattern) has helped trigger a relative 
re-politicization process the likelihood that this transforms into a re-politicization of particularly state-
crafting is low, for reasons argued earlier. With regards to the generalized inner-normatively identifying 
output/performance-directed consumer-citizen: put bluntly, to the extent that, as argued, state 
legitimation has become co-produced, a relative triggering of re-politicization (even at the popular 
level) most likely ends up becoming expressed in absurd and spectacular largely immaterial events and 
dynamics (involving specific politicians, parties, etc.). Thirdly, the development of a critical-cynical 
subjectivity is fundamentally hampered by the above argued process linked to corporate activity, which 
over time encourages and intensifies the micro-situated emergent meshing of subjective-cognitive 
computations and material-objective textures and structures.        
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Part IV      Automobile Production in a State-crafting Context 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
287 
 
Chapter 13. Exploring the Emergence, Consolidation and 
Reconfiguration of the Automobile Industry in the UK and Sweden 
 
In this extended case study chapter I shall examine the emergence, consolidation and reconfiguration of 
the automobile industry in Britain and Sweden.269 In doing this, the analysis of automobile production 
shall be placed in the context of the analytical framework and the historically informed governance-
situated ECR state-crafting model integral to this. As argued earlier, the main intention of this case 
study is to place the changing historical dynamics of automobile production in the historically varying 
context of fiscal and legitimatory state-crafting; to perceive the different stages of the development of 
the automobile industry in the two countries as, in a certain sense, nationally specific sectoral-level 
articulations of the changing historical logics of state-crafting. Moreover, by juxtaposing the ECR 
scheme and the historical development of the automobile industry in Britain and Sweden, and by 
focusing on a sector often considered to reflect the turn to governance, I intend to both highlight and 
qualify, through the case study analysis, some of the claims and contextual premises associated with the 
governance phenomenon. 
Since chapter 4 has already provided an extensive account of the logic of this case study, I shall 
not do the same here. That said, a few case study-relevant aspects may be productively reiterated. 
Importantly, selectively drawing on the vocabulary of Thomas & Myers’ (2015: 53-55) typology, the 
analysis can be described as a key diachronic single case study, chosen for instrumental and explorative 
reasons and operating with semi-parallel and semi-comparative nested elements, which uses a primarily 
illustrative but also partly theory-building/testing approach and a varied or eclectic repertoire of 
methods and empirical sources. This, inter alia, implies some (but not all) of the following things.  
Firstly, the automobile industry (the subject) can be considered a ‘key case’: it provides a 
productive mirroring of the state-facilitated governance turn; the changing historical stages of the 
                                                          
269 By automobile industry I shall generally refer to the companies, organizations, institutions, agents – including, 
whenever pertinent, the component suppliers – and social activities relevant for the production of primarily 
passenger cars but also commercial vehicles (including trucks and busses) and motorcycles. The terms 
automobile, car or motorcar are used interchangeably.  
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automobile industry can be perceived as variant articulations – placed at the nationally specific sectoral 
level – of the analyzed changing dynamics of state-crafting (the object). The governance dimension 
appears as both (1) an internal process – related to the organizational-managerial and economic 
practices of the industry or the specific automobile company – and (2) an external process  – related to 
the industry’s or the automobile company’s changing relationship to governing authorities. Importantly, 
as shall be seen, both processes are critically underpinned, whether directly or indirectly, by state-
crafting dynamics. In this capacity, the chapter puts focus on the connection between the changing 
historical dynamics of the tension-filled functional relationship between legitimatory and fiscal state-
crafting and the historical development of the automobile industry.270   
Secondly, although the examination and presentation of the case material have been heavily 
analytically and thematically organized, the analysis remains slightly descriptive and empirical, 
constituted by a narrative-like logic. While this current balance may be tilted more heavily towards an 
analytical/thematic mode in the context of possible future research, in relation to this chapter it 
inevitably also implies that not all of the analytical angles or conceptual dimensions 
launched/developed in the previous chapters are (fully) activated through this case study analysis.  
Thirdly, and lastly, the case study analysis relies on an analytically selective mixture of contextual 
and detailed accounts provided by the mainstream historical literature on the automobile industry, a 
heterogeneous cluster of additional literature and sources (such as, e.g., country-specific statistics, 
automobile industry and governmental reports, etc.) and broader scholarly work addressing both overall 
political-economic developments and the specific party-political/political-institutional history of Britain 
and Sweden.  
Obviously, this case study analysis in no way provides an exhaustive account of the industry’s 
development. The focus is naturally on analytically selected dominant aspects, key organizational 
                                                          
270 While, for example, Paterson’s (2007) analysis of ‘automobility’ – and particularly the cultural conditions of 
this phenomenon – puts emphasis on the antagonisms between capitalist market dynamics and problems of 
legitimacy and cultural reproduction, this is generally done at the level of the cultural political economy, focusing 
on the interest of ‘capital’ in automobile reproduction, and utilizing, amongst other things, a governmentality-
anchored perspective on the governing of ‘(auto)mobile subjects’. In this chapter, I am less interested in 
automobility – notably automobility as a larger and more generic sociological constellation (although this is 
undoubtedly interesting) – than in tracing specific regulations, interventions and institutional-organizational 
changes connected to the more circumscribed and tangible category of the automobile industry.  
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actors and vital events and junctures. Naturally, when trying to utilize productive analytical categories 
and concepts drawn from another context – to have them travel from the state to the industrial level – 
certain aspects shall be stressed, while others shall be less accentuated.    
The basic structure of this extensive chapter is as follows: firstly, I shall treat, separately, the two 
cases of Britain and Sweden. For each country the chapter looks at the automobile industry from its 
inception to its current status. Secondly, and lastly, I shall try to summarize some of cross-cutting 
findings and discuss the peculiarities of the two cases within the context of the larger study.  
 
 
13.1 State-facilitated restructuring in the British automobile industry 
 
 
13.1.1 Emergence: Gradually crafting an industry 
As shall be seen, the gradual emergence of a British automobile industry appears as an in many ways 
politically constituted process; as part of not only a generic state-situated development from 
personalism to corporate impersonalism but also the gradual crafting and coming into place of the four 
monopolies of the state and, specifically, the ongoing and unfinished formalization of the tension-filled 
functional coordination of legitimation and fiscal accumulation, all of which appeared in the context of 
still uncertain particularistic dynamics, notably impatient socialist pressures on the one side and unruly 
capitalistic interests on the other.  
From its birth, and throughout much of the early 20th century, the UK automobile industry relied 
on a relatively craft-intensive, and non-standardized form of motor production (Owen 1999: 210). The 
motor car – the first gasoline-powered three-wheeled motor car was patented by Karl Benz in 1886 – 
did not originate in the UK, but can be seen as a, firstly, German and French technological invention. In 
the UK, unlike in many rival continental countries, many of the earliest automobile producers – for 
example, Rover, Singer and Humber – originated in the bicycle industry (Wood 1988: 3; Owen 1999: 
209). Coventry, which earlier – from 1868, before the collapse of the bicycle boom of 1893-1897 
(partly due the influx of cheaply produced imported US bicycles) – had become the home of the bicycle 
trade, gradually established itself, like for example Detroit in the US, as Britain’s so-called ‘motor city’ 
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(Boschma & Wenting 2007: 222; Wood 1988: 10).271 As was the case in many countries, the early 
pioneers or ‘great men’ of the British automobile industry – notably the figures of Herbert Austin (a 
quasi-autodidact engineer/inventor/entrepreneur) and W. R. Morris (a former bicycle-repairer/seller) – 
were less businessmen per se than (sometimes self-taught) inventors and engineers (Wood 1988: 4; cf. 
Church 1994: 1), or, perhaps more correctly put, ‘engineer-entrepreneurs’ (Church 1994: 1).  
Although a relatively late starter, the number of automobile manufactures in the British industry 
in the early period was high compared with other countries, even after this number peaked in the early 
1920s at around 150 firms and afterwards stabilized at around less than one-third of this level (Boschma 
& Wenting 2007: 221-2). While France was the number one producer of cars (measured in units) in the 
world in the very first years of the 20th century, it was soon surpassed by the US, and in the 1930s the 
UK automobile industry became the biggest in Europe – a European lead that would last until the mid-
1950s (Owen 1999: 214; Church 1994: 18). Also, in the 1930s, both Britain’s car exports and car 
ownership rate (or car density) surpassed that of other European countries (Church 1994: 20, 44). By 
the late 1930s the selection of car manufactures in Britain known collectively as the ‘Big Six’ included 
Morris, Austin, Ford, Vauxhall, Rootes and Standard – the leaders Morris, Austin and Ford took up 
around 60% of total British production, while Vauxhall, Rootes and Standard each accounted for circa 
10 % (Owen 1999: 212-13). Economically, Britain performed relatively better in the 1930s than in 
Germany and the US where the Great Depression continued into the early years of this decade 
(Rubinstein 2003: 181).  
Before the advent of both railways and automobiles, British authorities facilitated ‘public carrier 
services’ centered on the ‘horse-drawn carrier wagon’ (Freeman 1996: 50). Here, public or ‘common 
carriers’ supplied public road transport services, not simply to and from the economically dominant 
Metropolis of London, via the well-known ‘London carrier’, but also major provincial towns like 
Bristol and Norwich (Turnbull 1996: 25-26).272 In places like South Hampshire, the state-facilitated 
                                                          
271 According to Boschma & Wenting’s (2007: 222) estimates, ‘89% of the automobile entrants that located in the 
Coventry-Birmingham area (…) in the period 1895-1990 had prior experience in (…) industries like bicycle 
making’.     
272 The common carriers were, according to Turnbull (1996: 26), ‘traders who engaged in the public supply of 
road transport services’.  
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turnpiking of roads in the mid-18th century helped expand the carrier system – a system which, through 
Acts of Parliament of 1691/92 and 1748, handed over much of the control of the rates charged by 
carriers for incoming/outgoing goods to local government, more specifically the local Justices of Peace 
(Freeman 1996: 63), partly as a way of preventing carrier’s from combining or fixing (and thereby 
raising) prices (Albert 1972: 169). The increase in carrier activity in South Hampshire – and in Britain 
more generally – peaked around the 1850s, when railways took over much ‘longer-distance carrier 
services’ (Freeman 1996: 49, 54) and diverted these towards shorter and more local activities.  
It was not until the early 20th century – perhaps not until the 1920s – that the ‘road-rail 
competition’ (Millward 2005: 11) started to tip in favor of the progressive expansion and facilitation of 
automobiles. While the first railways appeared in the UK in the early 19th century, authorized by a 
series of Acts of Parliament, the first steam-powered passenger railway, the Liverpool and Manchester 
Railway, opened in 1830 and set in motion a rail track development which began in, and was dominated 
by, Britain until Germany and France took over around the last quarter of the 19th century (Ibid.: 7, 16). 
While railways in the UK were privately owned in the early 20th century (as opposed to tramway 
undertakings) (Ibid.: 18, 22), the industry came under state control during WW1; the Railways Act 
1921 reorganized the over 100 companies by amalgamating and regrouping them with an eye to 
optimizing economies of scale, etc., competition for contracts were undertaken, and it was generally 
underpinned by a ‘rights of way’ logic, which instituted ‘public interest obligations’ into the system 
such as the control/setting of rates and fares (Millward 2005: 95, 152, 25-30, 149, 156).  
The Locomotive Act 1865, which constrained car use by regulating the amount of passengers (to 
at least three) and, importantly, set the speed limit to 4 mph (2 mph in urban areas) – a piece of 
legislation strongly encouraged by the railway lobby (Zuelow 2016: 115) – was amended in the 
Locomotives on Highways Act 1896 (that, in turn, was promoted by associations such as the Motor Car 
Club (Ibid.)), which raised the speed limit to 14 mph, and the Motor Car Act 1903, which raised it 
further to 20 mph (Wood 1988: 3; Paterson 2007: 115). In the 1920s, the British railway system saw 
declining demand and profits, as road transport increased markedly (Millward 2005: 11, 153, 165). 
While, as Millward (2005: 161) points out, by specifying differential licenses for businesses, laying 
down permissible routes and enforcing vehicle safety and driver competence, the Road Traffic Acts of 
1930 and 1933 can be seen as a ‘constraining’ of road transport, these initiatives nevertheless helped 
institutionalize and legally codify the normalization of automobiles. Arguably, the Labour party of the 
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1930s was particularly keen on promoting the motor industry, although road building schemes through 
motorway construction was not actually taken up before 1946 (Paterson 2007: 117); and although 
nationalizations were not actually carried out before after WW2, Labour switched from ideologically 
advocating the nationalization of railways to ‘transport’ in a more generic manner (Millward 2005: 
161), arguably exemplifying the newfound fiscal and organizational importance of automobiles.    
Although it is typically argued that the Great Exhibition of 1851, held in the original Crystal 
Palace in Hyde Park, which showcased British manufacturing and industrial excellence to the world and 
the pleased masses, was intended to promote the doctrine of free trade and the removal of national 
barriers, such perspective overlooks (or could not foresee) both: (1) the already institutionalized 
difference between the free trade orientation of commercial interests and the protectionist industrial 
sector and (2) how the post-Victorian state would set up fiscally favorable differential regulation 
accommodating these two economic constituencies (cf. Speck 1993: 56-9).273 In the case of the 
manufacturing-based automobile industry of the early 20th century, such frameworks became 
instantiated through considerable protective import restrictions, notably the so-called McKenna duties, 
which placed a 33 1/3 % duty on imported cars and other items.274 
Although initially set up in 1915 during WW1, in the context of appeals from the manufacturing 
industry (Wood 1988: 31), in order to restrict the import of luxury items (particularly cars from the US) 
– hoping to help the balance of trade and save shipping space (e.g., Owen 1999: 211) – the McKenna 
Duties were, with the exception of a momentary break in 1924-5, annually renewed until 1956. The 
duties, which helped stifle foreign competition in the home market, together with the so-called Imperial 
Preference arranged in 1932, which through tariff concessions sought to encourage trade throughout the 
Empire, combined to increase British export (particularly in the 1930s), making Britain the number one 
exporter of automobiles in Europe in the period 1920s-1950s (Church 1994: 19, 96).  
                                                          
273 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, writing in Neue Rheinische Zeitung Revue in 1850, described the announced 
1851 Great Exhibition as a ‘great world congress of products and producers’, which demonstrates ‘the 
concentrated power with which modern large-scale industry is everywhere demolishing national barriers and 
increasingly blurring local peculiarities of production, society and national character among all peoples’ (Marx & 
Engels 1850).  
274 In 1926 the duties also included commercial vehicles (Church 1994: 11).  
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More generally, what can be construed as a fiscally-oriented national/Imperial protectionist legal 
framework became a general British policy with the General Election of 1931 where Ramsay 
MacDonald’s National Government instituted the 1932 Import Duties Act and the Import Duties 
Advisory Committee (overseeing tariff policy), which became vital pillars of the overall fiscal 
framework of the British state in the post-WW2 period (National Institute of Economic and Social 
Research 1943: 5). Although the McKenna Duties were temporarily abolished in 1924 by a short-lived 
minority Labour government that at least ideologically preferred to increase taxation on the wealthy 
rather than support the production of (what was still seen as) luxury automobile items (Rubinstein 2003: 
187)275 – and although Labour politicians rhetorically rejected ‘business threats’ made by both Sir 
William Morris and Sir Herbert Austin, arguing that unemployment would rise if the Mckenna Duties 
were repealed (and in Austin’s case that the Birmingham factory would close down)276 – the policies of 
the incoming MacDonald government and later governments went in the opposite, protectionist, 
direction. 
A notable feature of state-crafting in the emergence period (involving the emergence of both state 
functions and the British automobile industry) was also the implementation of the so-called Horsepower 
Tax, which in an ambiguous manner arguably helped both: (1) pay for road maintenance in a class-
situated manner, (2) diversify and tweak car production towards smaller engines, (3) boost the home 
market and (4) dampen the post-WW1 export boom (see, e.g., Wood 1988: 43; cf. Church 1994: 14-
15). On the one hand, using the formula invented by the Royal Automobile Club (RAC) at the request 
of the government for another purpose, the Liberal Chancellor of the Exchequer David Lloyd George 
instituted through the Finance Act 1910 a hypothecated Road Fund Tax or Vehicle Excise Duty that 
was earmarked for maintaining the roads. From 1921 an increased tax rate of 1£ per horsepower was 
set. Announced as part of Lloyd George’s welfarist People’s Budget of 1909, this so-called Horsepower 
Tax was intended as a tax on ‘luxury’ items, a way to externalize or transfer the costs of road network 
maintenance to individual motorists (who at that time were considered well-off). On the other hand, 
although the RAC formula used for the Horsepower tax may have taxed motorists (and thus indirectly 
manufactures) it also (1) for good and for bad, ‘path dependently’ increased the variety of car models 
                                                          
275 On the early UK car as a luxury item, invested with class distinction, see, e.g., Ivory & Genus (2010: 1115).   
276 See, for example, the following newspaper articles: ‘Chancellor Backs Government’ (1929); ‘Political 
Intimidation’ (1929); ‘McKenna Duties’ (1929).  
294 
 
(as an accommodation to the taxation scales took place), (2) boosted the British home market because it 
discouraged higher-engine big-bored cars, typical of American car production, notably imported larger 
foreign cars like Ford’s famous Model T that were taxed higher and, precisely because of this, 
simultaneously (3) restrained the post-WW1 export boom (Wood 1988: 43; cf. Church 1994: 14-15).   
Generally, with regards to the emergence period, the relationship between the British state and the 
motor industry changed as the latter developed, conditioned by state-crafting practices, from being an 
uncertain personalistic technological enterprise into a more formal, economically extensive and 
organizationally emergent entity; as the automobile industry emerged, its fiscal importance expanded 
(as would also be evidenced through the later knighting of key persons in the industry), and with that 
the political attention and negotiability of the sector.        
 
 
13.1.2 Consolidation: National industrial unification 
Looking at the UK automobile industry in the Golden Age (GA) period, a particular process stands out: 
as the British automobile industry consolidates and becomes more formalized in its institutional-
organizational operations, its activities increasingly becomes subjected to state-crafting considerations, 
and thus regulatory initiatives, focused not simply on maintaining the organizational (and 
infrastructural) function of the state than on optimizing legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting and 
bridging and managing this tension-filled dynamic.  
After WW2, the British automobile industry continued its expansion of the 1930s: motor 
employment, output and exports increased (Wood 1988: 95; Church 1994: 220), as did the share of 
these dimensions out of total manufacturing (Whisler 1999: 5). While employment in the automobile 
industry was already between 500-800 thousand by the 1960s,277 this number rose by 33% percent in 
the period 1959-1973 (Church 1994: 51). Also, according to Church (Ibid.), the automobile industry 
and its suppliers accounted for 1/3 of the economy’s industrial growth in the period 1950-1960. While 
the British automobile industry in the 1950s was initially dominated by the Big Six, in 1952 Austin and 
Morris, pressured by competition from Ford, merged and became the British Motor Corporation (BMC) 
(Whisler 1999: 3). Out of the now five dominating companies, Vauxhall (which was acquired by 
                                                          
277 Depending on whether one includes, respectively, only direct employment or also supply/components sectors.  
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General Motors in 1925) and Ford was American owned. Ford’s British production, through its famous 
Dagenham plant of 1931, was the most important foreign subsidiary of the US multinational (Wood 
1988: 150). Ford, in particular, performed well after WW2 (Whisler 1999: 51), even as BMC’s iconic 
1959 Mini Minor, with its high-quality technical design and innovative front-wheel drive, turned out to 
become one of the best-selling cars of the 1960s (Wood 1988: 135-38).  
Throughout the postwar period, and particularly the 1960s, car ownership (in the form of, e.g., the 
Mini) expanded and would increasingly straddle the social spectrum (Wood 1988: 134), helping to 
usher in (still class-segmented) ‘mass car ownership’ or a so-called ‘motor revolution’ (Gunn 2013: 
223-224). In the postwar period, the percentage of households with a car grew by 271% in the period 
1951-1970, going from 14% in 1951 to 52% in 1970.278 While UK’s absolute car output actually rose 
until the late 1960s/early 1970s, automobile production lost out, comparatively, to other European 
countries, notably Germany, in the 1960s (Church 1994: 45) – a country whose share of world car 
exports started to exceed that of the UK (who, when exporting, still primarily sold to the 
Commonwealth countries) in the same period (Owen 1990: 221-2, 226). Arguably, it is not only the 
British automobile sector’s development in the postwar period that should be understood in such a 
comparative manner – it is advisable to perceive the wider economic development in Britain in a 
correlative relative way (although the industry generally grew faster than the economy (Church 1994: 
51)): while the average annual growth rate of 3% in Britain in the period 1950-73 was relatively lower 
than that of comparable OECD countries in the same period, this average growth rate was nevertheless 
much higher than the previous period of 1913-1950 or the following period of 1973-94 (Hansen 2001: 
314).   
Both directly and indirectly, war activities conditioned the development of the automobile 
industry in Britain (as would also be the case in other countries) – inter alia revealing the always 
already dialectical relationship between the fiscal and the violence-security-sovereignty function of the 
state. Like in the case of WW1 – where the factories and machinery of automobile companies expanded 
through war contracts and government expenditure, new production techniques were learned and 
manufacturers like Austin and Wolsely provided aeroplanes and armed vehicles and Morris engaged in 
the production of munitions (such as hand grenades and bomb cases) (Wood 1988: 31-3; Church 1994: 
7-9) – the British engagement in WW2 had enormous consequences for the later development of the 
                                                          
278 Based on my calculations of numbers from Department for Transport (2003).  
296 
 
industry. Prior to WW2, in 1936, so-called Shadow Factories were set up by Stanley Baldwin’s 
Coalition Government. While these factories, which at first manufactured aero engines but later all sorts 
of war-related goods (tanks, tractors, etc.), were practically managed by automobile industrialists, 
having Sir Austin as chairman of the Shadow factory Committee, they were launched, authorized and 
financed by the government for war purposes (Wood 1988: 57: Church 1994: 43). Not only did WW2 
(and its preparation) strengthen the British state-industry institutional relationship (Wood 1988: 57), it 
would also expand and transform production and organizational techniques.    
When considering the evolution of the motorway network in Britain, the 1960s clearly appears as 
the formative decade (Spence & Linneker 1994: 248-9). Clearly, as perceived through James 
O’Connor’s (1973: 105) fiscal-budgetary perspective, ‘highway spending’ appears as a crucial type of 
(physical) ‘social investment’, primarily linked to the larger category of accumulation-oriented ‘social 
capital expenditures’. Conditioned by the traffic data and survey findings of the Ministry of Transport’s 
planning-group – and arguably the active promotion of the ‘highway lobby’ (Paterson 2007: 117) – the 
state-facilitated British motorway expansion of the postwar period was initiated with the Preston bypass 
(opened in 1958) and the first inter-urban motorway, the London-Birmingham (M1) (Spence & 
Linneker 1994: 248-9). Although schemes for the M1 were set up by the Labour government already in 
the immediate postwar period, it was the Conservative Prime Minister Harold Macmillan who launched 
the actual construction of the motorway network, which, despite the fact that the M1 had already been 
authorized by the business-savvy Minister of Transport Harold Watkinson, was based on amongst 
others Michael Beesley’s fiscally-grounded cost/benefit analysis (Foster 2001: 5-6). 
On the one hand, the 1945-1951 Attlee Labour government stands out for its ambitious 
interventionist/nationalization agenda. Bolstered by the war-induced generalized higher than usual 
‘planning’-oriented postwar political economic outlook, as addressed in chapter 7, the Attlee 
government, which had received a stunning 48% majority at the general election, launched an 
ambitious program of interventionist economic policy (notably the nationalization of electricity, civil 
aviation, the Bank of England, road haulage, railways, etc., amounting to 20% of the economy) and 
welfare reform (notably the National Insurance Act and National Health Act of 1946 and the National 
Assistance Act of 1948) (Smith 1979: 118; Rubinstein 2003: 230, 237).  
On the other hand, these activities were expressive of British politics in most of the postwar era 
which overwhelmingly followed the general contextual patterns of the GA period. The era of great 
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consensus or, more historically narrowly put, ‘Butskellism’, is meant to convey the inter-party status 
quo with regards to dimensions such as a ‘mixed’ Keynesian economic policy and full employment 
targeting (Smith 1979: 119-128). For example, the Industrial Charter of 1947 launched the 
Conservatives’ commitment to full employment and the welfare state, and the social reforms and 
nationalizations of the Attlee government were, with few exceptions, kept intact when the Tories took 
over in 1951 (Rubinstein 2003: 247).  
Moreover, although Attlee’s nationalization program at first glance reflected the socialist goal of 
achieving ‘the common ownership of the means of production’ – as formulated in Clause IV of 
Labour’s original party manifesto of 1918 – this policy aim was practically watered down through both 
the ideological ambiguities of the concept of nationalization (see O’Hara 2009) and the so-called 
Morrisonian style of implementation, which entailed the establishment of bureaucratic and 
commercially-oriented public corporations, and the 1947 shift (with the replacement of Dalton by 
Cripps as Chancellor of the Exchequer) from physical planning to a more technocratic and budgetary 
broadly interventionist Keynesianism agenda (Smith 1979: 109-10, 118).  
Nevertheless, the postwar Labour government sought to actively engage with and bolster the 
automobile industry: the sector was not only subjected to the government’s high export targets, part of 
its ‘export or die’ campaign (Whisler 1999: 3, 13-4) intended to bolster the all-important balance-of-
payment objective, which was first set at 50% of each firm’s output in 1945 and then raised to 75% of 
output in 1948 (Church 1994: 51; Whisler 1999: 22), but also its regional industrial policy. This 
regional policy scheme, which was an extension of the policy of 1934 of maintaining so-called 
Distressed Areas, directed automobile manufacturers (who needed permission, an Industrial 
Development Certificate, in order to expand or open up a plant) towards Special Areas with a 
historically high rate of unemployment through financial inducements (Wood 1988: 101; Owen 1999: 
220) – a full-employment-targeting policy which continued under later Conservative governments 
(Wood 1988: 96, 150-1). Business competitiveness was sought optimized when a flat rate tax took the 
place of the earlier Horsepower Tax in 1948 – a policy change conditioned by the lobbying of the 
British motor industry (particularly the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders), which argued 
that the Horsepower tax, as argued earlier, stifled exports due to its bias against larger cars (Church 
1994: 53; Wood 1988: 96, 98).  
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In the GA period fragmentation was perceived as being potentially problematic, while national 
consolidation (in both the business and state-crafting sense) offered a more promising route. Sparked by 
an influential academic report that in 1959 argued that while the automobile industry was overall 
strong, it nevertheless suffered from fragmentation due to its small firms, its large component/model 
range, etc. (Owen 1999: 224; Whisler 1999: 4), the 1960s introduced waves of mergers and 
consolidations: BMC acquired Pressed Steel in 1965; Jaguar Cars, which had already bought Daimler 
from BSA in 1960, merged with BMC in 1966; Leyland Motor Corporation first bought Standard-
Triumph in 1960 and then took over Rover in 1967. In 1968, strongly encouraged by the Wilson 
government – which, aiming to create a so-called ‘national champion’, both provided financial 
incentives and political support – the two remaining major British automobile manufacturers Leyland 
and BMC merged to form the British Leyland Motor Corporation (BLMC), Europe’s fourth largest 
automobile manufacturer (Nuttall et al. 2011: 1292; Whisler 1999: 5, 93). This merger, which left the 
automobile market with a single dominant British-owned manufacturer, was promoted by the Labour 
government through the creation in 1966 of the Industrial Reorganization Corporation (IRC) – a public 
body charged with encouraging economies of scale, consolidation and rationalization of industry (Owen 
1999: 227-8; Church 1994: 85).  
Ford’s UK activities also induced the partial immigration of US management/industrial relations 
routines. While Ford’s relatively good performance after WW2 can also be attributed to the 
government’s generally accommodating stance towards its British operations (such as a supportive 
allocation of steel, exemption from nationalization policy) – a goodwill partly stemming from Ford’s 
chairman in Britain Sir Percival Perry’s contribution to armaments procurements policy and the 
establishment of the important Fordson tractor plant (Church 1994: 73) – it also hinged on it 
maintaining the main pillars of the Fordist regime of economic organization, i.e. its management style 
and payment structure. The mass production-based Fordist system relied inter alia on relatively high 
fixed/rigid hourly day rates combined with a high degree of managerial control of workers (in terms of 
job tasks, the pace of production, etc.), whereas the bulk of British automobile manufacturing was 
based on a more diversified piecework payment system based on looser worker discipline (Church 
1994: 60-62; Tolliday 1987: 38-9).  
Compared to the (always fully unrealized) British Fordist regime, which, at least until the 1944 
recognition agreement which compelled Ford and other companies to strengthen their relationships with 
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unions, was based on an explicitly anti-worker and anti-union stance (Church 1994: 21; Tolliday 1987), 
the British piecework system increased job control and, in particular, granted discretion to shop 
stewards. While employers originally considered the piecework system favorable to their interests – as 
a system of ‘payments by results’, earnings would be paid out literally according to ‘the amount of 
sweat given off by the workers’ – the war experience and the GA economic prosperity had altered the 
state’s relationship to workers in a mutually energizing way and vastly increased union membership 
such that the piecework system could be progressively controlled by unions in the 1960s, which 
increasingly engaged in sectorally-based ‘inter-union competition’ (Tolliday 1987: 39, 38; Church 
1994: 62, 64). 
The consolidation of the British automobile industry witnessed, at least from the 1960s, the 
gradual shift away from ‘a seller’s market’ (e.g., Wood 1988: 134), a process correlated with, and 
underpinned by, not simply a car ownership boom but a general policy – which arguably, at least at 
first, was more greatly emphasized by the Tories (Rubinstein 2003: 255) – accommodating 
consumership, affluence, housing, economic growth and production, etc. Importantly, as the 
quantitative analysis of Dargay (2001: 813) indicates, ‘[r]ising incomes lead to a higher car ownership 
level, but when incomes fall car ownership is not reduced correspondingly’ – a finding that clearly 
matches the earlier argued case for the generally irreversible asymmetric endogenous logic of 
consumption-situated economic growth and its frustration-escalating properties and, more generally, the 
arguments concerning the postwar consolidation of a popular socio-psychological expectation of ever-
widening economic growth and consumption prospects.  
The postwar development of the British automobile industry also reveals the broader shift from 
nationalization to Keynesianism: we observe, notably in the case of the Attlee and later Wilson Labour 
governments’ approach to the automobile industry, the gradual marginalization of the ‘threat’ to the 
state of socialism and party politics more generally. We see through the turn to budgetary 
Keynesianism and the institutionalization of Morrisonian public corporations/bodies, a watering down 
of core socialist principles and a limiting of the discretion of party politics vis-à-vis state-functional 
reproduction. Both this development, the general consolidation of the British automobile industry 
(increasing its fiscal vitality considerably) and the generalized search for a ‘national champion’, signals, 
as argued earlier, the advent of the ‘catch-all party’ – that is, the shedding of parties’ earlier ideological 
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principles, the integration of state and party politics and the subjection of the ruling government to a 
nation-state agenda. 
As seen, as the automobile industry consolidates and increases its societal importance – a process 
in many ways facilitated by the state – the ‘responsibility’ for its activities gradually but increasingly 
becomes a state-functional affair, subjected to legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting considerations. For 
example, the general fiscal and regulatory encouragement of the gradually consolidated automobile 
industry and full employment targeting through inter alia the inter-party regional industrial policy of 
targeting Special Areas with high unemployment, can be considered state-crafting initiatives aiming to 
ease functional tensions: pro-business industrial practices (indirectly the fiscal dimension) combined 
with worker/union- and employment-optimizing practices (indirectly the legitimatory dimension).  
 
 
13.1.3 Reconfiguration: Externalizing expenditures and tensions 
As shall be seen, the development of the UK automobile industry in the reconfiguration period is 
marked by the causally interrelated implementation of a series of both state-facilitated claim-reducing 
processes (e.g., discontinuation, Japanization/internationalization/Europeanization) and industry-
situated hybrid tension-displacing co-productive schemes (e.g., Lean Production).  
In the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, the UK automobile industry underwent a series of 
crises, disruptions and institutional experimentations – a development working alongside the crisis-
guided fate of the wider British economy and other advanced industrialized polities, which have been 
addressed earlier in this study. Although the government-backed 1968 creation of BLMC was intended 
to consolidate and overcome the gradually declining British industry (which had fallen behind other 
automobile-producing countries), the giant ‘national champion’ company did not deliver: exports, 
profits, liquidity, and its share of the home market, soon fell (Wood 1988: 170; Whisler 1999: 6). 
Arguably, BLMC suffered from a diversity of factors: a too ambitious organizational setup, a too 
diverse model range, a failure to integrate eight differentially profitable public companies (with, in 
total, circa 48 factories and 180,000 employees), model failures and weak marketing strategies, rising 
competition from freer trade and increasing import penetration rates, rising worker/union militancy and 
bargaining power, overmanning, etc. (e.g., Whisler 1999: 94, 91-121, 87, 84-124; Owen 1999: 228-
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234). The relationship between fragmentation and consolidation had now reversed: bigness was a 
problem, while fragmentation presented itself as an attractive scenario.   
The widespread means-oriented bewilderment that, as argued earlier, generally characterized the 
1970s also applied to the UK automobile industry. At first, well-known GA-situated initiatives were 
presented. Although the Conservative Heath government, winning the election in 1970, removed the 
IRC in 1971 as a way of proclaiming its ideological dislike of public interventions in industrial 
activities, the nationalization of the troubled Rolls-Royce the same year (a way to save jobs) together 
with the 1972 Industry Act (e.g., Nuttal et al. 2001: 1293; Smith 1979; 166-7), which allowed for a 
highly state-based and interventionist industrial agenda, marked the party’s practical ‘U-turn’ and 
pragmatic adherence to maintaining/maximizing fiscal state-crafting. This interventionist wave 
continued under Labour when Wilson’s second government took over in 1974. While promising to back 
BLMC’s increased borrowing, the Wilson government awaited the so-called Ryder Report on the status 
of the company, whose influential findings would not only provide the basis for (mostly) equity-based 
government bailouts but also the 1975 nationalization of the failing BLMC, which turned it into the 
state-owned British Leyland (BL) (Owen 1999: 232-3). 
This rescue-cum-nationalization of BLMC and the later running of BL was managed through the 
National Enterprise Board (NEB), an equity-holding government body set up in 1975 and chaired by 
Lord (Don) Ryder (who wrote the Ryder report). Later, as a way of avoiding huge job losses, Chrysler 
UK, which was in a deep crisis, was provided financial assistance in return for a ‘planning agreement’ 
and industrial relations promises (Whisler 1999: 128-9).  
While the interventionism of the crisis-ridden 1970s – which not only entailed the automobile 
industry but the nationalization of aerospace, shipbuilding, etc. – may be considered ideologically 
grounded, its inter-party nature bears testimony to the basically pragmatic character of the policies 
(Nuttal et al. 2001: 1293). Arguably, the sheer importance of the industry for the economy coupled with 
the functional pressure for fiscal accumulation raised the probability that an effective (rather than 
necessarily rhetorical) inter-party consensus would exist with regards to the implementation of fiscally-
oriented ‘crisis management’ measures. Moreover, the pragmatism with regards to Labour was also 
visible through the selection of the specific institutional-organizational modes of intervention. For 
example, while the NEB (set up through the 1975 Industry Act) was placed in charge of managing BL, 
it was a largely watered down version of the one introduced in the 1974 White paper, The Regeneration 
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of British Industry, which proclaimed a more explicit public ownership motivation;279 in reality, the 
NEB reflected much less adherence to a socialist (or original social-democratic) cause – while only 
Tony Blair managed to remove the famous Clause IV of the party manifesto, revisionist Anthony 
Crosland-inspired ‘modernizers’ like Hugh Gaitskell had already tried, unsuccessfully, to remove it in 
the late 1950s (see, e.g., Jones 1997) – than to basic technocratic principles of the ‘mixed’ Keynesian 
economy (Smith 1979: 133). Furthermore, despite the apparent principled radicalism of planning 
agreements, the deal actually formed with Chrysler UK was not only much less restrictive and watered 
down, in 1978 Chrysler was sold to Peugeot (Holmes 1985: 53; cf. Wilks 1981). 
Approaching the later part of the 1970s, alternative and tougher measures would become 
activated, heralding the unleashing of, notably, an overall industrially-situated claim-reduction strategy. 
When Leslie Murphy replaced Sir Don Ryder as chairman of NEB in 1977 – James Callaghan had 
replaced Wilson as Labour prime minister a year earlier – he hired the tough business-oriented Michael 
Edwardes, a NEB member, as both chairman and chief executive of BL (Wood 1998: 112-3), taken on 
board in order to initiate a thoroughgoing ‘rationalization’ process. Edwardes’ comprehensive 
‘restructuring program’, the Coordination of Resources plan (CORE) (Whisler 1999: 369, 371), which 
after Thatcher’s 1979 victory enjoyed increased ideological support, entailed a regular crackdown on 
workers/union autonomy. While strike rates had increased steadily since the postwar period and 
exploded from the late 1960s and early 1970s (Church 1994: 66), Edwardes confrontational 
restructuring plan not only meant huge job losses through plant closings (Owen 1999: 240), around 
50,000 in the period 1977-1982 (Church 1994: 102), but also increased shop-floor control and 
introduced wage-bargaining constraints (Whilser 1999: 270-75; Wood 1988: 220-8) – a process both 
symbolically represented through Edwardes firing the notorious communist and union activist Derek 
Robinson (known as ‘Red Robbo’) in 1979 (Church 1994: 102) and practically witnessed through 
overall union capitulation and diminished strike rates around 1983-4 (e.g., Whilser 1999: 375, 270-75). 
Clearly, the advent of the aggressive anti-union Edwardes regime illustrated that industrial policy had 
                                                          
279 In the 1974 White Paper it is argued that the Wilson government seeks to establish NEB as a public entity able 
to ‘provide the means for direct public initiatives in particular key sectors of industry’ in order to, inter alia, 
achieve ‘greater industrial efficiency’, ‘industrial democracy’ and offset ‘the short-term pull of market forces’ 
(Department of Industry 1974: 2, 6).  
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replaced full employment targeting (Owen 1999: 240), and, interestingly, the fact that Edwardes’ initial 
1979 restructuring plan, although rejected by the shop stewards, was approved by 87% of the 
employees in a ballot (Wood 1988: 227).  
Although a slow starter, the Thatcher government, not only underwriting and accelerating the 
main pillars of the Edwardes regime but encouraged by a deeper-sitting micro-situated transformation 
of popular value priorities and a more output/performance-based and marketized-fiscalized mode of 
macro-level legitimation, would eventually embark on a combined campaign of internationalization and 
privatization affecting the British automobile industry as much as any. ‘Japanization’ through inwards 
investments was not only cherished but actively promoted by the Thatcher government: as effective 
tariff rates continued to fall throughout the 1980s (Ennew et al. 1990: 76), Japanese companies opened 
up new factories – notably, Nissan at Sunderland, Toyota at Burnaston and Honda at Swindon (Owen 
1999: 239, 245; Whilser 1999: 391). Of course, already in 1977, under the Callaghan Labour 
government, NEB and governmental acceptance underpinned Edwardes plan for a strategic alliance 
with Honda (Wood 1988: 226). An overall industrially-situated claim-reduction strategy of 
government-sanctioned privatization and restructuring appeared: in 1984 Jaguar was separated and 
successfully auctioned on the stock exchange (until it was bought by Ford in 1989) (Church 1999: 106); 
BL took the name Rover Group PLC in 1986 – in 1981 a mass-market subsidiary of BL, Austin Rover 
Group (ARG), had been formed integrating Austin Morris, Rover and Triumph – and a year after the 
bus division was dispatched and the truck division sold to the Dutch-owned DAF in 1987 (Church 
1994: 107; Owen 1999: 243); British Aerospace (BAe) bought Rover Group in 1988, only to have it 
sold off to BMW in 1994. However, one attempt, involving talks between Ford and the government, to 
sell off Rover Group (at that time BL) (and thus effectively British automobile manufacturing) did not 
succeed as amongst other things a popular backlash appeared, arguing for a stop to the 
internationalization of the British national champion (Nuttal et al. 2011: 1294; Church 107).    
A mapping of the UK automobile industry in the 1990s and 2000s would reveal the cumulative 
effects of the politically driven externalization process of the 1980s: in the 1990s, as mentioned, Jaguar 
was owned by Ford and British Aerospace (BAe) sold off Rover Group to BMW in 1994, leaving the 
industry effectively without any British-owned car manufactures; in the 2000s, Jaguar and Land Rover 
was jointly bought by Ford in 2000 and then sold to Indian automaker Tata Motors in 2008 (joined 
together as Jaguar Land Rover in 2013). Of course, despite this internationalization trend, the ‘car parc’ 
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(number of cars available) and total car ownership has risen steadily in the same period – although the 
rate of households with one car has remained constant, the proportion of households with two or more 
cars have increased (Leibling 2008: 3-5; Department for Transport 2003). Also, although British 
vehicle output crashed in the 1970s, it rose again from its low in the 1980s as domestic production, 
particularly from the 1990s, was overtaken by foreign-owned manufacturing (Holweg et al. 2009: 22-
3). Moreover, employment in the UK automobile industry still averages around 200,000 people since 
the mid-1990s (and around 6.5% of total manufacturing employment) – and using a more expanded 
‘job multiplier’ definition, which includes components suppliers, etc., the industry ‘supports’ around 
384,000 jobs (Holweg et al. 2009: 31-37, 102, 38-40). That said, according to some projections, of this 
latter number 330,000 may be threatened by offshoring and the UK has lost more jobs than those of 
comparable countries and seen a great deal of plant closures (Holweg et al. 2009: 31-33, 37-8, 39-40).     
Arguably, the development and fate of the UK automobile industry correlates heavily with the 
largely state-facilitated process of Europeanization and, gradually, so-called globalization. While 
already from the 1950s one can observe a joint process of tariff reduction and increasing import 
penetration, the latter surpassing Germany in 1980 (Owen 1999: 226, 230), the long-awaited British 
EEC entry in 1973 further accelerated the process of import penetration and internationalization 
through the removing of tariffs within the EEC by 1977 (Church 1994: 47). While Britain first applied 
to the EEC in 1961, the French vetoed this in 1963 – a veto which apparently constrained Ford’s plans 
for a closer commercial collaboration between its German and UK activities (Wood 1988: 151) – and it 
took one more unsuccessful attempt in 1967 before the UK joined the club in 1973 (Whilser 1999: 315-
7, 320). Although Britain had enjoyed membership of the alternative and arguably less successful 
EFTA since 1959, and although British politics (and politicians) have historically been marked by a 
deep inter-party ambiguity towards the EU, entry into the EEC in 1973 became a main agenda for the 
Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath, and many Labour party members (particularly the neo-
Gaitskellites) as well as the British population supported the Europeanization process (Rubinstein 2003: 
299; Speck 1993: 199-200). Of course, this overwhelmingly economically-oriented Europeanization 
process was pushed forward by lobbying campaigns launched already from 1968 by the automobile 
industry, notably the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT) (Whilser 1999: 318).  
In the end, though, while the contemporary UK automobile industry exports on a comparatively 
massive scale, one can observe a constant automotive trade deficit since the 1990s as the import rate 
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has consistently surpassed exports in this period (Holweg 2009: 29). Importantly, the politically 
facilitated process of externalization through internationalization and Europeanization – the latter of 
which would push the regulation of the automobile industry towards an integrated EU legal framework, 
pushing for intra-community trade and external EU barriers and regulating (i.e., constraining) state aid 
to troubled national industries (see, e.g., Swaak 1999: 434-5, 277-341) – has also brought changes to 
the prevailing forms of work organization and management philosophies.  
In this context, Lean Production280 appears as a dominant, and possibly paradigmatic, system of 
work organization both (1) simultaneously representing and influencing the post-1980/1990s evolution 
of British automobile production and (2) symptomizing the Anglo-specific dynamics of the larger post-
1990s co-productive hybrid tension-displacing order (as analyzed in chapter 9). 
While initiated in Japan already in the first half of the 20th century and further developed 
throughout the 1960s and beyond, Lean Production started to proliferate first in the US and then 
globally – especially thanks to Womack et al.’s (1990) influential Americanized observation and 
interpretation of Japanese work organization – from the 1980s. Although the existence of a global 
convergence on Lean Production may be somewhat exaggerated, it is evident that the paradigm has in 
fact, at varying degrees, been adopted across the British automobile industry from the late 1980s and 
early 1990s (arguably stimulated by early initiatives like the Honda-Rover alliance) – the Rover Group 
being a notable case (see e.g., Scarbrough & Terry 1997) – as a way of inter alia regaining cost 
effectiveness and managerial control. As Vidal (2006: 202) describes it, Lean Production refers to 
‘demand-driven production in short runs, achieving efficiency through continuous improvement and 
optimized workflow with minimal buffers’.281 Arguably, while Lean Production amongst other things 
promises to increase worker ‘empowerment’ and ‘participation’ and ‘teamwork’ and institute a 
‘flexible’, ‘diversified’, ‘collaborative and ‘skilled’ non-assembly line system of production catered to 
the whimsical dynamics of co-productive consumption, more substantive case-based critical research 
(see, e.g., Scarbrough & Terry 1997; Jones et al. 2013) reveals that this production paradigm in many 
                                                          
280 Sometimes known as the Toyota Production System. 
281 In this form of work organization: ‘[b]ased on just-in-time (JIT) and continuous flow principles, work is 
‘pulled’ through the factory based on customer demand’ (Vidal 2006: 202, emphasis in original).  
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instances is underpinned by constrained or restrictive forms of employee participation directed towards 
productivity enhancements.282 
As argued earlier, hybrid tension-displacing co-productive schemes are problematic. In this 
relation, looking, more generally, at the contemporary British automobile industry it is for example 
noticeable that industry reports, such as The UK Automotive International Competitiveness Report 2015 
published by the Automotive Council UK (2015: 8), points out that ‘[l]abour flexibility is a major 
strength for the UK’ and that ‘[w]e should strive to retain this key competitive advantage’. Also, an 
SMMT industry report (Henry 2015: 3, 17), entitled The Future of UK Automotive Manufacturing in 
2025 and Beyond, mentions the UK’s comparative ‘attractiveness in terms of taxation, regulation, 
labour flexibility and the overall business environment’ and points to factors, besides for example a 
‘[c]omparatively low tax regime’ and a ‘[s]upportive approach from government’, such as ‘[l]ess 
onerous labour laws and rules compared to most other EU countries’ and ‘[u]nions which are 
committed to maintaining and developing the manufacturing sector’. Holweg et al. (2009: 37) also finds 
that the observed decline in UK auto employment ‘can be explained to 32% by productivity gains made 
over the past decade’. As (otherwise strategically constructed) presentation videos – widely available 
on Youtube – apparently transparently recapping the manufacturing process underpinning a new car 
model also reveal, contemporary car production, while showcasing aspects of a post-Fordist production 
regime (teamwork, high-quality products, etc.), nonetheless relies on mass-production, moving 
assembly lines, robots, disciplined and well-orchestrated maneuvers, etc.283 Arguably, the objective of 
achieving both high-quality production and lower costs and the aim of optimizing effectiveness and 
finding democratically-embedded remedies for worker dissatisfaction (such as empowerment and co-
production) correlates heavily with the broader post-1970s/1990s relative shift towards a more self-
legitimating mode of fiscal accumulation. Lean production can be perceived as an attempt, operating at 
the level of work organization, to seemingly overcome the above tensions and, in many instances, in a 
more sophisticated manner intensify and deepen managerial control and production effectiveness. It 
represents a distinctive post-1970s/1990s co-productive tension-displacing hybridization, characteristic 
of the specific UK context, which both reflects and has been indirectly causally pushed forward by 
state-facilitated claim-reducing processes of Japanization/internationalization/Europeanization.  
                                                          
282 For a more general critique of self-management, see Barker (1993).  
283 For a production video presenting the New Mini, see TestDriven (2013). 
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As a concluding observation on the UK experience: the objective shallowness of this overall 
supposed tension-overcoming agenda also appears evident when looking at transportation dynamics 
more broadly. In relation to post-1990s transport policy – a regulatory system underpinning not only the 
globalized UK automobile industry but also the proliferation of a broader automobile ‘culture’ – one 
finds, firstly, a deregulation in 1992 of the provision of motorway service areas, transferring the 
responsibility for ‘the identification and acquisition’ of motorway service areas (MSA’s) to private 
actors (Walton & Dixon 2000: 336). Although this system was partly revised by the New Labour 
government in 1998, one of the reasons for this was that the promised optimization of ‘consumer 
choice’ did not appear (cf. Walton & Dixon 2000: 337). Secondly, the supposedly progressive ‘New 
Realism’ transport policy launched through the notable 1998 White Paper A New Deal for Transport, 
and in large part drawn up by the transport analyst and policy advisor Phil Goodwin (see, e.g., Goodwin 
1999), did not mark such a ‘radical’ break with the earlier so-called ‘predict and provide’ policy 
(Docherty & Shaw 2011). While the important Conservative ‘Roads for Prosperity’ program of 1989 
had promised an extensive campaign of road building to deal with the increasing and forecasted 
demand for cars, it brought popular attention to the problem of congestion, which New Labour 
promised to tackle in a ‘sustainable’ manner in its 1998 White Paper. As Docherty & Shaw’s (2011: 
233-47, passim) extensive review of the actual post-1998 transport policy record of New Labour show, 
the party did not deliver on its announced aims such as to decrease car journeys, increase public 
transport and cycling and reduce pollution – rather, the principle of balanced ‘sustainable transport’ has 
been subjected to a ‘choice’-oriented pro-car realism oriented towards optimizing economic 
competitiveness.284   
 
                                                          
284 Although we can observe a post-1998 development towards a New Labour transport policy that, as the 2008 
Delivering a Sustainable Transport System agenda declares, increasingly aims to ‘support national economic 
competitiveness’, the archetypical Third Way virtue of always seeking to productively overcome/displace various 
state-functional considerations remains a general rhetorical characteristic: as the 2004 Future of Transport Agenda 
proclaims what is needed is a ‘transport network that can meet the challenges of a growing economy and the 
increasing demand for travel, but can also achieve our environmental objectives’ (both quotes as cited in Docherty 
& Shaw 2011: 231).      
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13.2 Reflective fiscal state-crafting in the Swedish automobile industry 
 
 
13.2.1 Emergence: State-corporatized unfurling of automobiles 
As shall be seen, the Swedish automobile industry relied heavily on direct and indirect state 
involvement from the very beginning. Its gradual emergence was not only critically underpinned by (1) 
a fiscal accumulation logic based on both low domestic protection (but high competitiveness and car 
ownership) and a principally class-biased taxation scheme but also (2) an early ability to politically 
coordinate what were already highly corporatized interests and resources. Generally, the development 
of the Swedish automobile industry mirrors, and was critically underpinned by, the earlier than usual 
emergence-cum-consolidation of legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting in Sweden.    
While in Sweden, like in other European countries, the railway industry took shape from around 
the mid-19th century – the absolute level of Swedish rail track opening has consistently triumphed that 
of both Norway and Denmark and rail freight traffic has been comparatively high (Millward 2005: 16, 
196, 198) – it was (although less than in Denmark and Norway) characterized by a relatively high 
degree of state ownership: as private companies could not build railways at the appropriate speed, after 
a 1854 decision by the Rigsdag the state took over the organization of a basic rail network 
(stambana)(Millward 2005: 18, 22, 60, 68-9). By the 1920/30s, much of the general goods/freight 
traffic – a large part based on the increasingly unprofitable private railways, which would be taken over 
in 1939 by Statens Järnvägar (SJ) – was being replaced by road-based transport (Millward 2005: 157, 
160). While this gradual late interwar ‘switch’ of course reflected the objective technological 
development and expansion of private motor vehicles (including trucks and buses), it was also 
underpinned by increased government financing and organizational involvement (Hasselgren 2013: 57) 
– a process, although at first a bit hesitant, which was spurred and made fiscally viable by the 1923 
introduction of vehicle/fuel taxes (Hasselgren 2013: 57; Stenkula 2013: 32-3).       
Notwithstanding inter alia the very early years of the 20th century in which mostly ‘engineer-
entrepreneurs’ (or simply inventors) helped introduce automobiles such as the steam-driven 1891-2 
Cederholm (Cederholmaren) built by the Cederholm brothers, the Swedish automobile industry has 
overwhelmingly historically revolved around three major home-grown companies: Volvo, Saab and 
Scania (or Scania-Vabis). Saab, which stands for Swedish Aeroplane Company Limited, was 
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established in 1937 in Trollhättan, first as an aircraft producer and later, after WW2, an automobile 
manufacturer (Malmberg 1995: 174). Scania-Vabis, overwhelmingly a commercial vehicles producer 
focused on trucks and buses, was established through a merger in 1911 of Scania (established in 1900), 
a bicycle-cum-automobile maker, and Vabis (established in 1891), a former railway supplier (Kinch 
1993: 4-5). Later, when it merged with Saab in 1969 it would become Saab-Scania AB (until it was 
split in 1995 and named Scania AB). In 1926 the manager Assar Gabrielsson and the engineer Gustaf 
Larson teamed up to form Volvo in Göteborg as a subsidiary of SKF, a ball bearing manufacturer 
started in 1907 (e.g., Malmberg 1995: 174; Elsässer 1995: 69). In 1935 Volvo was separated formally 
from SKF and listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (Elsässer 1995: 71). The Swedish automobile 
industry, like that of other car-producing countries, is heavily regionally concentrated with automobile 
production/employment being concentrated in the south-west of Sweden near places like, for example, 
Göteborg (Elsässer 1995: 62; Malmberg 1995: 180-1). As the data shows, the production of trucks was 
higher than private vehicles in the 1930s and 1940s – something which is also partly reflected in the 
relatively higher share of total exports of trucks and busses in the same period (Elsässer 1995: 63, 68).   
The early Swedish logic of automobile-situated fiscal accumulation was in some ways different 
than the British one. The Swedish tariff rates on automobiles in the 1920s were very low compared to 
other countries, standing at around 15% (Elsässer 1995: 39). While an important Rigsdag’s debate took 
place on whether customs tariff should go up to 30% as a way of protecting and fostering a national 
industry – the Swedish-owned automobile manufacturers such as (the no longer existing) Tidaholms 
Bruk and notably Volvo’s Assar Gabrielsson generally lobbied for this – it ended with a 1927 
resolution that actually decreased the tariff to 12% (Kinch 1993: 9, 10, 11; Elsässer 1995: 241). This 
early Swedish low protection regime – which inter alia was intended to raise the competitiveness of the 
home automobile market, expand car use and establish more favorable conditions for foreign 
manufacturers producing in Sweden using imported components (cf. Kinch 1993: 9-11) – helped make 
Sweden a net importer of automobiles until well into the post-WW2 period (Elsässer 1995: 67). 
Importantly, according to Lindgren & Petterson’s (2009: 186) comparative analysis of the historical 
differences in car ownership in Sweden and Norway, pre-1960s import protections in Norway ‘clearly 
held back (…) private car ownership’. 
Throughout the historical emergence of the Swedish automobile industry, the state’s own 
consumption of automobile products helped influence its development: in the 1920s, to take one 
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example, Scania-Vabia delivered busses to the national post office (what would later become 
Postverket and in 1994 corporatized as Posten AB) and the national train service provider (later SJ) 
(Elsässer 1995: 240). Like in other countries, war-related activities spurred automobile production, 
which in Sweden entailed production for the military in the interwar period and more importantly 
during and after WW2 Saab and Volvo enjoyed monopoly-like guarantees of orders of products for the 
military (notably the Swedish air defense) (Elsässer 1995: 240).  
Despite labour unrest, the interwar period saw the political facilitation of a highly pro-business 
fiscal and industrial relations setup – underpinning the emergence and later consolidation of the 
Swedish automobile industry – that would become formalized and maintained throughout many 
decades. Industrial relations-wise, Sweden in the early 1930s ‘held the international record for working 
days used for industrial conflict and lockout, as well as for strikes’ (Korpi 2006: 188), indicating an 
increasingly higher relative degree of labour bargaining power, which already in the 1920s, although its 
profitability bounced back in 1927, had accelerated the pressure on the financially strained Scania-
Vabia, bankrupting it in 1922 (Kinch 1993: 5-6). But party politically, this pressure would be expressed 
differently. The general election in 1932 in which the social democrats received 42% of the votes – 
around twice as much as the Conservatives,285 which was the number two party – and the 1936 election 
victory, in which the social democrats and the communist party could together obtain a parliamentary 
majority, would cement social democratic governmental rule until 1977, that is, for the next 44 years 
(e.g., Steinmo 1988: 418). Importantly, despite the 1932 victory and the 1936 left-wing majority, the 
Social Democratic Party (SAP) – whose party manifestos, ever since its first in 1897 had not actually 
stressed (with regards to economic policy) the ‘socialization’ or ‘nationalization’ of the economy but 
instead the reduction of inequality and progressive taxation286 – generally accepted the necessity of 
maintaining capitalist productivity and profitability (Steinmo 1988: 416-20).  
Thus, throughout the unemployment-ridden and labour-militant 1930s, consumption taxes were 
raised (rather than income tax) and tax breaks for large Swedish corporations were instituted – of 
course lobbied for by the Swedish Employers Federation (SAF) – as part of an arguably pragmatic deal 
in which inter alia the labour union confederation (LO) was tacitly promised acceptance of an LO-run 
                                                          
285 At that time the General Electoral League, later the Moderate Party.  
286 For a collection of the Swedish social democratic party’s manifestos since 1897 until 1990, see the Swedish 
Labour Movement’s Archives and Library (2001).  
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employment insurance program and all parties accepted the new bargaining setups intended to resolve 
or dampen industrial conflicts (Steinmo 1988: 416-422; Steinmo 1989: 522). Although partly unrelated, 
the latter initiative would find expression in the so-called Saltsjöbaden Agreement of 1938, which for 
many decades – well into the consolidation period of the Swedish automobile industry – 
institutionalized a distinctive deliberative ‘Swedish model’ of corporatist, particularly wage-related, 
industrial bargaining between the employers and the unions.   
  
 
13.2.2 Consolidation: Corporatively consolidating and managing tensions  
The Swedish automobile industry experience in the GA period not only ideal-typically symptomizes but 
was also critically causally underpinned by a prolonged pro-business consolidated corporatized 
management of the tension-filled relationship between legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting.  
After WW2, and generally boosted by war-related manufacturing, Volvo formally embarked on 
(or rather returned to) the large-scale production of civilian automobile production, namely private cars, 
introducing the PV 444, what would become a highly successful Swedish ‘people’s car’ (Elsässer 1995: 
75, 152-5, 271). While Volvo’s first branch plant was set up in 1958, the 1960s saw Volvo initiating 
foreign automobile production, notably setting up an assembly plant for private car production in 
Ghent, Belgium, in 1965 (Malmberg 1995: 178-9). While the biggest suppliers/manufacturers on the 
Swedish car market was Scania-Vabis in the 1950s and Volvo in the 1960s, Volkswagen sold the most 
private cars in the 1950s (with Volvo as number three), while Volvo enjoyed the biggest market share 
in the 1960s (Elsässer 1995: 187). Generally, while the Swedish state railways, SJ, suffered from 
increasing financial deficits all throughout the postwar period (Millward 2005: 266, 271), the 1950 and 
1960s can be considered prosperous for particularly Volvo and Scania-Vabis with regards to 
productivity and production volume (Elsässer 1995: 8; Malmberg 1995: 174).  
Relatively speaking private cars have consistently and increasingly surpassed trucks and busses 
when looking at the development of the car fleet since the 1950s (Elsässer 1995: 308). As data clearly 
shows, car ownership per capita exploded after WW2 and throughout the GA period – and while car 
ownership continued to increase after the 1970s, the still increasing slope weakens markedly – pushing 
forward, or revealing, a growing socio-economic and geographical diffusion of automobiles in Sweden 
(Lindgren et al. 2010: 167). With the notable exception of Japan, the intensity of this postwar expansion 
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and diffusion of private cars, which saw a quadrupling of the car fleet in the period 1950-1960, 
surpassed that of other comparable advanced countries (Lindgren et al. 2010: 168; Elsässer 1995: 64-
65). Also new car registrations rose markedly in the GA period, particularly in the first part of the 
1960s, being 2.5 times as big in 1960 as in the 1950s (Elsässer 1995: 269; Lindgren et al. 2010: 168). 
Because, as Lindgren et al. (2010: 169, 170) show, both the trends in new car registrations and car 
ownership correlate with GDP per capita developments – such that slower GDP correlates with fewer 
new registrations and lower car ownership – one can place the postwar diffusion of automobiles in the 
context of the generally expanding Swedish macroeconomy during the GA period. While the expansion 
in the Scandinavian countries generally was a bit lower than many other comparable countries, Sweden 
nonetheless had an average annual economic growth rate of 4% in the period 1950-73 – a growth rate 
higher than countries such as the US, the UK and Denmark, and certainly much higher than in both the 
interwar and the post-1970s period (Hansen 2001: 314). 
Like in the UK, accumulation-oriented ‘social capital expenditures’ (in O’Connor’s sense) were 
activated to expand the motorway. At the same time as the postwar period saw a decline in the prices on 
new cars and gasoline, and as private cars became the dominant means of transport for Swedish 
consumer-citizens from the 1960s – squeezing out, relatively speaking, the railways and shipping (with 
ferry routes actually going down) – one can observe a marked expansion of the government-mandated 
construction of new (paved) roads, bridges and motorways, the latter increasing heavily from a starting 
point of 0 km in 1950 (Elsässer 1995: 15, 16, 312). The postwar motorway expansion in Sweden stands 
out when compared to the development in Norway (an in many other instances similar Scandinavian 
country): both the amount of motorway (measured in km) in Sweden has been around ten times as high 
as in Norway since 1965 and the relative extent to which roads are paved, although nearing each other 
in recent years, has consistently been higher in Sweden (Lindgren & Pettersson 2009: 182-3).  
Originally, since medieval times, roads and their maintenance and construction in Sweden had 
been managed through rural/local management: first by landowners or individual farmers and then at 
the turn of the 19th century by laymen on behalf of the municipal authorities (Boge 2008: 222, 229; 
Hasselgren 2013: 57). Then, in 1944, the Royal Board of Roads and Waterways (formed in 1841) 
nationalized the public roads and pushed forward – particularly through a series of postwar government 
transport committees and notably the 1958 Road Plan for Sweden (Vägplan för Sverige), and its 
equivalent of 1969, which presented the contours and targets of the national plan for the construction of 
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roads (Lindgren et al. 2010: 166-7) – a much more autonomous, state-facilitated, professionalized and 
efficiency- or cost-benefit-oriented transport policy agenda (Boge 2008: 221-4; Hasselgren 2013: 58-
63). Importantly, this post-WW2 public management of roads not only simplified and centralized local 
authority and networks – and subjected these to the relatively homogenizing organizational solipsism 
and fiscal lens of the Swedish state – it also helped further consolidate road-related activities as a 
distinctive GA-oriented category of fiscal state-crafting. In this relation, a notable GA-specific 
O’Connor-like fiscal maneuver were made: Starting with the 1923 imposition of hypothecated fuel and 
vehicle taxes, whose revenues were effectively earmarked for the financing of road-related initiatives, 
after 1938 and until 1980 ‘the government set up a particular account in the state’s accounting system 
with road construction and maintenance as contra entries to the annual vehicle and fuel tax revenues’, 
arguably, as a way of maintaining a ‘long-term balance between road users’ payments of vehicle and 
fuel taxes and public spending on road purposes’ (Boge 2008: 222). 
The expansion of the Swedish automobile industry in the GA period was positively conditioned 
by a complex wage coordination scheme. A central pillar of the ‘Swedish model’ of industrial relations 
was the state-facilitated so-called Rehn-Meidner regime – historically underpinned by the important 
Saltsjöbaden Agreement of 1938 and the ensuing wartime experience – in which the peak-level 
organizations LO and SAF would regularly negotiate and set central targets for wage levels (effectively 
the level of wage increase) (e.g., Shonfield 1965: 199-211; Coates 2000: 94-8). Importantly, this 
scheme based itself on a policy of so-called ‘wage solidarity’ where ‘an enterprise in an industry where 
productivity is low are compelled to pay the same wages as more productive workers earn elsewhere’ 
(Shonfield 1965: 207). In such a situation ‘workers in less prosperous industries (…) should be enabled 
to capture some of the benefits of the extra earnings that have been obtained elsewhere’ (Ibid.).287 One 
of the aims of this inter-sectoral/industrial wage re-allocation mechanism was to increase overall 
business competitiveness by using ‘wage increases and the consequent pressure on profit margins to 
eliminate enterprises with relatively low increases in productivity’ (Israel 1978: 343). Importantly, the 
solidarity policy of achieving uniform wages (or at least low wage differentials) between sectors 
benefited the profitability of the automobile industry, otherwise characterized as a skills-intensive and 
                                                          
287 According to Eichengreen (2008: 35), ‘[t]he state played a tacit role in these negotiations by signaling its view 
of appropriate wage increases given prevailing macroeconomic conditions and applying its seal of approval to the 
results’. 
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productive industry, because it introduced relatively lower wages than what there would otherwise have 
been in this specific industry (e.g., Elsässer 1995: 254-5).288  
Of course, while thus seemingly reliant on a hands-off approach from the state, what Korpi (2006: 
188) calls the Swedish ‘Historical Compromise’ between the two main parties of capitalist democratic 
society rather reflected, as Shonfield (1965: 205) puts it crudely, a (neo-)corporatist system in which the 
relevant interest groups ‘are the instruments of public policy used by the state, wherever this is feasible, 
in the place of its own paid servants’. While the Swedish state arguably maintains authority over the 
overall political-economic direction, it has a long tradition of handing over technical discretion and 
responsibility for policy implementation to quasi-autonomous public entities like the National Board 
and Agencies (NBAs) – for example, the National Labour Market Board or the National Social 
Insurance Board – a form of ‘administrative corporatism’ in which the NBA’s are filled with 
representatives from political parties, the SAF and the LO and the civil service (Rothstein 1988: 235, 
244, 237, 238, 236). More generally, the postwar Swedish corporatist system can be seen as largely a 
creature of pre-democratic legitimatory state-crafting: As Rothstein (1991: 167, passim) points out, the 
pre-democratic state – universal suffrage was not obtained before 1918 (with the first universal general 
election held in 1921) – sought to establish and nurture extra-parliamentary means of political-
institutional embracement and bureaucratic cooperation. 
A Swedish-style approximation of a relatively regimented form of production also partly 
appeared. Although both institutional and technological factors had historically worked to constrain this 
development (and continuously would) (see, e.g., Kinch 1993: passim), Volvo nonetheless increasingly 
tried to match and promote the postwar expansion of private cars through economies of scale and 
notably the implementation in the early 1950s of the Fordist-like (or perhaps rather Taylorist-like) 
MTM (Methods-Time Measurement) system – a time- and motion-oriented method for measuring and 
                                                          
288 Although productively pointing towards a seeming intention of the corporate actors, Coates (2000: 96) also 
argues that potential inflation triggered by high employment rates was sought dampened by ‘trading wage 
restraint (…) for active and selective labour market policies’. But, importantly, in line with the overall analysis of 
chapter 7, despite this arguably pro-competition limiting of wage differentiation between skill levels (and 
differentially skilled sectors), etc., Sweden did not on the whole experience wage moderation in the GA period – 
as has, for example, been argued by Eichengreen (2007: 35, fn. 38) – but rather high wage pressure (Bengtsson 
2015: 372-6). 
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rationalizing work tasks developed by US engineers in the 1940s – which it took Saab and Scania-
Vabis around ten years to finally incorporate (Elsässer 1995: 153-5). Notable in this regard was the 
building of the Göteborg-based Torslanda plant (Ibid.: 153, 166).   
Economic policies played a great role in the postwar period, underpinning the private vehicle 
expansion. A key fiscal maneuver was activated: Starting in the mid-1950s, a so-called investment 
reserve funds system was set up in which companies could reserve up to 40% of their pre-tax profits in 
a reserve fund where about 40% of this tax-free deduction would be deposited in the Central Bank 
without interest (Taylor et al. 1982: 59-62). The idea of these investment funds was to enable firms – 
with the blessing of authorities – to release the money stored in the Central Bank in downturns as a 
countercyclical measure (Shonfield 1965: 201-2; Taylor et al. 1982: 62). Importantly, this investment 
reserve system had a great effect on the Swedish automobile industry in the 1960s; by helping to 
modernize production facilitates – for example, in the form of the Torslanda factory and the 
construction of Volvo’s successful PV 444 – it critically underpinned the postwar private car expansion 
and the increasing export of cars to the US (Elsässer 1995: 250, 271, 274). More generally, exports 
increased markedly – particularly exports to the US – in the GA period, and in the late 1960s Sweden 
switched from being a net importer to a net exporter of private cars (Elsässer 1995: 67). Throughout the 
postwar period, Sweden’s historically low tariffs on cars stayed more or less the same – the tariffs on 
automobiles generally being higher than other types of commodities in this period – while the tariffs of 
other countries started to fall as part of a general international trend of trade liberalization (Elsässer 
1995: 39, 43, 242, 241). Data on the trends in the relative share of automobile employment out of total 
employment shows an increasing slope since WW2 (Elsässer 1995: 58). While the steepness of this 
rising trend would actually increase markedly from the 1970s, it reveals the both legitimatory and fiscal 
importance of the automobile industry. Notably, during the 1960s, Sweden generally maintained an 
active regional policy, encouraging investments and plant constructions – especially through the 
investment funds – in areas with high unemployment (e.g., Elsässer 1995: 248-50). 
The Swedish experience in the GA period provides an ideal-typical demonstration of a prolonged 
pro-business management of the tension-filled relationship between legitimatory and fiscal state-
crafting. Unable – and/or ideologically unwilling – to generally ‘socialize’ or nationalize economic 
production, the Swedish social democrats during the GA period instead aimed, in Keynesian fashion, to 
achieve the twin aims of securing both full employment and ‘business confidence’. On the one hand, 
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the full employment obligation increasingly consolidated itself as simultaneously a fiscal variable – an 
indication of GDP expansion and normally entailing a decrease in ‘social expenses’ – and a powerful 
means of state legitimation (conditioned on the gradually increasing identification of employment and 
welfare and more generally a growing work-related synthetization of the ‘private’ and the ‘public’ 
facets of legitimation that, as argued, would critically intensify in a reconfigured manner in the post-
1970s period). On the other hand, the fiscal and industrial policies of the postwar period were 
underpinned by a class-biased mixture of strategic cooperation with big businesses and low corporate 
taxation and relatively high income and consumption taxes (VAT) – policies that helped concentrate 
Swedish capital, leaving the country with few dominant big businesses, such as the powerful 
Wallenberg Group whose owner Marcus Wallenberg helped run inter alia Saab – as a way of promoting 
(re-)investment and thus economic growth (Steinmo 1988: 426, 427, 429; Israel 1978: passim).289    
 
 
13.2.3 Reconfiguration: State-reconfigured ‘reflective’ accumulation in the automobile industry  
As shall be seen, the Swedish experience in the reconfiguration period reveals a causally interrelated 
two-pronged Swedish-style hybrid co-productive tension-displacing development: a relative turn to a 
more ‘reflective’ pro-business (1) automobile profit-making and (2) fiscal state-crafting.  
In the 1970s, the Swedish automobile industry faced a crisis, seeing declining production and 
exports, and while the market for trucks and busses generally did well, the sale of passenger cars 
plummeted (Elsässer 1995: 278; Malmberg 1995: 182). Underpinned by generalized crisis-ridden 
features of the international political economy as addressed previously, Sweden experienced increasing 
labour unrest, wildcat strikes, etc. Of course, the increase in strike activity, labour consciousness and 
wage costs – the latter of which arguably a result of both (1) a labour-initiated ‘stretching’ of the long-
standing wage solidarity scheme (Pontusson & Swenson 1996: 228, 235), which (as argued) did not 
generally imply overall wage moderation but rather coexisted with continuous high wage increases 
(Bengtsson 2015: 372-6), and (2) employer-initiated moves to decentralize and escape the bind of the 
historical compromise (Korpi 2006: passim, 186-192) – also spread to the automobile industry. By the 
1970s, the general situation had also affected the industry, and notably Volvo’s factories, implying 
                                                          
289 As Israel (1978: 348) shows there was a general merger trend in the 1960s in Sweden.  
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strikes, a generally overheated sector (making recruitment more difficult), high wage costs and an 
increasing degree of sick days (and other types of absenteeism) (Elsässer 1995: 159-60, 256-7; 
Malmberg 1995: 182). 
Interestingly, as Lindgren et al. (2010: 169-70) show, although there was actually an increase in 
new car registrations in the early 1970s, car ownership rates largely reflects the general fluctuations of 
the economy: new registrations and the net increase in car ownership (i.e., new registrations minus 
scrapped cars) fell after the mid-1970s, as they would again after the Swedish economic dip in the early 
1990s. Moreover, partly a result of legislation underpinning this, throughout the latter part of the 
postwar period, we see an expansion in the sales of used cars, making the ratio of used cars to new cars 
sales 2:1 in the late 1960s/early 1970s (Ibid.: 168) – a development that arguably also reflected both the 
increasing socio-economic diffusion of car ownership (e.g., lower-income groupings entering the car 
market) in the GA period and the more general transitory politicized energy of the objectively short-
lived activation of the claim-based frustration scenario of the late 1960s/early 1970s. Although the 
unemployment rate did not increase markedly until the early 1990s where it exploded (OECD 2016g; 
see also Ljungqvist & Sargent 2010: 212), the Swedish growth rates of the post-1970s period stand out 
as even weaker than most other comparable countries (Hansen 2001: 314, 466). Perhaps even more so 
than in other countries, the crisis of the 1970s marks a crucial macro-structural turning point for 
Sweden, reconfiguring the properties of state-crafting practices, industrial relations and the organization 
of economic production in the automobile industry. The Swedish post-crisis experience provides a 
productive nationally specific illustration of the objective watering down and short-livedness of the 
immediate end-oriented form of political-institutional bewilderment of the 1970s, which was addressed 
in chapter 8. 
At the political-institutional level, the politicized expectation/claim escalation processes of the 
early 1970s (e.g., in the form of a brewing discontent with working conditions),which inter alia helped 
increase demands for a more ’co-productive’ organization of production, found expression in, first, a 
series of labour laws intended to improve the status and discretion of employees – laws accepted across 
the political spectrum – and, second, LO-initiated proposals of (and demands for) so-called Wage 
Earner’s Funds (WEF) (Åsard 1986: passim, 210). While originally proposed by Rudolf Meidner, the 
famous LO economist, in his 1975 report as a way of altering the increasing concentration of capital in 
Sweden by expanding popular ownership and control of economic production – funds obtained by 
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introducing a 20% tax on profits was over time supposed to be used for taking over control of important 
Swedish corporations – the WEF idea was significantly stifled by not only an inactive Public 
Commission (looking into the matter from 1975-81) and a counter-acting SAF (introducing a general 
lockout and later mobilizing strikes against the idea) but also a very reluctant social democratic party 
(now in opposition), generally afraid to openly discuss issues of ownership and explicit resistance to 
capitalism (Steinmo 1988: 431-33; Åsard 1986: 213-15; Korpi 2006: 192). Importantly, the watered 
down WEF bill that was finally passed in 1983 – the social democrats said yes, the right-wing voted 
against it and the Communists abstained (Åsard 1986: 207) – now, to the relative satisfaction of the 
employers (Steinmo 1988: 433), overwhelmingly aimed at underpinning employment and capitalist 
production, supporting ‘risk capital’ and ideally helping to restrain wage inflation, etc. (Steinmo 1988: 
432-3). A combination of ongoing means-oriented bewilderment and inflated firmness (through, e.g., 
politically driven co-productive externalization processes) would become the order of the day – at least 
from the 1990s.   
At the industrial relations level, the Swedish postwar corporatist system of peak-level centralized 
bargaining was qualitatively transformed, in a deeply state-crafting-underpinned manner, from the 
1980s and particularly the 1990s. While the first moves towards decentralization correlated with the 
slump of the early 1980s, the crisis of the early 1990s – largely a result of a banking crisis not entirely 
dissimilar in its origins from the 2008 financial crisis with its prior phase of re-regulation of credit 
markets, etc. – marked the beginnings of a new regime of ‘coordinated decentralization’ (Howell & 
Givan 2011: 237-241; Baccaro & Howell 2011: 543-545; cf. Pontusson & Swenson 1996: 229). 
Underpinned by the employers’ – and particularly the export-oriented Association of Engineering 
Employers – material-strategic interest in increasing both the wage differences between sheltered and 
non-sheltered (export-driven) sectors and the ability to more flexibly connect wages to individual 
employee performances (Pontusson & Swenson 1996: 232), we see a shift, particularly with the 
Industrial Agreement of 1997, towards a new multi-sectoral coordinated agreement allowing for more 
individualized wage bargaining (at the local or firm level), the partial institution of a new ‘wage norm’ 
linked to the development of the export sector, new rules banning strike activity during negotiations, 
etc. (Howell & Givan 2011: 237-241). Clearly, state-crafting practices, for example in the temporary 
party-political guise of the generally pro-competition but mostly banking-crisis-oriented 1991-1994 
center-right Bildt government, conditioned the emergence of this decentralized regime; either through 
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explicit state-facilitated bargaining (Pontusson & Swenson 1996: 232, 230), more indirect mechanisms 
such as a generally supportive governmental stance (Ibid.: 232) or the signaling of potential state action 
(pointing in a decentralizing direction) ‘in the event of non-action’ by the ‘social partners’ (Howell & 
Givan 2011: 138).  
The political-institutional WEF-situated watering down process found equivalent expression at 
the automobile industry-level. Looking at the automobile industry in Sweden, the crisis of the 1970s 
helped spawn an at least indirectly state-facilitated reconfiguration of economic production and work 
organization. While Volvo’s Torslanda plant had constituted the ‘Americanized’ assembly-line 
manufacturing site in the 1960s (Ellegård 1996), Volvo sought to accommodate problems of worker 
dissatisfaction, absenteeism, etc. – and the changing socio-psychological conditions of work 
organization more generally – by opening up new alternative and more innovative plants throughout the 
1970s and 1980s. Pehr G. Gyllenhammer, Volvo’s CEO since 1971, was active in facilitating a 
transformation of Swedish work organization – towards what has later been called a ‘reflective 
production system’, ‘Uddevalla system’ or ‘alternative assembly system’ (Ellegård 1996; Jonsson et al. 
2004: 757, passim) – positively acknowledging in 1973 that ‘[d]emands for what is called work content 
have increased strongly during recent years’ and arguing that ‘it should be possible to develop new 
solutions in the area of production technology in factories and offices (…) that combine rational 
systems with more meaningful work tasks so that the requirements for increased efficiency are satisfied 
too’ (as cited in Jonsson et al. 2004: 754). When Volvo opened up the (short-lived) truck-oriented 
Arendal plant/workshop in 1974, the Kalmar plant in 1975 and the Uddevalla plant in 1985 it aimed to 
not only introduce an alternative to the moving ‘single product flow pattern’ of assembly lines in the 
form of a ‘semi-parallel’ (at Kalmar) and ‘parallel’ (at Uddevalla) product flow pattern with 
workstations but also more ‘self-management in (…) autonomous workgroups’ enjoying a higher 
degree of overview of and control over the complete manufacturing process (Jonsson et al. 2004: 755; 
Ellegård 1996).  
According to the key academic proponents of this so-called ‘Swedish model for work life 
development’ (see Engström et al. 1996; Jonsson et al. 2004) – notably Tomas Engström, Dan Jonsson 
and Lars Medbo – ‘alternative assembly systems’ generally introduce a ‘flexibility advantage’: they are, 
much more than traditional assembly lines, ‘suitable for product markets with high product 
differentiation, large fluctuation in demand over-time and relatively short product cycles’ (Jonsson et al. 
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2004: 767, 763) – a view that, of course, commonsensically accepts the apparent contextual shift 
towards notably so-called ‘flexible specialization’. Importantly, Jonsson et al. (2004: 768, 758, 
emphasis added; see also Engström et al. 1996) not only argue, based on their own empirical-
observational studies, that ‘assembly in alternative assembly systems is more efficient in terms of man-
hour use than line assembly’ – they argue, more generally, that whereas ‘[t]rue teamwork certainly 
existed in the Uddevalla plant’, it is more uncertain whether Lean production delivers on that parameter 
(Engström et al. 1996: 144, passim) – they also advocate the Swedish model of ‘reflective production’ 
as a way of ‘[taking] advantage of specific Swedish competitive advantages’. In other words, what is 
being described is the development of a pro-business and supposedly tension-overcoming ‘reflective’ 
co-production logic in the Swedish automobile industry. 
Two key overall aspects should be considered in this regard. Firstly, with regards to the above 
latter point, that is, the advocacy of the ‘competitive advantage’ of the Swedish model, it seems crucial 
to emphasize the importance of the Swedish state in underpinning the construction of alternative 
manufacturing sites: for example, Volvo’s plant construction in Uddevalla, where a regionally 
important shipyard closure was taking place, was government supported; an important motorway was 
constructed linking Göteborg and Uddevalla; although soon closed again, Saab’s alternative Malmö 
plant, established in 1989, also received financial support (Malmberg 1995: 186; fn. 4 ; see also 
Ellegård 1996). 
Secondly, like in the case of the reconfiguration of the UK automobile industry, there are 
problematic aspects linked to supposedly tension-overcoming co-productive hybridization schemes. 
Characteristically, the above pro-alternative assembly systems scholars argue, as against both 
traditional assembly line and Lean production, that the Swedish model actually overcomes tensions: as 
also indicated in the above quote by Volvo CEO Gyllenhammer (which they present approvingly), 
Engström et al. (1996: 156) optimistically find that in the ‘parallel flow manufacturing model there is 
(…) no conflict between humanization of work and productivity, or between productivity and 
flexibility’. Writing in the 2000s, and in an even more optimistic manner, Göran Brulin (2000: 249), a 
scholar from the National Institute for Working Life, affirms the observed decentralization of the 
Swedish system of manufacturing and industrial relations and, pointing particularly to the 
Metalworkers’ Union, applauds ‘the Swedish unions’ for having ‘at least locally and regionally, started 
to adjust to the new requirements’ – that is, for seeing adjustments ‘as necessary to allow production to 
321 
 
develop towards increased consumer adaption, flexibility, shorter lead times and increased 
productivity’. To a certain degree, Brulin (2000: Ibid.) approvingly finds in at least one instance, ‘the 
unions have become partners in the development process instead of just negotiating the effects’ – a co-
productive industrial relations dynamic that, as argued above, was heavily politically constituted.290 
Overwhelmingly, the alternative Swedish system of production – in many ways a natural 
response, operating at the level of work organization, to the short-lived gradual activation of the claim-
based frustration scenario of the late 1960s/early 1970s – were dismantled in the crisis period of the late 
1980s and the early 1990s. Notably, restructuring activities in the 1990s entailed the selling off of 
production plants, massive workforce layoffs and the closure of amongst others the experimental 
Kalmar and Uddevalla plants (although the latter opened again two years after it was finally 
reorganized in 2002 in a more traditional assembly line manner) (Malmberg 1995: 187; Jonsson et al. 
2004: 756-7). Arguably, the post-1990s ‘reintroduction of assembly lines’, as described and decried by 
Jonsson et al. (2004), is indicative of a both generalized yet distinctively Swedish post-1970s trajectory: 
firstly an apparent radicalism in the 1970s, then a watering down process in the 1990s.291 In many 
ways, the Swedish model of ‘reflective production’ mirrors the trajectory of the WEF (operating at the 
level of fiscal and legitimatory state-crafting): the watering down of the Swedish alternative assembly 
system can be seen as the automobile-organizational equivalent of the political-institutional watering 
down of the WEF. 
                                                          
290 This form of proposed ‘co-production’ apparently also found early expression at the level of the worker-
costumer relationship at the Uddevalla plant when at one point, as Ellegård (1996: ‘Results’ para. 1) neutrally 
describes it, ‘[c]ostumers were invited to follow ‘the birth’ of their own car, and to talk to the team who 
assembled it. The costumer could also be allowed to assemble some components in his car himself [sic], 
supervised by a worker’.    
291 As Richardson et al. (2010: 62) for example also finds when looking at transportation policy and the complex 
institution of congestion taxation in Stockholm, we go from initial radical proposals in the 1970s – focused on 
tackling the problems of extensive car use – to a gradual (yet somewhat fluctuating) watering down process from 
the 1980s and beyond, resulting, in the end, in a congestion scheme that is ‘not about changing mobility patterns’ 
but is ‘[r]ather (…) about ‘effective’ mobility management’. In this resulting moderated scheme, ‘the mobile 
subjects in focus are once again car users, who should not necessarily travel less but should modify their 
behaviour to use the road system in a more efficient way’. 
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Although this occurred later than in the UK, and in a different context and thus with a different 
relative intensity, etc., a somewhat similar (although less explicitly) state-facilitated process of 
displacement through internationalization and Europeanization could be observed. Arguably, the crisis 
hitting both Saab and Volvo in the late 1980s, showing falling returns on total capital (at the concern 
level) from the mid-1980s (Elsässer 1995: 86)292 – and of course, much more indirectly, the crisis 
starting in the 1970s and the larger reconfiguration associated with the post-1970s period – helped 
initiate a general internationalization process from particularly the late 1980s and beyond that have 
decisively altered Swedish automobile production. The important 1990 strategic alliance between 
Volvo and the (until 1996) state-owned French automobile company Renault, allowing for cross-
ownership, collaboration, etc., initiated Volvo’s effective internationalization process that intensified in 
the 2000s. Ford bought Volvo Cars in 1999 entailing a bifurcation in the form of Volvo Group, a 
Swedish-owned entity focused on inter alia commercial vehicles, and Volvo Cars, a more regular 
automobile producer. Then, in 2010, the Chinese automobile company Zhejiang Geely (or Zhejiang 
Geely Holding Group Co.) bought Volvo Cars from Ford. Volvo Group, amongst other international 
activities, bought a stake in Nissan Diesel in 2006 and the entire French automobile company Panhard 
in 2012. In 1989, in the crisis-ridden late 1980s, Saab Automobile AB was formed – it was separated 
from Saab-Scania AB, the post-1969 Wallenberg-organized merger of Saab and Scania-Vabis – as part 
of a joint investment from General Motors (GM) and the Swedish investment company Investor AB, 
only to become a full subsidiary of GM in 2000. 
Certain symptomatic aspects connected to this (at least later Europeanization-driven) restructuring 
and internationalization process of the post-1990s implicitly express the tension-displacing and 
strategic-discursive, rather than necessarily objectively tension-overcoming, components of the 
‘reflective’ Swedish scheme. Notably, the recent restructuring/internationalization process – 
intrinsically connected to Sweden’s entry into EU in 1995, which entailed an acceptance of an EU-
harmonized tariff rate on passenger cars and trucks (currently 10% and 11-22% respectively) (US 
Department of Commerce 2011: 83) – has challenged the purported national ‘integrity’ of the Swedish 
automobile manufacturers (cf. Malmberg 1995: 189-90). Arguably, both Saab’s successful 2005 ‘Born 
from Jets’ campaign, which sought to reach back to its military-situated aircraft heritage and Volvo’s 
                                                          
292 Despite this fall, the stock prices of both Saab-Scania and Volvo seemed to have increased markedly from the 
early 1980s and throughout the early 1990s (see, e.g., data in Elsässer 1995: 311).  
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ongoing ‘Made By Sweden’ campaign, which, for example, tries to reach back to its Swedish 
manufacturing roots, its long history of safety-technology innovations, etc., is revealing of a legitimacy-
deficit intrinsically connected to the industry’s increasing objective national uprooting. 
This seems to be particularly visible in Volvo’s ongoing Made By Sweden campaign: its 
inclusion of, amongst other things, a 2014 TV-ad featuring both the soccer-star Zlatan Ibrahimović 
engaging in various outdoor activities in the Swedish winter-landscape reciting, in voiceover form, 
sentences from the Swedish national anthem and the Swedish pop singer Robyn’s climate-oriented 
Volvo commercial intended to promote Volvo’s new supposedly emission-friendly Drive-E technology, 
seems focused on displacing the fact of its Chinese ownership. Interestingly, while ‘producing the 
Volvo way’ referred to the original decentralized form of production, with its strategic use of specified 
components from a network of suppliers and subcontractors, this strategy did not really survive the 
interwar period (Elsässer 1995: 72; Kinch 1993: 13-15). Moreover, while the more recent versions of 
the Made By Sweden campaign – which of course almost conspicuously sidesteps the issue of whether 
the cars are still overwhelmingly made in Sweden – includes the slogan ‘Made By People’, presumably 
referring to the Swedish form of car manufacturing, associated with its particular system of ‘reflective 
production’ practiced at the Kalmar and Uddevalla plants, this discursive appeal of course falls flat 
given the company’s above mentioned return to more traditional styles of assembly-line production.       
While it seems tempting to read the Swedish post-1970/1990s automobile experience as the story 
of a genuine alternative Swedish route, this route arguably involves a form of ‘reflective’ automobile 
profit-making or, at another level, ‘reflective’ fiscal state-crafting that in many instances actually is 
underpinned by a combination of a micro-situated transformation of popular value priorities and a more 
output/performance-based and marketized-fiscalized mode of macro-level legitimation. In this relation, 
despite the presumably greater than usual proliferation of a critical-cynical subjectivity in the Swedish 
‘reflective’ context, there is for example implicit evidence that car ownership preferences in Sweden are 
actually patterned according to more output/performance-based inner-normatively identifying 
consumer-citizen value priorities. 
Specifically, although Volvo’s post-1990s commercials increasingly find it necessary to infuse 
their activities with a ’reflective’ content – seemingly as a way of tapping into the new sophisticated 
consumership that is increasingly normatively skeptical of car ownership, car culture, etc. – there is 
strong indication that car ownership patterns are greatly dependent on rational-material considerations. 
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For example, as Lindgren et al. (2010: 169-70) finds, the fall in new registrations of cars fell 
simultaneously with the economic dip of the early 1990s, or as Bastian & Börjesson (2015: 101) shows, 
most of the observed development in vehicle kilometers traveled (VKT) in the period 2002-2012 ‘can 
be explained by trends in fuel price and GDP per capita’. Bastian & Börjesson (2015: 96) reports an 
increase in the VKT throughout the 2000s until a fall in the period 2008-2012 is seen. Importantly, 
while it may be obvious to see the fall in VKT in the period 2008-2012 as an expression of a normative 
change (notably connected to the 2008 crisis), Bastian & Börjesson’s (2015: 101) findings show that it 
is ‘too early to draw conclusions about any substantial break in the preferences for driving’. Moreover, 
while there has been an observable decrease in Swedish driver licence holdings from around the 1990s, 
much of this can be explained by factors such as a higher unemployment rate (particularly amongst the 
youth), increasing migration or, as survey reports show, a lack of financial resources or time (Kågeson 
2014: 5-6, 6-7, 10). Seen in this light, as marketized/fiscalized output/performance-based value 
priorities seem to be intact – they are in a certain sense confirmed by the fall in VKT during the 2008 
crisis – it is reasonable to expect increases in for example VKT should the macroeconomic situation 
change.293 
 
 
13.3 Analytical formalization and conclusion 
Concludingly, against the background of the above nested two-country case study analysis, this section 
shall non-exhaustively analytically formalize and summarize some of the both shared and peculiar key 
properties that have been dealt with. Generally, looking historically at the British and Swedish 
automobile industry in a state-crafting context – and across their specific nationally-situated 
experiences – provides a productive way of perceiving the state-crafting conditions of possibility for the 
automobile industry in these two countries, i.e. how the industry’s emergence, consolidation and 
                                                          
293 The two transportation scholars optimistically conclude: [t]ransport modeling is based on the underlying 
assumption that preferences stay constant over time. From this perspective, it is reassuring that most of the 
variation in VKT per adult in 2002-2012 can be explained by elasticities in fuel price and GDP per capita’ 
(Bastian & Börjesson 2015: 101).           
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reconfiguration in many ways both (1) mirrors/reflects and (2) was directly and indirectly conditioned 
by the changing historical dynamics of legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting.   
Firstly, the development of the automobile industry in both countries throughout the three periods 
is symptomatically representative of the state-crafting dynamics integral to the ECR model. In the 
emergence period, the crafting of the two automobile industries correlate with the crafting of the state 
itself, its gradual securing of its monopoly status and its functional hardwiring. In the consolidation 
period, the automobile industries, as they have concentrated and corporatively formalized, are not only 
highly correlated with the tension-bridging status of legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting of the GA 
period but have also become explicitly subjected to state-crafting considerations. In the reconfiguration 
period, the industry-situated launching of British- and Swedish-style hybrid tension-displacing co-
productive processes and schemes heavily correlates with the earlier argued relative shift towards a 
more self-legitimating mode of fiscal accumulation.   
Secondly, the development of both the British and the Swedish automobile industries were 
directly and indirectly conditioned by state-crafting practices and considerations. On the one hand, 
automobile production was more or less directly influenced by accumulation-oriented (physical) ‘social 
investments’ (in O’Connor’s sense), nationalization, regional initiatives, tariff rates, taxation policies, 
the fiscally functional promotion of a ‘national champion’ (linked to the strategy of normative 
mobilization-control), etc. On the other hand, the two automobile industries were indirectly facilitated 
by the general consolidation and maintenance/maximization of national growth-oriented and 
consumption-optimizing agendas, which through encouraging a popular socio-psychological 
expectation of ever-widening economic growth and consumption prospects secondarily supports the 
diffusion of a car-consuming citizenry (by tendentially tweaking value priorities in a pro-car direction). 
In this way, through servicing its own fiscal ISI, the state, via a long-term causal chain, helps secure the 
necessary (but of course insufficient) socio-psychological conditions for both, what Paterson (2007: 
121-165) describes as, the ‘(auto)mobile subject’ and the wider automobile industry. 
Thirdly, the two-country case study analysis not only (1) stresses the importance of the state-
facilitated shift from an early period of personalism (associated with networking, craftsmanship, 
innovation, flexibilism, fragmentation, etc.) to a later period of corporate impersonalism (associated 
with rationalization, bigness, organizational solipsism, bureaucracy, fiscalism, etc.), but also (2) reveals 
the correlative operation of this historical dynamic at different levels of analysis, i.e. at the sectoral 
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level (that is, the automotive industry), the political-economic level (associated with industrial relations, 
managerial-organizational arrangements and economic production) and the state-crafting level 
(associated with legitimatory and fiscal state-functional reproduction). The historically increasing 
degree of automobile fiscal saliency and corporativenes – the increasing extent to which automobile 
manufacturing becomes fiscally relevant and organizationally formalized and managed by synthetic and 
increasingly emergent and impersonal corporate actors with an ISI and a (usually) international 
geographical reach – strongly correlates with not only the generally growing degree of state-facilitated 
societal corporativeness but also a much more consolidated state-industry relationship. This not only 
signals how, as argued with Weber (1978, 1948: chapter VIII), Sennett (2006: 20-23) and Chang (2011: 
see especially 199-209) in chapter 7, capitalism is irreducibly intrinsically linked to ‘planning’, but also 
generally stresses the importance of state-facilitated change: how the pressure to serve state functions 
and the ISI of the state pushes things forward in a corporatized manner, sets formalized processes, 
mechanisms, organizations and actors (that all have their own dynamics and rationality) in motion and 
over time indirectly helps tweak value priorities in a corporate functional direction.         
Fourthly, as seems evident, war activities, which are ultimately connected to the ontological 
violence-security-sovereignty function of the state, have been crucial in shaping the development of the 
automobile industry in Britain and Sweden – both in terms of spawning specific ‘path dependent’ 
technological and organizational patterns and more generally in terms of supporting the consolidation 
of the four monopolies of the state (and, in this relation, utilizing fiscal resources and manpower and 
supporting the state’s large-scale organizational-functional considerations, etc.).294 Importantly, the 
wartime effect on the development of the automobile industry – a cross-cutting feature of the car 
producing industrialized polities – appears as a salient indication of not simply (1) the always already 
dialectical relationship between war and fiscalism but also (2) how the fiscal function (along with 
profit-based accumulation) becomes subjected to the otherwise backgrounded structural constraints of 
the violence-security-sovereignty function of the state in war/military contexts. Although the case study 
analysis showcase the activation and mutual establishment of all of the four of the state’s monopolies, 
                                                          
294 On a general note: looking broadly at the development of economic growth and the distribution of 
wealth/income, Piketty (2014: 20) interestingly boldly points out: ‘the reduction of inequality that took place in 
most developed countries between 1910 and 1950 was above all a consequence of war and of policies adopted to 
cope with the shocks of war’.  
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after WW2 it is evident that what has earlier been described as the Maslowian-like relative historical 
backgrounding of the violence-security-sovereignty function kicks in as, in particular (but of course not 
exclusively), the fiscal-functional importance of the automobile industry takes primacy.  
Fifthly, the case study analysis reveal, confirming Chang’s (2011: especially 74-87) general 
argumentation, that private economic actors – in this case automobile companies and their organized 
representatives – in many instances do not favor free markets and open borders. Their concrete stance is 
highly historically and contextually contingent: the overall pro-market ideological stance is greatly 
counterbalanced by pragmatic-functional considerations that may easily result in the individual 
company unproblematically supporting tariffs or other forms of protections. As also argued earlier, the 
same goes for regulation: automobile companies, as seen in the two national experiences of the UK and 
Sweden, are neither for or against state intervention – this question overwhelmingly depends on the 
specific nature, direction, timing, etc., of the state-crafting activity. 
Sixthly, the automobile industry analysis stresses the importance of maintaining the analytical 
saliency of the ISI of the state. This is seen in at least four ways.  
 
(1) While this may be obvious, with regards to nationalization and the institution of public bodies, the 
case not only makes clear that the distinction between, for example, public and private, in no way 
linearly corresponds to the distinction between either state and capitalism or socialism and capitalism 
(cf. Millward 2005: 289), but also that public ownership for the most part has merely entailed an 
alternative way of fiscally managing the capitalist economy.295 Moreover, the observed failure of 
nationalization – that is, either the failure of notably social democratic parties to implement their own 
original policies, or the (purported) unsuccessful operation of a specific instance of state ownership – 
should not necessarily be perceived as a failure of statehood or as something working against the state’s 
ISI. The observed watering down of the nationalization agenda, the institutionalization of Morrisonian 
public corporations/bodies, the general shift towards budgetary Keynesianism, the incorporatization of 
the Wage Earners’ Funds agenda, etc., may easily imply the gradual marginalization of the (at least 
theoretical) ‘threat’ to the state of socialism and the advent of the ‘catch-all party’, implying the 
effective subjection of political parties to an institutionally-organizationally emergent state-crafting 
                                                          
295 More generally on the ambiguousness of nationalization/socialization from a historical socialist/social 
democratic perspective, see Przeworski (1980: 47).    
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logic, rather than necessarily the power of ‘capital’ to structurally enforce its collective visions or 
material agendas, etc. (although this may sometimes be the case, and in any case may reinforce the 
watering down process). 
  
(2) The development of the automobile industry in many ways reflects the historically changing 
dynamics of social democracy vis-à-vis the state. Both the British and Swedish experience not only 
illustrate the gradual watering down of core socialist/social democratic principles but also how this 
party political selling out process affects the dynamics of fiscal and industrial policy and the broader 
conditions of possibility for the automobile industry. More generally, as seen in the case study, social 
democratic governments have been very active in pushing the overall corporatized fiscal state-crafting 
agenda forward (continuously advocating planning, modernization, economic expansion, cost/benefit 
calculations, etc.). While originally focused on a socialist agenda, particularly after WW2 social 
democratic parties have, as argued more generally earlier, in particular tied their agenda to the ISI of the 
state, expressing the advent of catch-allism and the first overall political-institutional displacement from 
state to party politics, implying a micro-situated relative socio-psychological backgrounding of the 
corporate character of the ISI of the state and the existence of state functions. Arguably, this experience 
of a gradual ideological watering down process stemming from the early effective identification of the 
social democratic agenda with the ISI of the state made social democratic governments particularly 
suitable for engaging in the widespread hybrid co-productive tension-displacing development of the 
post-1990s. 
 
(3) Relatedly, but more generally, the automobile industry case study to some extent helps empirically 
illustrate the causal saliency of state-functional reproduction. While the activation of state-functional 
pressure is always difficult to empirically perceive (for one, as discussed in chapter 3, the actual 
mechanisms are principally directly unobservable), the examined systematic ideological pragmatism of 
party politics provided a notable symptomatic indication of this: the different parties’ general adherence 
to overall principles of legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting is indirectly revealing of the saliency of 
state-functional pressure and the unequal intermingling of state and party (implying, as argued earlier, 
the relative domination of the state-administrative leg associated with non-trivial core, e.g., legal and 
political-economic questions).  
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(4) From the state’s fiscal lens, politically-facilitated processes of externalization through privatization, 
internationalization and Europeanization – part of the governance-situated second overall political-
institutional displacement from parties to civil society, profit-maximizing corporate actors, the 
international realm, etc., implying the activation of not only a claim-reduction strategy but the whole 
strategic toolbox of state-crafting – may easily be considered overall attempts at 
maintaining/maximizing the ISI of the state, and thus reenergizing statehood (see also, e.g. Barker 
1990: 100-1).296 Importantly, given the emergent logic of the ISI of the state, this argument precisely 
makes perfect sense even though such externalizations of expenditures and tensions – which in both 
cases were more or less encouraged by parties of all ideological colors – may be class-selectively 
detrimental to citizens. Moreover, it even still makes full sense if, in the end, the externalization process 
actually turns out to be dysfunctional for state-crafting (since the results are a much more contingent 
empirical question than the logic and direction of the functional pressure).    
 
Seventhly, looking at the automobile development in both the UK and Sweden helpfully 
illustrates some of the context-specific variations on the general dynamics of the post-1970s 
reconfiguration of legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting. Two aspects should be mentioned here.  
 
(1) Different governance routes were taken; variations on the overall hybrid co-productive tension-
displacing agenda could be seen: notably, a relatively harsher and more blatant state-facilitated Lean 
production in the UK and a relatively more intricate and convoluted state-facilitated ‘reflective’ logic of 
production in Sweden. Importantly, these contextually situated dynamics of governance-situated 
automobile production not only suggest a kind of varieties of co-production but also highlight the fact 
that despite this (sometimes life-altering) variation, the process still always already entails a co-
production of profits (whether in the Marxian sense or not) and is thus, in this sense, strictly speaking 
merely an alternative tension-displacing hybridization.  
                                                          
296 As Millward (2005: 297) also argues, in a partly different context, when pointing out that the effective 
‘control’ of an industry need not imply direct state ownership: ‘financial returns (…) together with the necessary 
affirmation of sovereignty could be achieved by asserting property rights, granting concessions and levying 
taxes’.     
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(2) Underlying the above nationally-specific variation in post-1970s automobile production is not only 
a different composition of value priorities – implying, for example, a relatively higher socio-
psychological premium being put on self-commodification in the UK context – but also arguably a 
different relative distribution of either inner-normatively identifying or critical-cynical subjectivity. For 
example, the relatively more emphasized critical-cynical component in the Swedish context becomes 
expressed in the more ‘reflective’ logic of automobile consumption and production (i.e., profit-making), 
concretely observable through not only the alternative logic of work organization but also, for instance, 
the industry’s long history of safety innovations –such as, for example, Volvo’s three-point safety belt, 
the rearward child seat, the Whiplash Protection System – and the generally climate-oriented 
production orientation. Nevertheless, as also argued earlier, (1) there is indication of an overall rational-
material logic of car ownership in Sweden (indirectly implying the continued generalized existence of 
marketized/fiscalized output/performance-based value priorities) and (2) the co-productive ‘reflective’ 
pattern of automobile production still relies on a tension-displacing logic.297     
 
Eighthly, and lastly, although the analyzed automobile trajectory generally mirrors the ideal-
typical macro-structural development integral to the launched/developed ECR model, both the British 
and the Swedish experience productively highlight certain analytically interesting timing-specific 
peculiarities. With regards to the UK experience, three items may be mentioned. Firstly, the fact that 
automobile production expanded before the post-WW2 GA period not only reveals variation on the 
ideal-typical pattern but also indirectly stresses the early saliency of many of the GA-like features, how 
they were already fairly consolidated during the emergence period (or put differently: the consolidation 
before the consolidation). Secondly, the fact that the average growth rate in the GA period exceeded the 
previous and the following periods, signals that the UK pattern of an otherwise comparatively speaking 
low growth rate appears as a variation on, rather than an exception to, the general expansionary trend. 
Thirdly, while seemingly breaking with the GA pattern, the automobile slowdown in the 1960s 
                                                          
297 In both the UK (see, e.g., Gunn 2013) and Sweden (see, e.g., Bastian & Börjesson 2015: 101; Lindgren et al. 
2010: 176-77), although naturally at varying degrees, car ownership patterns (and car-consumer preferences) are 
of course highly dependent on patterns of social stratification, notably differences related to income and 
geographical location.  
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highlights the fact that, as discussed earlier, the crisis dynamics of the 1970s in many cases appeared 
earlier (even earlier than the late 1960s) and in a more gradual manner than what is sometimes 
presented. As for the Swedish post-1970s experience, it is noticeable that it not only had a crisis in the 
1970s (hitting both the general economy and the automobile industry) but were also hit by a significant 
economic crisis in the early 1990s – a kind of second 1970s pre-2008 crisis. Arguably, this to some 
extent helped shift/delay a few of the ideal-typical dynamics – for example the state-facilitated 
processes linked to both privatization/internationalization and decentralization – by a decade or so.   
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Chapter 14. Conclusion 
 
This study has examined the governance phenomenon from a state-situated and broadly speaking 
historically informed perspective, explicitly and actively causally-functionally tying it to the 
reconfigured post-1970s dynamics of legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting. Mostly importantly, the 
study has asked whether, to what extent and through what processes and mechanisms the governance 
phenomenon can be considered a distinctive post-1970s/1990s state-facilitated manner of either 
bridging, reconfiguring or overcoming the tension-filled functional relationship between legitimatory 
and fiscal state-crafting. This agenda has been executed through an overall retroductive examination of 
the three retroductive operational questions: how is governance historically possible?; what state-
situated macro-causal mechanisms are related to governance?; and, importantly, what legitimatory 
qualities must exist for governance to be possible? In this way, the study has tried to answer the main 
research question and sub-question (which were integrated above for the sake of brevity) by 
investigating the main historical, state-situated and particularly legitimatory conditions of possibility for 
the governance phenomenon. Additionally, this examination has been critically underpinned and 
preceded by an extensive and in-depth meta-retroductive account and discussion of the 
philosophical/epistemological conditions and considerations necessary for productively understanding 
and studying governance.     
 
 
14.1 Thinking back 
Basically, the whole study can be perceived as an extensive attempt at establishing a complex yet 
meaningful historical and causal-functional connection between governance and state-crafting. By 
explicitly and systematically rooting the governance phenomenon in the historical dynamics of 
legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting, it has demonstrated how it has been fundamentally state-crafted. 
Governance has been systematically positioned in both a long historical trajectory and a relative 
extensive theoretical setting centered, in the first instance, on the gradual appearance of modern 
statehood, and in particular a state-situated ISI. In this relation, a range of important historically and 
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theoretically supportive maneuvers have been made, such as for example the analytical establishment of 
the four state monopolies and their Maslowian hierarchy and relative backgrounding/foregrounding. 
Even more importantly, in the second instance, the governance phenomenon has been analyzed in direct 
relation to the launched and developed ideal-typical historical-theoretical ECR model covering the 
emergence of legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting, its post-WW2 consolidation and its post-
1970s/1990s reconfiguration and focusing on the changing status of the tension-filled relationship and 
the correlative key dynamics of tension-management. Governance has been analyzed as a specific and 
contingent post-1970s continuation of this general and patterned but historically changing dynamic.   
In this way, the study has provided a way of clearing up a kind of puzzle, which is 
problematically implicitly integral to the governance perspective, namely that of the peculiar 
simultaneity of two things: (1) the claim of a seeming dissipation of state/governmental authority and 
(2) the normally accepted observation of the societal dominance of particularly fiscally functional forms 
of governing. Through the above historical-theoretical state-crafting analysis, this question concerning 
the governance period has been ‘unpuzzled’. Rather than implying a downgrading of state authority and 
control mechanisms, the study’s analysis of the post-1970s governance dynamics has focused on the 
activation and effects of state-crafting strategies, notably market-conforming re-regulation, normative 
mobilization-control and claim-reduction. For example, in the pre-2008 crisis case of the ‘privatized 
Keynesianism’ of the 2000s, the study put analytical attention on the rolling out of functionally 
encouraged strategies to, inter alia, have economic growth and hence fiscal state-crafting be 
increasingly co-produced through household debt-taking. Focusing on state-crafting strategies in this 
manner – strategies that straddle and should be perceived as both articulations of and ways of 
bridging/altering the tension-filled functional relationship between legitimation and fiscal accumulation 
– is indicative of a general insistence on not falling in the trap of conflating these with the effective 
possible downgrading of state/governmental authority.  
Instead of pointing to a simple shift ‘from government to governance’, the study placed 
governance in the long historical context of two overall deeply state-facilitated political-institutional 
displacements – the first one involving the shift from state to (party) government and the second one the 
functionally encouraged shift from parties to civil society or profit-maximizing corporate actors. This 
distinctive analytical view not only stresses the importance of what can be described as a preceding turn 
to government – indicating that the governance perspective may generally benefit from a clearer 
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historical unpacking of government, statehood and party politics – but also puts attention on the crucial 
historical and continuing state-crafting conditions of possibility for governance (in particular, those 
conditions that are causally-functionally connected to the changing status of the tension-filled 
relationship and the correlative key dynamics of tension-management). Coupling this particular 
historical understanding with the introduced two-level view of macro-political legitimacy – 
acknowledging a basic distinction between state and party-political legitimacy – it becomes possible to 
see how governance also effectively reenergizes and further sediments state legitimacy.  
As part of establishing and arguing for a functional connection between governance and 
legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting, the analysis has continuously highlighted both direct and indirect, 
exogenously- and endogenously-driven and bottom-up and top-down driven features of state-functional 
reproduction and stressed their emergent interconnection. In this relation, the analysis of the GA period 
provides a productive way of understanding how the emergent interconnection between these features 
helps explain the governance phenomenon. Importantly, this study’s analysis of the GA period put 
attention on the important way in which governance was sociologically conditioned by the prior state-
facilitated long-term intergenerational production of value priorities indirectly set in motion or 
encouraged by the consolidation of an overall national growth-oriented and consumption-optimizing 
agenda. In this way, a to a large extent inherently endogenously-driven process was exogenously 
provoked and systematically intensified; in this way, it becomes clear that the reproduction of fiscal 
state-crafting, the self-interested operation of the state’s fiscal lens, indirectly served to provide the 
legitimatory conditions necessary for state-functional reproduction through governance – conditions 
shaped and played out through a series of micro-situated dynamics, as discussed in chapter 12.    
This also, more generally, implies a reversal of the mainstream understanding of the GA period: 
rather than reflecting the opposite of the post-1970s, or an ‘embedded’ or ‘de-commodificatory’ era, it 
should primarily be distinguished for its consolidation of a possibly irreversibly heightened popular 
socio-psychological expectation of ever-widening economic growth and consumption prospects. By 
formalizing and analytically synthesizing the mechanisms of escalation structurally built into the 
dynamics of the GA period, the study has indirectly shed light on the GA-specific conditions for the 
crisis of the 1970s. In this sense, rather than reflecting, for example, a capitalist takeover, the crisis of 
the 1970s should to a large extent be considered the built-in crisis of the GA period; and the post-1970s 
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governance-situated period more generally should to a large extent be considered the reconfigured 
intensification of mechanisms integral to the GA period.  
With regards to the main research question concerning the functional contribution of the 
governance phenomenon, it is in this sense more accurate to understand the governance turn as a broad, 
long-term and gradual process, a series of activations of macro-mechanisms that were heavily state-
facilitated, than a consciously planned state-crafting agenda set up by necessarily rational and 
foreseeing state/governmental elites. It not only makes more sense to speak of state-facilitation rather 
than direct state-production, it is also more generally analytically productive to take seriously state-
facilitated functional mechanisms of change – that is, to systematically take into account the extent to 
which, and how, the pressure to serve state functions and the ISI of the state inter alia tendentially 
pushes things forward in a corporatized manner, sets formalized processes, mechanisms, organizations 
and actors (that all have their own dynamics and rationality) in motion and over time indirectly helps 
tweak value priorities in a corporate functionalist direction. Overall, supported by the necessary social-
theoretical vindication provided in chapter 3, the study has systematically extolled the virtues, and 
demonstrated the productiveness, of corporate functionalist analysis.  
This is also very much evident in the way in which the study has not only (1) continuously made 
a case for the corporate functionalism of state-crafting – which, amongst many other things, analytically 
implies letting Bourdieu meet Weber through Coleman and Hobbes/Skinner and synthetically teaming 
them all up through a critical realist-underpinned emergentist orientation – but also (2) actively and 
systematically utilized this conception for understanding the governance phenomenon. In doing this, the 
analysis has highlighted the close interconnections between corporatization, state-crafting and 
governance; specifically, how state-crafting indirectly underpins the governance phenomenon through 
facilitating the increased societal corporatization. Firstly, as argued, governance is closely causally 
connected to corporatization; it can be perceived as a particular historically contingent symptomatic 
articulation of this process. As argued, increased corporatization, and by extension corporate 
functionalism, tendentially increases the quantitative rate and qualitative intensity of functional 
considerations and boosts the causal saliency of macro-mechanisms and thus, for good and for bad, 
extra-individuality and the general degree of societal emergentism. Importantly, many of the key trends 
– and all of the four necessary attributes – associated with the governance turn are heavily correlated 
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with the general corporatization of society. Notably, chapter 12 non-exhaustively pointed to five 
general micro-relevant implications of the governance-situated societal corporatization.  
Secondly, while in no way being identical, the corporatization process is heavily connected to 
state-crafting dynamics. State-underpinned/facilitated corporatization appears in two main ways. First 
of all, as the dominant corporate actor, the playing out and activation of the state’s own activities 
directly boosts corporatization; the sheer bigness and comprehensiveness of states allow for this spread 
and intensification of corporate functionalism. Second of all, corporate functionalism is indirectly 
activated through the regular maintenance/maximization of state-functional reproduction, which, as 
argued, functionally encourages and sets in motion an array of formalized processes, mechanisms, 
organizations and actors. Although these two routes in no way exhaust the dynamics of corporatization, 
states thus greatly help underpin and facilitate this process and thus shape the overall flow, intensity and 
direction of corporate functionalism. In other words, states help craft governance through corporate 
functionalism. This particular connection between corporatization, state-crafting and governance, 
emphasized in this study, thus provides one dominant overall way in which governance should be 
considered a heavily state-crafted phenomenon.  
Underpinning, or complimenting, the above important points – which should be considered ways 
of establishing a systematic connection between governance and the tension-filled relationship between 
legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting, and thus answering the main research question – is the study’s key 
analysis of the historically evolving dynamics of macro-political legitimation that both underpins and is 
reflective of the governance turn. Importantly, the study has argued that the post-1970s/1990s co-
productive governance phenomenon presuppose, and were allowed for by, two heavily interrelated 
legitimatory conditions of possibility: (1) a heightened micro-situated normative and practical 
alignment with the prevailing fiscal-functional dynamics and (2) a macro-situated reconfiguration of 
state legitimation, involving a relative historical shift towards a more self-legitimating mode of fiscal 
accumulation. While the analysis of the expansion of household debt-taking in the 2000s amongst other 
things shed light on not only the increasing co-production of economic growth but also legitimation, the 
analysis of the post-1990s revealed how the proliferation of hybrid co-productive tension-displacing 
formations across many domains and levels of analysis both presupposes an overall reconfigured mode 
of state-crafting and should be considered causally active tension-displacing exercises.  
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In this way, the study’s overall characterization of the governance phenomenon, which is directly 
connected to the development and launching of the historical-theoretical ECR model and the larger 
analytical framework focused on legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting, thus serves a double function: it 
not only provides a particular account of governance and its main conditions of possibility but also 
simultaneously puts forward a distinctive historically informed reinterpretation of some of the key 
claims/prophesies of the adopted and reworked LAF approach. Notably, reinterpreting O’Connor’s 
fiscal-budgetary framework in light of the fiscal sociological reconfigurations of the post-1990s period, 
it seems clear that ‘social capital expenditures’ have increasingly come to also serve the ‘legitimation 
function’ and ‘social expenses’ has become more (at least indirectly) ‘productive’. Also, against the 
arguments of the LAF approach, legitimatory state-crafting has to a relatively increasing degree been 
both (1) underpinned by an alternative principal normative assessment-logic (focused on 
output/performance) authentically underpinning the ongoing process of normative conception-
formation and (2) infused with an alternative marketized/fiscalized content. Moreover, as argued, the 
LAF approach generally suffers from not operating with a two-level view of macro-political legitimacy, 
that is, a basic distinction between state and party-political legitimation, something which this study has 
tried to incorporate into the analysis.   
As for specifically the sub-question – which was in many ways naturally built into the main 
question – the study has provided a continuous examination of this throughout the different chapters, 
coming to the motley and qualified general conclusion that the governance phenomenon has overall 
implied a reconfiguration of the tension-filled relationship between legitimation and fiscal state-
crafting, not a temporary bridging or an overcoming of it. Although there are clear tendencies pointing 
in the direction of an outright overcoming – spurred by the state-facilitated process of corporatization 
and the relative intensification of an alternative principal normative assessment-logic underpinning the 
ongoing process of normative conception-formation – this has nevertheless not been actualized. Firstly, 
the shift is not complete but rather relative; legitimatory state-crafting still implies the effective 
activation of a heterogeneous set of types/sources of legitimation. Secondly, the generalized 
displacement process of the post-1970s has implied the co-production of a particular state-situated 
tension-filled relationship, not the disappearance of tensions as such.  
Of course, a relevant general question to ask in this relation would be: if a tension-filled dynamic 
is no longer socio-psychologically experienced as a state-crafting-relevant tension can it then still 
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meaningfully be said to exist or operate? While this is, given the nature of the analysis of the trends 
provided in this study, an increasingly salient question, the study has nevertheless argued that it, first of 
all, so far largely remains an empirically hypothetic one (although, again, not one that should be 
rejected on principal grounds). Second of all, in critical realist fashion, even if not socio-
psychologically experienced the underlying tension-filled relationship is still there, and its different 
effects, however absurd and idiosyncratic they may be expressed, are still experienced. In that sense, 
the underlying mechanisms underpinning the tension-filled relationship remains intact, although the 
logic of this relationship and the observability of the mechanisms are contingently socio-
psychologically untied from the dynamics of the state’s specific institutional-organizational activities. 
In any case, the empirical potentiality of a full socio-psychological untying is critically determined by 
the dynamics of state-crafting, notably the long-term indirect state-facilitated production of value 
priorities – a process that, in other words, is conditioned on the shaping of the content, direction and 
quality of the historically contextual/institutional-organizational leg of the micro-situated 
processes/mechanisms.  
The case study analysis of the automobile industry in the UK and Sweden has not only rolled out 
the analytical framework and the ECR model in a specific empirical setting, helping to illustrate, 
specify and qualify the arguments concerning governance. By looking at the maximum-variation 
countries of the UK and Sweden it has also helped make more convincing the general analytical focus 
on the shared dynamics of Western European liberal-capitalist democratic legitimatory and fiscal state-
crafting. Correlatively, and equally importantly, the automobile industry case study has tentatively 
emphasized the existence of what may be described as national varieties of the tension-filled functional 
relationships, or national varieties of legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting – in the form of, for example, 
a more externalizing state-crafting in the UK and a more ‘reflective’ one in Sweden. Of course, this 
case study merely represents an approximation, a tentative empirical articulation of this national 
variation. More empirical examinations, looking at new cases (or the same case in a different manner) 
and other areas, with potentially new methods, etc., would allow the agenda to be taken one step 
further. Moreover, although this was partly treated above, the case study would arguably benefit from a 
closer examination and/or critical reinterpretation of some of the implications for state-crafting of the 
perceived (particularly) post-1990s shift towards a more global and thus geographically speaking 
’disintegrated’ form of automobile production – for example, in relation to issues of 
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safety/risk/disasters, national automobile employment opportunities, the fiscal attractiveness of the 
industry more generally, etc. 
The case study analysis should be considered ideally part of a potential empirically based future 
research agenda introducing new and more refined dimensions and examinations. Ideally, the overall 
analytical framework, historical-theoretical ECR model and case study analysis can be utilized/taken on 
board, in whatever form, by other scholars focusing on governance-related issues, the post-1970s 
political economic development or elements related to the historically changing relationship between 
legitimation and fiscal accumulation.  
Something similar may in all modesty be hoped for with regards to some of the key social-
theoretical and methodological maneuvers that have been made in this study. Chapter 3 and 4, which 
provided an extensive reflection on some of the scientific conditions necessary for properly 
understanding and studying governance, as well as the actual execution of the examination, can be 
considered a defense and call for a particular style of analysis inter alia focused on: taking macro-
mechanisms and functional dynamics seriously (the state being a primary entity in this relation), 
breaking with the dominant DJ distinction, genuinely overcoming disciplinary cleavages, maintaining a 
firm constitutive spotlight on important societal issues and selectively integrating critical and 
mainstream literature. Arguably, although there is nothing inherently wrong with engaging with either 
of these two, all of these maneuvers can be productively made without succumbing to a full 
constructivist or neo-positivist philosophy of social science.    
In sum, the analysis has provided a range of interconnected arguments for why governance should 
not only be considered a historically specific modality or institutional-organizational mode of modern 
state-crafting – involving a process which is both deeply, historically, continually and increasingly 
state-facilitated – but more specifically a contingent post-1970s/1990s continuation of the historically 
changing tension-filled dynamics of legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting. At a more general level, this 
analysis promotes an analytical perspective that systematically integrates state-situated corporate 
functionalism – including state dynamics, activities, interests, functional considerations, etc. – into the 
study of all relevant post-1970s social affairs, not simply governance.  
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14.2 Thinking forward 
Although this has also partly been done above, it makes sense to reflect more formally on a few 
selected implications of this analysis. A productive question may for example be how to think about the 
2008 crisis and the post-2008 crisis period more generally in light of the arguments of the study. Any 
kind of reflections on this of course remains speculative since the analysis of governance, and the ECR 
model more generally, deliberately ended with the onset of the important 2008 crisis. Clearly, this crisis 
has served to ‘repoliticize’ a range of themes – from markets, to inequality to capitalism – and it is 
highly uncertain whether this study would have turned out in the same manner without the crisis. Since 
the crisis a greater and more mainstream emphasis has been put on defending democracy in its apparent 
struggle against capitalist crisis- or inequality-triggering forces (e.g., Streeck 2011, 2014; Piketty 2014). 
Although it generally welcomes this repoliticization, this study warns against any optimism with 
regards to the popular and institutional-organizational potential for a more socially progressive 
political-economic order.  
Firstly, there are no real indications that the type of value priorities that were consolidated during 
the GA period and intensified in a reconfigured manner in the governance period – as argued in this 
study – has been genuinely dissolved after the crisis. Despite academic, institutional and popular talk 
along the lines of, for example, OECD’s Better Life Index, fashion agendas concerning themselves with 
less extravagant clothing, well-meaning consumer initiatives promoting recycling, etc., the ‘normal’ 
value priorities still dominate – an observation that is not only daily confirmed through both a high-
level ongoing hunt for growth-relevant mechanisms but also the generalized attempts at maintaining the 
routinized dynamics of consumer-citizenship. Contemporary political-institutional processes are still 
very much encircled in a means-oriented bewilderment. Also, the less irregular appearance of absurd 
events – such as elections, spectacular media stories, etc. – does not indicate a weakening of the 
immaterial strategic and symbolic aspects of both micro-situated social activity and party politics (if 
anything they are revealing of a post-crisis strengthening of this dimension).     
Secondly, the general stress on the causal saliency of state-crafting dynamics, along with the 
arguments concerning the unequal intermingling of state and party – that is, the two-legged division of 
political domination – of the post-1990s governance period, implies that statehood/government is not 
necessarily the remedy, but rather a problem-contributing factor. Typically, the post-crisis advocacy of 
state-oriented solutions not only relies on an analytical misrecognition of the endless ways in which the 
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2008 crisis was state-facilitated but also, more generally and more problematically, a failure to take the 
in many ways built-in highly socio-economically status quo-maintaining dynamics of legitimatory and 
fiscal state-crafting into account. In this light, anti-predicament formulas seem both few, ambiguous 
and in any case long-term. If the analysis can be said to indirectly produce any kind of necessarily 
speculative post-crisis guidelines, they would obviously concern looking into the core macro-structural 
functional dynamics of state-crafting – the ISI of the given state, its functions, its fiscal lens, and so on. 
Of specific relevance in this relation, would be to focus on the indirect state-facilitated production of 
value priorities through notably a GDP growth-led fiscal state-crafting. While the entrance of a new 
political party or appearance of another increasingly ‘charismatic’ personality will be largely 
structurally immaterial (primarily involving the party-strategic leg), an alteration of the consolidated 
and intensified growth-oriented and consumption-optimizing agenda might potentially serve to tweak 
value priorities in a certain socially-progressive direction and thus provide the legitimatory conditions 
necessary for a possible new political-economic setup. Of course, such a process would not only be 
gradual, long-term and hinging on endogenously-driven intergenerational mechanisms but also 
dependent on (1) a problematically actualized and not immediately forthcoming prior (necessarily) 
democratic mandate to initiate this alteration and (2) the level of state-functional corporatization, which 
might in any case effectively behaviorally neutralize any otherwise democratically-relevant tweaking of 
value priorities.    
In specific relation to democratic dynamics, the above historically informed state-crafting analysis 
of governance might also indirectly address a few aspects of relevance for how to diagnose 
contemporary Western democracy and particularly its generally accepted symptoms of ‘fatigue’. 
Firstly, and generally, the analysis redirects attention away from simply capitalism – or the 
contradictory relationship between democracy and capitalism (e.g., Streeck 2011, 2014) – and towards 
legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting. Notably, as argued, this framework principally analytically allows 
for grasping the Chinese mode of ‘illiberal’ capitalist state-crafting; it indirectly analytically suggests a 
structural homology cutting across, operating over and above, both ‘illiberal’ and liberal-capitalist 
democratic polities; it emphasizes, amongst other things, the crucial non-identity (sometimes taken for 
granted) of democratic and political legitimacy. In other words, it provides an analytical framework that 
is in principal able to provide a meaningful understanding of some of the similar trends that can be 
observed in both China and across Western European liberal-capitalist democratic polities.  
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Secondly, and relatedly, rather than stressing particularly capitalist forces, the analysis of the two-
legged division of political domination points to the importance of focusing on the intricacies of the 
historically varying intermingling of state and party. Specifically, it indirectly warns against both 
fetishizing modern democracy and simply proposing an extension of state regulation or upgrading of 
state authority as a bulwark against the seemingly ruthless unleashed dynamism of the market and 
profit-engulfed corporate actors. The relevant question to ask oneself seems to be whether the current 
form of (party political) democracy and statehood either supports or dampens whatever intended agenda 
one may be thinking of and striving for. As argued, the answer to this question greatly depends on both 
the historically specific form of state-crafting – and the prevailing logic of its legitimatory and fiscal 
considerations – the state of party democracy and of course the specific way in which the two levels 
emergently co-vary over time, that is, the relative historical intensity and specific quality of their 
intermingling.  
Arguably, although this remains a tentative consideration, the study also indirectly addresses the 
theme of neoliberalism. Implicitly, more than anything, it not only (1) promotes a perspective that does 
not identify neoliberalism with a downgrading of state/governmental authority and control mechanisms 
– but rather the opposite – but also (2) construes neoliberalism, like governance, as a specific post-
1970s continuation of the general historically changing dynamics of legitimatory and fiscal state-
crafting. In this way, neoliberalism may, perhaps counterintuitively, be said to be about: the upgrading 
of the state’s ISI, the boosting of state legitimation and the fiscal lens of the state, the activation of the 
strategic toolbox of state-crafting and the reconfiguration of the tension-filled functional relationship 
between legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting. Although this characterization requires further 
consideration, the governance and the neoliberalism concepts arguably provide two alternative 
descriptions of some of the key changes observed in the post-1970s period: whereas the former centers 
relatively more on issues related to statehood/government and steering/governing, the latter puts more 
emphasis on capitalism, markets, financial forces, etc.  
Obviously, many otherwise relevant aspects or potentially interesting questions have not been 
treated, or treated exhaustively, in this study (many of which have already been mentioned). Some of 
these may arguably be productively pursued as part of potential future studies (in whatever form). Five 
examples shall be mentioned. Firstly, one productive research agenda may consist in more 
systematically historically and analytically examining the interconnections between the four 
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monopolies/functions of modern statehood discussed in this study. For example, although the focus has 
been on two of the functions, it may be interesting to analyze the more detailed dynamics of the other 
two, their mutual relationship and historical emergence, consolidation and reconfiguration, as well as 
their connection to legitimation and fiscal accumulation. Secondly, another productive way to take the 
analysis one step further would be to provide a more extensive and empirically informed theorization of 
the micro-situated dynamics of state legitimation. In this relation, as indicated earlier, one interesting 
research agenda might involve the study of the both generic and historically specific mechanisms of 
‘selling out’ – and to examine this both empirically (through, e.g., detailed case studies or even field 
work) and historically and at different levels of analysis in a way that ideally makes one able to explain 
the selling out process with regards to simultaneously a specific individual and for example a political 
party.  
Thirdly, another interesting and potential future exercise, which could not be undertaken in this 
particular study, would be to systematically juxtapose the legitimation and accumulation functions-
inspired analysis of the governance phenomenon with some of the subsequent post-1980s works written 
by the three LAF scholars. Fifthly, an interesting task might be to more systematically link up the 
launched/developed state-crafting framework and ECR model to the more recent ‘growth models’ 
perspective of Baccaro & Pontusson (2016), which is still in its very early and mostly programmatic 
stage. Since their largely post-Keynesian (or neo-Kaleckian) perspective does not really treat the state 
level, it may be productive to more formally think through how either (1) this study’s analysis may 
contribute to their agenda by providing it with a distinctive macro-structural and corporate functionalist 
state-crafting basis or (2) how the productive focus on different ‘growth models’ – rather than the more 
typical focus on different setups concerning profit-making, capital accumulation, finance, etc. – may 
contribute to the above mentioned potential empirically-based agenda focused on further detailing 
national varieties of legitimatory and fiscal state-crafting, and in particular nationally specific modes of 
fiscal state-crafting. Sixthly, yet another productive potential future research agenda might be to both 
further theorize functional activity and specifically the operations of state functions and 
methodologically formalize philosophically meaningful concrete procedures for studying and observing 
this and collecting relevant data. 
While executing any or all of the above suggestions for future study should undoubtedly boost the 
overall research agenda focused on analyzing the historical, state-situated and particularly legitimatory 
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conditions of possibility for governance, it is nevertheless the hope that the examination already 
provided may on its own ideally take the necessary critical macro-situated study of post-1970s Western 
European liberal-capitalist democratic polities one small step further.  On a more personal and 
idiosyncratic intellectual level, it will be interesting to observe the next 30 years or so in light of the 
analysis – to, for example, see to what extent our current post-2008 crisis vicissitudes can be analyzed 
as another post-1970s period; whether there will be a ‘new’ reconfiguration trumping the (by then) ‘old’ 
reconfiguration, which can thus be characterized by its own distinctive tension-filled functional state-
crafting relationship.    
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